Interpretation ID: Silverman1

Howard A. Silverman, Esq.
General Motors Corporation
Legal Staff
Mail Code: 482-C24-D24
300 GM Renaissance Center
Detroit, MI 48265-3000

Dear Mr. Silverman:

This responds to your letter of January 7, 2005, asking us to reconsider our February 4, 2003 letter of interpretation to Ms. Erika Z. Jones regarding the definition of the term "Model Year" in 49 C.F.R. Part 565, Vehicle Identification Number Requirements (VIN). In our letter to Ms. Jones, we addressed whether 49 C.F.R. 565.6(d)(1) permits a manufacturer to designate vehicles as belonging to a single Model Year, where the production period for such vehicles falls within three different calendar years, but runs for less than 24 months in total. In our letter, we said the answer was no. We interpreted "Model Year," as defined in 49 C.F.R. 565.3(j), as a production period of less than two calendar years (i.e. , a time period limited by year designation rather than a maximum number of days). For the reasons that follow, we have decided to rescind our earlier letter and instead to interpret "Model Year" as a period not to exceed 24 months.

In your letter, you explained how our February 2003 interpretation of the term "Model Year" for VIN recordation purposes was contrary to actual, long-standing industry practices, and discussed the substantive impacts of the interpretation. According to your letter, it had been the industrys understanding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has granted vehicle manufacturers flexibility in determining when to start production for a given Model Year, provided that such period may not exceed 24 months, and manufacturers scheduled their production in a manner consistent with this timeframe.

As discussed in our earlier letter, the VIN requirements were originally contained in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 115, until the agency promulgated a final rule shifting such requirements to a new regulatory section at Part 565 (48 FR 22567, May 19, 1983). The exact definition of "Model Year" did change slightly in its migration from FMVSS No. 115 to Part 565, adding the word "calendar" to the requirement that the actual period of production be "less than two calendar years. "However, the final rule stated that "[t]he basic substantive requirements of Standard 115 are unchanged by this action". 48 FR 22567, 22567. It also stated, "The new Part 565 would not have any requirements not in FMVSS 115 prior to today". Id. at 22569. That is, it was not the agencys intention to change the substantive requirements of the VIN regulation or to alter existing industry practices.

When drafting the letter to Ms. Jones, we did not fully appreciate the impacts that our interpretation would have on vehicle manufacturers production processes. These impacts suggest that our February 2003 interpretation would result in substantive changes to the VIN requirements, the type of changes that, according to the 1983 notice, were not intended to result from the addition of the word "calendar" to the regulation. Substantive changes to our regulations are conducted through the rulemaking process, with an opportunity for public notice and comments.

Accordingly, we have decided to rescind our earlier interpretation of the definition of "Model Year" contained within Section 565.3(j), and instead, we will interpret that term as any 24-month period from the starting point determined by the manufacturer, thereby permitting a full two-year period for all such manufacturer designations. To do otherwise would change the substance of the VIN requirement and could result in widely disparate treatment of different vehicles in terms of VIN requirements related to Model Year designation, depending upon when the manufacturer begins production, and would unnecessarily restrict manufacturers discretion in setting their own production schedules.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

cc: Erika Z. Jones, Esq.
ref:565
d.2/15/05