ID: 8096

Mr. Harry Cameron
Safety, Ltd.
31W651 North Ave.
Dupage Airport
West Chicago, IL 60185

Dear Mr. Cameron:

This responds to your letter of November 23, 1992 requesting information on "the procedure to obtain certification for the repair and recertification of motor vehicle passenger restraints to comply with DOT 206-3206." When you were contacted by Mary Versailles of my staff for clarification on what DOT 206-3206 is, you explained that you are also unfamiliar with this requirement but had been told that you had to comply with it. Based on your request, this letter will explain the laws and regulations administered by this agency, and the responsibilities of your company when you repair motor vehicle safety belts by replacing worn or frayed webbing.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.; Safety Act) to issue motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self- certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards.

NHTSA has exercised its authority under the Safety Act to establish Standard No. 209, Seat belt Assemblies, (49 CFR 571.209) which sets forth strength, elongation, webbing width, durability, and other requirements for seat belt assemblies. This standard applies to all seat belt assemblies as separate items of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements.

The Safety Act provides that no person shall manufacture, import, or sell any new item of motor vehicle equipment unless it complies with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. See 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A). If you were manufacturing new seat belt assemblies to replace those with worn or frayed webbing, you would be required to certify that the new assemblies complied with Standard No. 209. If you were installing replacement assemblies, the manufacturer of those assemblies would have certified that the assemblies comply with Standard No. 209.

The requirement that an item of motor vehicle equipment comply with all applicable safety standards applies only until the item's first purchase in good faith for purposes other than resale. See 15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1). After such first purchase, the only provision in Federal law that affects modifications that can be made to the item is set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A). That section provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

This section would prohibit you from replacing the worn or frayed webbing in a manner that would negatively affect the seat belt assembly's compliance with Standard No. 209. Violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition are subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation.

We urge you to exercise care when repairing safety belts. The belts you repair will fail to achieve their intended purpose if the webbing breaks or separates from the hardware or vehicle in a crash. Additionally, you may wish to consult a private attorney familiar with the law regarding potential liability in tort for your business in these circumstances.

I have enclosed an information sheet for new manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment that briefly explains the responsibilities imposed on manufacturers, and tells how to get copies of the relevant laws and regulations.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:VSA#209 d:2/22/93

ID: 8099b

Mr. Vasant Jinwala
Consumer Testing Laboratories
480 Neponset Street
Canton, MA 02021

Dear Mr. Jinwala:

This responds to your inquiry about a product known as the "Comfort Cushion" that your organization is testing for compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, (49 CFR 571.302). According to the product's packaging that accompanied your letter, the Comfort Cushion is intended to be placed over seats in motor vehicles as well as in homes and offices. You stated that a Comfort Cushion you tested did not conform to Standard No. 302. You further stated that the product's manufacturer believes that Standard No. 302 only applies to a car's original equipment and does not apply to an aftermarket auto accessory. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you.

By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized to regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 102(4) of the Safety Act defines, in relevant part, the term "motor vehicle equipment" as:

any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured or any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of such system, part, or component or as any accessory, or addition to the motor vehicle ...

In determining whether an item of equipment is considered an accessory, NHTSA applies two criteria. The first criterion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine a product's expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that retails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is intended to be used principally by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If the product satisfies both criteria, then the product is considered to be an "accessory" and thus is subject to the provisions of the Safety Act.

Applying these criteria to the Comfort Cushion, it appears that this product would be an accessory and thus an item of motor vehicle equipment under the Safety Act. Based on our understanding of the product, it appears that a substantial portion of the expected use of the Comfort Cushion will be during motor vehicle operations. In addition, it appears that the product would typically be used by ordinary users of motor vehicles since it is intended to be placed over the vehicle's seats.

While it appears that the Comfort Cushion is an item of motor vehicle equipment, NHTSA has not issued any standards setting forth performance requirements for such a device. Standard No. 302 would not apply to the device because that standard applies to new motor vehicles and not to aftermarket items of motor vehicle equipment.

However, there are other Federal laws that indirectly affect the manufacture and sale of the Comfort Cushion. The manufacturer of the product is subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. In the event that the manufacturer or NHTSA determines that the product contains a safety related defect, the manufacturer would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and for remedying the problem free of charge.

A commercial business that installs the Comfort Cushion would be subject to provisions of the Safety Act that affect whether the business may install the product on a vehicle. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)) provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

Any violation of this "render inoperative" prohibition would subject the violator to a potential civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation. A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business that installs an aftermarket item of rapidly burning material could vitiate the compliance of the materials that were present in the vehicle at the time of the vehicle's sale to the first consumer. Such an installation could constitute a possible violation of the render inoperative prohibition.

Please note also that the render inoperative prohibition does not apply to modifications vehicle owners make to their own vehicles. Thus, Federal law would not apply in situations where individual vehicle owners install the Comfort Cushion in their own vehicles, even if the installation were to result in the vehicle no longer complying with the safety standards. However, individual States have the authority to regulate modifications that individual vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:302#VSA d.1/22/93

ID: 8107

Mr. Stan Kaplan
Shimazaki Corp.
10 Columbus Circle
New York, NY 10019

Dear Mr. Kaplan:

This responds to your letter of December 10, 1992, with respect to the relationship of Federal motor vehicle regulations to the Red Alert device that you wish to import and sell in the United States.

The device is located on the accelerator rod. When there is a sudden release of the accelerator, the stop lamps are activated before the driver's foot has touched the service brake pedal. You state also that installation of the device is quick and simple, requiring 10 to 15 minutes and no special tools. You have asked if Red Alert "meets the standard set by your administration and the (sic) how we can get a waiver on this product or does it require one at all."

The descriptive literature that you enclosed notes (under "Authorization Requirements for Installation") that "there are many countries in which it is mandated by regulations that only the brake pedal activate the rear brake lights," and that "Red Alert, situated as it is on the accelerator rod, is illegal in these countries." The United States is one of these countries. Under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, the stop lamps may only be activated by the brake pedal. This means that a vehicle that is equipped with Red Alert no longer complies with Standard No. 108.

Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, this means that the manufacturer of the vehicle, and any distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business who installs Red Alert is liable for a civil penalty for creating the noncompliance. In addition, if the noncompliance is created by the manufacturer of the vehicle, the manufacturer is obliged to notify owners of the noncompliance, and then to remedy it. However, the Act does not restrict the owner of the vehicle from such modifications as (s)he may perform, even if the modifications result in a noncompliance, unless State laws so forbid. Thus, Federal law does not prohibit a vehicle owner from installing Red Alert but (s)he may not enlist the services of a distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business to perform the installation. In no circumstance is importation and sale of the device itself a violation of Federal law.

These matters and the agency's views on the device are set forth more fully in the enclosed agency letter of January 25, 1990, concerning the Advanced Brake Light Device (ABLD). Noting that both the ABLD and Red Alert originate in Israel, we surmise that Red Alert is a variant of the ABLD. Although the interpretation in this letter does allow installation of the Red Alert at the hands of the vehicle owner, our conclusion is based upon Federal law and should not be construed as an endorsement of the device. The same safety concerns that we expressed in January 1990 remain valid today.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d.12/29/92

ID: 8111

Mr. Daniel K. Upham
President
Sys Tek Corporation
444 N. Zachary, Suite 111
Moorpark, CA 93021

Dear Mr. Upham:

This responds to your letter of December 9, 1992, with respect to whether a "portable lighted message display using L.E.D. technology" is permissible under Federal law. The product would be sold in the aftermarket. As you indicate, "[i]t will be either battery powered or it will be powered using the vehicle power source via cigarette lighter or directly to the car's electrical harness." It will be installed in either the side rear or rear window.

We assume that battery-powered devices, and those activated through the cigarette lighter, are so simple that the vehicle owner can install and use the device without resorting to the assistance of others. Under this circumstance, there is no restriction that applies to this device under the laws administered by this agency. Nevertheless, the device may be subject to restrictions imposed by a State in which it is operated.

However, if attaching the device to the car's electrical harness is a task that may be performed by a person other than the vehicle owner, a different consideration applies. A manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or motor vehicle repair business may not install the device if it renders inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Examples of equipment added pursuant to a Federal standard and that could be affected by the sign board are the stop lamps, both center highmounted and conventional, and the inside rear view mirror. I enclose a copy of an interpretation of the agency dated August 17, 1989, to Mr. Alan S. Eldahr, and call your attention to our views on impairment by message boards expressed on the second page. This letter also provides the address of an organization that you may consult on applicable State laws.

Installation of the message board in a side rear window by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business would appear permissible. The only required side lighting equipment are front and rear lamps and reflectors, intended to mark the extremities of the vehicles, and we do not believe that their function would be negatively affected by installation of the message board.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d.12/28/92

ID: 8112

Mr. William R. Willen
Managing Counsel
Product Legal Group
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
1919 Torrance Boulevard
Torrance, CA 90501-2746

Dear Mr. Willen:

This responds to your letter of December 7, 1992 requesting an interpretation of the definition of "designated seating position" in 49 CFR Section 571.3. You request confirmation of your belief that a proposed Honda seat design would have two designated seating positions. For the proposed design, "(t)he hip room is 44.2 inches over the length of the seat, and the seat width is only 39 inches. The seat is flat and does not have stiff inboard seat belt receptacles."

The term "designated seating position" is defined at 49 CFR 571.3 as:

any plan view location capable of accommodating a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, if the overall seat configuration and design is such that the position is likely to be used as a seating position while the vehicle is in motion, except for auxiliary seating accommodations such as temporary or folding jump seats. Any bench or split-bench seat in a passenger car, truck or multipurpose passenger vehicle with a GVWR less than 10,000 pounds, having greater than 50 inches of hip room (measured in accordance with SAE Standard J1100(a)) shall have not less than three designated seating positions, unless the seat design or vehicle design is such that the center position cannot be used for seating.

If the seat has only 44.2 inches of hip room, the seat would probably qualify as having only two seating positions, since this value is below the 50-inch specification in the definition of "designated seating position." Please note, however, that the 50-inch specification does not mean that some vehicle seats with less than 50 inches of hip room should not also have more than two designated seating positions if the vehicle and seat design is such that three positions would likely be used. The specification is merely the amount of space the agency will consider as conclusive evidence that there should be at least three designated seating positions.

You ask if our answer would be different if fixed or movable armrests were provided. A fixed armrest does affect the measurement of designated seating position, since a fixed armrest would impede a person from sitting in the center position. NHTSA has stated in the preamble to the rule adopting the definition of designated seating position that the space occupied by a fixed, stationary armrest "would not be considered hip room and would not be included in the measurement of the 50-inch limitation." 44 FR 23229; April 19, 1979. A fixed armrest on your seat would show your intent that the position is not intended to be used as a seat.

Your letter also asked if the interpretation would be different if the seat width was greater than 39 inches. The number of designated seating positions is determined by the hip room, therefore, if the hip room remained the same, the seat would have the same number of designated seating positions even if the seat width was increased. Finally, you asked if the interpretation would be different if the seat were installed in a wider vehicle or positioned differently in the vehicle. Again, those modifications would only require an increase in the number of designated seating positions if the hip room were increased by these changes.

Finally, I emphasize that this letter only represents the agency's opinion based on the information supplied in your letter. NHTSA does not pass approval on any vehicle design, prior to the actual events that underlie certification. It is up to the manufacturer to determine whether its vehicles comply with all applicable safety standards and regulations, and to certify its vehicles in accordance with that determination.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:571.3 d:2/24/93

ID: 8125a

W.C. Burke, Captain
Department of California Highway Patrol
P.O. Box 942898
Sacramento, CA 94298-0001

Dear Mr. Burke:

This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of FMVSS No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR 571.205). This interpretation is based on my understanding of the statements in your letter as well as statements made by Mr. Greg Bragg of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) in a telephone conversation with Mr. Clarke Harper of this agency's Office of Vehicle Safety Standards and Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff.

You ask about the marking responsibilities of glass installers who put replacement glass in school buses. CHP personnel have found school buses with replacement glass that is not marked. You ask whether an installer who cuts sections of glass from a larger, marked section is required by S6.4 of FMVSS No. 205 to mark each individual smaller section (if not already marked) prior to installing them as replacement windows. As explained below, the answer to your question is yes.

The person who cuts a section of glazing to size for installation in a motor vehicle is considered a manufacturer of the glazing. This is because the item of glazing is not considered manufactured until it is in the form that it will actually be sold for installation into a motor vehicle. This position that the person cutting the glazing is a manufacturer was stated early in the history of Standard No. 205, in a letter to Donald Counihan (May 9, 1968). The agency has stated frequently since then that persons cutting sections of glazing are manufacturers, most notably in a preamble for a 1972 rule on Standard No. 205 adopting the requirements of S6.4. (37 FR 24035, November 11, 1972) NHTSA stated that S6.4 requires "persons who cut glazing" to include the markings required by Standard No. 205 "on each cut piece."

S6.4 requires each person who cuts glazing to mark the piece with the markings required by section 6 of American National Standard (ANS) Z26. Section 6, ANS Z26 requires the following information: (1) the words "American National Standard" or the characters "AS," (2) a number identifying the item of glazing, (3) a model number assigned by the manufacturer that identifies the type of construction of the glazing material, and (4) the manufacturer's distinctive designation or trademark. Section S6.5 of Standard No. 205 also requires that person to certify the material in accordance with section 114 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

While your letter refers to persons cutting sections of glazing from larger sections, we note that it is possible that an item of replacement glazing was designed for a specific vehicle by a "prime glazing material manufacturer" (i.e., "one who fabricates, laminates, or tempers the glazing material," see S6.1 of Standard No. 205). If the item was so designed by such a manufacturer, the item must be marked and certified in accordance with S6.1 and 6.2 of Standard No. 205. A person other than a prime glazing material manufacturer installing the glazing without cutting it would have no marking requirement under Standard No. 205.

I hope that you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mr. Shaw at (202) 366- 2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:205 d:3/31/93

ID: 8126

Mr. Eugene Berk
Food and Drug Administration
Center for Devices and
Radiological Health
Office of Compliance and Surveillance
1390 Piccard Dr.
Rockville, MD 20850

Dear Mr. Berk:

This follows up on telephone conversations between you and Deirdre Fujita of my staff about a letter you received from the Medical Device Inspection Company (MDI) concerning the "Tumble Forms LifeSeat." While much of the information in the letter is subject to a claim of confidentiality, Ms. Carolann Kotula-Cook of MDI told us that we can provide, for purposes of a letter that will be placed in the public docket, the following description of the LifeSeat. The LifeSeat is described by MDI as "a safety seat designed to protect children who are riding in emergency medical vehicles. The seat is designed to be secured to the ambulance stretcher or cot... [and] may also be secured to the vehicle's captain's chair." You ask whether the LifeSeat is a "child restraint system" regulated by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, "Child Restraint Systems." As discussed below, the answer is yes.

Standard No. 213 specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles and aircraft, to reduce the number of children killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft. The term "child restraint system" is defined in S4 of the standard as "any device except Type I or Type II seat belts, designed for use in a motor vehicle or aircraft to restrain, seat, or position children who weigh 50 pounds or less." As described in MDI's letter, the LifeSeat meets the child restraint system definition, since it is designed to restrain or seat a child in a motor vehicle. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, each child restraint system that is sold in or imported into the United States must be certified as complying with Standard No. 213. Since the LifeSeat is a child restraint system, it must be certified as complying with Standard No. 213.

We informed Ms. Kotula-Cook that it appears the LifeSeat would not comply with some of Standard No. 213's requirements. We have sent her a copy of the standard, and an information sheet for manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. The information sheet describes manufacturers' responsibilities under Federal law for manufacturing vehicles and items of equipment, such as the responsibility to ensure these products do not have any safety-related defects. Ms. Kotula-Cook said that MDI will be contacting us directly for more information about Standard No. 213 and these responsibilities.

We are returning the copy of MDI's letter you provided us. If you have any questions, please call Ms. Fujita at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:213 d.1/8/93

ID: 8128

Kenneth A. Gallo, Esq.
Howrey & Simon
1730 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-4793

Re: Micho Industries and Safety Research Manufacturing Inc. Exemption Petition

Dear Mr. Gallo:

This responds to your petition of December 18, 1992, on behalf of your clients, Micho Industries and Safety Research Manufacturing, Inc. The petitioners are manufacturers of an item of motor vehicle equipment called the "R-Bar Restraining System." They asked for an exemption for the R-Bar

from compliance with the testing procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. Sec. 571.222 subsections S5.1.4(c) and S5.1.4.1 & 2 (1991) for purposes of determining whether the R-Bar (when attached to a passenger seat) deflects to within four inches of any part of another passenger seat.

The petition was submitted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(B). Alternatively, you request consideration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1410(a)(1)(B). Preliminarily, let me note that the provisions of section 1397(a)(2) apply to vehicles originally manufactured to conform to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards but which are subsequently modified before or after their sale to a first purchaser for purposes other than resale. Section 1410(a) applies to a vehicle at the time of its manufacture.

Section 1397(a)(2)(A) provides, in pertinent part:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . .

Section 1397(a)(2)(B) provides that:

The Secretary may by regulation exempt any person from [subparagraph (A)] if he determines that such exemption is consistent with motor vehicle safety and the purposes of this chapter. The Secretary may prescribe regulations defining the term "render inoperative".

Thus, your petition asks, in effect, that manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses be permitted to install the R-Bar in a school bus in use, even if the installation may cause the vehicle to no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 222. Although section 1397(a)(2)(B) was added to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Act") in 1974, yours appears to be the first formal request for an exemption that the agency has received, and is therefore a case of first impression. Although NHTSA has provided advisory letters over the years interpreting "render inoperative," the NHTSA has not prescribed any "regulation" pertinent to section 1397(a)(2).

Congress did not write into the statute any limitation on the use of the section 1397(a)(2)(B) exemption authority apart from specifying that any exemption must be consistent with motor vehicle safety and the purposes of the Act. However, the committee report in the House, where the exemption provision arose, suggested a limited scope of authority. The report stated that "exemptions may be warranted for owners with special medical problems, who require special controls, or for emergency vehicles or police cruisers." While these purposes were not expressly incorporated in the statute as limitations on the exemption authority, the agency believes that it would not be appropriate to issue an exemption based on other grounds unless there were a strong, compelling reason to do so.

NHTSA does not believe that there is a strong, compelling basis for granting your clients' petition under section 1397(a)(2)(B). Indeed, NHTSA believes that the concept of using "safety bars" as occupant restraining devices in school buses raises significant safety concerns that would need careful evaluation before the agency would take any action to facilitate their use.

One concern is whether the bar could result in excessive loads (e.g., abdominal, leg, or chest) on occupants during a crash, as a result of contact between the bar and the occupants. This is a complicated issue involving many variables, including type of crash (e.g., frontal, rear), positioning of occupants (sitting up straight, leaning forward, slouching, etc.), what happens when a large occupant is seated next to a small occupant (which could affect the position of the bar relative to the small occupant), and what happens if books, brief cases, lunch boxes, etc. are placed beneath the bar or on top of the bar (thereby affecting the position of the bar relative to the occupants and/or movement of the bar during a crash). Another concern is whether the bar could result in excessive loading of occupants' heads during a crash, from head contact with the seat back in front of the occupant, instead of loading that is spread more evenly over the occupant's body.

I note that NHTSA does not have the information that would be necessary to assess your client's product in relation to these safety concerns. The agency has not conducted any testing of safety bars, and the very limited test information submitted with your client's petition does not provide a basis to make such an assessment. It is clear, however, that Standard No. 222 has been effective in ensuring a high level of occupant protection in school buses. NHTSA believes it would be inappropriate to take any action to facilitate the use of a device that potentially could reduce school bus occupant protection.

Please note, as we have advised others, the prohibition in section 1397(a)(2)(A) does not extend to the owner of the vehicle. If a school bus authority has its own private service facilities, the installation of the R-Bar by the service facilities would not violate the prohibition. However, in view of our discussion above, we would not encourage a school bus authority to make that installation.

The petitioners have also asked to be exempted pursuant to section 1410(a)(1)(B). This section excuses a noncompliance if the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of new motor vehicle safety features which provide a level of safety which is equal to or exceeds the level of safety established in the standard from which exemption is sought. However, a petitioner under section 1410(a) must be the manufacturer of the new motor vehicle for which an exemption is sought. Thus, NHTSA can not consider your clients' petition under that section. The agency would be able to consider a petition under section 1410(a)(1)(B) that is submitted by a school bus manufacturer which wished to install the R-Bar in its vehicles. However, any such petition should address the safety concerns discussed earlier in this letter.

We are returning the videotapes and two of the three copies of the petition that accompanied your letter. If you have any further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this office (202-366-5263), who spoke with you previously on this matter.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:VSA#555 d:2/19/92

ID: 8133

Mr. Dale E. Dawkins
Director
Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs
Chrysler Corporation
CIMS 415-03-17
1200 Chrysler Drive
Highland Park MI 48288-0857

Dear Mr. Dawkins:

This responds to your letter of December 16, 1992, to the Administrator informing the agency about the intent of Chrysler Corporation to manufacture 10 Chesapeake Consortium Electric Vehicles (CCEV) under NHTSA Temporary Exemption 92-1.

According to your letter, these vehicles are "almost identical" to the TEVans for which the agency granted the temporary exemption, except that they will utilize an AC electrical motor, while the ones which were the subject of the exemption petition will be powered by a DC electrical motor. You seek no broader exemption as the combined volumes of CCEVs and TEVans "will not exceed the maximum units of the petition that was granted." You have submitted this information to us so that NHTSA will have a clear understanding of the content of your electric vehicle development program and the extent of the exemptions under which these vehicles will be manufactured.

It appears that you would like confirmation from NHTSA that the CCEV vehicles are covered by Temporary Exemption 92-1. In order for the agency to provide this confirmation, it must determine that CCEV and TEVans are essentially the same vehicle and that none of the minor differences between the vehicles affects the findings made by the agency in issuing the TEVan exemption. In granting Chrysler's exemption petition covering three standards, the Administrator first found that the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of a low emission motor vehicle. We do not believe that the change in electrical propulsion from DC to AC affects this finding. The Administrator next found that an exemption from the three standards would not unduly degrade the safety of the vehicle. You state that "[b]ased on our engineering judgement, there is no significant difference between the CCEV or TEVan in terms of overall vehicle safety." While you may have used the word "significant" in an excess of caution, it implies that there are differences between CCEV and TEVan and that there is a difference in overall vehicle safety between the CCEV and TEVan, although not an important one from Chrysler's viewpoint. We would appreciate your identification of the differences between the vehicles, and of the differences, if any, in the safety between the CCEVs and TEVans that may have led to Chrysler's engineering conclusion. With this information, we shall be better able to evaluate whether the two vehicles are essentially the same and whether there is any undue degradation in safety that might render it inappropriate to consider the CCEVs covered by the TEVan exemption.

We appreciate your calling our attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:555 d:2/18/93

ID: 8133a

Mr. Dale E. Dawkins
Director
Vehicle Compliance and Safety Affairs
Chrysler Corporation
CIMS 415-03-17
1200 Chrysler Drive
Highland Park MI 48288-0857

Dear Mr. Dawkins:

We have received your letter of March 9, 1993, responding to mine of February 18.

On December 16, 1992, you informed the agency of the intent of Chrysler Corporation to manufacture 10 Chesapeake Consortium Electric Vehicles (CCEV) under NHTSA Temporary Exemption 92-1.

According to your December letter, these vehicles are "almost identical" to the TEVans for which the agency granted the temporary exemption, except that they will utilize an AC electrical motor, while the ones which were the subject of the exemption petition will be powered by a DC electrical motor. You seek no broader exemption as the combined volumes of CCEVs and TEVans "will not exceed the maximum units of the petition that was granted."

It appeared that you wished confirmation from NHTSA that the CCEV vehicles are covered by Temporary Exemption 92-1. As I informed you on February 18, in order for the agency to provide this confirmation, we must determine that CCEV and TEVans are essentially the same vehicle and that none of the minor differences between the vehicles affects the findings made by the agency in issuing the TEVan exemption. In granting Chrysler's exemption petition covering three standards, the Administrator first found that the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of a low emission motor vehicle. We do not believe that the change in electrical propulsion from DC to AC affects this finding. The Administrator next found that an exemption from the three standards would not unduly degrade the safety of the vehicle. You stated that "[b]ased on our engineering judgement, there is no significant difference between the CCEV or TEVan in terms of overall vehicle safety." While you may have used the word "significant" in an excess of caution, it implied that

there were differences between CCEV and TEVan and that there was a difference in overall vehicle safety between the CCEV and TEVan, although not an important one from Chrysler's viewpoint. Therefore, we asked you to identify the differences between the vehicles, and of the differences, if any, in the safety between the CCEVs and TEVans that may have led to Chrysler's engineering conclusion.

Your letter of March 9 informs us that there are "no discernable safety differences" between TEVans and CCEVs. It further informs us, as before, that the only difference between the two programs of electric vehicle development is the propulsion motors and transmissions. Therefore, it appears that two vehicles are essentially the same in design and in terms of the level of safety provided, and that it is appropriate to consider the CCEVs covered by the TEVan exemption.

We appreciate your calling our attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:555 d:3/24/93