Skip to main content

NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 9571 - 9580 of 16506
Interpretations Date
 

ID: nht88-1.22

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/01/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Jaguar Cars, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

C.D. Black, Engineering Manager Legislation, Compliance Product Development 600 Willow Tree Road Leonia, NJ 07605

Dear Ms. Black:

This is in reply to your letters of June 8 and October 17, 1987, with respect to an electrically-operated headlamp leveling system that Jaguar intends to offer on passenger cars beginning with the 1989 model year. Such a device is required by EEC regulat ions. You have informed us that the system does not allow lamps to be adjusted above the "zero" position, only downward to compensate for rear end loading of the vehicle. There is no provision for automatic return to the "zero" position when the engine i s turned off. Further, there will be no indication to the driver from the vehicle instrumentation that re-aim is necessary when the headlamps are adjusted downward. You have concluded, for the six reasons given in your letter of June 8 that "no aspect of FMVSS 108 . . . is contravened by this proposed installation."

The sole restriction that Standard No. 108 imposes upon an item of motor vehicle equipment not covered by the standard but which a manufacturer wishes to add to a vehicle as original equipment is that it not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equip ment that the standard requires (S4.1.3). If a manufacturer concludes that the unrequired equipment would not impair the effectiveness of the required lighting equipment, it may certify that the vehicle complies with Standard No. 108. Based on our unders tanding of your system, it does not appear to impair the effectiveness of the required equipment. However, we urge you to consider the possible consequences if the driver forgets to return the system to the "zero" position from either of the two adjustme nt positions. These possibilities are a concern because the system does not automatically return to that position, and no warning is provided to the driver that the headlamps are not in their original design position. On the other-hand, if properly used, the system could enhance headlighting effectiveness by ensuring that the headlamp provides the same lighting performance under all conditions of vehicle load.

We hope the information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

June 8, 1987

Ms. Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street SW Washington, D.C. 20590

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION FMVSS 108 DRIVER ADJUSTMENT OF PASSENGER CAR HEADLAMPS

Dear Ms. Jones:

Jaguar Cars Ltd. of Coventry, England, manufactures passenger cars for worldwide markets. For UK and European road vehicles of all types it will be required, by EEC Directive 76/756 (as amended) Paragraph 4.2.6, to fit a system for maintaining headlamp d ip beam (passing beam) vertical alignment. If this is not achieved by power operated suspension levelling, then either an automatic lamp-levelling system or a control operable from the driving seat must be provided.

Jaguar will fit an electrically operated lamp-levelling system, operable from the drivers seat, to the XJ-S model range on all cars for the United Kingdom and for Europe from Job 1 1989 model year. Jaguar would like to fit this system to cars supplied fo r the USA market.

Jaguar believes that this will not contravene or compromise any aspect of compliance with FMVSS 108 for the following reasons:

1. In a front-engine passenger car, the only adjustment required after the initial aim in the "driver only" condition is downward. (This may not be valid for rear engine cars or for heavy trucks).

2. The lamps will be compatible with the use of mechanical aimers as defined in FMVSS 108 and the sub-referenced SAE J.602. New semi-sealed light units for the USA models will conform with all applicable requirements of FMVSS 108. (Distinct conditions of light units will be used for U.S. and for Europe but they will be designed to fit commonised mountings and therefore will enable use to be made of the lamp levelling feature.)

3. The lamp mounting will be designed to meet the torque deflection test of SAE J.580.

4. A mechanical adjustment facility for manufacturing tolerances and an initial alignment will be fitted to each lamp and will be operable in the manner required by SAE J.580.

5. Subsequent to the initial alignment as defined in lighting inspection code SAE J.599, the only adjustment operable from the driving seat will be downward. Because the lamp provides both passing and driving beams this will enable the driver to adjust t he beams downward if necessitated by heavy rear seat, trunk, or trailer hitch loading. It is impossible to adjust the beams to a higher position than the datum setting by the operation of the control from the drivers seat.

Even if the driver does not use the control under the conditions outlined above, then the dazzle problem would never be worse than that created by conventionally mounted lamps. What the lamp levelling system would provide is the opportunity to eliminate dazzle that would otherwise occur.

6. Jaguar will explain in the owner literature the correct use of the control by the driver. Jaguar will also instruct dealers and servicing outlets of the need to zero the drivers control before checking or adjusting beam alignment.

For the foregoing reasons, Jaguar believe that no aspect of FMVSS 108 or the subreferenced SAE standards is contravened by this proposed installation. However, because of design and manufacturing leadtimes we request your confirmation that our interpreta tion is correct.

We believe we have explained all relevant features of the system but if further information or clarification is required, please contact me by telephone.

Sincerely,

C.D. Black CDB:as Engineering Manager Legislation, Compliance, Product Development

ID: nht88-1.23

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/01/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Bureau of Economic Analysis

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Edgar G. Meyer Bureau of Economic Analysis Florida Department of Commerce 407 Fletcher Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-2000

Dear Mr. Meyer:

This responds to your November 24, 1987 letter asking about the applicability of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, to the manufacture of automobile seat cushions and seat backs. Specifically, you asked whether it would be permissible if the fabric (i.e., felt) from which the seat cushions and seat backs would be manufactured were made from "old clothes and rags." Standard No. 302 neither specifies nor prohibits any particular type of raw material used to manufacture seat backs and seat cushions. The felt must meet the flammability requirements of the standard if it is used for cushions and seat backs for new motor vehicles. Also, felt used to manufacture seat cushions and seat backs for new and used motor vehicles must contain no safety related defects.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and NHTSA regulations require manufacturers of new motor vehicles to certify that their vehicles comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, including Standard No. 302. Standard No. 302 specifies burn resistance requirements for materials used to manufacture seat cushions and seat backs on new passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses. Thus, any person manufacturing a new vehicle with seat backs and seat cus hions made from the felt material you described must ensure that the seat backs and cushions possess the burn resistance characteristics required by Standard No. 302. If the felt can meet those requirements, it may be used in new motor vehicles in satisf action of Standard No. 302, regardless of the felt's raw materials.

The felt manufacturer should also be aware that the Vehicle Safety Act requires all vehicle and equipment manufacturers to ensure that their products contain no defects relating to motor vehicle safety. If it were determined by the manufacturer or this a gency that the seat cushions and seat backs had a safety related defect, all purchasers of the vehicle containing the defective equipment would have to be notified and the defective item repaired or replaced without charge.

If the felt material is used to manufacture items of motor vehicle equipment that are sold to vehicle owners for use in used vehicles (i.e., vehicles previously purchased in good faith for purposes other than resale), the felt need not meet Standard No. 302. In general, it would not violate Standard No. 302 to add aftermarket seat cushions to used vehicles, even if the addition of the seat cushions caused the vehicles to no longer comply with the standard.

This general rule is, however, limited by the application of the provisions of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That section specifies: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative vehi cle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." The flammability resistance of the original vehicle is an element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with Standard No. 30 2. Thus, any person in the aforementioned categories that installed a seat cushion which did not comply with the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302 would be rendering inoperative that element of design, and thereby violating a secti on 108(a)(2)(A). Section 109 of the Act specifies a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation of section 108.

Again, the manufacturer of the aftermarket seat cushions would be obligated to recall and remedy cushions that are determined to contain a safety related defect, even if the cushions were installed by the vehicle owners themselves.

You asked about other Federal laws that might have a bearing on the manufacture of the felt material. You might wish to contact the Occupational Safety and Health Administration at (202) 523-8148 and the Environmental Protection Agency at (202) 475-8040 for information about the applicability of any of their statutes and regulations.

Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Division of Economic Development

November 24, 1987

Ms. Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 5219 Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

We have a British prospect who is considering moving to Florida to manufacture felt for car seat cushions and seat backs. He will be using old clothes and rags as raw materials.

Pursuant to our telephone conversation with Ms. Deidre Hom of Your office, it is our understanding that Standard No. 302: Flammability of Interior Materials (Vol. 49, Section 571.302 Code of Federal Regulations) applies to seat cushions and seat backs.

We would appreciate if you could provide us with a legal interpretation addressing the prospect's question: Is it legal in the U.S. to manufacture felt for car seat cushions and seat backs using old clothes and rags as raw materials?

The prospect will visit Florida in early December. We would like to be ready with an answer at that time. Our telefax number is 904/487-1407. If you have any questions please call me at 904/487-2971.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely, Edgar G . Meyer Economist EGM/mw cc: Deidre Hom

ID: nht88-1.24

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/01/88

FROM: GLENN L. DUNCAN -- THORNE GRODNIK AND RANSEL

TO: ERICA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TITLE: OUR CLIENT: UNITED TOOL & STAMPING, INC. MATTER: FMVSS 207 SEATING SYSTEM

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/16/88, TO GLENN L. DUNCAN FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 207; LETTER DATED 08/30/79 TO ROBERT J. WAHLS FROM FRANK A. BERNDT; LETTER DATED 04/28/77 TO GORDON P. CRESS FROM FRANK A. BERNDT, STANDARD 210; LE TTER DATED 11/16/87 TO ERICA Z. JONES FROM GLENN L. DUNN RE FMVSS 207 SEATING SYSTEM OCC - 1278

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

Enclosed is a copy of the letter we sent to you on November 16, 1987. As of yet, we have received no response. I would appreciate at least an indication that you have received our letter and are working on developing a response, if you are not prepared to actually provide me with a response at this time.

Respectfully,

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht88-1.25

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/03/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA

TO: L. T. MITCHELL -- SPECIFICATION ENGINEER THOMAS BUILT BUSES, L. P.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 08/21/87 FROM LT MITCHELL TO ERIKA JONES RE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION ON FMVSS 222 ON SCHOOL BUSES WITH A GVWR OF 10,000 OR LESS, REF ENCLOSED LETTERS MR. JONES TYDINGS, THOMAS BUILT BUSES; NHTSA RESPONSE NOA-30; OCC-945; LETTER D ATED 05/11/78 FROM JOSEPH J LEVIN JR TO JAMES TYDINGS; LETTER DATED 03/10/78 FROM JAMES TYDINGS TO US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RE FMVSS 217 - SECTION 5.2 "PROVISION OF EMERGENCY EXITS"

TEXT: Dear Mr. Mitchell:

This is a response to your letter asking whether it is permissible to install only two seat belts on a 39-inch bench-seat in a school bus with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less (small school bus). I apologize for the delay in this response. The answer is no.

You stated that Thomas Built Buses (Thomas) would like to accommodate certain customers who wish to have two designated seating positions on each 39-inch bench-seat installed in a small school bus "for passenger comfort reasons." Your letter sets forth a suggested rationale as to why Thomas believes such a configuration would be permissible in small school buses. First, you argued that a May 11, 1978 interpretation of Standard 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, states that Federal motor vehicle saf ety regulations do not prohibit having only two-passenger seating positions on a 39-inch bench-seat in a bus designed for adult transportation. In these circumstances, we said, a manufacturer has some discretion to decide the number of designated seatin g positions in its vehicles, but must make a good faith determination of the vehicle's passenger capacity to discourage vehicle overloading.

You reason that because the term "designated seating position" is in the Definitions section of the Federal safety standards (49 CFR @571.3), the definition applies to all safety standards. You apparently conclude that our earlier interpretation of Stan dard 217 and the definition of "designated seating position" in @571.3 permit a manufacturer to make a good faith determination respecting the number of seating positions on a school bus. Based on this conclusion, you posited two situations in which thi s reasoning might be applied.

Situation 1 was described as follows in your letter:

Thomas Built Buses interprets (the May, 1978, interpretation) to be applicable for a school bus sold to carry only high school students. We consider the use of two seat belts on a 39 inch seat to be reasonable and justified due to passenger size maki ng three passengers on one 39" seat impossible. We would honor a purchaser's request to equip these 39" seats with two belts each. Is this interpretation correct?

This interpretation is incorrect for several reasons. First, the earlier interpretation did not apply to school buses; by its own terms, it is clearly limited to buses other than school buses. Second, there is not a separate set of standards that speci fy differing requirements for school buses designed to carry high school students. In determining whether school bus standards apply to a vehicle designed to carry 11 or more persons, the proper inquiry is whether the bus is sold to carry "primary, prep rimary, or secondary school students" to or from school or school-related events. Any vehicle that meets this definition of the term "school bus" must comply with all applicable school bus standards, regardless of whether it is designed to carry small c hildren to kindergarten or teenagers to high school.

Third, the definition of "designated seating position" and our interpretations of that term, are not relevant in determining whether a school bus bench-seat in a small school bus complies with the requirements of Standard 222. Paragraph S4.1 of Standard 222 sets out a specific procedure for calculating the number of seating positions in a bench seat. That paragraph explains that the number of seating positions on a bench seat in school buses is calculated by (1) measuring the width of the bench seat i n inches, (2) dividing by 15, and (3) rounding to the nearest whole number. The value which results from this calculation (expressed by the term "W") is the basis for determining whether the seat complies with the requirements of Standard 222.

For a 39-inch bench-seat, the procedure in S4.1 shows that this seat has three seating positions. Paragraph S5(b) of Standard 222 therfore requires that this bench-seat have three seat belt assemblies installed. Therefore, if your company were to insta ll only two seat belt assemblies on a 39-inch wide bench-seat in a small school bus, you could not certify that the vehicle complies with Standard 222.

For these same reasons, your interpretation set forth in your "Situation 2" is also incorrect. Even if a customer specifically asks that only two seat belt assemblies be installed on 39-inch bench seats, Standard 222 requires your company to equip these seats with three seat belt assemblies.

I hope you find this information helpful.

ID: nht88-1.26

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/05/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: The Honorable Leon E. Panetta

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta Member, U.S. House of Representatives 380 Alvarado Street Monterey, CA 93940

Dear Mr. Panetta:

This responds to your inquiry on behalf of Dr. Courtney F. Morgan, a constituent of yours. Dr. Morgan has purchased a 1987 model year Saab. The particular version of the model he saw at the dealership was equipped with manual lap/shoulder safety belts. H owever, the actual car that was delivered to Dr. Morgan was equipped with automatic safety belts. Dr. Morgan feels that the automatic belts are "hazardous and cumbersome," and asked what he must do in order to remove the automatic belts and have manual s afety belts installed in place of the automatic belts. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you.

Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 (the Safety Act: 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.), a Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection was issued in 1967 requiring the installation of manual safety belts in all new passeng er vehicles. Although these manual safety belts have shown their effectiveness as safety devices, only a relatively small number of motorists used their manual belts. As recently as 1984, only 12.5 percent of front seat occupants wore their manual belts. Because so few people used their manual safety belts, the Department issued the first requirement for automatic restraints in passenger cars in 1970, and it was scheduled to take effect in 1973. That implementation date was delayed for a variety of reas ons. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States found our decision to repeal the requirement for automatic restraints was "arbitrary and capricious," and ordered us to reconsider the decision (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. Stat e Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29). Against this background, former Secretary of Transportation Dole issued a final rule amending the Federal safety standard on occupant crash protection on July 17, 1984.

That decision, which promotes both automatic restraints and State safety belt use laws, provides a comprehensive approach designed to save as many lives as possible as quickly as possible. We believe that effectively enforced State laws requiring the pro per use of the manual safety belts reflects our belief in the value of automatic occupant protection systems, such as air bags and automatic belts, by requiring all new cars to have automatic protection starting with the 1990 model year. The automatic pr otection requirements are phased in during the preceding three model years, beginning with 10 percent of each manufacturer's 1987 model year cars. Each manufacturer must equip 25 percent of its 1988 model year cars with automatic occupant protection syst ems, and 4 percent of its 1989 model year cars with automatic occupant protection systems. However, if the Secretary determines not later than April 1, 1989, that State belt use laws have been enacted that meet certain criteria and that are applicable to two-thirds of the U.S. population, then the automatic restraint requirements will be rescinded.

The following prohibition appears in section 108 of the Safety Act: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative ... any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in c ompliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard ..." In this case, the automatic safety belts in Dr. Morgan's Saab are a "device or element of design installed in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle s afety standard." Removal of the automatic belts would render them inoperative. Therefore, Federal law prohibits Saab, any other manufacturer, and any distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from removing the automatic safety belts from Dr. Morgan's car.

Please note that this Federal prohibition does not prevent Dr. Morgan himself from removing the automatic belts from his car. However, we encourage vehicle owners not to tamper with the occupant crash protection systems installed in their vehicles. If Dr . Morgan were to remove the automatic belts himself and improperly install manual safety belts, he would be putting himself and other vehicle occupants at substantially greater risk of injury in a crash.

Please thank Dr. Morgan for informing us of his views on this subject. We welcome the interest of all concerned citizens on this important subject and I appreciate this opportunity advise you of our efforts to improve occupant crash protection for all Am ericans.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

December 18,1987

To: Ms. Nancy F. Miller, Director Office of Congressional Affairs U.S. Department of Transportation 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 10406 Washington, D.C. 20590

ENCLOSURES FROM:

Courtney F. Morgan, Ph.D.

RE: Dr. Morgan has contracted my office regarding his wish to have passive restraining system presently installed in his car replaced with a 3-point seatbelt system.

Would you please review the attached and reply to the concerns/questions which this constituent has brought to my attention? This matter has also been referred to the California Department of Motor Vehicles.

Thank you for your assistance.

I would appreciate your attention to the attached correspondence. Please direct your reply to the address to the address below.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

LEON E. PANETTA Member of Congress

PLEASE RESPOND TO ME AT: 380 Alvarado Street Montrey, California 93940 (408) 649-3555

Attention: Ken Christopher; (408) 429-1976

DATE: Dec. 8, 1987

STAFF MEMBER: KWC

CONSTITUENT'S NAME: Courtney F. Morgan, Ph.D.

ADDRESS: 351-D Western Dr. Santa Cruz, CA 95060

PHONE: 408 / 429-4382 area code

INFORMATION REQUESTED: (be specific)

Dr. Morgan purchased a new car, and would like information on how he can get the passive seatbelt restraints replaced with the 3-point seatbelt system that was formerly used in pre-1988 cars.

Dr. Morgan states that he bought a 1987 1/2 Saab 900-S coupe. When he viewed the car, it had the 3-point seatbelt system. Dr. Morgan ordered the car, and by the time his car arrived, the new models with passive seatbelt restraints were being manufactured . Dr. Morgan has learned

that these new type of restraints are being ordered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a branch of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Dr. Morgan feels that these passive restraints are hazardous and cumbersome. He wrote to the President of Saab, and was told that the company was only complying with a Federal order.

Therefore, Dr. Morgan would like to know what he must do in order to legally remove the passive restraints and have the 3-point seatbelt system he prefers installed.

ID: nht88-1.27

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/05/88

FROM: ROBERT DAUGHERTY -- QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER SAFETY REHAB SUNRISE MEDICAL

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- N H T S A

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 09/06/88 TO ROBERT DAUGHERTY FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 213; LETTER DATED 10/16/86 TO TERRY WOODMAN FROM ERIKA Z. JONES; LETTER DATED 07/31/87 TO RICHARD J. MAHER FROM ERIKA Z JONES;

TEXT: Dear Mrs. Jones:

Safety Rehab Systems, Inc. (SRS) manufactures wheelchairs for severely handicapped children. Our equipment is not only a means of transportation for these children, but also a positioning system.

Therapeutist throughout the country are starting to position these children as soon as possible, therefore a lot of kids are being transported to and from institutions for therapy by private car and school buses. I have included some literature for a better understanding of our product lines.

Safety Rehab believes that FMVS213 does not apply to durable medical products, (wheelchairs, positioning systems). Is this correct?

Safety Rehab's interest is to build safe equipment for transporting so all our equipment is crash tested at the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and meets the head and knee excursion limits of 213.

Are there any transportation standards for handicapped children? Are there any standards for tie-down systems for school buses concerning handicapped children? Some schools equip buses with forward facing tie-downs and some tie-downs are side facing .

I would appreciate any information dealing with transporting the handicapped that you can provide.

Sincerely

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht88-1.28

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: FEBRUARY 8, 1988

FROM: ANDREW P. KALLMAN -- TU-GROOVES

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL; NHTSA; SUSAN SCHRUTH

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 10-28-88, TO ANDREW P. KALLMAN -- TU-GROOVES, FROM ERIKA JONES -- NHTSA, REDBOOK A32, STANDARDS 205 AND 212; ALSO ATTACHED -- LETTER DATED 1-14-85, TO OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL -- NHTSA, FROM ANDREW P. KALLMAN -- DIRECTOR , KALLMAN MARKETING; ; PATZIG TESTING LABORATORIES CO. INC., REPORT ON 1/4 INCH CLEAR, LAMINATED, SAFETY GLASS, AS 1 WITH SAFETY GROOVES FOR USE ANYWHERE IN MOTOR VEHICLES, DATED 10-30-85, LAB. NO. 219766

TEXT: On January 14, 1985 a letter was sent to the Chief Counsel's office regarding our windshield safety groove process. Included with that letter were reports from the Technical Research Centre of Finland on the grooves.

On March 1, 1985 we received a reply from your office that stated in general that the Finnish results did not address FMVSS 205 and that your office felt that testing needed to be completed to demonstrate the grooves' compliance with FMVSS 205.

On October 30, 1985 the Patzig Testing Laboratories, 3922 Delaware Ave., Des Moines, Iowa, 50313 (Lab No. 219766), issued a report on our grooving process stating that the grooves fully comply with ANSI Z26.1-1977 (Supp. Z26.1a-1980) and FMVSS No. 205 an d Canadian MVSS 205.

Since November of 1985 we have been marketing the grooves under the trademark of Tu-Grooves and have grooved over 14,000 vehicles since that time.

Currently we are having problems with States which require inspections on motor vehicles. Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have all given written approval to use Tu-Grooves within their states. New York has given us a verbal o.k. and we are waiting for the letter confirming that. However, Maryland and New Jersey are bringing up issues for approval which have absolutely no bearing on whether or not the grooves comply with FMVSS 205.

The MVMA sent a response to N.J. which raised a question as to whether or not we might be in violation of FMVSS 212. N.J. has temporarily rejected our request for approval to cut grooves in N.J. based upon this question from the MVMA on FMVSS 212.

Our process is an aftermarket process only. The grooves can only be installed on an existing windshield. We do not remove or install a windshield at any time during our process. I am quite sure that if FMVSS 212 was applicable to our process that your office would have notified us of this in its letter of March 1, 1985 and also requested that we conduct "crash tests" to show compliance with FMVSS 212.

We recognize that the USDOT does not approve any process, however we have performed the necessary tests for FMVSS 205 as suggested in your letter to us of March 1, 1985. As a matter of fact, the samples that we submitted for testing exceeded the normal depth of the grooves and the grooves went right off the ends of the samples. Under normal conditions the grooves are only .3 mm (3/10ths) deep and are usually just an inch or two longer than the blades with the ends tapered to the surface of the windshi eld.

We would appreciate a response from you as to whether the steps we have taken are sufficient to show compliance with FMVSS 205. Also, we would appreciate a response regarding the MVMA's question as to FMVSS 212. It is our understanding that we do not n eed to show compliance with this section.

Would it be possible for us to indicate somehow on the windshields in which we place safety grooves that we have shown compliance with FMVSS 205 of the USDOT, (ie on a clear sticker)?

Since we have a temporary rejection from the State of New Jersey which impedes our licensee's ability(s) to conduct business there, we would like to thank you in advance for your help and consideration in this matter.

ID: nht88-1.29

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/09/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Karen Hastie Williams -- Crowell & Moring

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Ms. Karen Hastie Williams Crowell & Moring 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20004-2505

This is in reply to your letter of December 1, 1987, on behalf of your client, LTV Aerospace, and its predecessor, AM General. You have asked that we reconsider our letter of January 12, 1987, in which we informed AM General that we would consider certai n military vehicles "motor vehicles" for purposes of notification and remedy in the event they are discovered to have safety related defects. You have also asked for the opportunity to meet with us at our earliest convenience.

Because AM General had stated that the vehicles in question are designed to be used 60% of the time on primary and secondary roads, our letter concluded that tactical military vehicles such as the M998 Series 1 1/4 ton truck, the 2 1/2 ton M44 Series, an d the 5-ton M809 and M939 Series trucks are "motor vehicles". You believe that this interpretation was based upon "inadequate and misleading information", for the following reasons, paraphrased as follows:

1. The trucks are designed to military specifications and built for the military alone.

2. The government rejects a warranty concept and substitutes its own inspection and quality control standards.

3. Under the inspection clause, AM General must deliver trucks that meet contractual performance requirements and correct problem areas identified by the government.

4. AM General must comply with a performance safety standard (MIL-STD-1180B) comparable to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

5. No safety purpose is served by "superimposing" a notification and remedy requirement where there is only a single purchaser, where no warranty relationship exists, and where remedies for defective products are identified by the government and remedy i mplemented by the company under the terms of the contract.

6. The vehicles are defined in part as "seldom capable of maintaining normal highway speeds" and "usually operated in convoy on public highways".

In consideration of the foregoing you have asked for an interpretation that concludes that military tactical vehicles are specifically designed to meet military specifications and are not manufactured primarily for highway use, that they are not subject to the notice and remedy provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Act"), and that they are exempt from compliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

We have reconsidered our interpretation in light of the arguments you have presented. For both legal and policy reasons we affirm that the trucks in question are "motor vehicles" as defined by 15 U.S.C. 139113), that vehicles produced to military specifi cations are exempt from the Federal motor vehicle safety standards (49 CFR 571.7(c)), but that they are subject to statutory notification and remedy provisions in the event that they incorporate a safety related defect.

Specifically, the sole legal criterion that the Act establishes to determine its jurisdiction is whether a vehicle is manufactured primarily for use on the public roads. From the information presented to us by AM General we concluded that the trucks in q uestion spend 60% of their operational life on primary and secondary roads, and that therefore they have been manufactured primarily for use on such public roads. You have not contested that assertion. It is immaterial to the Act's definition of "motor v ehicle" that a truck is produced under military specifications, without an express warranty, and for only a single purchaser.

Although Congress expressed no intent that military vehicles be excluded from the coverage of the Act, the agency determined for reasons of policy that vehicles manufactured pursuant to military specifications should be exempted from conformance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards issued under the authority of the Act. Comments received at the end of 1966 in response to the proposals for the initial standards raised the possibility that compliance in some instances could affect the capabilit y of equipment to fulfill its military mission, and therefore when the standards were adopted military vehicles were exempted under 49 CFR 571.7(c), but the agency relinquished no other jurisdiction over them. Indeed, the Department of Defense in apparen t recognition that its vehicles are "motor vehicles" has attempted to ensure that they conform with the Federal safety standards to the extent practicable, as evidenced by MIL-STD-1180B which you enclosed.

Finally, we cannot agree with your contention that no additional benefit would flow to the government by requiring notification and remedy for safety related defects in these vehicles. We understand that AM General is required to deliver vehicles free of defects and which meet contractual specifications, but we are uncertain whether, under the inspection clause, the government has a right to demand remedy once it has accepted delivery of the vehicle in the event that safety related defects manifest them selves in service. Such a right exists independently under the notification and remedy provisions of the Act (i.e. the Department of Defense may petition this agency for a determination that a safety related defect exists). Further, the manufacturer itse lf has a good faith obligation imposed by the Act to determine the existence of a safety related defect when the facts so indicate, and to effectuate notification and remedy. Such an obligation appears absent from the contractual responsibilities of a ma nufacturer in the materials you have quoted to us and the arguments you have made.

Because your letter contains information sufficient for us to affirm our earlier letter, we have concluded that a meeting will not be required to clarify any of the points you have made.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

December 1, 1987

Erika Z. Jones, Esq. Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Room 5219 400 - 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 0590

Dear Ms. Jones:

On behalf of AM General and its successor, LTV Aerospace, this letter seeks further clarification of your January 12, 1987, communication to Donald Weiher, of AM General's Product Assurance Division. The January letter discussed the applicability of the notification and remedy provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, S113, 80 Stat. 718 (amended 1974)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS1411-1420 (1976)) with respect to safety-related defects discovered in tactical, military vehicles.

AM General currently manufactures only military tactical vehicles for use by one customer, the Federal Government.1/ As we understand your decision, you base your conclusion as to the applicability of the Safety Act to military tactical vehicles on two g rounds.

1/ In June, 1987, AM General was terminated as a member of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association ("MVMA") because ceased to meet the membership criteria. AM General failed to report the sale of any qualifying vehicles in its current fiscal year. T he MVMA Bylaws identify members as "corporations actually engaged in the manufacture and sale of motor vehicles in the United States" and define motor vehicles as "passenger cars, commercial cars, trucks, buses and similar self-propelled vehicles suitabl e for use on public highways, but not . . . combat or tactical vehicles sold for military purposes."

First, the generalization in Mr. Weiher's September 8, 1986 petition that states without documentation: ". . . all tactical vehicles are designed for cross-country (40%), secondary (30%) and primary (30%) roads . . ." Second, the Federal Highway Adminis trator's interpretation of the Safety Act definition of a motor vehicle in 34 Fed. Reg. 15416 (1969) that states: "that in the absence of clear evidence that as a practical matter a vehicle is not being, or will not be, used on the public streets, roads or highwa ys the operating capability of a vehicle is the most relevant factor in determining whether or not that vehicle is a motor vehicle under the Act."

We respectfully submit that the January interpretation of the regulation was based on inadequate and misleading information. We ask further that you reconsider that interpretation in light of the additional data and information presented herein:

1. The M998 Series, a 1 1/4-ton truck, and other tactical military trucks such as the 2 1/2-ton M44 Series and the 5-ton M809 and M939 Series are designed to military specifications and built for the military customer alone.

2. The Government rejects the warranty concept in its contractual arrangement and instead substitutes its own inspection and quality control standards (MIL-STD-1180). Attachment A.

3. Under the inspection clause, AM General must deliver trucks that meet the contractual performance requirements and correct problem areas identified by the Government.

4. Under the Government contract, AM General must comply with a performance safety standard (MIL-STD-1180) comparable to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

5. No federal regulatory or safety purpose is served by superimposing a notification and remedy requirement under Section 113 of the Safety Act (amended 1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 551411-1420), on these tactical military vehicles that must satis fy the federal specification.

. The Government is the only customer for these military tactical vehicles.

. No warranty relationship exists between the Government and seller.

. Remedy for performance failures or defective products are identified by the Government and implemented by the company under the terms of the contract.

. No additional benefit would flow to the Government.

. Expense of notification to the individual Government users would be significant and a waste of resources since any problems will be corrected under the contract.

While a theoretical generalization about operating capability may serve as an adequate generic description of tactical vehicles, the AM General military tactical vehicles are bought exclusively by the Government primarily for off-road, cross-country use. This fact is supported by the description of the vehicle contained in the contractual document, System Specification 3.1. (See Attachment B). The performance standards required by the contract also attest to the actual type of roads on which this milita ry tactical vehicle is used. Specifically, Section 3.1.2 of MIL-STD-1180B (the current version of MIL-STD-1180) states:

"High mobility tactical wheeled vehicles are expressly designed and built to Government specifications for the purpose of handling cargo while negotiating very rough terrain.... They are capable of operating in deep mud or snow, are often articulated, an d are seldom capable of maintaining normal highway speeds. They are usually operated in convoy on public highways. (emphasis added)

The reality of these circumstances overrides any theoretical operating capability characterization. Accordingly, the actual usage experience of these vehicles confirms that they are not designed, manufactured or intended for use primarily on public roads .

Based on the information and data presented herein, LTV Aerospace respectfully requests that you reconsider your January 12, 1987 guidance and reinstate the decisions of National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act non-applicability of February 19, 1986 and March 5, 1986 from the Office of Defects Investigation. Namely, with respect to the appropriate treatment of tactical military vehicles, we request that upon further consideration you issue a concurrence with the earlier decisions by the Office of D efects Investigation. We believe that the determination should conclude that:

o Military tactical vehicles are specifically designed to meet military specifications and are not manufactured primarily for highway use.

o These vehicles are not subject to the notice and recall provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 551411-1420 and are exempt from compliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. 5571.7(c) (1986).

Should you need any additional information, please contact me at the above number.

We would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you at your earliest convenience and await your affirmative action in support of this request.

Sincerely,

Karen Hastie Williams Counsel for AM General/LTV Aerospace

cc: Mr. Taylor Vinson, Office of the Chief Counsel

ID: nht88-1.3

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/01/88 EST

FROM: N. BOWYER -- LAND ROVER UK LIMITED

TO: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 10/14/88 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES TO N. BOWYER; REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 208, 209 LETTER DATED 04/19/88 FROM D. BRUCE HENDERSON TO OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, NHTSA; OCC 1908

TEXT: Dear Sir,

I am writing on behalf of Land Rover UK Limited to request, from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 and No. 209. Land Rover UK Limited is a British company which markets its Range Rover model in the United States of America via its subsidiary, Range Rover of North America Inc.

On November 23, 1987, the NHTSA published a final rule amending FMVSS 208 - occupant crash protection. This final rule introduced dynamic test requirements for manual seat belts in both light trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles. Part of this fina l rule introduced a new labelling requirement into FMVSS 209 - seat belt assemblies, and it is this requirement which we would like your interpretation on.

Paragraph S4.6.3. of FMVSS 208 is amended to read "a type of 2 seat belt assembly subject to the requirements of S4.6.1 or S4.6.2. (i.e. the dynamic test requirements) of this standard does not have to meet the requirements of S4.2(a) - (c) and S4.4. of Standard No. 209 (49CFR 571.209) of this part".

2

Paragraph S4.6(b) of FMVSS 209 is amended to read "a seat belt assembly that meets the requirements of S4.6. of the Standard No. 208 (49CFR 571.208) shall be permanently and legibly marked or labelled with the following statement: This dynamically tested seat belt assembly is for use only in (insert specific seating position(s), e.g. "front right") in (insert specific vehicle make(s) and model(s))".

These requirements appear to state that a manufacturer, at his option, can choose to fit seat belts which do not comply with some of the technical requirements of FMVSS 209, provided that they meet the dynamic test requirements of FMVSS 208. However, th ese amendments also imply that all seat belts which meet the dynamic test requirements must be labelled, in line with the amended FMVSS 209 requirements, regardless of whether or not they comply with all of the technical requirements of FMVSS 209.

Obviously, the NHTSA intended to ensure that seat belts which do not meet all the technical requirements of FMVSS 209, as allowed for in FMVSS 208, should be labelled, thereby ensuring that they are not installed into inappropriate vehicles. However, ou r reading is that the NHTSA did not intend the labelling requirements of FMVSS 209 to be applied to seat belts which comply with both the dynamic test requirements of FMVSS 208 and all of the technical requirements of FMVSS 209. After all, seat belts wh ich only comply with FMVSS 209 are not required to be labelled, so there is no reason to require seat belts which additionally meet the dynamic test requirements of FMVSS 208 need to be labelled. Is this not the correct interpretation of these requireme nts?

3

In considering this question, we would like to refer you to an NPRM which was issued by the NHTSA on December 29, 1987. This NPRM covers modifications to the headlamp requirements of FMVSS 108 and introduces a similar situation. The NPRM proposes simpl ifications to the headlamp requirements and also introduces a requirement that manufacturers supply information (i.e. part numbers) concerning the headlamps to the first purchaser. However, this NPRM proposes that the information is only supplied with v ehicles whose headlamps take advantage of the simplified requirements.

This example clearly indicates the intention to only require information on parts taking advantage of the relaxed requirements. Therefore, the labelling requirement of FMVSS 209 must be interpreted as follows:- 1) Dynamically tested seat belts which do not meet certain FMVSS 209 technical requirements, as allowed for in FMVSS 208, must be labelled in accordance with FMVSS 209 paragraph S4.6(b). 2) Dynamically tested seat belts which also comply with all of the technical requirements of FMVSS 209 need not meet the labelling requirements of FMVSS 209 paragraph S4.6(b).

If your interpretation is contrary to our understanding of the requirements, will you please treat this letter as a petition for rulemaking.

ID: nht88-1.30

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/10/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Ms. Laura C. Boniske

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Ms. Laura C. Boniske 2928 Coconut Grove Drive Coral Gables, FL 33134

This responds to your letter asking for an interpretation of the

requirements of Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, as they apply to "materials used in the manufacture of an aftermarket product which will be utilized in the occupant compartment of a vehicle." In an October 27, 1987 telephone convers ation with Ms. Hom of my staff, you mentioned in particular an item of equipment consisting of a pad for cushioning safety belts. Generally speaking, items of motor vehicle equipment are not covered by Standard No. 302.

Standard No. 302 is a vehicle standard and as such applies to completed vehicles. No vehicle can be manufactured unless the materials used in it comply with the requirements of the standard. The general rule is that aftermarket products may be added to v ehicles, even if the addition of those products causes the vehicle to no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 302, without violating the requirements of Federal law.

This general rule is, however, limited by the application of the provisions of Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (copy enclosed). That section specifies: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repa ir business shall knowingly render inoperative . . . any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ."NHTSA would consider t he installation of safety belt pads that do not meet the requirements of Standard No. 302 as "rendering inoperative" an element of design (flammability resistance) installed in accordance with an applicable Federal safety standard. Thus, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business that installed a safety belt pad which did not comply with the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302 would be rendering inoperative that element of design, and thereby violating sec tion 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. We note also that, since safety belts are safety devices installed in accordance with Safety Standards No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, those commercial businesses would be prohib ited from installing the safety belt pad if its installation would impair the effective operation of the belts. Section 109 of the Act specifies a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation of S108.

The prohibitions of S108(a)(2)(A) do not apply to the vehicle owner rendering inoperative some element of design in his or her vehicle. Therefore, aftermarket safety belt pads may be sold to a vehicle owner for installation in his or her vehicle regardle ss of whether the pad complies with the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302.

There are two factors which ought to be considered by the manufacturers of safety belt pads which do not satisfy the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302. First is the possibilities of liability under State and common law if those pad s were to catch fire in a situation where a pad complying with Standard No. 302 would not have caught fire, or if those pads burn much more rapidly than pads that comply with Standard No. 302. Second is the possibility of a finding of a safety-related de fect in your products. Sections 151-154 of the Safety Act require that, when an item or motor vehicle equipment contains a safety-related defect, the manufacturer of the item must recall and repair or replace the defective equipment without charge to the purchaser. In any event, we urge you to ensure that your products would not negatively affect the safety provided by the underlying belt assembly.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosure

LAURA CROVO BONISKE 2928 Coconut Grove Drive Coral Gables, Florida 33134

July 13, 1987

Erika Z. Jones, Esq. Chief Counsel, NHTSA 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Room 5219 Washington D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

Mr. Robert Williams suggested that I contact you regarding a legal interpretation as to Standard 302. Specifically, I need to know whether or not materials used in the manufacture of an aftermarket product which will be utilized in the occupant compartme nt of a vehicle are required by law to be fire retardant. The product will be detachable from the vehicle and when in use, a portion of the product will touch the body of the passenger or operator of the vehicle.

The favor of an early reply will be most appreciated.

Yours very truly,

Laura Crovo Boniske

LCB:jb

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.