Interpretation ID: 21713.ztv
Keith G. Dameron, Captain
Motor Carrier Safety Section
Colorado State Patrol
700 Kipling Street, Suite 1000
Denver, CO 80215-5865
Dear Captain Dameron:
This responds to your letter dated May 17, 2000, in which you request an interpretation whether Samsung and Daewoo "fixed-load/off-road" trucks are classified as "motor vehicles." This letter confirms that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not consider the trucks you describe, commonly called mobile construction cranes, to be "motor vehicles."
As you may be aware, a motor vehicle under our principal vehicle safety statute is defined as a vehicle that has been "manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways." (49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6)). Further, if a vehicle is a "motor vehicle," it must comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards in order to be imported into the United States (49 U.S.C. 30112(a)). The question is whether the Samsung and Daewoo trucks are "motor vehicles."
This issue was the subject of Koehring Co. v. Adams, 452 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wisc. 1978). The plaintiffs were seven manufacturers who sought a declaratory judgment that the mobile cranes, mobile excavators, and mobile drill wells which they manufactured were not "motor vehicles" subject to 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (recodified as 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 in 1994). The manufacturers had admitted that their vehicles used the public roads, and the parties stipulated that the typical item of the construction equipment at issue traveled an estimated average of 2,100 to 2,200 miles per year under its own power on the public roads, and spent a majority of its operation time off the public roads.
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and declared "that mobile construction equipment which is designed to perform work on a construction site and which normally uses the public streets, roads or ways only for travel between job sites, is not a vehicle which has been manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads and highways" (op. cit. at 638). Although conceding that the equipment possessed design features required for on-road travel such as rubber tires, the capability of traveling at highway speeds and conforming to government regulations for vehicle width, the court stated that the record before it was clear that operation on the public roads was "decidedly" an incidental activity and that "the greater percentage of these vehicles' operation is on off-highway construction sites rather than on public roads." On a limited interpretation of the term "primarily" in the definition of " motor vehicle," the court held that the mobile cranes, excavators and drill wells at issue were not "motor vehicles." The 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Although we did not agree with the courts, we have not undertaken to reconsider Koehring in our interpretations involving construction equipment.
We continue to be concerned with the Koehing decision, particularly because we have received information indicating that mobile construction cranes manufactured by Samsung and others are using the public roads far more frequently than they appear to have done at the time of the Koehring decision. We are not bound by Koehring because it was not based on an analysis consistent with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Committee, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). However, the importers of the Samsung and Daewoo mobile construction cranes may have imported their vehicles pursuant to Koehring's classification of mobile cranes as "mobile construction equipment," in accordance with that court decision. Since our interpretations are in accord with that decision and we have not undertaken to distinguish it, we do not view the importation and use of the Samsung and Daewoo vehicles you describe as a violation of 49 U.S.C. 30112(a).
Sincerely,
John Womack
Acting Chief Counsel
ref:571
d.3/21/01