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Interpretation ID: nht76-5.76

DATE: 01/01/76 EST

FROM: Frank A. Berndt -- Acting Chief Counsel

TO: W.G. Milby -- Staff Engineer, Blue Bird Body Company

COPYEE: Truck Body and Equipment Association

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-18-77 from Frank Berndt to W.G. Milby; Also attached to letter dated 8-16-90 from Thomas D. Turner to Paul J. Rice (OCC 5110); Also attached to letter dated 1-14-91 from Paul J. Rice to Thomas D. Turner (A37; Std. 221)

TEXT:

This responds to Blue Bird Body Company's July 20, 1976, question whether the NHTSA's redefinition of "school bus" (illegible), December 31, illegible) includes buses designed for intercity transportation utilized in charter operation to transport school children to and from school or related events, and what constitutes "interstate commerce" as that term term is used in the redefinition. A second July 20, 1976, letter from Blue Bird Body requests reconsideration of two NHTSA interpretations of Standard No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength, that were issued in an April 26, 1976, letter.

The definition of school bus (affective April 1, 1977) states:

"School bus" means a bus that is sold, or introduced in interstate commerce, for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, but does not include a bus designed and sold for operation as common carrier in urban transportation.

The definition is not intended to include intercity type buses on regular common-carrier routes, although they may be used in some circumstances to transport school students to and from school or related events. This bus type has never been considered a school bus under existing motor vehicle safe standards on Pupil Transportation Standard No. 17 (43 CFR 1204). In light of the major standardizing activity undertaken by Congress for school buses under the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1970 (the Act) (15 U.S.C. S 1392(i), it is unlikely that such a broad change of regulatory direction would be contemplated by Congress without explicit discussion in the legislative history. The boundaries of coverage of the redefinition are explicitly left by the statute to agency determination, and the agency did not include the intercity buses you describe in the redefinition.

The meaning "interstate commerce" in the redefinition is the same as for that term in S (illegible)(1)(A) of the Act, which states that no person shall "manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import non-complying vehicles. While the legislative history of the Act does not directly address the meaning of the term, the House of Representatives Committee report stated: . . . the purpose of this section is to prohibit the manufacture, sale, or importation into this country of vehicles . . . that fail to meet the Federal safety standards . . . (H.R. Rep. No. 1776,

(illegible) Cong., 2d Secs 22 (1966))

The agency adopts the existing construction of the term set forth in Ratzenback v McClurg, 379 U.S. (illegible) (1974). To answer your specific question, however, it should be clarified that only the classification of the bus as a school bus is determined by the (illegible) of "interstate commerce" in those infrequent cases were a sale does not occur. Blue Bird Body's responsibilities to conform to the standards arise directly from its manufacturing activities under (illegible)(1)(A). For example, a bus built in Georgia must conform to the school bus standards if it is sold to a Georgia school for use in transportation of school students, even it never leaves the state.

Your second July (illegible) letter requests reconsideration of the NHTSA's April 26, 1976, decision that the area of contact between headlining panels and the "header" over the windows qualifies as a body joint subject to the requirements of the standard. You assert that the area of contact is not such a joint because it is covered by a molding and therefore does not "enclose occupant space" and cannot be considered a "surface component".

"Body panel joint" is defined in the standard to mean, with several exceptions, the area of contact or close proximity between the edges of a body panel and another body component. Whether or not the joint itself it covered is not relevant to its status. The separate definition of "body panel" does refer to the surface of the exterior or interior of the bus and to use of the panel in enclosing the bus occupant space. Thus, it is the body panel and not the joint which must form part of the exterior or interior surface of the bus. In the case you describe, the headlining panel does enclose the bus occupant space and constitutes a part of the interior surface of the bus. Thus it does form a "body panel joint" at the point of contact with the header (a separate body component).

You also suggest that the requirements do not apply to a joint where the edges of the body panel join a body component at a point other than at the edge of the body component. Your interpretation is incorrect. In the case you describe, the floor panel's edges form a right angle that is attached to a central portion of the tag panel at some distance from its edges. The definition of "body panel joint" refers to contact between the edges of the body panel and another body component, without regard to the proximity of the edges of the body component.

You also request confirmation that a statement on rubrails in our April (illegible) letter is fulfilled by ensuring that, in testing a complex joint to which rubrails are fastened, the rubrails are modified so that they are not held by the gripping fixture of the tensile strength test machine. Your interpretation is correct.

In a related matter, the NHTSA would like to advise you of failure in our April 26, 1976, letter to respond fully to Blue Bird Body Company's February 13, 1976, letter. You asked if the cove molding that is attached at the border of the bus body floor against the sidewall of the bus body would qualify as a surface component whose edges form a joint

subject to the standard's requirements. From your description of the cove molding and its use at the edge of the floor, the agency considers that it does not have a function in enclosing the occupant space and is therefore not considered a body component for purposes of the requirements. A copy of your illustration of these component is attached for the benefit of interested persons.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge receipt of your July 28, 1976, letter to the Administrator, asking that the new definition of "school bus" become effective on April 1, 1977, instead of October 27, 1976. Your request has been granted by a recent notice of rulemaking.