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Interpretation ID: aiam2205

Mr. Charles A. Smith, Director, Alaska Traffic Safety Bureau, Pouch N, Juneau 99811; Mr. Charles A. Smith
Director
Alaska Traffic Safety Bureau
Pouch N
Juneau 99811;

Dear Mr. Smith:#This in (sic) in response to a request by Mr. Willia Hall, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Regional Administrator for Region X, for a review of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 104, *Windshield Wiping and Washing Systems* with special consideration of the comments of Mr. Robertson in his memorandum of November 24, 1975.#It is the opinion of this agency that Standard No. 104 is appropriate for the State of Alaska. The essential feature of a wiping system, as far as safety is concerned, is its ability to clear a specific portion of the windshield. The number of wipers necessary to provide the driver with a sufficient field of view is immaterial so long as the minimum percentages of critical areas are washed and wiped. These areas are established in the standard and are determined by the angles from the driver's eye position over which the windshield must be kept clear to provide a proper field of view. While targets of driver attention and environmental conditions may differ from state to state, if the critical areas are clear, the field of view provided to the driver is sufficient. The 1976 Scirocco (sic) appears to provide the required field of view.#The question therefore becomes whether the Federal standard on windshield wipers is intended to cover all aspects of wiping systems. If so, the situation is analogous to that presented to the court in *Motorcycle Industry Council v. Younger*, No. CIV S74-126(E.D.Cal. 1974) which resulted in a holding that Standard No. 108 did preempt an inconsistent state regulation in the field of lighting requirements. The NHTSA has determined that the standard on windshield wiping systems, No. 104, is intended to leave the number of wipers to the discretion of the manufacturers. Under *Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham*, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), and *Chrysler v. Tofany*, 419 F2d 499, 511-12 (2d Cir, 1969), the interpretation of this question by the administering agency is 'of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' Thus, a state regulation differing from the standard would impair the Federal superintendence of the field within the meaning of the doctrine set forth in *Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul*, 373 U.S. 132, 141-142(1963) and be preempted under section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, U.S.C. 1392(d).#Yours truly, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel;