Interpretation ID: nht71-5.34

DATE: 12/29/71

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; L. R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of March 3, 1971, concerning the preemption of State vehicle safety standards under section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1592(d). We apologize for the oversight that resulted in not answering the letter until this date.

You asked whether State laws requiring that vehicles having two red tail lamps, mounted on the same level and as widely spaced laterally as practicable, are preempted by Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. In our opinion the answer is no. Standard 108 has many detailed requirements that go beyond those described. Among them, however, are requirements that are substantively identical to your example, though not stated in precisely the same words. We do not interpret section 103(d), which prohibits a State standard "which is not identical to the Federal standard," as requiring the State requirement to be a verbatin copy of its Federal counterparts substantive identity of requirements is sufficient. Also, we do not interpret the statute as requiring the State to adopt all the Federal requirements on a given aspect of performance. It is sufficient that there be a Federal requirement that is substantively identical to the State requirement in question.

You also asked about two other requirements, as to which the answer may depend on a more detailed examination of their purposes and the circumstances under which they are enacted. One was the requirement that the light from the tail lamps be visible from a distance of 1,000 feet to the rear; the other was that a vehicle have "at least one tail lamp."

The guiding principle that we would apply to this situation is that State requirements that regulate the design of motor vehicles must be identical to the Federal standards, with the qualifications stated above. It was clearly the intent of Congress to provide for uniformity of regulation of the manufacturers in areas where the Federal agency has acted, and they did so by the identity requirement of section 103(d). By contrast, State requirements concerning the condition or adjustment of vehicles generally do not affect the requirements placed on manufacturers, and therefore do not fall within the section 103(d) identity provisions.

Applying this principle to your question, if the visibility requirement is construed by the State, and reasonably appears, to be basically a quantitatively stated requirement that the tail lamps be in good working order and not nearly degraded by conditions encountered in use, we would consider the requirement not to be preempted by section 103(d). Similarly, if the one tail lamp requirement is essentially a statement of required minimum working condition (as it appears to be on its face), it would not be preempted.

The issue you mentioned concerning the preemption of State laws applicable to vehicles in use was dealt with in detail in(Illegible Word). Tens' letter to you of December 21, 1970. As stated in that letter, our position is that the preemption question does not turn on whether the State law applies to pre-sale or on-the-road vehicles, and we feel that this position was upheld by the clear and compelling implication of the Super Lite cases. In light of the interpretations set forth in this letter, however, we do not believe that the problems of State law and enforcement that you felt may arise will be realized.