Skip to main content

NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 11131 - 11140 of 16510
Interpretations Date
 search results table

ID: nht72-5.21

Open

DATE: 03/24/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Truck Equipment & Body Distributors Association

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of March 6, 1972, concerning the certification of pickup trucks that are modified while still in the hands of a dealer. You describe a situation in which the dealer removes the pickup body and sends the vehicle to a final-stage manufacturer for fitting with a service body.

We would consider modifications of the type you describe to be manufacturing under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and the Certification regulations (49 CFR Part 567). Because a completed vehicle is involved regulations governing Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages (Part 568) do not apply.

One who remanufactures a completed vehicle assumes the responsibility of any manufacturer of completed vehicles. The extent to which he may safely rely on the original GVWR, GAWR, and statement of conformity depends on what he has done to alter the vehicle. He is required to certify the vehicle by affixing his own label, and must take into account the effects of any modifications he makes.

ID: nht72-5.22

Open

DATE: 02/07/72

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Downs-Clark

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of December 30, 1971, concerning whether you must comply with the Certification regulations (49 CFR Part 567) in cases where you "re-barrel" or "re-deck" trailers. You describe these processes as installing a new tank (re-barreling) or platform deck (re-decking) on a used trailer under construction furnished by your customer, which includes axles, tires, wheels, springs, hangers, and internal brake assemblies, in serviceable condition.

You are not required to certify these vehicles as they are manufactured on used chassis and are considered by this agency to be used vehicles under section 108(b)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1397(b)(1)).

We are pleased to be of assistance.

ID: Harness_and_LATCH

Open



    Mr. Terry Emerson
    Product Standards Manager
    Cosco
    2525 State Street,
    Columbus, IN 47201



    Dear Mr. Emerson:

    This responds to your letter of July 12, 2001, asking "Is the Cosco Travel Vest required to be LATCH compatible by September 1, 2002?" Stated differently, you ask whether child restraint vest systems are required by Standard No. 213 to have attachments that enable the restraint to connect to a child restraint anchorage system on a vehicle (49 CFR 571.225). (1) The answer to your question is no.

    According to the marketing literature you enclosed with your letter, the Travel Vest is a 5-point harness restraint. Section 5.9(a) of Standard No. 213 (49 CFR 571.213) excludes harnesses from the requirement in the standard that child restraints must have components that attach to the lower anchorages of a LATCH system. We excluded harnesses out of practicability concerns. We did not know whether harnesses had a structural member that was strong enough to withstand the forces that would be imposed on it by the LATCH connectors. (See LATCH final rule, 64 FR 10786, 10808; March 5, 1999.)

    I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Deirdre Fujita at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

    Sincerely,

    John Womack
    Acting Chief Counsel

    ref:213
    d.8/31/01




    1. 1 "LATCH" is a term used by industry and retail groups referring to the child restraint anchorage system required by Standard No. 225. LATCH stands for "lower anchorages and tethers for children." For convenience, we will use the term in this letter.



2001

ID: hatler

Open

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Via Federal Express

 

Ms. Patricia R. Hatler

Chief Legal and Governance Officer

Nationwide

One Nationwide Plaza

Columbus, OH 43215

 

Dear Ms. Hatler:

 

We have received reports that certain insurance companies may be engaging in transactions that violate Federal odometer disclosure law with respect to vehicles damaged in Hurricane Sandy. Although we are not asserting that your company is engaging in such practices, we are writing to a number of auto insurance companies to remind them of the Federal odometer disclosure law requirements and ask them to review their practices regarding odometer disclosures. These letters do not accuse your company, or any other company, of violating the law.

 

We understand that when a flood-damaged vehicle is declared a total loss, the insurance company pays the insured the value of the vehicle, becomes the owner, and acquires control over the vehicle from the insured. However the reports we have received indicate that instead of completing the required odometer disclosure, some companies ask the insured to complete the odometer disclosure statement without listing the insurance company as the transferee. According to these reports, the insurance company will not sign the title, make an odometer disclosure, or transfer title. The insurance company then sells the vehicle at auction, keeps the proceeds from the auction, and provides the title with the odometer disclosure statement as signed by the insured to the auction buyer. The next person in the chain of title of the vehicle will be the buyer at auction. The insurance company will essentially be omitted from the chain of title.

 

In the circumstance described above, an insurance company is considered a transferee when it pays the insureds claim (in return it obtains ownership of the vehicle), and a transferor when it sells the vehicle at auction. See 49 C.F.R. 580.3. As a transferor, the insurance company is required to make certain disclosures.

 

Under federal odometer disclosure law, 49 U.S.C. 32705, a person transferring ownership of a motor vehicle shall give the transferee written disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. More specifically, under 49 C.F.R. 580.5, each transferor shall disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title or on the document being used to reassign the title [t]his written disclosure must be signed by the transferor, including the printed name. The transferee must sign the disclosure statement, print his name, and return a copy to his transferor.

 

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Marie Choi of my staff at (202) 366-1738 or via email at marie.choi@dot.gov.

 

 

Sincerely,

 

 

 

 

O. Kevin Vincent

Chief Counsel

 

d: 12/20/12

 

Identical letters sent to:

 

Mr. Dana Proulx

General Counsel

GEICO Corporation

One Geico Plaza

Washington, DC 20076

 

Mr. Charles E. Jarrett

Chief Legal Officer

The Progressive Corporation

300 North Commons Blvd., OHF 11

Mayfield Village, OH 44143

 

Mr. Christopher C. Mansfield

General Counsel

Liberty Mutual Group

175 Berkeley Street

Boston, MA 02117

 

Ms. Susan L. Lees

General Counsel

Allstate Insurance Company

3075 Sanders Road

Northbrook, IL 60062

 

Mr. Garrett Paddor

General Counsel

Farmers New World Life Insurance Company

4680 Wilshire Blvd, 2nd Fl.

Los Angeles, CA 90010

 

Mr. Steven A. Bennett

General Counsel

United Services Automobile Association (USAA)

9800 Fredericksburg Road

San Antonio, TX 78288

 

Mr. Jeffrey W. Jackson

General Counsel

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

One State Farm Plaza

Bloomington, IL 61710

 

ID: headstart3

Open



    Helen H. Taylor, Associate Commissioner
    Head Start Bureau
    Administration for Children, Youth and Families
    Administration for Children and Families
    Department of Health and Human Services
    330 C Street, SW
    Washington, DC 20447



    Dear Ms. Taylor:

    This responds to your request that this agency revise its interpretation of the term "school" to exclude Head Start Programs. This would allow the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to implement a rule requiring that Head Start children be transported in vehicles that meet the Federal school bus safety standards other than those requiring traffic control devices. I regret the delay in responding to your request.

    You based your request on the Coats Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998. In that Act, Congress amended section 636 of the Head Start Act (42 U.S.C. 9831) to provide that "[i]t is the purpose of this subchapter to promote school readiness by enhancing the social and cognitive development of low-income children through the provision, to low-income families, of health, educational, nutritional, social, and other services that are determined, based on family needs assessments, to be necessary." You believe that by employing the term "school readiness," Congress was distinguishing Head Start programs from school programs.

    In considering your request, we reviewed the basis for our existing interpretation of Head Start as a "school." That interpretation was based on the former National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. ("the Vehicle Safety Act")). The Vehicle Safety Act defines "schoolbus" to mean

      a passenger motor vehicle designed to carry a driver and more than 10 passengers, that the Secretary of Transportation decides is likely to be used significantly to transport preprimary, primary, and secondary school students to or from school or an event related to school.

    (49 U.S.C. 30125(a)(1))

    In applying the term to Head Start, we equated the provision of educational services with the status of being a school, and concluded that Head Start programs were functioning as preprimary schools. On December 29, 1977, NHTSA issued an opinion that Head Start facilities are functioning as preprimary schools, and that buses transporting children to and from those schools are functioning as school buses, under the Vehicle Safety Act and accordingly are subject to the Federal school bus safety standards. Specifically, the letter stated:

      NHTSA interprets the term "school" broadly, because the agency believes that this is the intent of the Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-492) which directed the creation of the school bus safety standards. Since the Head Start program is basically an educational program for preprimary students, the agency had determined that those facilities are schools and buses transporting children to and from them must comply with the Federal school bus safety requirements if they transport 10 or more passengers.

    Subsequently, in a May 10, 1982, opinion, we distinguished day care centers from Head Start facilities on the basis that "facilities which are essentially custodial, even though they have some educational components, are not considered to be schools."

    In light of the 1998 amendment to section 636 of the Head Start Act, we have concluded that the linkage we have made in the case of Head Start between educational services and schools is no longer valid. We believe that it is clear from the language of that section that Congress has made a distinction between Head Start programs and school programs.

    Accordingly, we are revising our interpretation of "school" to exclude Head Start. Consistent with the evident intent of section 636, we conclude that a Head Start agency is not operating a "school" for the purposes of the Vehicle Safety Act. This means that buses sold to transport children to and from a Head Start site will no longer be required under the Vehicle Safety Act to meet the Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to school buses. In revising our interpretation, we act with the knowledge that HHS intends to implement a rule requiring that Head Start children be transported in vehicles meeting the Federal school bus safety standards other than those for traffic control devices. This will serve to ensure the children's safety.

    Sincerely,

    Frank Seales, Jr.
    Chief Counsel

    ref:VSA
    d.8/3/00



2000

ID: Heller2

Open

Mr. Peter E. Heller

Logo Brake Light

216 Redwood Road

Sag Harbor, NY 11963

Dear Mr. Heller:

This responds to your letter requesting clarification regarding how Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, applies to your patented product, the Logo Brake Light. Your letter described the Logo Brake Light as the merger of the center high mounted stop lamp with the automobile manufacturers logo, symbol or trademark. On a vehicle equipped with your product, when the service brake pedal is depressed, the lighted portion of the center high-mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) will illuminate in a shape representing the vehicle manufacturer or its brand. You enclosed three product samples (two in red and one in a combination of red and yellow). Based on the information you have provided to the agency and the analysis below, we have concluded that your product would not comply with Standard No. 108.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment (see 49 U.S.C. 30111 and 49 CFR Part 571). It is the responsibility of manufacturers to certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards before they can be offered for sale (see 49 U.S.C. 30115 and 49 CFR Part 567). FMVSS No. 108 sets forth the requirements for both new and replacement motor vehicle lighting equipment.

Turning to the specific issues raised by your letter, FMVSS No. 108 specifies requirements for CHMSLs in light vehicles. First, paragraph S5.1.1.27(a) of FMVSS No. 108 specifies that each CHMSL shall: (1) have an effective projected luminous lens area of not less than 2903 square mm (4.5 square inches); (2) meet the visibility requirements such that a signal is visible from 45 degrees to the left to 45 degrees to the right of the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; and (3) have minimum photometric values in the amount and location listed in



Figure 10 of the standard. In addition, Table III, Required Motor Vehicle Lighting Equipment, specifies that the CHMSL must be red.[1] (A CHMSL produced using a combination of red and another color, such as yellow or silver, would not comply with the color requirement set forth in Table III.) Because we have not had the opportunity to examine your product in use, we cannot offer an opinion as to whether your product would meet the applicable area, visibility, and photometric requirements of Standard No. 108. However, we note that your product appears to violate the color restrictions set forth in Table III.

Furthermore, in discussing your request with the agency in phone conversations, you directed us to your website, www.logobrakelight.com. Upon review of this site, we saw examples of your product mounted below the rear glass (one on a trunk lid and another on an SUV liftgate). We note that your product apparently would not comply with paragraph S5.3.1.8(a)(2), which requires that no portion of the lens [CHMSL] shall be lower than 6 inches below the rear window on convertibles, or 3 inches on other passenger cars. Thus, the applications of your Logo Brake Light CHMSL currently shown would likely violate this location requirement.

Finally, we should also observe that a lighting standard is premised upon consistency of the message intended to warn or alert other drivers or pedestrians. We are concerned that the presence of both regular red and multicolor stop lamps with logos on them could result in confusion of other drivers or pedestrians.

Please note that we are returning your product samples to you under separate cover. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

ref:108

d.2/7/07

 




[1] We note that there is a separate provision under S5.1.1.27(b) of Standard No. 108 that allows two CHMSLs (with specifications different from those above) on light vehicles other than passenger cars which have a vertical centerline that, when the vehicle is viewed from the rear, is not located on a fixed body panel but separates one or two movable body sections, such as doors, which lacks sufficient space to install a single CHMSL. Our analysis, however, would not differ for either version of the CHMSL.

2007

ID: hen2.jeg

Open

Lawrence F. Henneberger, Esq.
Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-5339

Dear Mr. Henneberger:

This letter follows up a meeting between you, your client, William A. Leasure, Jr., Executive Director of the Truck Manufacturers Association, and members of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) staff. In the meeting, you and Mr. Leasure raised concerns about our

September 22, 1997, interpretation letter, addressed to Mr. Leasure, concerning Standard No. 208's air bag labeling requirements. The requirements at issue were established in a final rule published on November 27, 1996. In our interpretation letter, we recognized that the rulemaking establishing the requirements focused on light vehicles. However, based on the regulatory text and purpose of the requirements, we concluded that the requirements also apply to medium and heavy trucks equipped with air bags.

You and Mr. Leasure raised several concerns about our conclusion. Among other things, it was argued that the air bags used on these vehicles are very different than the ones used on light vehicles, and that the specific attention-getting warning labels developed for light vehicles are not needed for medium and heavy vehicles. It was also noted that the "DATES" section of the final rule establishing the labeling requirements identified a compliance date for light vehicles but not for medium or heavy vehicles.

Upon reconsideration, we have decided to revise our previous position and instead interpret the labeling requirements established in the November 27, 1996, final rule as applying only to passenger cars and to trucks, buses and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a GVWR of 8,500 pounds or less and an unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less. These are the vehicles that are required to have air bags under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-40), and they are the ones that NHTSA intended to address in the rulemaking at issue. We believe that this is supported by the preamble and by the DATES section of the final rule.

We agree with your view that different labels may be appropriate for different types of vehicles than the ones addressed in the rulemaking at issue. However, given our revised interpretation, we do not, at this time, see a need to address this subject in rulemaking. Under our interpretation, the labeling of these other vehicles is at the option of the manufacturer. Thus, if a manufacturer believes that the labels specified in Standard No. 208 are appropriate for other vehicles as well, it is free to use those labels. However, if the manufacturer believes that a different label is more appropriate, it is free to use that label.

If you have any further questions about this subject, please feel free to call Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:208
d.3/23/99

1999

ID: hendrixMS_law_v2

Open

    Mr. William R. Hendrix
    6790 Riverdale Road
    Horn Lake, MS 38637-1518

    Dear Mr. Hendrix:

    This responds to your letter in which you ask if the State of Mississippis motorcycle helmet law is preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 218, Motorcycle helmets. We regret that we are unable to answer your question at this time.

    By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment (49 U.S.C. Chapter 301). Section 30103(b) of that Chapter states that when an FMVSS is in effect, a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the Federal standard. (There is an exception for state standards applicable to vehicles or equipment procured for the States own use that imposes a higher level of performance than the FMVSS. )

    In your letter, you state that you believe Mississippis helmet law to be pre-empted by 30103(b) because the state standard requires use of a helmet inspected and approved by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA). You further state that AAMVA no longer "inspects and approves" motorcycle helmets.

    We have been unable to reach Mississippi state officials for more information about Mississippis motorcycle helmet law. We cannot address the preemption issue without more information. If you can provide further information, you may contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

    Sincerely,

    Jacqueline Glassman
    Chief Counsel

    ref:218#VSA
    d.12/22/04

2004

ID: Higuchi.1

Open

    Mr. Kazuo Higuchi
    TK Holdings, Inc. (Takata)
    601 13th Street, NW, Suite 350 South
    Washington, DC 20005


    Dear Mr. Higuchi:

    This responds to your October 24, 2005, letter in which you seek clarification regarding the requirements for emergency-locking retractors (ELRs) under paragraph S4.3(j)(2)(i)(E) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. Specifically, you asked whether, for purposes of compliance with Standard No. 209, a vehicle acceleration-sensitive ELR, after being rotated to the locking point (i.e. , some angle more than 15 degrees), must then be rotated back to determine whether the ELR unlocks at an angle greater than 15 degrees from its initial orientation in the vehicle?The answer to your question is no.

    By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Standard No. 209 sets forth strength, elongation, webbing width, durability, and other requirements for seat belt assemblies. This standard applies to all seat belt assemblies as separate items of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements.

    As your letter points out, the agency published a final rule on August 22, 2005, which amended FMVSS No. 209 by redefining the requirements and establishing a new test methodology for ELRs (70 FR 48883). Under paragraph S4.3, Requirements for hardware, FMVSS No. 209 sets performance requirements for seat belt assemblies manufactured on or after February 22, 2007 (and ones produced by manufacturers opting for early compliance). Among those requirements, the standard states that for an ELR sensitive to vehicle acceleration installed as part of a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly, when tested in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph S5.2(j)(2) under zero acceleration loading, such ELR shall "not lock when the retractor is rotated in any direction to any angle of 15 degrees or less from its orientation in the vehicle" (see S4.3(j)(2)(i)(E)).

    The purpose of the requirement in S4.3(j)(2)(i)(E) is to prevent "nuisance locking" in situations where the vehicle experiences a minor change in orientation from its normal orientation on a flat roadway (e.g. , traveling on a moderate incline, hitting a pothole). However, once the ELR experiences a sufficient change in orientation, as specified in Standard No. 209, the retractor must lock. The standard contains no corollary provision for unlocking of the vehicle acceleration-sensitive ELR, either in the standards performance requirements or test procedures.

    If you have further questions, please feel free to contact Eric Stas of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

    Sincerely,

    Stephen P. Wood
    Acting Chief Counsel

    ref:209
    d.1/24/06

2006

ID: hill.ztv

Open



    Senior Trooper W. L. Hill
    Texas Department of Public Safety
    Highway Patrol
    2720 Industrial Boulevard
    Abilene, TX 79606



    Dear Trooper Hill:

    This is in reply to your request to Taylor Vinson of this Office for our opinion on the following two questions regarding compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment. You are requesting this information in connection with a court case in which a driver was cited for operating a vehicle equipped with a replacement taillamp consisting of a clear lens and a red bulb. You mentioned the driver's opinion that Mercedes-Benz was offering such a lamp.

    Your first question is whether, to the best of our knowledge, a motor vehicle taillamp is being manufactured, either as original or replacement equipment, which includes a red bulb and a clear lens, and which is certified as complying with Standard No. 108. Our answer is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is not economically feasible under the current state of the art to manufacture a taillamp with a red bulb and a clear lens that complies with Standard No. 108's taillamp requirements, and we are not aware of any such product.

    Your second question is whether red reflective tape that is affixed to a vehicle after a protective backing is removed can be a rear reflex reflector replacement under Standard No. 108. The tape has no DOT marking. The answer is no; the original rear reflex reflector, whether incorporated in the lamp or separately mounted on the body, would have been made of plastic in order to comply with SAE Standard J594f, Reflex Reflectors, incorporated by reference in Standard No. 108 as the requirement for reflex reflectors. A replacement rear reflex reflector would also need to be made of plastic to meet these requirements.

    If you have any further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson at 202-366-5263.



    Sincerely,

    Frank Seales, Jr.
    Chief Counsel

    ref:108
    d.10/5/00



2000

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.