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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 10921 - 10930 of 16510
Interpretations Date
 search results table

ID: nht95-2.98

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 30, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Barbara Bailey -- Administrative Assistant, Camp Berachah Christian Retreat Center

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 3/8/95 LETTER FROM BARBARA BAILEY TO WALTER MYERS

TEXT: Dear Ms. Bailey:

This responds to your letter and telephone call to Walter Myers of this office asking two questions about new 15-passenger vans that Camp Berachah leased from a dealer. I apologize for the delay in this response.

You first asked whether we require the leased vans to comply with our Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) for school buses. You also asked whether we require the vans to comply with those FMVSSs if Camp Berachah loaned or subleased them to a school. Subject to a few considerations, the answer to both questions is no.

Some background information on our school bus regulations would be helpful. Our regulations require any person selling or leasing a new vehicle to sell or lease a vehicle that meets all FMVSSs applicable to that vehicle. Accordingly, persons selling or leasing a new school bus must sell or lease a vehicle that meets the FMVSSs applicable to school buses. Under 49 U.S.C. @ 30101, et seq. (referred to as Safety Act), a school bus is any vehicle that carries 11 or more persons and which is likely to be significantly used to transport students to or from school or related events. Thus, persons selling or leasing a new vehicle that carries 11 or more persons and which is likely to be significantly used to carry students is selling or leasing a new schoo l bus. That means that the new vehicle must meet the school bus FMVSSs.

The FMVSSs apply only to new vehicles prior to sale to the first retail purchaser. The onus of complying with the school bus regulations is mainly on the seller or dealer to ensure that each new school bus it sells or leases has been certified to the sc hool bus FMVSSs. The purchaser, on the other hand, is not subject to such constraints. Under our school bus regulations, the purchaser is free to use any vehicle to transport school children. That is because this agency does not regulate the use of ve hicles once they have been sold at retail.

Turning to your questions, we answer no to your first question based on the following. It was unclear from your letter whether Camp Berachah is connected with a school. In directing NHTSA to issue its school bus regulations, Congress considered buses u sed to transport children to camps connected with schools to be subject to the school bus FMVSSs. However, you clarified the nature of Camp Berachah in your conversation with Mr. Myers. You said that Camp Berachah is independent from any school and is not in any way affiliated with a school. Based on that information, Camp Berachah does not appear to be a school.

Thus, our school bus regulations do not require the leasing of complying school buses for Camp Berachah purposes.

In your second question, you asked whether the new leased vans had to comply with the school bus FMVSSs if Camp Berachah lent, rented or subleased them to a school. The answer depends on whether the vans are significantly used for pupil transportation, and if so, whether the dealer knew or should have known of such use. New vans that are likely to be significantly used to transport school children would be school buses, and the dealer leasing the new van is required to lease certified school buses. U se of the vans on a one-time or occasional basis would not constitute significant use as a school bus. However, if Camp Berachah were to sublease the vans to a school for long-term use, we believe the use of those vans for school transportation would be significant within the meaning of the Safety Act. Accordingly, the leasing company could not lease a new van for this purpose.

You should also note that the states have the authority to regulate the use of vehicles by motorists. Thus, although NHTSA does not require the sale or use of complying school buses in the situations you described, Washington does have such authority. You may wish to contact the state director of pupil transportation to learn more about any state requirements applicable to vehicles used as school buses.

In closing, we would like to note that school buses are one of the safest forms of transportation in this country. We therefore strongly recommend that all 15-passenger vans that are used to transport school children be certified as meeting the school b us safety standards.

I hope this information is helpful. Should you have any further questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-2.99

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: May 31, 1995

FROM: John C. Golden -- Product Manager, Lighting and Electrical, Federal Mogul Corp.

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, U.S. DOT

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 10/16/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO JOHN C. GOLDEN (A43; VSA 108(a)(2)(A); STD. 125)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Womack,

We are seeking some clarification on F.M.V.S.S. 125 and how it relates to a letter you wrote Mr. John G. Klinge, Executive Vice President, Visibility Systems Company dated 12 August, 1994.

We market a wide variety of lighting and safety devices under the brand name Signal-State. Mr. Klinge provided us a copy of your written response to his inquiry before we chose to go ahead and market his product under our name.

Now, Mr. Klinge would like us to market a three-pack version of his battery operated safety strobe device (an equilateral triangle measuring 3 1/2" on each side) that is, in our opinion, specifically designed for use on DOT warning triangles. We think i t is a terrific idea. However, before we market this item we have one question:

The requirement for warning triangles is for 17" (minimum) leg length and 2" (minimum) leg width. The red reflector must be 1/2" (minimum) width. Does the mounting of one of these devices (as pictured, attached) take away minimum reflective area suc h that it would render the warning triangles illegal or ineffective?

Our greatest fear is the possibility of a motorist coming over a hill on a dark night . . . and over that hill is a broken down vehicle . . . with triangles properly deployed . . . but with a Lightman on top of each . . . with dead batteries.

If you think we should contact the Federal Highway Administration for clarification, please be kind enough to direct me to the proper person.

(Brochure Omitted.)

ID: nht95-3.1

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 6, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: C. Rufus Pennington, III -- Margol & Pennington, P.A.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 4/5/95 LETTER FROM C. RUFUS PENNINGTON, III TO MARY VERSAILLES

TEXT: Dear Mr. Pennington:

This responds to your letter concerning the rear seats of a 1979 Porsche 911 SC, which were not equipped with any type of seat belt. You asked two questions relating to whether these seats should have been equipped with seat belts. Your questions are a ddressed below.

1. Did the manufacturer's designation of "two front" passenger seats eliminate any obligation on the part of the manufacturer to provide seat belts in the rear seats under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208?

As explained below, a manufacturer's designation that a vehicle has two front seats does not eliminate the obligation to provide seat belts at rear seats, if those positions are "designated seating positions."

By way of background information, The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA has exercised this authority to establish Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208), which specifies performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes. Standard No. 208 req uired passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1973 and before September 1, 1986, to have either a Type 1 (lap) or Type 2 (lap/shoulder) seat belt assembly at each rear "designated seating position."

The term "designated seating position" is defined at 49 CFR 571.3. For vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1980, the term "designated seating position" was defined as:

any plan view location intended by the manufacturer to provide seating accommodation while the vehicle is in motion, for a person at least as large as a fifth percentile adult female, except auxiliary seating accommodations such as temporary or folding j ump seats. n1

n1 The definition was amended effective September 1, 1980. Copies of the September 28, 1978 notice of proposed rulemaking and April 19, 1979 final rule are enclosed.

In a May 22, 1978, notification to vehicle manufacturers, the agency stated that manufacturers are responsible for determining the number of seating positions that are in the vehicle. The agency also stated:

This does not mean, however, that the manufacturer's designation will be accepted by the agency if there are additional, obvious seating positions that are likely to be used by occupants while the vehicle is in motion. The agency unquestionably intends to require protection for all vehicle occupants. n2

Thus, a manufacturer's specification that a vehicle has two front seats did not eliminate Standard No. 208's requirement for a seat belt assembly at each rear seat, if those locations met the above definition.

2. Did the Porsche 911 SC comply with, or did it violate, the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208?

NHTSA cannot make a determination as to whether a vehicle complied with applicable safety standards outside a compliance proceeding. However, I can advise you of the factors the agency would look at to determine if the rear locations are designated seat ing positions. If those locations are designated seating positions, they should have been equipped with a seat belt assembly when originally manufactured.

n2 43 FR 21893. A copy of this notice is enclosed.

The May 22, 1978, notice provides a good summary of the agency's position. n3 That notice states:

the agency will consider any position . . . capable of accommodating a person at least as large as a fifth percentile adult female to be a "designated seating position", if the overall seat configuration and design is such that the manufacturer knows the position is likely to be used as a seating position while the vehicle is in motion.

I note that the hip breadth of a sitting fifth percentile female is approximately 13 inches, and the sitting height is approximately 31 inches. These are the measurements NHTSA would consider in determining whether a position is capable of accommodating a fifth percentile female.

n3 While that notice was focused on front seats, the rationale would apply to any seat.

I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-3.10

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 12, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Andrew Grubb -- Steve's Moped & Bicycle World

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO UNDATED LETTER FROM ANDREW GRUBB TO NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Grubb:

This responds to your letter asking whether this agency's requirements apply to several products you are selling. One is called the "California Go-Ped," a small push scooter with non-pneumatic tires, a 2-cycle motor mounted above the rear wheel, and a t op speed of 20 mph. Another is called the "Tsi Power Scooter," and resembles a scooter in frame style, but has larger pneumatic tires and can be outfitted with a seat. The Power Scooter has a top speed of 15 mph. You cited a previous interpretation sta ting that a scooter (similar to the Go-Ped) is not a motor vehicle, and thus not subject to our requirements, so I assume that you are asking whether the products you sell are motor vehicles. You also asked about motorized "skateboards" and motors for mo unting on a conventional bicycle.

The short answer to your question is that the Go-Ped is not a motor vehicle but the Power Scooter may be, depending on whether it is sold with a seat. Motorized "skateboards" are not motor vehicles, but motors for mounting on bicycles are "motor vehicle equipment".

You indicated that you have a copy of a letter dated April 1, 1991, in which we discussed whether a small push scooter called a "Walk Machine" is considered a motor vehicle for purposes of our standards. In that letter, we discussed the general principl es for determining whether a product is a motor vehicle.

As discussed in that letter, vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground m ining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel.

On the other hand, vehicles that are or can be operated off-road, but are also used on the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, utility vehicles like the Jeep are plainly motor vehicles, even though they a re equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, even though its greatest use will be off-road, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle." Further, if a vehicle is re adily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a motor vehicle. This finding was made with respect to dune buggies and regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicles were to be operated.

In discussing whether the Walk Machine is considered a motor vehicle, we noted that NHTSA has stated in previous interpretations that vehicles that regularly use the public roads will not be considered "motor vehicles" if such vehicles have a maximum att ainable speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) or less and an abnormal configuration which readily distinguishes them from other vehicles. We concluded that the Walk Machine is not a motor vehicle since it has a top speed of 16 mph and a configuration that re adily distinguishes it from motorcycles and other two-wheeled vehicles.

I will now apply these principles to the products you ask about in your letter. First, the California Go-Ped has an almost identical configuration to that of the Walk Machine and a maximum speed of 20 mph. Therefore, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle, for the same reasons that apply to the Walk Machine.

Second, the Power Scooter has a maximum speed of 15 mph and, when sold without a seat, has a configuration similar to that of the Walk Machine. In that configuration, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle.

When equipped with a seat, however, the Power Scooter is considered to be a motor vehicle. Although the advertising literature states that the Power Scooter is "not for in-street use," NHTSA believes that it is indistinguishable from a moped, which is a n on-street vehicle that we have long interpreted as a motor vehicle. Although most mopeds have chain drives, pedal starters, and lower-mounted engines, we do not think that these distinctions are important. The seated rider on the power scooter appears to other traffic to be riding a moped. We also note that the low ground clearance of the central platform appears poorly suited to off-road use.

Further, we consider the Power Scooter, when equipped with a seat, to be a type of motorcycle. A motorcycle is defined as "a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three w heels in contact with the ground" (Title 49, section 571.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)). Motorcycles are subject to our regulations in 49 CFR Part 571, including Standards for lights (No. 108), rear view mirrors (111), brakes (122), and con trols and displays (123). The materials you sent do not disclose the horsepower of the 21 cc engine, but we assume that it is less than 5 brake horsepower. If that assumption is correct, the vehicle would be a "motor-driven cycle," a type of motorcycle that is subject to less stringent requirements under our regulations. However, the Power Scooter does not appear to meet even the less stringent requirements. For example, the Scooter lacks lights, dual braking systems, and rear view mirrors.

The motors for mounting on a conventional bicycle are designed specifically to convert the bicycle into a motorcycle. Therefore, they are motor vehicle equipment. Despite the notation "not for in-street use" in the advertising brochure, bicycles are pr edominantly used in the streets. Merely adding a motor does not change this fact.

The motorized "skateboard" is not a motor vehicle because it was not manufactured for in-street use and is also not used on the public roads.

You stated in your letter that you want to clarify the application of our motor vehicle requirements to your products so that you can advise your customers exactly where they can and cannot operate them. We strongly encourage you to read the enclosed in formation sheet on your responsibilities under Federal law as a retailer of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. In addition, while the location of use of particular vehicles can affect our determination of whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle, t he actual regulation of the operation of vehicles and motor vehicles is a matter of State law. For information on State laws, you may contact the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administators at: 4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 600, Arlington, VA 22203.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Mr. Paul Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-3.100

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: August 28, 1995

FROM: Joseph J. Smith -- Assistant Chief Maintenance Officer, Technical Services & Maintenance Support, Department of Buses, New York Transit Authority

TO: John Womack -- Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 9/29/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO JOSEPH J. SMITH (A43; STD. 302)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Womack:

I am requesting interpretation of NHTSA Standard No. 302; Flammability of interior materials (49 CFR Ch. V, 10-1-94 Edition, para. 571.302).

The Department of Buses, MTA New York City Transit, has been notified by a supplier of air conditioning (A/C) return air filters that their filters do not meet Standard No. 302.

The A/C filters that the DOB utilizes on RTS 04 and 06 model buses are located on the top of A/C evaporator coil. Although the A/C filters are not mentioned in para. S4.1 of the Standard No. 302, they may, in our opinion, be affected by requirements of para. S4.2, being separated from the bus interior only by a louvered panel. This area (which the filters occupy) cannot be clearly defined whether it falls into the category of occupant compartment air space.

The copies of some selected pages from the bus service and parts manuals are attached for your reference.

It would be greatly appreciated if you could clarify whether the A/C return air filters must conform to the Standard No. 302. If you need any additional information, please contact Sol. Zhodzishsky of my staff at tel. 718 927-7634 (fax 718 927-8079)

I would like also to thank Mr. Marvin Shaw for his expedient response to our verbal inquiries.

(MANUALS OMITTED.)

ID: nht95-3.11

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 13, 1995

FROM: K. Howard Sharp -- Attorney at Law, Arnason Law Office

TO: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 6/30/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO K. HOWARD SHARPE (A43; STD. 108; VSA 30102)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Womack:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding the Safety Bright (R) product manufactured by NYTAF Industries, Inc. Your remarks provided a great deal of insight and assistance to NYTAF in the development of their product.

We are a bit confused on whether NYTAF qualifies as a manufacturer and whether standard 108 would apply in this instance. NYTAF manufactures Safety Bright (R) for use as an accessory to be installed on vehicles which are already in use on the roadway s. Presently NYTAF has no plans for the installation of Safety Bright (R) equipment on new vehicles. We understand that if that were the case the new vehicle manufacturer would be responsible for certification of compliance with the motor vehicle safet y standards. We are not certain, however, whether NYTAF must certify compliance with those standards since it is simply a manufacturer of an accessory. We would appreciate your clarification on this issue.

Again, thank you for your prompt response and helpful guidance.

ID: nht95-3.12

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 14, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Dennis T. Snyder, Esquire

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 8/11/95 LETTER FROM DENNIS T. SNYDER TO DAVID COLEMAN (OCC 10926)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Snyder:

This is in response to your letter of May 11, 1995, asking whether a client of yours is a "final stage manufacturer" within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and implementing regulations on manufacturer identification and v ehicle certification found in 49 CFR Parts 566, 567, and 568. You have described this client as being engaged in the manufacture of completed heavy duty dump trucks, vans, and road tractors from used chassis-cabs.

The term "manufacturer" is defined in 49 U.S.C. @ 30102(a)(5) (formerly section 102(5) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) as "a person- (A) manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment . . . " (emphasis added). Based on your description of your client as being engaged in the assembly of completed motor vehicles, it would appear to meet this definition. Because the manufacturer identification requirements of 49 CFR Part 566 apply to "all manufacturers of moto r vehicles," as stated in section 566.3 of that Part, your client would be required to submit to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) the identifying information specified in 49 CFR 566.5.

The term "final stage manufacturer" is defined at 49 CFR 568.3 as "a person who performs such manufacturing operations on an incomplete vehicle that it becomes a completed vehicle." An "incomplete vehicle" is defined in that section as "an assemblage con sisting, at a minimum, of frame and chassis structure, power train, steering system, suspension system, and braking system . . . that requires further manufacturing operations . . . to become a completed vehicle." The term "completed vehicle" is in turn defined in section 568.3 as "a vehicle that requires no further manufacturing operations to perform its intended function . . ." Based on your description of your client as being engaged in the manufacture of completed heavy duty dump trucks, vans, and r oad tractors from chassis-cabs, it would qualify as a final stage manufacturer, as that term is defined in section 568.3.

Requirements for final stage manufacturers are specified at 49 CFR 568.6. This section provides that a final stage manufacturer shall complete each vehicle "in such a manner that it conforms to the [Federal motor vehicle safety] standards in effect on t he date of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final completion, or a date between those two dates," and shall affix a label to the vehicle attesting to that conformance in accordance with 49 CFR 567.5, which specifies certification requir ements for vehicles manufactured in two or more stages. These certification requirements are in implementation of 49 U.S.C. @ 30115, which requires the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle to certify to the dealer or distributor at delivery that the vehi cle complies with applicable motor vehicle safety standards. NHTSA has long taken the position, however, that a vehicle is used if it is assembled by adding a new body to the chassis of a vehicle previously registered for use on the public roads. As a consequence, your client would not be required to certify the vehicles that it manufactures in this fashion.

Your client would nevertheless be subject to 49 U.S.C. @ 30122(b), which provides that "[a] manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or i n a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard . . ." NHTSA has interpreted this provision as requiring any of the specified entities that remove an old body from a vehicle in order to install a new one to ensure t hat the newly completed vehicle meets the standards that the vehicle was originally required to meet. For example, a vehicle consisting of a body manufactured in 1995 mounted on a used 1989 chassis must meet all standards that applied to 1989 vehicles. Your client would be liable for any violation of this requirement on vehicles that it manufactures, regardless of whether it removed the body from the old vehicle itself, or directed another entity to do so.

Additionally, as a vehicle manufacturer, your client would be required under 49 U.S.C. @ 30118 to furnish owners with notification of, and a remedy for, any safety-related defect or any noncompliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standa rd that is found to exist in a vehicle that it assembles.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, feel free to contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at the above address, or by telephone at (202) 366-5238.

ID: nht95-3.13

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 14, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: A. P. Corrado -- Director, Market Development, GenCorp Aerojet Electronic Systems Division

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 4/25/95 LETTER FROM A. P. CORRADO TO JOHN WOMACK

TEXT: Dear Mr. Corrado:

This responds to your letter requesting clarification of the requirements of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, with respect to automatic cut-off devices for air bags. You requested confirmation that the standard "does not preclude the use of inflatable restraint systems that by design inhibit deployment of a passenger air bag in those identifiable cases where the likelihood and severity of passenger injury would be greater with air bag deployment than without." You specifically cited the cas e of out-of-position passengers. As discussed below, Standard No. 208 does not preclude the use of automatic cutoff devices for passenger air bags, so long as the devices ensure that the air bag automatically deploys under the specific dynamic crash con ditions specified in the standard.

NHTSA addressed the legality of both automatic and manual air bag cutoff devices in the context of a recent rulemaking to permit manual cutoff devices under special circumstances. In a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published in October 1994, the agency explained that automatic cutoff devices for passenger side air bags are already permitted by Standard No. 208. However, the devices must be designed to automatically ensure that the air bag is activated under the dynamic crash test conditions spe cified in the standard, i.e., in a 30 mph barrier crash test, with a 50th percentile male dummy properly positioned in the seat. See discussion at 59 FR 51160, October 7, 1994. I have enclosed a copy of that notice for your information, as well as a co py of the recently issued final rule.

I would like to note a safety issue that is relevant to the design of automatic cutoff devices for air bags. Standard No. 208's requirements for air bags are intended to provide safety benefits for a much broader set of real world conditions than the na rrow conditions specified in the standard's dynamic crash test, i.e., at a greater number of speeds and frontal impact angles, for many different sizes of occupants, etc. The agency recognizes the safety benefits that can be provided by well-designed au tomatic cutoff devices that can sense rear facing infant restraints and other possible special situations where deactivation is appropriate. At the same time, NHTSA believes it is important for manufacturers developing automatic cutoff devices to ensure that the devices do not deactivate air bags under circumstances where the air bags would provide important safety benefits.

I hope this information is helpful to you. If you have any further questions or need additional information, please feel free to contact Mr. Edward Glancy of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht95-3.14

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 14, 1995

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: K. Olsen

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 9/4/92 LETTER FROM PAUL RICE TO BOB BULLARD; ALSO ATTACHED TO 5/12/95 LETTER FROM K. OLSEN TO JOHN WOMACK

TEXT: Dear Ms. Olsen:

This responds to your letter of March 12, 1995, requesting an opinion as to the liability of the manufacturer, dealer, or customer in an accident involving a trailer originally sold with used tires. I apologize for the delay in our response.

By way of background information, Chapter 301 of Title 49, U.S. Code, authorizes this agency to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 30112 of Title 49 pro vides that no person may manufacture for sale, sell, or import a new motor vehicle or a new item of motor vehicle equipment unless that vehicle or equipment complies with all applicable FMVSSs and is covered by a certification of such compliance. Genera lly speaking, upon the sale of that vehicle or item of equipment to the first retail purchaser, the use of that vehicle or equipment becomes a matter of state regulation.

This office cannot give you an opinion as to who may be liable in the accident you described. The question of liability would be a matter of state law. You may wish to consult with a local attorney on the question of liability.

I can advise you that FMVSS No. 120, Tire selection and rims for motor vehicles other than passenger cars, generally requires tires installed on new trailers to be new, but includes certain specified exceptions which do not appear to be relevant here. I n that connection, please find enclosed a copy of a letter we wrote to a gentleman in Odessa, Texas, dated September 4, 1992, which discusses in some detail our requirements for tires installed on new trailers.

This agency does not have any standards for trailer brakes other than air brakes. Also, as indicated above, matters relating to the use of a vehicle, such as connection of the electric brake control to the towing vehicle and loading of the trailer, are not under the jurisdiction of this agency.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Based on your March 12, 1995 letter and your telephone and facsimile communications with the staff of this agency's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, that office has initiated an inquiry to the trailer manuf acturer to determine if a noncompliance exists with FMVSS No. 120. If you have further information or data to offer in this regard, please contact Mr. Luke Loy at this address or at (202) 366-5288 or by FAX at (202) 366-3081.

ID: nht95-3.15

Open

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: June 15, 1995

FROM: M. Judson Brown, PE -- Central New York Regional Transportation Authority, CNG Bus Project Manager

TO: Mr. John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Transport, NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 7/18/95 LETTER FROM JOHN WOMACK TO JOHN RENOCK (REDBOOK 2; PART 304)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Womack,

The Central New York Regional Transport Authority (CNYRTA) of Syracuse, New York has eight natural gas buses which have Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) cylinders which are used for fueling the buses. It was our original understanding that the tanks, which are certified by the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) with an exemption (Exemption Number 8814) are required to be re-inspected and hydrostatically retested every three years. I am enclosing a copy of the USDOT Exemption which the tank manufacturer, Stuctural Composite Industries, received from USDOT Hazardous Materials Branch. Please note page 5, item g of the Exemption. I am also enclosing a copy of the regulations, DOT FRP-1, governing manufacturing and test requirements for the tanks.

I recently received a copy of a letter which was sent to Spencer Testing Services by yourself as Acting Chief Counsel for the U.S. Department of Transportation (copy of letter enclosed). The letter states that the Research and Special Programs Administr ation, (RSPA) is authorized by Congress to issue standards for containers including the CNG containers used to transport hazardous materials. However, RSPA does not have statutory authority to regulate CNG containers that are used to fuel a motor vehicl e. In other words, as I read the letter, RSPA is not authorized to require reinspection and hydraulic retesting of CNG containers which are used to fuel a motor bus.

Would you please confirm by letter to Central New York Regional Transport Authority that fueling containers on their 8 buses are not required to be re-inspected and hydraulically re-tested every three years under USDOT requirements. Please address the l etter to:

Mr. John Renock Director of Operations Central New York Regional Transport Authority 200 Cortland Avenue Syracuse, NY 13205-0820

Thank you for your assistance.

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