ID: nht81-2.43

DATE: 07/07/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Carabela USA, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 8, 1981 requesting "the candlepower rating on a moped headlamp."

I enclose a copy of SAE Standard J584 Motorcycle and Motor Driven Cycle Headlamps April 1964, which contains the information that you request. Most mopeds develop 5 horsepower or less and thus qualify as a "motor driven cycle."

If you have any further questions, we shall be pleased to answer them.

ENC.

Carabela USA, Inc.

6-8-81

Office of Chief Council NHTSA

Dear Mr. Schwartz:

Please quote me the candlepower rating on a moped headlamp, if any. Thank you.

Barry N. Aebischer Mktg. Coordinator

ID: nht81-2.44

DATE: 07/07/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Burlington Industries, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your recent request for an interpretation of Federal Motor Vehcile Safety Standard No. 117 (49 CFR @ 571.117). Specifically, you asked if the addition of "edger fabric strips", pursuant to a process covered by U.S. Patent 4,196,764, would violate the prohibition in section S5.2.2(b) of Standard No. 117 against adding belts to retreaded passenger car tires.

The described process is prohibited by section S5,2.2(b), because it is clearly adding a belt to the tire.

In the abstract of the subject patent, which you included in your request for an interpretation, is the following statement: "The invention relates to the use of reinforcing cords associated with the pneumatic tire . . ., and the method of applying such reinforcing cords woven in a warp and weft relationship cut in a bias shape to form a belt . . . ." Similarly, in the Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments section of the patent, Section 3 begins, "The essence of my invention is achieved by providing an extra belt . . . ." Hence, the patent itself states that this process involves the addition of a belt to retread tires. Such an addition is expressly forbidden by section S5.2.2(b) of Stanard 117; "No retreaded tire shall be manufactured with a casing on which a belt or ply, or part thereof, is added or replaced during processing."

Your letter stated that this edger fabric should not be considered a belt for purposes of the Standard, because the addition of the edger makes a retreaded tire safer and longer lasting. While you may be correct concerning the performance of "edger fabric," the Standard as currently written does not permit its use. If you wish, however, you may file a petition for rulemaking requesting this agency to amend Standard 117 to permit the addition of a belt such as edger fabric by following the requirements set forth in 49 CFR Part 552 (copy enclosed). If you choose to do so, please include all data showing that the addition of this extra belt makes the retreaded tire safer, and that the edger fabric belt would be compatable with the existing cords of the casing that is used.

Finally, let me point out that Standard 117 applies only to retreaded passenger car tires. There is no safety standard applicable to retreaded tires for vehicles other than passenger cars, and the use of this patented process on those tires would not violate any requirements of this agency.

Mr. Hugh Oates of my staff sends his regards.

ENC.

May 1, 1981

Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration Attention: Stephen Kratzke

Re: NHTSA Standard No. 117 - Retreaded Pneumatic Tires

Dear Sirs:

Upon suggestion by Mr. Stephen Kratzke, I am writing to request an interpretation of NHTSA Standard No. 117 relating to retreaded pneumatic passenger car tires. In particular I would appreciate a written opinion as to whether S 5.2.2(b) of the Standard would apply to a retreading process by which the tire was stripped and a recap containing "edger" fabric molded therein then bonded to the carcass. For your better understanding, please note that "edger" fabric is a narrow strip of fabric positioned on each side or shoulder of the recap around the entire perimeter of the tire. The strips are intended and believed to aid in the prevention of steel belts "turning up" and rendering the recapped tire unsafe.

A careful reading of Standard No. 117 convinces me that "edger" fabric strips which are molded into the retread prior to the retread being secured to the casing is not addition or replacement of a belt or ply to the casing as contemplated by Standard 117. In fact, the purpose of the "edger" fabric is entirely consistent with the purpose of Standard 117 in that it is intended to make a retreaded steel belted tire safer and longer lasting than if the fabric were not incorporated into the recap. To hold that the "edger" fabric falls within the language and intended scope of Standard 117 would therefore run counter to the purpose and policy considerations behind the Standard.

In order that you may more fully understand the nature of the recapping process utilizing an "edger" fabric incorporated into the recap, I have attached hereto a copy of a U.S. patent generally directed to the process and highlighted some of the more pertinent portions. I hope that the above is sufficient for full understanding of our request, but please do not hesitate to call me at (919) 379-4517 if I may offer further explanation.

We respectfully solicit an expeditious opinion on this matter and thank you for your assistance to us.

Richard E. Jenkins Assistant Patent Counsel

ATTCH.

ID: nht81-2.45

DATE: 07/07/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: British Standards Institution

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of March 12, 1981, concerning the strength requirements specified in Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, for a dual buckle (i.e., a two buckle unit) anchored in a vehicle by one common anchorage attachment.

As explained below, I disagree with your judgment that the standard does not deal adequately with the dual buckle design. Your proposal to test the dual buckle with 5,000 pounds of force is also incorrect; the correct force is 6,000 pounds.

Section 3 of the standard defines "hardware" as "a metal or rigid plastic part of a seat belt assembly." That section further defines "attachment hardware" as "any or all hardware designed for securing the webbing of a seat belt assembly to a motor vehicle." As described in your letter and shown in its attached photograph, the dual buckle has a common metal anchorage attachment. Since the purpose of that metal part is to secure the webbing to the vehicle, it is considered attachment hardware.

Section 4.3 (c)(2) specifies that "attachment hardware designed to receive the ends of two seat belt assemblies shall withstand a tensile force of at least 6,000 pounds or 2.720 kilograms without fracture . . . ." Since the common anchorage attachment is designed to receive the force created by the ends of two seat belt assemblies, it must meet the requirements of S4.3(c)(2).

You are correct that the attachment bolt is required to withstand a force of at least 9,000 pounds or 4,080 kilograms under paragraph S4.3(c)(1) of the standard.

Sincerely,

MARCH 12, 1981

F. BERNDT, CHIEF COUNSEL -- U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA

Dear Sirs,

FMVSS 209

We have been asked to test for FMVSS approval a Dual Buckle anchored in the vehicle by one bolt, the Dual Buckle having common anchorage attachment.

The standard does not cope fully with this design and I suggest that it is tested in the following manner. The Dual Buckle should be tested statically at 5000 lbs and survive this test. This test would be in addition to the loop load test. The anchorage bolt would be tested to 9000 lbs. I have chosen 5000 lbs as a test limit for the following reason. The loop load test is done at 5000 lbs, the attachments being subjected to a load of 2500 lbs during this test. To prove the dual buckle we need to test it statically at twice this load of 2,500 lbs i.e. 5,000 lbs.

I would appreciate your comments on my proposal.

I have also written this letter to Mr A Cardarelli of AAMVA.

Yours faithfully

J E BINGHAM -- MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY COMPONENTS SECTION, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION

(Photo Omitted)

ID: nht81-2.46

DATE: 07/11/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; John Womack; NHTSA

TO: Maryland Department of Transportation

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

ID: nht81-2.47

DATE: 07/14/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Firestone Tire Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your recent letter to Mr. Kratzke of my staff, describing a situation in which a railroad car full of new tires caught on fire. As a result of the damage caused to the tires by the fire, Firestone's quality control staff determined that the tires could no longer be certified as safe for highway use. The railroad company has refused to pay your claim for damage to the tires unless Firestone releases the damaged tires to the railroad company. You stated that the railroad company will either sell the tires through its salvage outlets or use the tires on company vehicles. You ask whether you can rightfully withhold these tires from the railroad company.

If Firestone releases the tires and the railroad company sells the tires or uses them on the public roads, both Firestone and the railroad company would violate an express provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) ("the Safety Act"). Therefore, you can rightfully withhold the tires from the railroad company.

Your letter did not indicate whether the damaged tires were tires for passenger cars or tires for motor vehicles other than passenger cars. In either case, the tire manufacturer is required to certify that each tire fully complies with certain marking requirements and with specified performance requirements (resistance to bead unseating, strength, endurance, and high speed performance) of Safety Standard No. 109 in the case of passenger car tires (49 CFR @ 571.109) or of Safety Standard No. 119 for tires other than passenger car tires (49 CFR @ 571.119). This certification is made by the manufacturer by molding the letters "DOT" into the sidewall of the tire.

As a result of the damage to this particular shipment of tires, your company has determined that this certification is no longer valid. This determination obligates Firestone to remove the "DOT" symbol from the sidewall of the tires.

Without the "DOT" symbol, these tires would clearly not comply with the requirements of either Standard No. 109 or Standard No. 119. Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)). provides:

No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, or offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any . . . item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard . . . .

Firestone would violate this prohibition if it were to deliver tires to the railroad company which were not certified as complying with the appropriate safety standard. The railroad company would violate this prohibition if it sold or offered to sell uncertified tires, or if uncertified tires were used by the company on the public roads (introduction in interstate commerce). Section 109 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1398) specifies penalties of up to $ 1000 for each violation of section 108, and each tire delivered by Firestone or sold or used by the railroad company would constitute a separate violation of section 108. Section 109 specifies that the maximum civil penalty which can be imposed for a series of related violations, which this would be, is $ 800,000 for each violator.

You indicated that Firestone would not release the damaged tires for use in any case, because of the potential safety hazard. I hope that this response reinforces that position. Should you need any further information on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. Please show this letter to the interested railroad company so that it will realize the serious nature of its contemplated actions.

SINCERELY,

Firestone TIRE COMPANY

June 24, 1981

The National Highway Safety Administration Office of Chief Counsel

Attention: Steven Kratzke

Dear Mr. Kratzke:

Pursuant to our phone conversation this morning, we would appreciate hearing from you and the National Highway Safety Administration as to the disposition to be made on tires which have been exposed to fire while in transit. We experience approximately five of these situations per year and recently we've experienced an incident where the carrier is demanding that we release to them the salvage.

In this particular incident, the carload of 1,596 tires was shipped from our Decatur, Illinois Plant back in June of 1979. Enroute the carrier noticed a missing hasp and ordered the car confined to its repair track until a new hasp could be affixed to the car. In the process of welding the hasp on to the car a small fire started which the carrier's employees quickly extinguished. After a break for lunch and the subsequent return from lunch the car was again found ablaze. The car was again extinguished by both the railroad's employees and the local fire department.

Our Quality Control people inspected the tires and found them to be in a condition not suitable for highway use. The railroad retained outside experts in this area and our company likewise retained experts to evaluate the condition of these tires to confirm basically what our Quality Control people originally decided. Both these outside firms cannot guarantee the safety of these tires. The railroad has refused to pay our claim unless we release these tires to them to be salvaged through their salvage outlets to the public or for use on their own company vehicles. We find this railroad's request in total disregard of public safety.

We would appreciate your confirming in writing basically how the National Highway Safety Administration feels about this and whether or not a manufacturer of tires, such as Firestone is correct in wanting to scrap these tires in such a manner that they are never used on the highway. We are confirming at this time that we have no intentions of releasing these tires to this particular railroad but would appreciate your decision as to whether or not we can rightfully withhold these tires from the railroad for their salvaging, which in the end will hopefully produce a settlement from the railroad for the value of these tires which they destroyed.

Thank you.

C. L. BIDDLE SUPERVISOR OF CLAIMS GENERAL TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

ID: nht81-2.48

DATE: 07/16/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: CSMPCO Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of March 3, 1981, providing additional information about the "Downshift Warning System Kit."

After reviewing this information and the points you make concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, we wish to point out that the pertinent provisions of this standard are S4.1.3 and S4.5.4. For your information, a copy of Standard 108 is enclosed.

You will note that S4.1.3 provides that: "No additional lamp, reflective device or other motor vehicle equipment shall be installed that impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by the standard." Further, you will note that S4.5.4 provides that: "The stop lamps on each vehicle shall be activated upon application of the service brakes." This means that your system must not impair the effectiveness of the stop lamps that are original equipment on the vehicle, and that any application of the service brakes that does not activate the stop lamps would be inconsistent with Federal requirements. As we have made no formal study of your system, you will have to determine whether a vehicle on which it is installed would meet Standard No. 108.

Also enclosed for your information is a copy of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Section 108(a)(2)(A) is interpreted to mean that the installation of your system on a used vehicle by a person other than its owner must not render inoperative in whole or in part, the stop lamp system. However, the prohibitions of the Act and the standard do not cover sale of your system as an aftermarket device nor its installation solely by the vehicle owner. Use of it is subject to State regulation.

We would also like to call your attention to the agency's study: "Field Test Evaluation of Rear Lighting Deceleration Signals - Analytical and Experimental Studies (1979)" (DOT HS 805 061). We urge that you obtain a copy of this report and consider it carefully with regard to your system. You may obtain a copy by writing to the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

The agency has tentatively decided that a single high-mounted auxiliary stop lamp is the most effective way of preventing rear end collisions and has proposed that such be made available both as original equipment and in the aftermarket. I enclose a copy of the proposal for your consideration.

ENCLS.

CSMPCO CORPORATION

March 3, 1981

Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel Office of Chief Counsel, NOA-30 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Berndt:

Compliance status of the "Chicoine Downshift Warning System Kit" with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Nos. 105, 108 and 121.

In your letter of November 14, 1980 you informed me:

* Your review of standard Nos. 105 and 121 show that installation of the kit on a vehicle would not render it noncompliant with them.

* I regard to the lighting standard No. 108, you have several questions for me to answer.

But first, I wish to inform you that I have added a "Conditioned Availability" ancillary system, to the basic kit (return samples). It is a permissive concept introduced to guard against the main system's abuser by its user(s), whether the attempt(s) is inadvertently or maliciously perpetrated.

If you will, please carry the evaluation of compliance to the lighting standard No. 108, using my up-graded system.

I have two versions to present of the ancillary system for the compliance evaluation:

First version: Vacuum Control/engine intake manifold's high vacuum condition triggers, a normally openned, permissive switch's closing. The switch is wired in series with the gear shift knob switch, the closing of both switches is required for the activation of the brake lights.

A vacuum delay valve and a vacuum control valve are added to the ancillary system, to give it a time delay effect that will reduce the system sensitivity to the intake manifold vacuum fast variances. This way an operator can upshift without incurring activation risks of his vehicle brakelights.

1) Delay Valve

A delay valve is fitted in the vacuum line between/near the permissive vacuum-operated switch and the present vacuum control valve. The delay valve is an air flow (vacuum) restrictor, it allows unrestricted flow of air one way and impeded flow the other way. It is necessitated for protection continuity in upshift operation.

2) Present vacuum control valve

The preset control valve is vacuum operated and is fitted in the vacuum line between/near the delay valve and the intake manifold. The preset vacuum control valve closes when the vacuum drops by 5" hg. below the triggering vacuum setting of the permissive vacuum-operated switch. It is necessitated for protection continuity in upshift operation.

Second version: Electronic control/the control device's logic reads the vehicle's deceleration rate and compares it to the manufacturer selected rates (i.e.: 1.5 mph/sec. is acceptable). And as long as the vehicle deceleration rate matches or exceeds the device's set rate, the control device enters and remains into an available operative mode. With the electronic control device in an available operative mode the vehicle's operator can then activate his vehicle's brakelights by using the gearshift switch.

Hall Effect Devices or Wire Coils are used with magnets to generate signals of vehicle velocity to the electronic control device. The takeoffs are from the vehicle's drive shaft or the vehicle speedomaster cable.

A power transistor that is built-in with the electronic control device, is used instead of the electrical-mechanical relay found in the basic kit.

To your first question: "We would like to know if your system prevents the turn signal lamps from flashing, in lamps combining stoplamp and turn signal lamps."

The answer is no. My system will not prevent the turn signal lamps from flashing in lamps combining stoplamps and turn signal lamps.

First reason) The brake switch is not a controlling component for the turn signal lamps flashing operation(s).

Second reason) The kit's relay contact are wired in parallel with the brake pedal stoplamps switch's tabs in other words, the existing switch is simply wirejumped and the kit's relay switch is substituted for the existing brake switch.

I have a '78 Fiesta-Sport Model and it has the lamps combining stoplamps and turn signal lamps that your question refers to. Closing of the brake pedal switch does not prevent the turn signal lamps from flashing, nor does the closing to the kit relays contact prevent the turn signal lamps from flashing. I carried the experience in my garage.

Reply to your second question and closing request: "We would like clarification whether the system activates the stop lamps by pushing the button alone or whether actual motion of the gear shift lever is also required. If the former, we would appreciate your views on possible abuses) of the system, . . . . "

Your second question and closing request convey a message of concern for abuse(s) of the system. That message has influenced my decision to supplement my basic kit with the conditioned availability ancillary system, both versions are automated, beyond operator's control, and work on a permissive concept basis to keep in check main system's abuses.

The content in your second question is a good example of conditioned availability -- the motion of the shift lever be reflected as a condition to fulfill for the system operativeness. But I have not selected as a requirement the motion of the shift lever for the system operativeness.

I have given consideration to the following points:

1) The gear selection(s) for an upshift or a downshift in vehicle(s) equipped with a manual transmission is left to the operator's discretion and vehicle's demand(s).

2) The traffic flow pattern(s) does very i.e.: A traffic flow pattern may dictate a downshift:

* for an acceleration of the vehicle

* for a deceleration of the vehicle

3) The cost of retrofitting of the vehicles already on the roads.

4) The selected permissive ancillary systems' operations:

* are to be fully automated

* are to be controlled by inputs that are relating to the vehicle modal status of acceleration and deceleration.

* in case of component(s) failure, the system is to become inoperative, the fail safe concept.

5) The activation of the downshift warning system kit is to remain a manual, conscious operation by the vehicle operator.

6) The language of the vehicles' stoplamps: To the non-lead driver, the following message have become universal standards, for the vehicles moving on relatively flat grade.

1. Stoplights OFF - Brakes OFF - STOP NOT IN Progress

2. Stoplights ON - Brakes ON - STOP IN Progress

*3. Stoplights OFF - Brakes ON - STOP IN Progress

**4. Stoplights OFF - Brakes OFF - STOP IN Progress

* The message applies in cases where the stoplamps system of the lead vehicle is defective (i.e.: burnt stoplamps).

** The message applies in cases where the lead vehicle operator uses the engine brake (downshifts) to come to a stop or a slowdown. I refer to this message as "The Burnt Stoplights Syndrome."

Note: Operating a vehicle that has its stoplamps system out of order (i.e.: burnt stoplamps) is inconsiderate of other people's safety and is incomsiderate of one's (operator) own safety as well. The same can be said for the operator(s) that downshift to a stop. I address this "The Burnt Stoplamps Syndrome." The use of the device can help keep in check "The Burnt Stoplamps Syndrome." The device restores safety to the operator(s) that uses the downshift method to stop/slowdown his vehicle. The following driver(s) will share same.

7) The device is not to impair the integrity and effectiveness of lighting equipment that the standard requires. The device is to enhance the integrity and effectiveness of lighting equipment that the standard requires.

Downshifting makes use of engine braking energy instead of letting it be wasted. In a world that is energy short, let's make it safe to use that stopping method.

I trust that I have satisfactorily answered your questions. Enclosed is a flow-sheet layout copy of the kit's components and wiring, first version adaptation.

Gustave J. Chicoine, President CSMPCO Corporation ENC.

(Graphics omitted)

WIRING DIAGRAM

ID: nht81-2.49

DATE: 07/17/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Department of Transportation; Michigan

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your March 30, 1981 letter pertaining to the mounting of an old school bus body on a new chassis. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has stated that such a mounting constitutes the manufacture of a new motor vehicle and must comply with all applicable safety standards in effect at the time of that manufacture. This statement comes from previous agency interpretations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and from the rationale underlying the provisions of section 571.7(e) of our regulations. You state that section 571.7(e) applies only to trucks and, accordingly, has no application to school buses.

The agency has had a longstanding position that a vehicle combining an old body and new chassis is a new vehicle. This position was developed and applied long before the proposal of section 571.7(e) in May 1975. See, for example, the enclosed 1972 letter of interpretation and the discussion of pre-proposal interpretations in the enclosed copy of the May 1975 proposal.

The codification in section 571.7(e) of the agency's position as regards trucks did not alter its simiar position as regards other vehicle types. I am enclosing a 1978 interpretation stating that school buses will be treated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in the same fashion as trucks are under section 571.7(e). The reason for this interpretation is the similarity of the practice of manufacturing school buses and trucks on new truck chassis. Accordingly, the agency has applied the same rationale in determining those vehicles, e.g., buses, that are to be considered newly-manufactured.

In light of these existing interpretations and in the interest of safety, the agency is retaining its position that vehicles using old bodies and new chassis be treated as newly manufactured vehicles.

ENCLS.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

March 30, 1981

Roger Tilton, Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Tilton:

The State of Michigan is in the grips of a financial crisis which is now threatening the children of this State through the local school's inability to provide new school buses to replace those which have reached the end of their life expectancy.

New school bus purchases are off by about 75% due to budget constraints which have also reduced the State's assistance to the school district from 68% during the last reimbursement period to an expected 30% for the 80-81 fiscal year. In this State, we turn over 1,900 school buses each year.

As a means to provide safe, dependable and economical school bus transportation, the local school districts are contemplating rehabilitation of these older school buses.

Rebuilding an old school bus is easy and economically rewarding. However, there are many old school bus bodies (approx. 20% or 350 each year) that would better serve the fleet if they were mounted on new chassis.

We, in the State of Michigan, are fully aware of previous interpretation of Part 571.7(e) of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards which relates to combining new and used components. The interpretations which are printed for all who ask, come from Joan Claybrook's office and from Frank Berndt do not say one shall not put an old school bus body on a new chassis, BUT that when an old school bus body is placed on a new chassis, the entire re-manufactured vehicle must comply with all of the FMVSS's in effect on the date of re-manufacture. The interpretation leads us to Part 571.7(e).

The Part 571.7(e) relates to "TRUCKS" and does not address "BUS" or school bus. Since there is "TRUCK" listed in definitions, Part 571.3 and the word "BUS" is also in definitions Part 571.3; we contend that 571.7(e) does not apply to Bus or School Bus since 571.7(e) does not refer to "BUS" in its content.

We do not accept the interpretation provided by Joan Claybrook or Frank Berndt. We completely understand that by allowing these used buses manufactured prior to April 1, 1977 to wash out of the system that in a few years the only buses on the road will be those which were manufactured in compliance with 220, 221, & 222.

The Part 571.7(e) also tells us that the re-manufactured truck must meet the current FMVSS "unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle." Therefore, if we in Michigan make these drive line changes we do not have a re-manufactured truck and we can continue to use a pre April 1, 1977 school bus body which still does not meet 220, 221, & 222; while mounted on a post April 1, 1977 chassis.

I submit to you that your office, NHTSA, is saying that we may not put a pre April 1, 1977 school bus body on a post April 1, 1977 chassis unless the body is updated to meet the post April 1, 1977 FMVSS 220, 221, & 222, OR instead of updating the body, we may install a used engine, transmission, and rear end in the new chassis; two of those three components must come from the same used vehicle.

Your interpretation is illogical and seemingly does not apply where school buses are concerned. We respectfully request a new interpretation keeping in mind that it is President Reagan's philosophy that those Federal Regulations which are non-productive, yet require great expense in order to comply; are Regulations with which we need to deal.

The State of Michigan, the State Department of Education, and I personally feel bound to comply with Federal Law; however, we do not feel bound to comply with an interpretation which smacks of pressure from the manufacturers and dealers who are in the business to sell new bodies.

We eagerly await your response.

Larry Louderback, Safety Specialist Pupil Transportation

cc: PHIL O'LEARY - SAFETY & TRAFFIC PROG; MR. WEINHEIMER - MICH. SCH. BD. ASSOC.; MR. TEBBE - UNION CITY SCH. DIST.; SENATOR DON RIEGLE; ROD LAMORE - GRAND RAPIDS STATE POLICE; DREW LEWIS - TRANS. SEC.; NHTSA

ID: nht81-2.5

DATE: 03/17/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Thiele Incorporated

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

NOA-30

Mr. Ted Thiele Thiele Incorporated P.O. Box 188 111 Spruce Street Windber, PA 15963

Dear Mr. Thiele

This is in response to your letter forwarding your firm's vehicle identification numbering system and requesting confirmation that it complies with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 -Vehicle identification number.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not give advance approval of a manufacturer's compliance with motor vehicle safety standards or regulations, as it is the manufacturer's responsibility under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to ensure that its vehicles comply with the applicable safety standards. However, my office has reviewed your proposed system. Based on our understanding of the information which you have provided, your system apparently complies with Standard No. 115.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

January 28, 1981

Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. 400 Commonwealth Drive Warrendale, PA 15096

Attention: Leo P. Ziegler, Jr.

Gentlemen:

We are enclosing copy of our coding system to be used in our trailer identification numbers. We will not begin to use this system until we have your approval.

Yours truly,

THIELE, INCORPORATED

Ted Thiele

TT:rr cc: N. F. Erickson, NHTSA?DOT

ID: nht81-2.50

DATE: 07/22/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: British Standards Institution

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of June 8, 1981, concerning Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. You are correct that my letter of June 1, 1981, on the abrasion test procedure of the standard should have referred to section 5.1(d), instead of to section 5.2(d).

You also suggested that in the process of clarifying the standard's abrasion requirements, the agency should consider possible modifications to sections 4.2(e) and (f) of the standard. In the process of reviewing the abrasion test requirements, the agency will also examine those other sections to determine what changes should be made.

Finally, you raised the issue of whether the standard, as with other national and international standards, should have a requirement that conditioned webbing must retain a certain percentage of its unconditioned strength and must also meet the minimum strength requirement for unconditioned webbing. The agency is not aware of any data indicating that our current conditioned strength requirements are insufficient.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

JUNE 8, 1981

F Berndt -- U.S. Department Transportation, National Highway Traffic Administration

Dear Mr Berndt

Many thanks for your letter dated 1 June 1981 regarding abrasion testing to FMVSS 209. However, should Section 5.2 (d), when it occurs, read 5.1 (d)?

I understand your reasoning for the clarification, however, should this be extended to cover Sections 4.2 (e) and 4.2 (f)?

In most of the National and International specifications which we test to the strength after conditioning must be above a certain percentage of its unconditioned strength and also above the minimum required strength of the webbing. You are permitting the use of webbing that might, after abrasion, fall below your minimum strength requirement. Do you have any comments on this?

I look forward to receiving a prompt reply to the first paragraph. Yours sincerely

J E BINGHAM -- SENIOR TEST ENGINEER, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY COMPONENTS SECTION, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION

ID: nht81-2.6

DATE: 03/20/81

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

MARCH 20, 1981 NOA-30

Mr. Charles E. Payne Boyd, Payne, Gates & Farthing Virginia National Bank Building Suite 1240 One Commercial Place Norfolk, Virginia 23510

Dear Mr. Payne:

This responds to your recent letter concerning the problem plaintiffs' lawyers in civil cases have in obtaining certain data from foreign manufacturers of automobiles. Your letter specifically asked if there are any Federal safety standards concerning the crashworthiness of automobile seats. You state that the Department of Transportation informed you by letter that there are no such standards.

This is incorrect. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 207, Seating Systems (49 CFR 571.207), specifies performance requirements for vehicle seats in passenger cars and other vehicles. The standard requires passenger seats to be able to withstand forces equal to twenty times the weight of the seat without collapsing. This is a static test in which the force is applied directly to the seat. The standard does not, however, require a dynamic crash test of vehicles to determine seat integrity, such as the tests used by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety cited in your letter. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended 1974 (15 U.S.C. 1381, et seq.), Toyota Motor Company is required to certify that its vehicles comply with Safety Standard No. 207. I am enclosing a copy of the standard for your information.

Please contact Hugh Oates of my office if you require any further information (202-426-2992).

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel Enclosure

March 5, 1981

Frank Berndt, Esquire Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation 400 7th Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Berndt:

Congressman Bill Whitehurst forwarded to you my recommendation concerning legislation or regulations aimed at forcing foreign manufacturers of mechanical products imported into this country, to file for record with your agency certain data accessable to private litigants. You sent him a reply letter dated February 18th and he sent me a copy.

Your letter was informative and helpful. I would even agree that the regulations that you referred to are of some help. However, I do not think they truly meet the problem.

A news release issued by the Department of Transportation reported that foreign imports were notably less safe than their American counterpart automobiles. I also have in my possession in connection with litigation I am now pursuing against Toyota, data from various organizations around the country which data discloses that occupant safety and crashworthiness are of little concern to those who manufacture their cars and ship them into our country from abroad. The same data also diclosed that American manufacturers, on the other hand, have by-in-large, done very well in comparison to the foreign manufacturers in the area of crashworthiness and occupant safety.

I believe that most attorneys who practice products liability litigation will agree that the greatest single impetus for improved crashworthiness and occupant safety of American automobiles has been our system of tort liability, and the effectiveness of our courts and plaintiff's counsel in bringing to light defects and unsafe designs in automobiles.

Apparently however, most notably our Japanese friends have by-in-large not been subjected to the same examination by litigation of their design concepts and practices with respect to occupant safety. I for one am convinced, as are a good many of my colleagues at the plaintiff's bar, that part of the reason for this is the substantial difficulty of gaining access to files and records of the foreign manufacturers. This same difficulty was a subject of an in depth investigative reporting effort by "60 Minutes" last year. Perhaps you are aware of it.

The problem has not been an inability to gain in personam jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturers. That is the easiest part of it. However, once they are in court, they have proven very adroit at using every conceivable tool to preclude production for examination by plaintiff's experts of such things as design specifications, computer simulation data, and films of crash testing. Their excuses include the language barrier, the transoceanic legistics and communications probIems, as well as the "We are a multi-national corporation with warehouses full of documents, and it is impossible to locate what you want" excuse.

I believe that if the Japanese and Germans, whose cars are the principal culprits, were forced by the spector of substantial civil liability quickly and efficiently imposed, they would build their cars with the crashworthiness and occupant protection equal to American cars. I also dare say that if they had to do so, they could not market their cars at a price competitive to American makes.

While I appreciate the intent of the regulations you cite which require all automobiles imported to be certified to meet the Department of Transportation safety standard, that program does not appear to have yet begun to prove effective. One reason is that the Department of Transportation safety standards are by no means comprehensive. In particular, with respect to the suit I now have against Toyota, the Department of Transportation has advised me by letter J that there is no safety standard currently in existence with respect to the crashworthiness and design safety of passenger seats. The decedent, whom I epresent, died as a result of his seat collapsing upon moderate rear end impact making it possible for his upper torso, neck and head to be whipsawed, and in turn resulting in a fatal injury to the brain stem. It is with somewhat bitter irony that I refer you to report A-4650.01, dated November 1973, issued by General Environments Corporation and prepared for the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. That report and others like it cite over and over again that upon moderate impact from the rear, the seats of most of the foreign imports collapsed, exposing the occupant to serious and avoidable risk injury, whereas the same testing done on American makes shows a dramatically lower incidence of seat failure.

If I have been misinformed, and if there truly is a Department of Transportation safety standard concerning the crashworthiness of automobile seats, I would appreciate a copy of such standard. Also, if there is such a standard I should like to report that I have serious reason to believe that Toyota automobiles manufactured between 1973 and 1979 do not meet anyones safety standard with respect to the design of their seats, and especially the bucket seats.

I appreciate your time and attention to this letter and its intent.

Yours very truly,

BOYD, PAYND, GATES & FARTHING

Charles E. Payne

CEP:wjb

cc: Mr. James Kelly