ID: nht74-5.46

DATE: 08/22/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Universal Tire

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of August 6, 1974, asking what registration procedures apply to tires manufactured before May 22, 1971, but sold after that date.

We interpret Part 574 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which establishes the tire registration requirements, as applying only to tires manufactured after the effective date of the regulation, May 22, 1971. Therefore, tires manufactured before that date need not be registered.

YOURS TRULY,

Universal Tire

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Department of Transportation

Attention: Dick Dyson, Acting Chief Counsel

August 6, 1974/Letter #3747

I have just finished conversing with Mr. Cassanova who was very helpful; however, he referred my question to your department for legal advice.

Universal Tire is contemplating purchasing a number of containers of tires of foreign manufacture which have the old type serial number used prior to May 22, 1971. I am advised by Mr. Cassanova that we can sell these tires in view of the fact they have the old type serial number. They also are marked "D.O.T." and, of course, meet all D.O.T. specifications. We would be happy to have a letter to this effect written by the manufacturer if you suggest we do so.

Would you please reply by mail as to whether these tires would require registration as applies to the current system.

Your quick response and time is appreciated.

Thanking you in advance, I remain

Bruce Ladson Assistant Division Manager

ID: nht74-5.47

DATE: 04/22/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: American Safety Equipment Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of August 3, 1973, petitioning for amendments to paragraphs S4.9 and S5.3.1 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213 which would allow the use of a buckle release mechanism design that requires, before release, some foreshortening of the belt system to reduce the load on the release mechanism. This design cannot meet the existing requirements of S4.9 of Standard No. 213 with the device under load. We wrote to you on August 20, 1973, and on December 17, 1973, requesting additional data. We have not received a response from you to either letter.

We have decided that your petition should be denied. Our objection to the design you wish to employ is that it cannot be released when the belt restraint system is under load. The NHTSA believes, and has adopted its position in Standard No. 213, that a fundamental safety requirement for any occupant restraint release mechanism is the ability to release when it is under a load imposed by the weight of the occupant. In many vehicle crashes restraint systems may be loaded in this fashion when occupants must be removed.

We do not disagree with your argument that mechanisms which release under load may more readily be released by children when release is undesirable. We believe the greater safety problem, however, is presented by designs which are difficult to operate because they require a prior unloading of the release mechanism. These systems may not be able to be released, even by adults, in crash situations. Data we have received indicates substantial difficulty in the ability of adults to release a child from a child seat in situations (total darkness) simulating emergencies. The study in question has been conducted by the National Swedish Road and Traffic Research Institute and is on file in Docket No. 2-15.

Moreover, we believe buckle release mechanisms should be operable by older child occupants, particularly in situations such as in upside-down configurations where a load is imposed on the mechanism. This purpose is met by the existing requirements of the standard but would not be met were we to grant your petition.

In your petition you argue that even a lower release force does not necessarily mean that the occupant will be able to escape easily from the restraint system. While this may be true, as no requirements are specified in Standard No. 213 regarding ease of belt removal, it is not a justification for increasing the difficulty of operating the buckle release mechanism.

SINCERELY

August 3, 1973

Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Subject: Petition for Rule Making

Reference: MVSS213, S4.9 and S5.3.1

American Safety Equipment Corporation is a major developer and manufacturer of safety belt restraint systems for automobile manufacturers. American Safety personnel have a great deal of experience designing aircraft and automotive restraint systems, particularly hardware such as buckles, retractors and associated items. The Company has been active since 1966 in the business of designing and producing restraint harnesses and complete seating systems for children in the 20 to 40 pound size range. The Company has been working on development of a new child safety seat since 1970 basing the basic design criteria on dynamic performance under simulated crash testing, while also observing the current static testing regulation. Final testing of prototype models has been completed on the design considered optimum for performance, economy and simplicity of use.

This petition is submitted in accordance with the procedure described in Subpart B Section 553.31. This proposal is to add a performance requirement and test procedure for an occupant harness release mechanism not currently considered by the Child Seating Systems regulation. The mechanism is not of a nature normally classified or described as a "buckle", but for purposes of MVSS213, is being considered a release mechanism.

The proposed additions and revisions to MVSS213 are shown underlined:

S4.9 (b) Release when a force of not more than 20 pounds is applied when tested in accordance with S5.3 expect for systems described by S4.9 (c).

2 (c) Release when a force of not more than 10 pounds is applied when the release mechanism requires foreshortening of the webbing restraint components to activate and is tested in accordance with S5.3.1 (d).

S5.3.1 For forward-facing child seating systems where foreshortening of the webbing restraint components is not required by the release mechanism -

(a) -- unchanged --

(b) -- unchanged --

(c) -- unchanged --

When foreshortening of the webbing restraint components is required to actuate the release mechanism -

(d) Test the system with a 1,000-pound force as specified in S5.1, remove the force completely and then release the mechanism in a manner typical of that employed in actual use.

Photographs are enclosed showing the release mechanism actuation under normal and simulated emergency conditions and a typical testing set-up to determine release force. The application of force to release the occupant harness must simultaneously pull down on the abdominal pad and the shoulder straps thereto attached and upwards under the metal latch. This is very simply described as a "pinching" action of the thumb and first and/or second finger. The shoulder straps are thereby foreshortened and the occupant will be forced rearward (unless lifted or pushed) toward the back surface of the child seat. The hand not activating the release mechanism can be used to move the child's torso away from contact with the restraint straps. The actuation of the release mechanism with the belts in a slackened condition is an easy one-hand operation with a low force requirement.

The performance criteria on which our restraint release mechanism design is based are as follows:

1. The mechanism must be capable of restraining the occupant when the system undergoes dynamic forces of an auto crash without distortion of any kind which could result in a jammed or difficult-to-release condition.

2. Child must not be able to easily release himself.

3. The mechanism must be extremely easy to understand from the standpoint of an adult learning how to actuate. Similarity to current production adult safety belt hardware assures the shortest possible learning time by an adult.

3 These criteria were formulated after studying field experience of consumers and consulting with experienced people in various phases of the child and adult restraint business. This experience indicated to us that -

1. A common possible problem with many child seat harness buckle release mechanisms is that the release mechanisms could be easily actuated by the child occupant. The child is protected only while sitting in the seat with the harness secured.

2. Emergency removal of a child occupant from a wrecked automobile should be accomplished within a minimum time. Emergency removal always involves supporting at least a portion of the child's weight while releasing the harness mechanism. After an accident the child's weight is forced against the restraining straps if the car has overturned or if the car seat back is exerting pressure on the child and/or child's seating system.

3. Restraint harness buckles which have a low release force (even under occupant's weight load) may not completely detach all components of the harness system from the occupant. Such components as shoulder and/or lap belts may remain wholly or partially attached to the buckle and could interfere with the removal of the occupant from the seating system.

Much subjective information from consumers was also evaluated by us to finalize the release mechanism design since it is considered one of the key components of the overall child seating system. Real-world data is scarce on crash performance of child restraint systems, but accident experience is reasonably hypothesized from experience with children and emergency post-crash situations. It is considered reasonable by us that release mechanisms which actuate under the test procedures now in effect are likely to be released wholly or partially be a child prior to a crash. Protection in low speed, as well as high speed crashes, is important and a securely fastened harness is mandatory for protection. Driver distraction by unrestrained children can also cause accidents which is minimized by a release mechanism not easily operable by the child. Supporting the child's weight or otherwise relieving pressure of the child's body from the harness webbing during emergency removal is consistent with a majority of conceivable accident conditions and always would be a requirement with the impact-shield type restraints (no harness) where the occupant would be expected to be wrapped around the impact shield after a crash. Self-removal from a harness restraint under emergency conditions by a child in the 20 to 40 pound age group

4 is not reasonable unless the child is taught expressly for this purpose. In such a case, training in body articulation and hardware manipulation is probably difficult for the proposed release mechanism.

American Safety is planning procurement of the necessary tooling for manufacturing the child seat design incorporating the proposed release mechanism. The proposed child restraint release mechanism and release procedure is nearly identical to the release of the detachable shoulder harness pin-connector in production for adult restraints in certain cars for three years. The pin and plastic grommet used on the child restraint mechanism proposed are parts produced for several different 1973 model cars. The Company requests the addition of the proposed requirements to MVSS213 to permit it to manufacture and sell the child restraint product.

Gordon M. Bradford Vice President, Corporate Development

enclosures

(Graphics omitted)

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 1

Restraint release mechanism -- This general view shows the similarity to the established pin and connector design now in production for shoulder belts on adult restraints. The two straps above the release mechanism are adjustable upper torso restraints. The release mechanism is affixed to the abdominal pad and the adjustable crotch strap is sewn permanently to the release mechanism connector.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 2

Release mechanism activation -- The initial step in activating the release is as shown. The thumb depresses the abdominal pad and foreshortens the upper torso restraints. The index finger or middle finger holds up the connector while the pin is forced downward.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 3

Release mechanism activation -- The completion of the releasing operation shows the pin and grommet now moved downward into the enlarged opening of the connector where it is completely separated from the crotch strap and connector. A slight forward pull with the finger finishes the release. The connector is then dropped and the abdominal pad with upper torso straps attached is swung upward over the occupant's head for removal when the seat is situated in a normal horizontal attitude.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 4

Release force requirements -- A possible form of measurement device which operates the release mechanism in a manner typical of that employed in actual use is shown. This test would be performed after the child seating system had been subjected to a static load of 1,000 lbs in accordance with MVSS213, S5.1. Following this the release force test would be done in accordance with the proposed procedure S5.3.1(d).

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 5

The position illustrated simulates a nose-down car attitude. The child's full weight is resting on the harness. The adult is about to release the harness.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 6

The adult has pushed upward with her left hand on the abdominal pad. This slackens the crotch strap allowing normal operation of the buckle with her right hand. The load required to release the buckle in this way is no greater than normal.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 7

The buckle has opened and the adult has begun to lower the child. The abdominal pad has slid naturally from her left to her right hand. Her left hand continues to support the abdomen.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 8

The adult's right hand continues to guide the abdominal pad while the left hand continues to support the abdomen. The crotch strap is completely clear of the child.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 9

The child is out of the harness and is now on what would be either the car's dash or front seat back, depending on where the child seat was installed in the vehicle. The harness is clear of the child. No force greater than the child's weight was exerted. There were no "practice" runs after instructions on how to correctly release the child were given to the Mother.

ID: nht74-5.48

DATE: 05/17/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Renault, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of May 3, 1974, requesting an interpretation of the test procedure specified in Standard No. 301 (Docket No. 73-20; Notice 2) concerning the operation of the vehicle's fuel pump during testing.

Paragraph S7.1.3 of the standard requires that electrically driven fuel pumps be in operation during the barrier crash tests if they normally operate with the activation of the vehicle's electrical system. If the pump is incapable of functioning with the independent activation of the electrical system and requires the operation of the vehicle's engine, then the pump should not be running during the barrier crash tests.

Thus, the interpretation of the requirement expressed in your letter is correct.

YOURS TRULY,

May 3, 1974

Mr. Lawrence R. Schneider Chief Counsel -- NHTSA

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION - FMVSS 301-75

We would appreciate receiving a confirmation that our interpretation of @ S.7.1.3 of FMVSS 301-75 (Docket No. 73-20; Notice 2) is correct.

@ S.7.1.3 says, "If the vehicle has an electrically driven fuel pump that normally runs when the vehicle's electrical system is activated, it is operating at the time of a barrier crash".

Our understanding is that while the ignition switch is in the "ON" position, the engine is stopped since the fuel tank is filled with an ASTM type 1 solvent. However, some vehicles equipped with an electrically driven fuel pump include a switch device that shuts off the fuel pump after 1.5 seconds, should the engine stop for any reason.

This means that during the test at the time of the crash the fuel pump will not be running even though the ignition key is turned "ON".

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Francois Louis Manager Technical Standards Department

ID: nht74-5.49

DATE: 05/10/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Triboro Coach Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of April 4, 1974, concerning your request for an exemption from the roof emergency exit requirements (S5.2.1) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217 (49 CFR 571.217). We had denied an earlier request on March 27, 1974, following your letter to us of February 13, 1974.

We must again deny your request. The Federal motor vehicle safety standards which apply to motor vehicles (some apply to equipment only) specify safety requirements which apply to vehicle types generally (passenger cars, trucks, buses, etc.) and must of necessity be based on the use to which such vehicle types are generally put. The NHTSA has determined through the administrative rulemaking process that buses, including buses for use in urban environments, must have a roof emergency exit when a rear exit can not be installed due to the configuration of the bus. In most cases, including many urban situations, the roof exit can be an important safety feature, particularly when the bus is overturned on a side. While we do not dispute the facts you present, we view the situation as unsual, and not a suitable basis for modifying a requirement applicable to every urban bus. Our regulations do not permit exemptions from requirements for buses sold to one party.

However, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @@ 1391 et seq.) under which Standard No. 217 is issued, a vehicle need not conform to a Federal motor vehicle safety standard after its sale to its ultimate user. Consequently there is no Federal prohibition to your modifying or eliminating the roof exits in these buses if you wish, after you receive them from the manufacturer.

SINCERELY,

Tribo Coach Corporation

April 4, 1974

U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Att: Lawrence R. Schneider Chief Counsel

In reply to your letter dated March 27, 1974, N40-3 (MPP)

Subject: Roof emergency exit (S5.2.1) Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #217

I am sure that you are becoming increasingly familiar with problems of making buses safer; this has also been our prime concern. In your letter you stated in order that the requirements be modified, there must be a showing, that their cost is unreasonable in terms of the safety benefits achieved. Again we are not concerned with the cost ratio, safety is our and your prime concern. About the abuses which the buses are subject to, you must take into account exactly, that which is going on in the buses. Bus seats being torn off there mounting, then seat cushions being thrown out of the window, window frames being dismantled and thrown out, screws from internal panels being removed and panels thrown out of buses, glass being broken, whereby cost and replacing is almost impossible, seat being cut up so as to be unrecognizable.

You speak of possible alternative steps taken to develop designs that will minimize the tampering with. I would like at this time to say that it is my opinion, in order to achieve the safety that we are both looking for, we should first develop the means to modify this condition that I presently see as a very dangerous and hazardous condition. Visualize the roof hatch being opened and the pupils boosting each other thru this hatch. What do you think will happen when the driver discovers this? immediately he will hit the brake pedal and where do you think the pupils will wind up? also, think of the traffic following. The hitting of the brake pedal will not be deliberately on our drivers part.

In an accident such as a roll over the bus can land on one of four sides. If it lands right side up that is on four wheels, there will be one entrance and one exit door. Eight large picture frame windows, if it lands on the left side. It will have one entrance door and one exit door and four large picture frame windows. The entire front windshield and the entire rear windshield, which are set in rubber can be kicked out very readily in any of the four positions, making an opening large enough to walk out in a standing position, if it lands on the right side there are four large picture frame windows. Also remembering the front and rear windshields, the most important part to remember, is in a roll over the sides of the bus will be pushed in there by buckeling up the roof. Because of the structure of the vehicle which I believe will distort the roof hatch and make it inoperable. This has been proven to be a fact.

To give you a short resume of my experiences aroun buses, listed below are the following:

1. 42 years as Superintendent of all Equipment.

2. A graduate of Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, New York.

3. Triboro Coach Corporation operates 165 city coaches.

4. Varsity Transit Inc. which is a school bus operation only and operates 1,378 vehicles which includes 80 lift buses hydraulically operated for wheel chairs.

This resume is not intended to impress you, or that I am an authority on the subject, but rather to show that I am familiar with the importance of that which you seek.

William J. Cicero Supt. of Maintenance

ID: nht74-5.5

DATE: 02/20/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: House of Representatives

COPYEE: LAWRENCE R. SCHNEIDER -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA; SIGNATURE BY RICHARD B. DYSON

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: In response to your February 11, 1974, request in behalf of a constituent, Mr. Frank Mills of Saint Louis, I would like to discuss the legal implications of modifications to the ignition interlock system on 1974 model passenger cars. I am not familiar with the booklet to which Mr. Mills refers.

The interlock is one part of Standard 208, which like any other safety standard issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, applies to new vehicles only. Once a vehicle is sold for purposes other than resale and the buyer takes delivery, he may modify the system or legally have the system modified by an automobile repair service to accommodate circumstances, such as physical incapacity, which make use of the belts unwise or inconvenient.

Whether or not a dealer's disconnection of an interlock system under any given specified set of circumstances would be legally permitted is a conclusion which the courts would determine if called upon to decide such an issue. The position of this agency is that any act by a dealer to disconnect an interlock system which could be related to a sales transaction or the introduction into interstate commerce of a motor vehicle is prohibited. In this respect, we support H.R. 5529 which would prohibit any motor vehicle manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from removing or rendering inoperative any Federally-required safety equipment, including interlocks, from new or used vehicles. The prohibition would not apply to vehicle owners.

I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of this letter to Mr. Mills at his St. Louis address to assure receipt of the information by February 21, 1974.

February 11, 1974

Larry Schneider Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Will you please advise me on the legal aspects of the clarification of the seat belt law, which information has been requested by one of my constituents, Mr. Frank Mills, President of the Greater St. Louis Automotive Parts and Service Association of St. Louis, Missouri. For your information, I am enclosing herewith a copy of Mr. Mills' letter.

You will note that Mr. Mills has requested this information for use at the next meeting of his Association on February 21, 1974. If it is at all possible, I would like very much to fulfill his request.

Thank you for your cooperation in this instance.

Leonor K. (Mrs. John B.) Sullivan Member of Congress 3rd District, Missouri

Enclosure

GREATER ST. LOUIS AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & SERVICE ASSOCIATION

FEBRUARY 5, 1974

Lenore Sullivan 2221 Rayburn Bldg. Washington D.C. 20515

I am writing to request your booklet on the "Clarification of the Seat Belt" law. It is unlawful for the Automobile Dealers to disconnect this system, but an independent person feels he is not covered by this law. This does not seem logical.

When speaking with your Office, I explained as President of the Greater St. Louis Automotive Club, I wished to look into the proper legal aspects and discuss it at our next meeting, the 21st of February. They informed me, I must send my request to you and you would see it was received on time.

Thanking you in advance for your time and trouble.

Sincerely,

Mr. Frank Mills President

Copy: file

Please mail to:

Mr. Frank Mills 5204 Walsh St. Louis, Missouri 63109

ID: nht74-5.50

DATE: 04/22/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Nissan Motor Company, Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of April 5, 1974, requesting interpretations of two sections of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301 (39 FR 10588).

Your first question was whether dummies are required to be positioned at each front outboard seating position even if such dummies are not specified for testing under Standard No. 208. The answer to your question is yes. Standard No. 301 provides for testing with dummies at each front outboard seating position regardless of the Standard No. 208 testing provisions. Where, however, Standard No. 208 specifies additional test dummies, such dummies are to be included in the vehicle for Standard No. 301 testing.

Your second question was whether the dummies are to be restrained by belt systems until passive restraint systems become mandatory under Standard No. 208. The answer to this question is no. The dummies are to be restrained for testing under Standard No. 301 only by systems that require no action by the vehicle occupant. Therefore, dummies are not to be restrained during testing by belt systems, but only by the passive means, if any, that are employed in the vehicle.

Thank you for your inquiry. Yours Truly,

NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD

April 5, 1974

Lawrence R. Schneider Chief Council National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

This is to request your interpretation of the FMVSS 301, Fuel System Integrity, issued through the Federal Register on March 21, 1974.

(1) S6.1 Frontal barrier crash which states:

" . . . . at each front cutboard seating position and at any other position whose protection system is required to be tested, by a dummy under the provisions of Standard No. 208 . . . . . . . ".

May we understand from the above requirement that regardless of the provisions of the MVSS 208, we will have to provide the test dummies at each front outboard seating position? And, on the other hand, that it will not be necessary to provide the dummy at the frontal barrier crash test in any other position where installation is not required under the mandatory passive restraint system provided for in the MVSS 208? (See attached figure.) (2) Also, the S7.1.1 which states:

"Each dummy shall be restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle for protection at its seating position and that require no action by the vehicle occupant".

May we understand from the above that the dummy which is only provided at each front outboard seating position, from our understanding in (1) of the above, shall be restrained by lap and shoulder belts until the proposed effective date of the mandatory passive restraint system under MVSS 208? And, that(Illegible Words) be able to restrain the dummy by lap belt if it will be installed in the front seat to meet the rollover requirement under MVSS 208. (See attached figure.)

Thank you for your attention to our request. We look forward to hearing from you regarding the above.

Tatsuo Kato Staff, Safety

9.1.75 effective date of MVSS 301 9.1.76 proposal effective date of MVSS 208

(Graphics omitted) no dummy for rear seating position no dummy for rear seating position the dummy restrained by lap and shoulder seat belt for front seating position the dummy unrestrained or the dummy restrained by lap belt which is installed to meet the rollover requirement

ID: nht74-5.51

DATE: 04/18/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Law Ofices of William and Black

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Thank you for your letter of March 29, 1974, requesting information and documentation concerning Fuel System Integrity Standards.

The GSA 515/26 Standard which you mentioned was published July 15, 1966, and was effective October 13, 1967. This standard was effectively supplanted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301 which was effective January 1, 1968. A copy of this original Standard No. 301 is enclosed for your information along with a recent amendment (F.R. 39, 10586, March 21, 1974) that substantially upgrades the requirements of this standard.

We do not consider it appropriate to give advice concerning private incidents or controversies, beyond what is contained in our regulations and other public issuances. You may find it helpful to contact private-sector groups such as the Society of Automotive Engineers for further information.

ENC. (3)

Williams and Black

March 29, 1974

Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration OFFICE OF CRASHWORTHINESS

Attention: Guy Hunter

Re: KLANN vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

I had a very lengthy conversation with Mr. Koschak in the Los Angeles Office of the General Services Administration. He very kindly referred me to you for help needed in this matter.

We presently have an action pending against the Ford Motor Company for the deaths of two adults following a collision while they were driving a 1965 Model P-250 pick-up truck. This pick-up truck had a camper installed on the bed.

The accident would be a barrier-type crash in which a vehicle went out of control on the opposite side of the road, came into the lane of the subject vehicle and the crash ensued.

The husband and wife occupying the pick-up truck were burned to death. We have had several experts examine this vehicle and have described the mechanism of their incineration as a shearing of the neck of the gas-tank filler pipe, along with some displacement of the cab of the vehicle itself. Between the shearing of the neck, as well as the displacement, the fuel in the tank was forced into the driving compartment, and a fire of great intensity developed.

This fire was of sufficient intensity to melt the interior fittings of the vehicle, as well as causing fatal injuries to the occupants.

During the process of our litigation with Ford Motor Company, we have had occasion to examine, but not photocopy certain of their crash tests. These crash tests make reference to a publication specifically referred to as "1968 GSA Standard 515/26-53.2." This reference was contained in test No. D-5192 performed on October 15, 1966. This was a sixteen mile per hour crash into a movable barrier. I further note that in one of the additional tests, more particularly, No. D S126 performed on August 5, 1966, which was a 29.5 m.p.h. crash into a barrier, the test results indicated that the fuel tank displaced; however, no photos of the crashed vehicle were attached to the Ford test.

We are interested in learning the specifications or directions from the Department of Transportation to auto manufactuers and, more particularly, as relates to the fuel systems and locations in 1965 and 1966 model vehicles -- i.e., pick-up trucks. We would also like to know whether or not the Department of Transportation directed any recall or modification campaigns, either by direction or by suggestion to the automobile manufacturers, especially Ford Motor Company.

We have been advised by our own automotive engineers that the location of the gasoline tank is a defect in design. We believe that our position would be further fortified by some communications or directions from the Department of Transportation directed to the various automobile manufacturers as relate to the location or stability of gasoline tank systems.

I am uncertain as to what we are looking for is adequately described within this letter; however, I believe the brief description I have given may be sufficient for you to determine specifically what we are looking for.

We would certainly appreciate any copies of correspondence or any other documents you may have as pertains to this problem and, more particularly, communications directed to the Ford Motor Company referring to their fuel system in their pick-up trucks.

Thanking you in advance for your anticipated courtesy and cooperation, I remain,

ROBERT S. PRIVER

cc: Mike Koschak c/o General Services Administration Motor Pool 300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 3124 Los Angeles, California 90012

ID: nht74-5.52

DATE: 01/22/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: West & Wilkinson

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of January 2, 1974 requesting information concerning the legal permissibility of an automobile dealership furnishing private passenger motor vehicles with add-on gasoline tanks or modifying existing gasoline tanks.

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, establishes minimum performance requirements for motor vehicle fuel systems. Compliance with the level of performance mandated by the standard is enforced by Section 108(a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act which prohibits the manufacture, sale, delivery, or importation of vehicles or motor vehicle equipment that do not meet the requirements of applicable safety standards. Therefore, if your client modified a motor vehicle fuel tank in such a manner that it no longer complied with Standard No. 301 and then offered it for initial sale for purposes other than resale he would be in violation of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act and would be subject to civil penalties of not more than $ 1,000 for each such violation. If, however, your client performed a fuel tank modification on a vehicle that was already owned by and in the possession of a buyer who purchased the vehicle for purposes other than resale, no violation of the Act could result. The installation of an add-on fuel tank would be considered a modification. Therefore, the fuel system would have to comply with Standard No. 301 with the add-on fuel tank considered as part of the system.

There are no Motor Vehicle Safety Standards applicable to add-on gasoline tanks since these are items of motor vehicle equipment and Standard No. 301 restricts its application to motor vehicles. Section 113(c)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, however, authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to determine whether or not an item of motor vehicle equipment contains a defect which relates to motor vehicle safety. If the Secretary finds that a safety-related defect exists, your client may be compelled to notify all purchasers of vehicles with the add-on fuel tanks of the attendant hazard.

The action of installing add-on gasoline tanks in motor vehicles exposes your client to the requirements of yet another safety regulation (49 CFR 567.7) If the vehicle in which he installs the fuel tank is a certified and complete vehicle that has not yet been purchased in good faith for purposes other than resale, your client will be considered an alterer of the vehicle, and he must provide a certification that the vehicle as altered still conforms to the standards.

YOURS TRULY,

WEST & WILKINSON January 2, 1974

Secretary of Transportation Department of Transportation

According to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Act, 15 USC Sections 1391 et seq., and particularly Section 1392, your office was empowered and directed to adopt minimum safety standards for motor vehicles. We do not have ready access to whatever standards have been promulgated but have received inquiry from a client concerning the existence of a specific provision in such standards. Specifically, my client, an automobile dealership, inquires if there is any prohibition(Illegible Word) civil or criminal sanctions on adding gasoline tanks to private passenger motor vehicles, including campers, or modifying existing gasoline tanks on such vehicles.

Your assistance will be appreciated.

Richard Wright West

ID: nht74-5.53

DATE: 08/05/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: The Adams & Westlake Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Dear Mr. Hansing:

This is in reply to your letter of July 3, 1974, regarding Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217. You requested that we reconsider our opinion of June 11, 1974, that a bus emergency release mechanism which you describe must meet the requirements for emergency exit release in S5.3.2 of the standard after as well as before the retention test required by S5.1, when the glass breaks during the retention test.

Paragraph S5.3.2 requires that the release requirements be met both before and after the retention test. We do not find sufficient justification to relax this requirement in the situation you described. First, it is not clear that it is as easy as you represent to eliminate by hand all of the glazing material left in the frame. More importantly, however, we still question whether most persons are sufficiently cognizant of the qualities of tempered glass to attempt to remove the remaining fragments in an emergency situation. Finally, glazing with completely different breakage characteristics may be used to replace the original tempered glass at some time during the life of the bus. For these reasons, our conclusion of June 11 remains the same.

Yours Truly,

July 3, 1974

Office of Chief Counsul

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Attention Mr. Richard Dyson

In regard to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard #217, "Bus Window Retention and Release S5.3.2 and our previous correspondence (here enclosed), please reconsider our request for exemption from having operable release mechanisms after the retention test when glazing with tempered glass.

In my letter to you of April 16, 1974 we noted that tempered glass once broken made the operation of any release mechanism unnecessary, as any glass remaining in the opening would be easily removed by touch. We therefore asked for exemption from the requirement that the release mechanism be operable after the retention portion of the test on the basis that the release mechanism would no longer be necessary in the event of glass breakage.

Our design, which is proposed for use on short and mid-range transit busses, uses an extruded aluminum frame which is screwed to the coach body. The glass is glazed directly into the frame; the stationary lite being returned by a rubber extrusion and bedding tape. The sliding glass is also retained directly in the frame and glides horizontally in a pocket weatherstrip. The release lock mechanism is bonded directly to the sliding lite and retains it in a closed position by engaging a groove in the extruded frame rail.

To meet the opening requirement of S5.2.2B of the spec, the release lock mechanism is disengaged and the sliding lite is moved foreward or rearward, depending on which half contains the sliding lite, until the minimum opening width of 20 inches is obtained. See drawing #DK-1553 and test pictures which show the type of window proposed.

This system meets the preliminary release test and the retention test without question, but if the tempered sliding glass shatters during the lotter test most of the glass, often including the release lock mechanism, falls out of the opening. This obviates any further practical need for the release

lock mechanism as the required opening, if not immediately obtained by the breakage of the sliding lite, can be obtained by touching any remaining glass cubes which will cause them to crumble and fall out. In the event that the tempered glass does not break during testing, or more importantly during crash impact, the mechanism would obviously be required to function.

We feel that our system fully meets the intent of the specification in providing unobstructed openings for emergency agress. We respectfully request that you reconsider our request for exemption from the portion of paragraph S5.3.2 which requires that the release lock mechanism remain operable after the retention test when tempered glass is used in this manner and has broken out during that test. Please give this request your earliest consideration as a reply is urgently needed by August 1, 1974.

Ronald J. Hansing Project Engineer

(Graphics omitted)

ID: nht74-5.54

DATE: 07/10/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Hellstar Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 17, 1974, requesting further information on the applicability of Federal safety standards to auxiliary fuel tanks.

Standard No. 301 does not apply directly to auxiliary or extra-capacity fuel tanks. However, it does apply to motor vehicle fuel systems. Therefore, if an auxiliary or extra-capacity tank is installed in the fuel system of a vehicle that is subject to the performance requirements of Standard No. 301, before its first purchase for purposes other than resale, causing that fuel system not to be in compliance with the standard, the person installing the tank or offering the vehicle for sale would be in violation of @108 (a)(1) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Since Standard No. 301 becomes applicable to trucks with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less on September 1, 1976, the fuel systems of such trucks will have to meet the performance requirements of the standard as of that date.

The fact that a customer may have ordered the auxiliary or extra-capacity tank to be installed in the vehicle he is purchasing does not affect the installer's responsibilities under the Act. He would still be in violation of Standard No. 301 if the tank were installed prior to the first purchase causing the fuel system to be in noncompliance.

Auxiliary and extra-capacity fuel tanks are not subject to regulation under Standard No. 301 where they are installed after the first purchase of the vehicle for purposes other than resale. However, the auxiliary and extra-capacity tanks are subject to the

2 section of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act that authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make a determination as to whether or not an item of motor vehicle equipment contains a safety-related defect. In the event that such a determination is made, the manufacturer may be compelled to notify purchasers of the hazard.

If the installation of the fuel tank occurs before the first purchase of the vehicle for purposes other than resale, the installer must affix to the vehicle an additional certification label stating the alterer's name, the date of the alteration completion, and that the vehicle conforms to all applicable safety standards in effect on a date no earlier than the manufacturing date of the original vehicle, and no later than the date the alterations were completed.

We appreciate your interest.

YOURS TRULY,

CORPORATION June 17, 1974

Richard B. Dyson Assistant Chief Counsel -- NHTSA

Re: N40-30 KK

Your letter to Merle Robberts did not state clearly what effects standard No. 301, Part 571 would have to pick up truck auxiliary fuel tanks when this standard takes effect in 1976.

If I am reading your letter correctly auxiliary fuel tanks will not be effected, even after 1976, as long as they are not installed prior to first sale. Is this a correct assumption?

We also manufacture a line of extra capacity fuel tanks where the original tank is removed and our tank is installed in its place. Would the above be true in this situation?

If a new truck dealer installed an auxiliary or a replacement fuel tank on a vehicle that was ordered by the customer, would he be in violation of Standard 301?

Would a person that installs an auxiliary or replacement fuel tank on a vehicle have to recertify this vehicle under Part 567 certification rules?

A reply to the above at your earliest convenience will be greatly appreciated.

John J. Gostomski President