ID: nht80-1.1

DATE: 01/03/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Glen Brinks

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your recent letter requesting information concerning the Federal safety regulations applicable to motorcycle fuel tanks and motorcycle trailers.

The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard regarding fuel system intergrity, Standard No. 301-75, currently does not apply to motorcycles. Two safety standards would be applicable to the manufacture of motorcycle trailers: Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment and Safety Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars.

The manufacturer of a trailer, including a motorcycle trailer, would have to certify the compliance of the trailer to these two safety standards. Part 566 of our regulations, Manufacturer Identification (49 CFR 566), specifies information which must be submitted to the NHTSA by manufactures of motor vehicles, including trailers. Part 567, Certification (49 CFR 567), specifies the content and location of the certification label or tag that must be attached to motor vehicles regulated by our standards. I am enclosing an information sheet that explains where you can obtain copies of these safety standards and regulations.

ENC.

November 23, 1979

Joseph Levin NHTSA

Dear Mr. Levin;

Some time ago, you were a big help to me when I was working on a kit car article for Road & Track magazine. Currently, I am working on another project requiring a knowledge of NHTSA regulations and I wonder if you could help out again. Could you send me a copy of the NHTSA regulations relating to 1) motorcycle fuel tank construction, type of fittings required, fuel lines, etc. and 2) motorcycle trailers? Thank you very much for your consideration.

Glenn Brinks

ID: nht80-1.10

DATE: 02/07/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Michelin Tire Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your November 16, 1979, letter in which you requested an interpretation of the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109 (49 CFR @ 571.109). Specifically, you asked if it is permissible for a tire manufacturer to label its tires with information about other tire sizes which the labeled tire could be used to replace. For example, you stated that Michelin would like to label its tires with the alphanumeric tire size which its P-metric tire sizes could replace and that Michelin would like to label its 230-15 tires as replacements for the 225-15 tires. Such labeling is expressly prohibited by Standard No. 109.

Paragraph S4.3(a) of Standard No. 109 specifies that each tire shall be labeled with "one size designation, except that equivalent inch and metric size designations may be used." With respect to the alphanumeric sizes and the P-metric replacements and the 225-15 and 230-15 sizes, the suggested replacement sizes have different section widths and minimum size factors than the sizes they would be replacing. In other words, they are not equivalent size designations, and S4.3(a) prohibits the tire from containing more than one size designation in these circumstances.

Labeling of the sort you have requested has been commonly referred to as "dual-size markings." Dual-size markings are a representation that a particular tire can be considered as meeting fully the criteria of two separate tire size designations. In fact, such tires do not satisfy the physical dimension criteria in Standard No. 109 for both size designations. As a consequence, labeling of this type was specifically prohibited when the labeling requirements of Standard No. 109 were amended at 36 FR 1195, January 26, 1971. The prohibition has been repeated in subsequent notices which addressed the question of tire labeling under the Standard; see 39 FR 10162, March 18, 1974 and 42 FR 12869, March 7, 1977.

I should note that prohibition of dual-size markings does not mean that NHTSA believes that the replacement tires would perform inadequately if installed on the rims. However, dual-size markings represent a marketing effort by tire manufacturers to attempt to persuade consumers to change the size and/or type of tires mounted on their cars. It is inappropriate to extend this marketing effort to the Federally required label on the tire. The manufacturer must provide the consumer, in a straightforward manner, technical information necessary for the safety of the consumer's automobile. This should be the only purpose of the label.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

MICHELIN TIRE CORPORATION -- Technical Group November 16, 1979

Office of the Chief Counsel -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U. S. Department of Transportation

Ref: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 109

Gentlemen:

We are considering marking our P-series tires with the alpha-numeric size they replace shown below in parenthesis. An example would be as follows:

P205/75 R15 (replaces FR78-15)

Similarly, we are considering marking our 230-15 tire as follows:

230-15 (replaces 225-15)

The 230-15 can be used on all cars that are fitted with 225-15.

Please advise us if such markings would be in violation of FMVSS 109 or any other D.O.T. Standard.

Your quick response would be appreciated since we are planning to start these programs shortly.

Thank you.

Yours truly,

John B. White -- Engineering Manager, Technical Information Dept.

ID: nht80-1.11

DATE: 02/07/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Volvo of America Corporation

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your recent letter and visit to the NHTSA regarding the proper designated seating capacity for the Volvo 262C Coupe. The rear bench seat in this vehicle is 53.15 inches wide and has two depressed areas with contoured upholstery to fashion bucket seats. You ask whether the seat may be designated as having only two seating positions.

It is the agency's opinion that the rear seat in the Volvo 262C Coupe must have three designated seating positions. The definition of "designated seating position" provides, in part, that any bench or split-bench seat having greater than 50 inches of hip room shall have not less than three designated seating positions, "unless the seat design or vehicle design is such that the center position cannot be used for seating" (49 CFR 571.3). The rear seat in the Volvo Coupe is substantially over this 50-inch caveat in the definition, since it has more than 53 inches of hip room. Further, the seat design is not such that the center position cannot be used for seating. The center position is well padded on both the seat cushion and the seat back and there is no impediment to use of the position. This was demonstrated when several persons sat at the center position when your demonstration vehicle was brought to the agency.

Your letter mentions that the Volvo Coupe has less head room than other Volvo models, yet there is sufficient head room even at the center position for large persons to occupy the seat. Therefore, we do not believe that the vehicle design is such that the center position cannot be used. The fact that the two outboard positions of the rear seat are aesthetically designed to appear as bucket seats is irrelevant, since the center position is a well-padded integral part of the entire bench seat. Other current models have the same type bucket seat appearance in the rear seat, yet because of hip room have three designated seating positions. You might examine the 1978 Oldsmobile Regency Sedan, for example.

We noted in the demonstration model that the rear seat of the Volvo Coupe has an arm rest at the center position that folds into the seat back. If the design of this arm rest were modified to be permanently attached to the seat cushion, the center position could not be used. The bench seat would then qualify as a two-person seat under the definition of "designated seating position".

Finally, I would emphasize that this letter only represents the agency's opinion based on the information supplied in your letter and an examination of the demonstration model brought to the agency. The NHTSA does not pass approval on any vehicle design, for any safety standards, prior to the actual events that underlie certification. It is up to the manufacturer to determine whether its vehicles comply with all applicable safety standards and regulations, and to certify the vehicles in accordance with that determination.

SINCERELY,

December 7, 1979

Robert Nelson National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Nelson:

This letter is sent in response to your request for information concerning the rear seat dimensions of the Volvo 262C Coupe. The width of the seat (measured in accordance with SAE Standard J1100 (a)) is 1350 mm, 53.15 inches compared to 1430 mm (56.30 in.) for other Volvo vehicles.

We are providing a Volvo Coupe for your inspection on December 11, 1979 at your offices in Washington, D. C. The Volvo Coupe is a limited production vehicle, about 1500 are expected to be sold in the United States this model year. As you know, all other Volvo models (DL, GL, GLE & GT) have a rear seat different from the Coupe and were designed to accommodate three designated rear seating positions. The rear seating depressions and design of the upholstery of the Volvo Coupe are intended to provide occupancy for two persons. The choice of a depression to divide the two seating positions was influenced by the reduced head room, as compared to other Volvo models. Based on these differences from the other Volvo models, we believe that the Volvo Coupe should be classified as a 4 passenger vehicle.

If we can provide any additional information, please let me know.

VOLVO OF AMERICA CORPORATION Product Planning and Development

Richard Tearle, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

ID: nht80-1.12

DATE: 02/08/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Brotherhood Racing

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your conversation with Mr. Hugh Oates of my office concerning the manufacture and installation of replacement fuel tanks.

Enclosed please find (1) a copy of a letter concerning the legal implications of replacing a vehicle's fuel tank with a larger tank, (2) a copy of a letter concerning the legal implications of building and installing auxiliary fuel tanks which discusses issues also relevant to replacement fuel tanks and (3) a notice describing how to obtain copies of motor vehicle safety standards and regulations.

In addition to the points raised in the enclosed letters, I would like to point out two additional factors. First, please note that if you go into the business of manufacturing replacement fuel tanks you must submit identifying information and a description of the items you produce to this agency in accord with 49 CFR Part 566 (copy enclosed).

Second, as you will note from the enclosed letters, a manufacturer or other person specified in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act who installs an auxiliary or replacement fuel tank in a new or used vehicle must not compromise the vehicle's compliance with relevant safety standards. Thus, in installing replacement fuel tanks you should be aware not only of any effect that your installation may have upon the vehicle's fuel system (see Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301-75, Fuel System Integrity), you should also be aware that your installation might affect, among othert things, the vehicle's braking system (see Safety Standard No. 105-75, Hydraulic Brake Systems) or the vehicle's weight as it relates to safety standards concerning tires (see Safety Standard No. 110, Tire Selection and Rims, applicable to passenger cars, and Safety Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars).

I hope that you will find the enclosed material helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to call Ms. Debra Weiner of my office at 202-426-2992.

ENCLS.

ID: nht80-1.13

DATE: 02/08/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Motor Coach Industries

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your December 11, 1979, letter asking whether you would be permitted to install a valve in your braking system that would prevent air from reaching the front axle brakes when your vehicle is in reverse. You want to make such a modification to prevent brake chatter when your vehicle is in reverse and question whether such a modification would comply with the requirements of Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems.

Sections S5.3.3 and S5.3.4 of the standard establish brake actuation and release times. In an interpretation of those sections (July 23, 1976), the agency stated that the air pressures of 60 psi and 95 psi were only benchmarks, and that the agency would use either of those values or 70 percent of the maximum pressure in the brake chamber, whichever is lower. You state that this interpretation allows you to install a valve, because the maximum air pressure reaching the front brake chamber when the vehicle is in the reverse gear would be 0 and 70 percent of 0 is 0. Therefore, you suggest that your vehicle would pass the tests in these two sections if tested at 0 psi.

The intent of the July 23 interpretation of the sections was to provide flexibility of designs that incorporate lower air pressures than originally contemplated by the air brake standard. The interpretation was not intended as a device to escape from compliance with the air brake standard by creating a situation where front brakes would be rendered inoperative. Accordingly, the agency limits its July 23, 1976, interpretation to those instances where air brakes are receiving air pressure and are performing as designed to stop the vehicle. Using this limitation on our July 23 interpretation, the NHTSA concludes that your new brake design would violate the standard and, therefore, will not permit the use of the valve that you recommend.

The brake chatter that you refer to in your letter appears to be a problem that occurs only in your vehicles. We have not been made aware of similar problems affecting other manufacturer's vehicles. Accordingly, we must assume that something in your design is creating the chatter problem. We suggest that you alter your brake design in a way that eliminates the chatter problem while maintaining the vehicle's compliance with the air brake standard.

SINCERELY,

December 11, 1979

National Highway Traffic Safety Agency Chief Consul

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION -- STANDARD #121

Gentlemen: We are manufacturers of the MC-9 Crusader Intercity bus. Some of our operators, have experienced a brake chatter, from the front axle, when the coach is in reverse. This does not affect brake performance, but can be annoying to the passengers. As this situation only occurs when the coach is backing up, we question if a value can be inserted into the braking system, to stop the air from the front axle, only when the transmission is in reverse. This control would be automatic, and could not be controlled by the driver (except by shifting into "reverse").

We question if this modification will affect the compliance to Standard #121. Specifically, we are looking at Section S5.3.3 and S5.3.4 which covers apply and Release times. Also, we refer to Mr. Frank Berndt's letter to White Motor Corporation (copy enclosed), which refers to 70% of the maximum air pressure at the brake chamber. In our proposal, this could mean 70% of zero.

We would appreciate your comments on this proposal.

MOTOR COACH INDUSTRIES

Ted J. Szkolinicki, Supervisor Mechanical Engineering

ID: nht80-1.14

DATE: 02/08/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: American Honda Motor Co. Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of November 18, 1979, requesting an interpretation as to whether the VIN plate samples you enclosed with your letter comply with the requirements of Standard No. 115, Vehicle identification number.

You enclosed two proposed VIN plates in your letter, one for automobiles and one for motorcycles. The VIN plates themselves and the preprinted lettering which appears on them seem to conform to the requirement of Standard No. 115. The lettering is clear and indelible, as required by S4.3, in that it cannot be removed without damage to the surface on which it is printed. Further, the plate when riveted to the vehicle would be considered to be permanently affixed in that it cannot be removed without damage (S4.3). The type face utilized for the lettering consists of capital, cans characters with a minimum height of 4 mm as required by S4.3.1.

The letters stamped on the automobile VIN plate, "SL5322AS000001", can hardly be seen, and would not appear to meet the requirements of S4.3 and S4.4.

ID: nht80-1.15

DATE: 02/08/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance - Enforcement

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

DATE: Feb. 8, 1980

SUBJECT: Request for Interpretation of Fuel Tank Capacity as used in Safety Standard No. 301-75, Fuel System Integrity

FROM : Chief Counsel

TO : Director, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, Enforcement

This confirms the oral response previously given by Hugh Oates to your memorandum requesting an interpretation of the term, "capacity", as used in Safety Standard No. 301-75. Paragraph S7.1.1 of that standard provides that "the fuel tank is filled to any level from 90 to 95 percent of capacity with Stoddard solvent ...." You ask whether "capacity" should include the vapor volume in the air dome plus the volume of the fuel filler pipe when filling a fuel tank for compliance purposes. (Total tank volume = usable capacity + unusable capacity + vapor volume + fluid in filler pipe.) Apparently, the vapor volume can be filled with solvent if the solvent is added very slowly to force the air vapors out of the dome. This has been done in past compliance testing.

It is our opinion that the term, "capacity", should not be interpreted to include the vapor volume in the air dome, since fuel tanks are never filled to this level by vehicle users. Fuel tanks are designed to include an area for fuel vapor and pressure build- up. Vehicle users never fill their tanks so slowly that this area is displaced with fuel. Therefore, it would be an unrealistic test to require manufacturers to fill tanks in this fashion. Moreover, I understand from convervations between our offices that fuel is actually squeezed out of the filler pipe during compliance testing if the tank is filled to this absolute level. This would not seem to be an accurate test of fuel tank integrity, since it is leaks or punctures in the tank itself that generally cause fuel loss in real-world crashes.

In consideration of these facts, we would interpret "capacity" to mean "usable capacity", as used in the vehicle manufacturer's Part I submission to the EPA, plus "unusable capacity" (i.e., the volume of fuel left in the tank when the engine fuel pump sucks air).

I think it should be emphasized that the "usable capacity" should be determined only after the tank has been filled to its "unusable capacity". In other words, when testing a tank that has never been filled, the unusable, residual fuel level should be reached before the "usable capacity" is added to the tank. If this is not done, the actual volume of fuel in the tank will be somewhat below the "usable fuel capacity".

Frank Berndt

February 20, 1980

Note From Tom Grubbs FMVSS 301-75 Safety Compliance Engineer Office or Vehicle Safety Compliance

As of February 20, 1980, all FMVSS 301-75 vehicle compliance tests will use the following fuel tank filling technique:

1. Test vehicle's engine will be "run dry"*.

2. 95% of the "usable capacity" of the fuel tank (as determined from EPA Part I submissions) will be added.

*After "run dry", the fuel left in the tank will be the "unusable capacity".

November 25, 1979

Request for Interpretation of Fuel Tank Capacity as used in FMVSS No. 301-75, "Fuel System Integrity" NEF-31TGr

Director Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance Enforcement Office of the Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

THRU: Associated Administrator for Enforcement In order to preclude controversies during the FY 1980 FMVSS No. 301-75 vehicle safety compliance testing program, it is requested that an interpretation of "capacity" be issued by your office. At the present time, S7.1.1 of FMVSS No. 301- 75 states, "The fuel tank is filled to any level from 90 to 95 percent of capacity with Stoddard solvent...." The word "capacity" can be interpreted to mean one of the following: 1. Total Tank Volume - The unusable tank capacity plus the usable capacity plus the vapor volume in the air dome plus the volume of solvent in the fuel filler pipe as shown on the attached sketch. In order to completely fill the total tank volume, the solvent must be added slowly to force the air/vapors out of the air dome which is presently being performed by the OVSC testing laboratories. The vehicle manufacturers claim that this is not a realistic fuel tank filling technique.

2. Usable Capacity - The usable capacity of the fuel tank as stated in each vehicle manufacturers' Part I submission to the EPA. Some manufacturers are using 95 percent of this "usable capacity" value for their FMVSS No. 301-75 certification tests. It appears that this would be the most realistic fuel tank filling technique.

The FY 1980 FMVSS No. 301-75 vehicle compliance testing program will be initiated during the first week of January 1980, and it is requested that an interpretation be made prior to that time.

Francis Armstrong

Attachment

NEF-31TGrubbs:vgw:11/21/79:62807

cc: NEF-01 Chron NEF-30 Chron NEF-31 Subj/Chron/TGrubbs/File

LEFT SIDE VIEW OF TYPICAL GM FUEL TANK IN 1980 MODEL

*INSERT DIAGRAM HERE

ID: nht80-1.16

DATE: 02/25/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: BF Goodrich Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your October 29, 1979, letter asking about brake adjustments prior to testing for compliance with Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems. In your letter, you ask that the agency permit up to three adjustments during the burnish for dynamometer testing.

By letter of interpretation and by preamble to our November 1974 Federal Register Notice (39 FR 39880), adjustments were permitted during the burnish procedures in S6.1.8 and S6.2.6 for the purpose of controlling brake temperature. According to agency information at the time of those interpretations, controlling brake temperature was the only reason that would require the use of brake adjustments during burnish. In a subsequent letter to the agency, you requested that we modify that position in light of your experience with disc brakes and their need for adjustment during burnish for dynamometer testing for reasons other than temperature control. The agency denied that request in April of 1979 while suggesting that the NHTSA would reconsider if more supporting data were supplied.

In response to the agency's request for more data, you have submitted another request for interpretation. To support this request, you have provided information in your letter and have also provided other information directly to our technical staff. As a result of this information, the agency agrees that adjustments during the burnish procedures may be necessary for reasons other than temperature control. Accordingly, the agency will permit adjustments during the burnish procedures for the sections cited above for any reason.

The standard presently is silent on the issue of how many brake adjustments may be made during burnish. As discussed with you and your staff we are considering limiting the number of adjustments to three during the burnish tests. However, no limitation is in effect at this time. The agency will undertake rulemaking shortly to limit the number of adjustments during burnish and encourages manufacturers to limit adjustments to three in the interim.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

October 29, 1979 FRANK BERNDT -- CHIEF COUNSEL, Department of Transportation

Dear Mr. Berndt:

This letter comments on and is in regard to your correspondence of April 27, 1979 to Mr. D.L. Haines; the Mr. Joseph J. Levin, Jr. letter dated January 24, 1979 also to Mr. D.L. Haines; the BFGoodrich letter of January 15, 1979 to Mr. Tad Herlihy; and the BFGoodrich letter of November 8, 1978 to Mr. Joseph J. Levin, Jr.

BFGoodrich reviewed your interpretation of FMVSS 121, Paragraph S5.3, S5.4, and S6.1.8 and S6.2.2 regarding brake adjustment during burnish. In summary, you state that brake adjustments may be made during burnish, but only to control brake temperature.

In reference to that interpretation, BFGoodrich submits the following observations and comments.

1. The intent of our original inquiry, dated November 8, 1978, was to ensure that the BFGoodrich interpretation of FMVSS 121 with regard to adjustment during burnish was correct.

2. Mr. Levin's response of January 24, 1979, which postdated our letters of November 8, 1978 and January 15, 1979, was originally thought to be a reply to BFGoodrich correspondence and was interpreted as supporting our position that adjustment during the burnish sequence is not restricted.

3. Your letter of April 27, 1979 declined to support our position but suggested that NHTSA would consider data and information that would indicate that the NHTSA position on this matter might be too narrow.

4. Your letter of April 27, 1979 also stated that "The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is unaware of a reason other than control of brake temperature which would justify adjustments during burnish." BFGoodrich establishes that reason for adjustment by means of the information presented in the following paragraphs.

A. A review of our Vehicle testing in compliance with procedures detailed in FMVSS 121 (including sections recently deleted for trucks and trailers in response to the 9th Circuit remand) has shown that vehicles using the BFGoodrich Air Disk Brake can meet all performance criteria without brake adjustment during the burnish sequence.

B. A review of BFGoodrich Air Disk Brake dynamometer testing in compliance with procedures detailed in FMVSS 121 has shown that the dynamometer tests can be completed and meet all performance criteria. However, during burnish, as a flat and fully mated lining/disk interface is established, a maximum of three brake adjustments is required to maintain burnish decelerations.

C. The burnish procedures detailed in FMVSS 121 appear to be tailored to the needs of drum brakes equipped with organic linings. The primary need is to cure the "green" organic lining in preparation to meeting the actual performance requirements of the standard.

D. The burnishing requirements for the BFGoodrich disk brake are significantly different due to the fact that its metallic lining material requires minimal conditioning. For example, the BFGoodrich disk brake lining can be conditioned after 100 dynamometer burnish stops (and many times with as few as 50) to successfully complete the performance requirements. Such an abbreviated burnish sequence requires no brake adjustments between any burnish stops.

In presenting the foregoing data, we feel we have established a reason for an interpretation which is supportive of our position that adjustment during burnish is acceptable. In our particular case, the reason and need is limited to the dynamometer burnish in which we require a maximum of three burnish adjustments in order to complete a full burnish sequence. Parenthetically, it should be noted that an abbreviated dynamometer burnish sequence of 100 stops can be accomplished with our disk brake without brake adjustment between burnish stops. In either case, the actual performance testing following the dynamometer burnish can be successfully completed.

Listed below is a summary of the BFGoodrich viewpoints on this matter:

* There is no clear basis for the no-adjustment-during-burnish interpretation in the wording of FMVSS 121 as applied to disk brakes.

* The above position is strengthened by the interpretive precedent. established in November of 1974, which allowed adjustment during burnish to control brake temperature (reference the Joseph J. Levin, Jr. letter of January 24, 1979).

* The burnish procedure is preceived as a preparation for testing and not a performance requirement in itself.

* Technical criteria used in establishing the burnish sequences appear to be based only on drum brake experience and requirements, and that criteria is not necessarily representative of the burnish requirements of other braking technologies such as the BFGoodrich Air Disk Brake.

* No degradation of performance requirements are suffered by allowing adjustment during burnish.

In light of the above and for the reasons noted earlier, BFGoodrich requests a reconsideration or modification to the previous interpretation which would allow up to three brake adjustments during the burnish for dynamometer testing.

If the Department still feels that there is insufficient reasoning to reconsider the current interpretation and additional discussion is required, please advise me as to a date that you will be available to review this issue.

Sincerely,

THE B F GOODRICH COMPANY -- Engineered Products Group;

Jack D. Rainbolt -- Chief Engineer, Air Disk Brakes, Transportation Division

cc: K. M. Ryan

ID: nht80-1.17

DATE: 02/26/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Toyota Motor Co. Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your recent request for an interpretation concerning the proper designated seating capacity for the rear seat in several Toyota vehicle models (Corolla Sedan, Corolla Coupe, Corona Sedan and Starlet). You assert that the rear seat hip room in these models ranges from 39.4 inches to 42.6 inches, and ask whether the vehicles would qualify as having only two designated seating positions.

Under the strict measurement technique specified in the amended definition of "designated seating position" (SAE J1100a), the Toyota vehicle models in question would have the hip room dimensions you state. This is due to the fact that the SAE procedure specifies that hip room is to be the minimum dimension of the seat cushion. The Toyota designs include wheel wells and contoured side paddings at the intersection of the seat back and seat cushion that establish the minimum dimension of the seat. However, these structures only extend out 4 to 5 inches (approximation) from the seat back. If the hip room of the rear seats is measured midway of the seat cushion, all of the designs have greater than 50 inches of hip room, and ostensibly should have three designated seating positions. Nevertheless, since according to the measurement technique specified in the definition these seats have substantially less than 50 inches of hip room, the agency must conclude that the rear seats could qualify as having only two designated seating positions. This opinion is accompanied with several candid remarks, however.

The effective hip room of the Toyota seat designs is much greater than the approximately 40 inches that is obtained by the technical measuring technique specified in the definition. If two outboard occupants move their hips several inches forward from the seat back in these vehicle designs, the wheel-wells and contoured side paddings are no longer impediments and there is over 50 inches of hip room, as noted above. Moreover, the design of these rear seats is such that use of the center position is "invited." There is at least 10 to 12 inches of well-padded hip room at the center portion of the seat between the inboard ends of the two seat belt assemblies installed in the seats. The manufacturer has given no indication that this space is not intended for occupancy. The agency is also concerned that this center position has no belt assembly to secure a child restraint system, particularly since the rear-center seat is statistically the safest position in a vehicle.

Frankly, with the wide center space that is available in these rear seat designs, we do not believe the manufacturer has made a sincere attempt to indicate to vehicle occupants that the seats are intended for use by only two occupants. It would be a simple matter for the manufacturer to make this obvious by use of a fixed armrest or some other impediment to use of the position. Furthermore, we believe that this message can be given to occupants without otherwise compromising the design the manufacturer wishes to achieve. If the manufacturer does not in fact wish to market the vehicles as having three-passenger rear seats, we do not understand why wide, well-padded center positions are present.

Finally, I am enclosing a copy of an earlier interpretation which discusses the measurement procedure included in the definition of "designated seating position." As that interpretation pointed out, the agency will not allow manufacturers to avoid the obvious intent of the definition by finding "loopholes" in the specified measurement procedure. If designs such as those displayed in the Toyota vehicles persist, without some clear indication that the center position is not to be used, the agency may find it necessary to amend the definition to provide that the hip room measurement is to be taken at the midpoint of the seat cushion. We hope that manufacturers will voluntarily alter designs of this type to conform to the intent of the definition, so that such an amendment is not necessary.

SINCERELY,

TOYOTA MOTOR CO., LTD.

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE

January 17, 1980

Ralph Hitchcock Chief, Crashworthiness Division National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Hitchcock:

This is to confirm our request, made by Mr. Donald Schwentker, Attorney-at-Law, for a meeting with appropriate National Highway Traffic Safety Administration personnel on Tuesday, January 29, 1980, to seek an interpretation of the designated seating position definition as it applies to several specific Toyota vehicles, as follows:

* Corolla Sedan

* Corolla Coupe

* Corona Sedan

* Starlet ('81 Model)

As you requested, Toyota will bring all vehicles to NHTSA's office on that date.

Our Attorney will contact you by telephone to work out the arrangements.

J. Kawano General Manager

ID: nht80-1.18

DATE: 02/28/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Hugh A. West, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your letter of October 22, 1979, addressed to Mr. Nelson Erickson. Please accept my apologies for the lateness of our reply. Your letter asked whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114, Theft Protection, was intended to prevent a small child or animal left unattended in a parked automobile (model year 1973) from which the keys have been removed, from intentionally or accidentially moving the gear selection level from the "Park" position. The answer to your question is no, for the reasons noted below. You also requested a copy of any technical analysis that may have been done in the development of Safety Standard 114. Although the public docket contains analyses pertinent to later versions of Safety Standard 114 it contains none pertinent to any version of the standard applicable to passenger cars manufactured in 1973. The only analyses pertinent to these earlier versions of the standard are contained in documents which contain internal agency opinion and recommendations and thus are not publicly available.

When Safety Standard 114 was adopted in 1968 its stated purpose was to "reduce the incidence of accidents resulting from unauthorized use." (33 FR 6471, April 27, 1968). This goal was based on evidence which showed that: "cars operated by unauthorized persons are far more likely to cause unreasonable risk of accident, personal injury and death than those which are driven by authorized individuals," (33 FR 6471, preamble). Neither the rule nor the preamble states that the standard was intended to accomplish any other goal.

As adopted, the standard required that all passenger cars manufactured on or after January 1, 1970, be equipped with a key locking system that (upon removal of the key) would prevent "activation of the car's engine or other main source of motive power; and either steering or self-mobility or both." Safety Standard 114 in its current form also provides manufacturers with this option. The preamble to the standard simply stated that a steering or self-mobility lock was needed in order ". . . to defeat car thieves who start cars with so-called 'master keys' and devices which bypass the [ignition] lock . . ." (33 FR 6471).

In light of the compliance option described above and the purpose of Safety Standard 114 as expressed both in the standard itself and in the preambles of various Federal Register notices, it appears that Safety Standard 114 was not intended to apply to the situation described in your letter.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Ms. Debra Weiner of my staff at 202-426-2992.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

HUGH A. WEST, INC.

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW

October 22, 1979

N. F. Erickson -- Safety Standards Engineer, U. S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Reference: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #114

Dear Mr. Erickson:

I thank you for your letter of October 12, 1979 and the enclosed copy of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #114 as I requested.

The purpose of my inquires have been to determine whether there was any Motor Vehicle Safety Standard which would require an automobile manufactured in 1973 (1973 Chevrolet Vega) to have as part of its safety equipment, a device which would lock the gear selection lever in the "Park" position when the key was removed from the ignition switch after the lever had been locked. I understand that automobile manufacturers would have little difficulty in having such a locking system as part of the steering column gear-selection method.

The particular gear-selection lever on the car in question was a console model. The car was parked on an incline, the gear selection lever being placed in the "Park" position, the ignition key removed after the ignition system had been placed in the locked position, and the driver exited the vehicle. Thereafter, the car rolled down the incline and a 5 year old child within the car was drowned. When the car was recovered, the gear selection lever was in the "Neutral" position. It is unknown whether the gear selection lever was intentionally or accidentally removed from the "Park" position.

We are particularly concerned as to whether or not this problem was a recognized hazard which the standard was trying to correct. It is obvious that if the steering column were locked so as to prevent the steering of the vehicle, and any child, or an animal, left unattended in the vehicle could move the gear shift lever, the vehicle would obviously be set into motion on an incline with absolutely no control over its movement. It would then become an extreme hazard not only to a small child, as here, being within the vehicle, but other users of the highways and streets toward whom the uncontrollable mass of metal was moving.

If there are other standards which may be applicable to our particular situation, I would appreciate your forwarding a copy of the same to me. We would also appreciate your sending to us a Technical Analysis Study, if any were done, on Standard #114.

We sincerely appreciate your kind assistance.

Very truly yours,

Walter S Felton

cc: Thomas L. Woodward, ESQ.