Interpretation ID: sponorship_rbm
Erika Z. Jones, Esq.
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw
1909 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-1101
Dear Ms. Jones:
This letter responds to a recent request you made regarding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) interpretation of the term "motor vehicle manufacturer" as it relates to compliance with the phase-in requirements of various Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). Your immediate concern is whether a vehicle may be deemed to be manufactured by more than one manufacturer if there is an agreement between two separate companies under which both companies provide financial and engineering resources for the development of a vehicle model that will be assembled by one company for the exclusive marketing by the other. If the answer to that question is yes, you ask whether either company could take credit for those vehicles for the purpose of complying with the phase-in requirements of a safety standard, as long as they filed a contract with NHTSA specifying who was taking such credit. I am pleased to provide an explanation of NHTSA's position on these issues, which we refer to as "sponsorship."
NHTSA first articulated its position on sponsorship in 1985 when it proposed to phase-in the new passive restraint requirements of FMVSS No. 208, Occupant crash protection. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14589, 14596 (April 12, 1985). In that rulemaking, NHTSA allowed consensual attribution of a vehicle when there was more than one manufacturer of the vehicle. Specifically, NHTSA developed a regimen under which a passenger car produced by more than one manufacturer would be attributed for phase-in purposes to a single manufacturer, as specified by an express written contract provided to NHTSA. In the absence of a written contract, the attribution would go to the importer, in the case of an imported vehicle, or to the manufacturer that marketed the vehicle, in the case of a vehicle manufactured in the United States. See 49 CFR 571.208, S4.1.3.5. The same regimen has been adopted for subsequent phase-ins of other requirements of FMVSS No. 208 (S4.1.5.2, S4.2.5.6, S4.2.6.1.2, S14.3.1, and S14.3.3.1), as well as those of other safety standards (FMVSS No. 201, Occupant protection in interior impact, at S6.1.6; FMVSS No. 214, Side impact protection, at S8.4; and FMVSS No. 225, Child restraint anchorage systems, at S14.2).
The term "manufacturer" is defined by statute as "a person manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment; or importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale." 49 U.S.C. 30102. The NHTSA regulations governing vehicle certification of a completed vehicle require the assembler of the vehicle to certify the vehicle as the manufacturer. Three exceptions apply to the general requirement: first, a non-assembling manufacturer may certify compliance when it controls the corporation assembling the vehicle and agrees to assume all legal responsibilities associated with certification; second, a manufacturer that fabricates and sends a vehicle in an unassembled form such that it can be assembled without any special machinery or tools may name itself as the vehicle manufacturer; and third, a trailer manufacturer may certify compliance for a trailer that it did not manufacture, but for which it accepts legal responsibility associated with certification. See 49 CFR 567.4(g). The manufacturer identified on the certification label generally bears full legal responsibility for any notifications and remedies resulting from a determination of a noncompliance with a FMVSS or a safety-related defect. See 49 CFR 573.3.
In the 1985 FMVSS No. 208 NPRM, the agency acknowledged that there were instances in which a vehicle could arguably have more than one manufacturer. One example of this situation could be when there was an existing parent/subsidiary relationship. However, there could also be instances where the relationship between the two possible manufacturers was not based on control of the company, but rather on control of the production of a specific vehicle model. We determined that, under certain circumstances, the definition of manufacturer in 49 U.S.C. 30102 was sufficiently broad to include this scenario. The example we gave in explaining our position was a company, which we refer to as a "sponsor," that contracts with another manufacturer to produce a design exclusively for the sponsor. However, the agency went on to state, "the mere purchase of vehicles for resale by a company which is also a manufacturer of motor vehicles does not make the purchaser the manufacturer of those vehicles." See 50 Fed. Reg. 14589, 14596.
To date, NHTSA has examined the sponsorship question, based on particular sets of circumstances, only four times. In the first instance, the agency evaluated the relationship between General Motors and Lotus Cars Ltd. See August 15, 1987, letter from NHTSA to General Motors. We determined that since GM sponsored the importation, distribution, and marketing of the Lotus vehicles in the United States, it could be considered the manufacturer of the vehicles for the FMVSS No. 208 phase-in requirements. In making its decision, NHTSA noted that Lotus was a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM and the vehicles were marketed in the United States by another wholly-owned subsidiary of GM, providing sufficient indicia of GM's active role in bringing the vehicles to market.
Two years later, NHTSA concluded that a contractual relationship whereby one manufacturer contracts with another to assemble vehicles, without more, was insufficient to establish a sponsorship relationship. The agency noted that a contract to assemble may be nothing more than the purchase of vehicles for resale. Without more information as to the details of the contract, NHTSA was unable to determine whether the non-assembly manufacturer exercised sufficient control over the production of the vehicle to be considered a sponsor for phase-in purposes. See September 7, 1989, letter from NHTSA to LAFORZA Automobiles, Inc.
In 1991, NHTSA determined that a joint venture agreement, under which one party provides design and development support, as well as major components, and the other party assembles the vehicle, was sufficient to allow the non-assembler to be considered as the manufacturer of the vehicle and to attribute the vehicle to its fleet for phase-in purposes. See October 28, 1991, letter from NHTSA to Nissan Research & Development, Inc.
Finally, we recently clarified our position that vehicles of related manufacturers may be grouped together for the purposes of meeting safety standard phase-in requirements, and expanded it beyond the findings of control described in the GM/Lotus letter. In a letter to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, we noted that the manufacturer attribution provisions needed to be clear and easily applied. We stated that we believed there was sufficient interaction among related manufacturers, and direct involvement by parent corporations in the actions of their subsidiaries, that their fleets could be grouped together or treated as the vehicles of separate manufacturers, at the manufacturers' option. We also stated that if the fleets of motor vehicle manufacturers are considered to be within the same "control" relationship for the purposes of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) statute, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 329, their vehicles could be grouped together or treated as the vehicles of separate manufacturers for phase-in purposes, again at the manufacturers' option. See October 24, 2002, letter from NHTSA to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.
Thus, under existing interpretations, sponsorship could be found with respect to a vehicle model in three instances: first, if the vehicle were designed from the beginning exclusively for another manufacturer; second, if the fleets of the two companies are combined under the CAFE statute during the model year at issue; and third, if the vehicle were designed and produced pursuant to a joint venture agreement that reflected joint participation. Sponsorship would not be found, however, if a contract merely directed one company to assemble an existing model for another manufacturer without other evidence of the non-assembling company's control over the design and production process.
I now turn to the fact scenario presently before the agency. In your letter, you state that Company A has agreed to supply Company B with a vehicle model developed, in part, pursuant to an engineering agreement between the two companies. The new model is based in large part on an existing model that was designed and engineered by Company A. Company A has also marketed the existing model in the United States. However, a subsidiary or affiliate of Company B will have sole distribution and marketing rights for the new model.
Under the engineering agreement, Company B has provided exterior and interior specifications and requirements, prepared and provided detailed designs of modified interior and exterior parts, and assigned employees to participate actively in the design and development process. Additionally, Company B has committed to pay Company A a net total of $30 million to cover engineering and tooling costs for the vehicle.
I have determined that this arrangement is sufficient to establish a sponsorship relationship between Company A and Company B with respect to the vehicle, regardless of whether such a relationship could be found generally, as was the case with GM and Lotus or with fleets of vehicles that are grouped together under the CAFE statute. I have also determined that it is not necessary for Company B to have been actively involved in the initial development of the vehicle, as was the case in the Nissan joint venture. Rather, my decision is based on the presence of three separate factors: the would-be sponsor's commitment of substantial design and engineering resources, the significant financial contribution by Company B to the development of the vehicle, and Company B's exclusive marketing rights to the vehicle. I note that the absence of any one of these factors, particularly the commitment of design and engineering resources, could create a situation more akin to the situation with LAFORZA, where NHTSA expressed concern that the contractual relationship may not have amounted to more than a mere purchase for resale.
Please note that in order for Company B to take credit for the vehicles in question during the phase-in, the companies must submit a written contract to that effect with NHTSA. Moreover, we note that the entire production for a given production year (i.e., from September 1 of one year through August 31 of the next year) must be attributed to one manufacturer. We would not allow a company to "sponsor" only a portion of a given year's production.
This approach to sponsorship for phase-in purposes is somewhat different from NHTSA's recently articulated position on the respective responsibilities of manufacturers under the early warning reporting rule. 67 Fed. Reg. 45833 (July 10, 2002). In that rule, we specifically addressed the obligations placed on manufacturers involved in joint ventures and production agreements. We noted that all manufacturers that are party to such ventures or agreements could assume responsibility for reporting consumer complaint and other relevant information to NHTSA. Under the early warning reporting rule, we described a production agreement as one in which one manufacturer agrees to produce vehicles for another under the second manufacturer's brand name. We did not premise our statement about the assumption of responsibility on whether the owner of the vehicle brand name had any control over the design or production of the vehicle, or whether the vehicle was designed exclusively for marketing by the brand name owner. We took this approach in the early warning reporting context because we believe the critical element is which company a consumer is more likely to notify in the event of a complaint or problem. We believe consumers would be most likely to notify the manufacturer whose name appears on the vehicle rather than the manufacturer whose name appears on the certification label. To that end, we also added a definition of "brand name owner" to mean "a person that markets a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment under its own trade name whether or not it is the fabricator or importer of the vehicle." This definition alone would be insufficient to establish sponsorship under the phase-in requirements of the various safety standards, because the mere branding of a vehicle does not demonstrate sufficient control or investment in the design and production of the vehicle.
I hope that this information is helpful. Should you have any further questions on this matter, please feel free to contact me or Rebecca MacPherson of my staff at the address given above or at (202) 366-2992.
Sincerely,
Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel
ref:VSA
d.12/10/02