ID: 19234.nhf

Mr. Thomas J. Undlin
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.
Attorneys at Law
2800 Lasalle Plaza
800 Lasalle Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55402-2015

Dear Mr. Undlin:

This responds to your inquiry about whether the Polaris RANGER manufactured by your client, Polaris Industries Inc., is a motor vehicle that would have to comply with the applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. I apologize for the delay in our response. You state that the RANGER is a general purpose off-road utility vehicle with features that make it impractical to operate on public roads. You explain that the RANGER's certificate of origin states: "This general purpose, off-road utility vehicle is not intended for and may not be registered for on-road use." You also explain that the RANGER is designed to fit in the rear of a standard full-sized pickup truck so that it may be transported, rather than operated, on public roads. On the basis of the information you provided in your letter and the warning labels, photographs and owner's manual excerpts you enclosed, it appears that the RANGER is not a motor vehicle.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues and enforces the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. NHTSA's statute defines the term "motor vehicle" as follows:

[A] vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line. 49 USC 30102(a)(6).

Whether NHTSA considers the RANGER to be a motor vehicle depends on its use. In the past, we have concluded that this statutory definition does not encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-road use of the equipment is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which they were manufactured. Other construction vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles, since the on-highway use is more than "incidental."

Based on the information you provided in your letter and the warning labels, photographs and owner's manual excerpts you enclosed, it appears that the RANGER is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the statutory definition. This conclusion is based on the statements in your letter that the RANGER is designed to fit in the rear of a full-size standard pickup truck to move between off-road sites. It is also based on the statement that the RANGER is designed and sold for off-road use only and has certain features that make it impracticable to use on paved roads. We note that the vehicle lacks a differential for both the rear driven axles. The lack of a differential, which ordinarily facilitates turning by allowing the wheels to rotate at different rates, makes the RANGER difficult to drive on pavement. Other features of the RANGER, including the oversized-cleated tires and suspension system, are consistent with off highway use. Assuming your statements are correct, we would consider the RANGER to be an off-road vehicle. If we were to receive additional information indicating that the RANGER uses the public roads on more than an incidental basis or that Polaris is no longer selling it as an off-road vehicle, the agency would reassess this interpretation.

If you have further questions regarding NHTSA's safety standards, please contact Nicole Fradette of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
cc: Leonard Goldstein Office of General Counsel
U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission
Washington, DC 20207 ref:VSA#591
d.8/6/99

ID: 19235.drn

Mr. Fritz Litchfield
Litchfield Rent A Car
3015 E. Clairemont Ave.
Eau Claire, WI 54701

Dear Mr. Litchfield:

This responds to your December 4, 1998, letter asking whether your motor vehicle rental business may rent 15-person vans to schools. Your letter states that your company rents 15-person vans to schools by the day, and does not sell or lease the vans to schools on a long term basis. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has previously stated that Federal law permits van rental to schools on a one-time or very occasional basis. However, because States have the authority to regulate the use of vehicles, you should contact Wisconsin officials to see if State law would permit the rental of the vans to schools.

We have enclosed a copy of a December 18, 1997, letter from us to Congressman Phil English. The letter discusses NHTSA's statutory authority to regulate sales, leases and rentals of buses to schools. If you have questions about Wisconsin State requirements for student transportation, please contact:

Mr. Robert Christian
Acting State Director
Wisconsin School Bus Association
P.O. Box 168
Sheboygan, WI 53082-0168
Telephone: (920) 457-7008.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
2 Enclosures
ref:571#VSA
d.1/21/99

ID: 1923y

Mr. Martin M. Ginsburg
Proline Designs
25206 Loytan Street
Torrance, CA 90505

Dear Mr. Ginsburg:

This responds to your letters asking whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials (49 CFR /571.302), applies to the "interior window coverings" that you manufacture for "pick up truck shells." In your letters, you briefly explain that the "shell," which is sold as an aftermarket product, "is placed directly over the bed of a truck." The answer to your question is no, Standard No. 302 does not apply to your product. I regret the delay in responding to your letter.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not grant approval of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable requirements. The following represents our opinion based on our understanding of the facts provided in your letter.

There are two factors which lead us to conclude that Standard No. 302 does not apply to your window coverings. First, you manufacture an aftermarket item of equipment--i.e., an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle sold to owners of used vehicles. Standard No. 302 regulates the flammability resistance of curtains and shades in new completed vehicles only.

Second, even if the shell and its window coverings were installed on a new vehicle prior to the vehicle's first sale to a consumer, Standard No. 302 applies only to components in the "occupant compartment air space" (S4), which the agency has indicated is the area in which persons are likely to use to ride. Assuming that we are correct in believing that people do not typically ride in the enclosed bed of the truck, we conclude that the area enclosed by the shell would not be an occupant compartment. This accords with the agency's February 15, 1983 letter to Mr. Nakaya in which NHTSA stated that, with regard to vans, the space to the rear of the rearmost seat was not part of the occupant compartment. Accordingly, since the window coverings in question are not located in the occupant compartment, we conclude that they are not subject to Standard No. 302.

Nevertheless, there are two matters that you ought to consider when manufacturing your window coverings. First is the possibility of liability under State and common law if the coverings were to catch fire in a situation where a window covering meeting Standard No. 302's flammability resistance requirements would not have caught fire, or if the coverings burn much more rapidly than coverings meeting those requirements.

Second is the possibility of a finding of a safety-related defect in your products. While Standard No. 302 does not directly apply to your product, you should be aware that the window coverings you manufacture are considered to be items of motor vehicle equipment. As the manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, you are thereby subject to the provisions set forth in sections 151-159 of the Vehicle Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of equipment with defects relating to motor vehicle safety. If you or this agency determined that your product had a defect relating to motor vehicle safety, you would have to notify all known purchasers of the defect and either repair your product so that the defect is removed, or replace the window coverings with an identical or reasonably equivalent product that does not contain a defect.

Your letter did not indicate whether you also manufacture the truck shell to which you refer. If you are the shell manufacturer, and if your product contains glazing material, Standard No. 205 (49 CFR /571.205, Glazing Materials) directly applies to your product. Standard No. 205 is an equipment standard which sets performance requirements for glazing materials used in new and used motor vehicles and glazing materials sold as items of motor vehicle equipment, including glazing used in truck shells. The standard establishes both performance requirements, including those regulating the light transmittance and abrasion resistance of glazing, and labeling requirements applicable to the glazing used in your product.

We note also that, since your description of the "shell" was very brief, we were not certain whether the term "shell" as you use it includes what our regulations refer to as a "slide-in camper." Under Standard No. 126, Truck-Camper Loading (49 CFR /571.126), a "slide-in camper" is a structure having a roof, floor, and sides, designed for the purpose of providing shelter for persons and to be mounted on and removed from the cargo area of a truck by the user. (See, also, 49 CFR /575.103 for NHTSA's consumer information requirements for trucks that are capable of accommodating slide-in campers.) In light of the possibility that the structures to which you refer are slide-in campers, and that you might be the manufacturer of the campers, we would like to mention our regulations that apply to slide-in campers.

Briefly, each slide-in camper must meet Standard No. 205 for any glazing materials used in the camper. In addition, Standard No. 126 requires each slide-in camper to be permanently labeled with information including its maximum loaded weight. This standard also requires each camper to be furnished with an owner's manual that includes information on total camper weight, proper matching of a truck and slide-in camper, appropriate methods of camper loading, and how to determine the camper's center of gravity (cg) and where the cg should be placed in the truck cargo area. All campers must also be certified in accordance with section 114 of the Vehicle Safety Act as conforming to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Each camper manufacturer must submit certain information concerning its company pursuant to Part 566 of our regulations, Manufacturer Identification. However, Standard No. 302 does not apply to slide-in campers, even if the slide-in camper is installed on a new pickup truck.

Finally, we must decline your request that we review "California Health and Safety Code Standard No. 19" to inform you whether window coverings that meet the California standard can meet Standard No. 302. NHTSA determines whether a vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment complies with an applicable safety standard by purchasing vehicles and equipment and testing them under strict conditions according to the procedures specified in the standards. Thus, we determine whether a product subject to our standards complies with those standards by assessing the actual performance of the product in our tests. Since your window coverings are not subject to Standard No. 302, they will not be part of our compliance testing. Further, even if the coverings were subject to Standard No. 302, we have already noted that it is the responsibility of the manufacturer of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment--and not NHTSA--to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable FMVSS's.

I have enclosed copies of all of the safety standards and regulations mentioned above, and an information sheet explaining how you can obtain copies of NHTSA regulations for your future reference. I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures /ref:302#126 d:7/27/89

ID: 1924y

The Honorable Butler Derrick
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Derrick:

Thank you for your July 11, l989 letter on behalf of one of your constituents in South Carolina, asking whether mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional. I am pleased to have this chance to provide you with the following information.

Before addressing your specific question, I would like to emphasize that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts offer our best opportunity to save lives today at virtually no cost to the consumer. We recognize that a safety belt use law requires an action that many people do not take voluntarily. However, all traffic laws involve some restraint on individual behavior. Most are accepted without a second thought: we drive on the right side of the road, instead of the left, we stop for red lights, and we obey speed limits. In many cases, the failure of motorists to obey these traffic laws will have an impact on motorists besides the violator.

The same is true when motorists fail to wear safety belts. Automobile accidents have many victims -- family, friends, employers, and taxpayers -- all of whom bear some measure of the human and economic cost. During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic injuries and deaths have resulted in an annual cost to society of $57 billion, including such costs as workman's compensation, welfare payments and lost tax revenues. Because of the substantial societal burden imposed by vehicle-related deaths and injuries, we believe that State legislatures have more than adequate justification to impose the relatively small intrusion on individual liberties that results from mandatory safety belt use laws.

The constitutionality of State mandatory use laws has been upheld by the courts of three different States, Illinois, Nebraska, and New York. I have enclosed a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion on this issue (Illinois v. Kohrig, decided October 1, 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kohrig, on the grounds that it did not present a substantial Federal question. This dismissal suggests that the United States Supreme Court also believes that State mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional.

You also stated that your constituent believes that the Supreme Court has declared laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets to be unconstitutional. This belief is inaccurate. Page 7 of the enclosed Kohrig decision lists 35 different State and Federal cases that have held that State laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are a valid exercise of a State's powers and not unconstitutional. That list shows that the Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision that the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet use law was a constitutional exercise of a State's power (Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review decisions by State Courts in Lousiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin upholding the constitutionality of State motorcycle helmet use laws. There are no Supreme Court decisions suggesting that State motorcycle helmet use laws are unconstitutional exercises of the State's power.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure /ref:208 d:7/31/89

ID: 19257.drn

Mr. Robert L. Douglas
Director of Product Integrity
AmTran Corporation
P. O. Box 6000
Conway, AR 72033

Dear Mr. Douglas:

This responds to your request for interpretation of how to test a floor panel complex joint in a school bus, as AmTran is considering a new floor design. As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) will address this issue in a final rule amending Standard No. 221, School bus body joint strength.

As you are aware, in the FEDERAL REGISTER of November 5, 1998 (63 FR 59732), NHTSA published a final rule amending Standard No. 221. The final rule's effective date is May 5, 2001. The final rule addressed testing of curved or complex joints, such as that found in a school bus floor panel. NHTSA has received several petitions for reconsideration of the final rule to clarify test procedures for small, curved, and complex joints.

NHTSA is presently reviewing the petitions, and expects to issue another final rule on Standard No. 221 that will address the issues raised. Because the issue you raised in your letter was raised by the petitioners, we will address your question in our response to petitions for reconsideration that will be published some time in the future.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:221
d.7/10/00

ID: 1925y

Mr. L.T. Mitchell, Specification Engineer
Thomas Built Buses, Inc.
P.O. Box 2450
1408 Courtesy Road
High Point, N.C. 27261

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

This responds to your letter asking us to reassess our previous interpretations of Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release (49 CFR /571.217). Before turning to the substance of your letter, I would like to apologize for the regrettable delay in this response.

You asked us to reassess a December 20, 1984 letter to Mr. Melvin Smith regarding school buses. Mr. Smith had, among other things, asked for an interpretation of the concluding sentence of S5.4.2.1(b) of Standard No. 217. Section S5.4.2.1(b) requires side emergency doors installed in a school bus with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds to have an opening that is at least 45 inches high and 24 inches wide when the side door is extended. The final sentence of S5.4.2.1(b) reads: "A vertical transverse plane tangent to the rear-most point of a seat back shall pass through the forward edge of a side emergency door." Mr. Smith had asked how much, if any, forward and/or rearward variation from perfect coincidence of the plane and door edge were permissible. We responded that no variation from the explicit requirements of the standard is permissible.

Your letter stated that a requirement for an exact coincidence of the plane and door edge "opens the door to impossible manufacturing requirements," and is "an extremely difficult goal to meet." You stated that requiring an exact relationship between a part of the seat and the door will require multiple seat installation adjustments, bending the seat, or deforming the seat padding. To avoid such burdens, you asked if the agency would consider setting tolerances for the coincidence of the points expressed in this provision. You proposed the following interpretation of the requirement for coincidence of the plane and door edge:

1. A seat back may not intrude backward into the door opening through the transverse plane coincident with the leading edge of the door opening.

2. A seat back may be located ahead of this transverse plane by no more than three-quarters of an inch, plus or minus three-quarters of an inch, or within but no more than, one and one-half inches ahead of the transverse plane coincident with the leading edge of the door opening.

It would be helpful to set forth some background information to fully explain why NHTSA cannot issue an intepretation along the lines you have suggested. Section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1392; the Safety Act) specifies that NHTSA shall establish by order appropriate safety standards and that the Administrative Procedure Act shall apply to all orders establishing, amending, or revoking a safety standard. The Administrative Procedure Act generally requires agencies to publish a notice setting forth the proposed change to a safety standard, and allow the public to comment thereon, before the agency can adopt any change to the established safety standard.

Please note that the Safety Act requires public notice and comment only when adopting orders that establish, amend, or revoke a safety standard. Interpretations are not subject to the requirements for public notice and comment, because interpretations do not add, delete, or change any requirements established in a safety standard. Instead, intepretations explain how the requirements established in safety standards or the Safety Act apply to particular vehicles or equipment, or otherwise clarify the meaning of the established requirements.

In this case, the meaning of the requirement in Standard No. 217 that "a vertical transverse plane tangent to the rear-most point of a seat back shall pass through the forward edge of a side emergency door" is clear. This language clearly and unequivocally requires an exact coincidence of the location of the seat back and the forward edge of a side emergency door. There is no way that we can interpret this language in accordance with your suggestion; i.e., that the seat back shall be located no more than 1 and 1/2 inches forward of the forward edge of the emergency door.

Your letter suggested a change to the requirements of Standard No. 217, not a clarification of those requirements. As explained above, the only way by which we can change those requirements is to initiate rulemaking and give the public notice of and the opportunity to comment on the proposed change. Hence, your letter asking for an interpretation would have been more properly filed as a petition for rulemaking, pursuant to the provisions of 49 CFR Part 552.

Ordinarily, we would simply notify you of your right to file such a petition and take no further action unless and until you decided to file such a petition. In this case, however, the delay in this response may have conveyed the erroneous impression that NHTSA would provide a substantive response to your request in this interpretation. To ensure that your request receives a response addressing its merits, we will treat your letter as a petition for rulemaking filed under Part 552. We will notify you of our response to the petition as soon as we have completed our review of it.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel

ref:217 d:8/3/89

ID: 1926y

Mr. Frank Miller
Gerry Baby Products
12520 Grant Drive
Box 33755
Denver, CO 80233

Dear Mr. Miller:

This responds to your letter to me asking whether the "binding" you use of the edges of a seat cushion should be tested under Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, separately from the cushion assembly or as a composite with the other materials. I regret the delay in responding. You said that you currently test the binding separately, but would find it easier to test the binding "as a portion of a cushion assembly."

Paragraph S4.2.1 of Standard No. 302 provides that "any material that does not adhere to other material(s) at every point of contact" must meet the standard's flammability resistance requirements when tested separately. Thus, if the binding is joined to the cushion assembly so that it does not adhere to the cushion at every point of contact, the agency would test it separately. If, on the other hand, the binding adheres to the cushion at every point of contact, paragraph S4.2.2 requires it to meet the performance requirements of the standard when tested as a composite with the other materials.

In your letter, you did not directly state whether the binding adheres to the cushion at every point of contact. However, we presume that you currently think it does not, since you said you test the binding separately from the cushion. I am enclosing copies of two previous interpretations of Standard No. 302 that might be helpful in determining whether there is the requisite adherence. In a March 10, 1978 letter to Mr. Edmund Burnett, the agency discussed the application of S4.2.1 to a seat cushion consisting of vinyl stitched at varying internals to padding. In that letter, the agency stated that the vinyl, which did not adhere to the material at every point of contact, must be tested separately. On the other hand, a July 17, 1972 letter to Mr. Satoshi Nishibori concerned materials glued together, which NHTSA said would be tested by us as a composite.

Your inquiry follows our December 3, 1987 letter to you in which we said that thread that is used in the manufacture of a seat cushion may be tested as part of the component. We explained in our letter that although the agency recognizes that stitching that does not adhere at every point of contact should be tested separately under S4.2.1 of Standard No. 302, NHTSA has determined that it is more practical to test stitching as part of the material since the test apparatus cannot readily accommodate stitching alone. I note that the issue you now appear to raise is whether your binding, which presumably does not adhere at every point of contact, may be tested as part of the cushion material (i.e., as a composite) in the same manner thread is tested. The answer to this question is that the agency would probably separately test such binding under S4.2.1.

We have no reason to believe that it is not practicable to separately test binding that does not adhere at every point of contact, as specified in Standard No. 302. In fact, your present procedure which tests binding separately indicates that S4.2.1 is practicable. Since the practicability problems arising when separately testing thread are not encountered when the binding is tested, the agency will test binding that does not adhere at every point of contact in the manner specified in Standard No. 302.

This does not mean to say, however, that you are prohibited from testing the binding as a composite. Standard No. 302 does not require you to test your products using the test procedure set forth in the standard. The standard only specifies how the agency will conduct its compliance test for the flammability resistance requirements of Standard No. 302. A manufacturer may choose any means of evaluating its products to determine whether the vehicle or item of equipment complies with the requirements of Standard No. 302, provided, however, that the manufacturer exercises due care in ensuring that its products will comply with the standard when tested by the agency according to the procedures specified therein.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures

/ref:302 d:8/2/89

ID: 19278.DRN

Richard Nelson, Director
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services
Regulation and Licensure
P. O. Box 95007
Lincoln, NE 68509-5007

Dear Mr. Nelson:

This responds to a letter from your predecessor, Ms. Gina Dunning, regarding a "new regulation" that Ms. Dunning believed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has issued which "prohibits the sale of commercial vans with a capacity of eleven or more to child care centers that transport children to or from school and school-related activities and Head Start programs." As the head of the Nebraska regulatory agency for child care programs, Ms. Dunning expressed concern about its effect on transportation for children in your state.

Let me begin by explaining that NHTSA's school bus regulations have not changed. We have, however, clarified our interpretation of the regulations. Our statute, at 49 U.S.C. 30112, requires any person selling or leasing a new vehicle, including a new school bus, to sell or lease a vehicle that meets all applicable safety standards. Our statute defines a "schoolbus" as any vehicle that is designed for carrying 11 or more persons and which is likely to be "used significantly" to transport preprimary, primary, and secondary students "to or from school or an event related to school" (emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. 30125. Any person selling a new "school bus" must sell a vehicle that meets our school bus safety standards, or risk civil penalties under Federal law.

In recent interpretation letters to NHTSA, the agency was asked to address situations where non-educational institutions are procuring buses to transport children to or from school. In answering these, we had to determine whether the bus was to be "used significantly" to transport the students to or from school. >If a new bus is sold for such purpose, the dealer selling such a vehicle for that purpose must sell a bus that has been certified as meeting our school bus safety standards. There are van-based vehicles, completed by school bus manufacturers, that are certified to those standards.

One of those letters involved a dealer selling a new 15-passenger van to a child care facility which planned to significantly use the van for school transportation. The letter is dated July 23,

1998, to Mr. Don Cote of Northside Ford in San Antonio, Texas (copy enclosed). In that letter, we explained that the large passenger van is a "school bus" under our regulations. Thus, when a dealer sells or leases a new van for such use, the dealer must sell or lease only buses that meet Federal motor vehicle safety standards for school buses, even when the purchaser is a child care facility.⁽¹⁾

The Cote letter discusses NHTSA's reexamination of two previous letters addressed to Ms. Vel McCaslin of Grace After School. In arriving at the conclusions set forth in the Cote letter, NHTSA decided that the letters to Ms. McCaslin did not focus on the fact that the buses were being used to transport school children "from school" as specified in 49 U.S.C. 30125. To the extent that the McCaslin letters are inconsistent with it, the Northside Ford letter superceded the letters to Ms. McCaslin.

This change in interpretation applies only to persons that sell new buses, not to school bus purchasers or users. NHTSA cannot require Nebraska's institutions, including schools or child care centers, to buy only school buses for use in transporting students. How children are to be transported to or from school is determined by Nebraska state law.

Ms. Dunning expressed concern whether "children are indeed safer being transported by school buses than commercial vans," and indicated that while that might have been true in 1974, her belief is that vans are safer today than they were in 1974. All motor vehicles, including passenger vans and other buses, must meet higher safety standards today than they did in 1974. Nevertheless, children are still much safer when transported by school bus, than by passenger van or passenger car. This point is illustrated in the enclosed NHTSA publication "School Bus Safety: Safe Passage for America's Children."

Page 12 of the publication shows how safety is enhanced for school buses, with a table summarizing the Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to school buses. Passenger vans are not required to meet the described safety enhancements.

Ms. Dunning expressed concern about the fact that the large school buses are not required to provide seat belts. I am enclosing NHTSA's position on this issue, titled "Seatbelts on School Buses." This information is from NHTSA's web site at www.nhtsa.dot.gov. In brief, our position has been that school bus crash data show that Federal requirement for belts on school buses would provide little, if any, added protection in a crash.

Ms. Dunning also believed that child care centers that purchase school buses "will incur significantly higher vehicle costs and higher insurance, maintenance and fuel costs." We have examined the issues of costs and availability. Our inquiries to the vehicle manufacturers indicate that while school buses are somewhat more expensive than large vans, the difference is not so large that it would prevent child care centers from acquiring school buses. The cost range for 15-passenger school buses is approximately $30-32,000, compared to $25-28,000 for 15-passenger vans. The longer service life for school buses will offset a part of this difference.

Ms. Dunning's final point was that child care centers have expressed concern about the length of time it takes between ordering a school bus and its delivery. Ms. Dunning said that the delay hampers the child care centers' operations and "will seriously impact centers' ability to meet parent needs and remain in business." NHTSA has a very strong focus on child safety in transportation, and is doing its best to facilitate school bus purchases for child care centers that seek to purchase school buses for their school-aged children. The leadtime required for delivery of a school bus may be two or three months longer than for a large van, but this should not present a problem for organizations that follow a systematic plan for vehicle replacement. We are currently working with our partners in state and local communities, and in the school bus industry, to see what can be done to reduce the time between a school bus order and its delivery.

For your information, because of the increasing number of pre-school aged children being transported by school buses and the pupil transportation community's request for guidance on how to safely transport these children, NHTSA released a February1999 Guideline for Transporting Pre-school Aged Children in School Buses. A copy of this document is enclosed for your information.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
Enclosures (4 items)
ref:VSA#Part 571.3

1. Please note that NHTSA has never stated that day care facilities that provide only custodial care are "schools." NHTSA's laws do not affect new bus sales to child care facilities that are not significantly involved in transporting school aged children "to or from" school. The Cote letter could affect the facility if it is involved in transporting children to or from school.

ID: 19283.ogm

E. Pluribus Law Firm, P.C.
P.O. Box 326
Leland, MI 49654

Re: FMVSS 209

Dear Sir or Madam:

This responds to your letter concerning the test requirements of Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. Your questions relate to provisions addressing the performance of seat belt buckles under this safety standard. Specifically, you ask several questions about what you describe as the "partial engagement" provisions of Standard No. 209. Your seven questions, and our response to each question are provided below.

l. How does NHTSA define "partial engagement" under FMVSS 209 3.21 & 5.27?

ANSWER: We note that Standard No. 209 does not contain either section you refer to in your question. However, S4.3(g) and S5.2(g) of Standard No. 209, respectively, each use the phrase "partial engagement" in describing the minimum performance criteria and the test procedures for assessing buckle performance. Under S4.3, a seat belt buckle with a metal-to-metal buckle must separate when subjected to a force of not more than 22 newtons 95 pounds) or less when in any position of "partial engagement." The meaning of the phrase "partial engagement" is not defined in Standard No. 209 and has not been previously interpreted by NHTSA insofar as it applies to this particular standard. We believe that "partial engagement" is that position where the male end and the female receptacle of a seat belt assembly is neither fully engaged and latched nor fully disengaged. Therefore, the two components are partially engaged when the male end is inserted into the receptacle but has not been inserted to the point where the latching mechanism has closed.

2. Is "partial engagement" one of the phenomena which NHTSA is concerned about in the language of FMVSS 209 3.5 - "Buckle release mechanism shall be designed to minimize the possibility of accidental release"?

ANSWER: No. As used in this Standard, "partial engagement" is not a phenomenon but is a state in which the buckle assembly is placed to test the resistance of the assembly to separation or disengagement when it is not in the fully latched position. The requirement in S4.1(e) that buckle release mechanisms be designed to minimize the possibility of accidental release is intended to provide some assurance that buckles will not be inadvertently released once in the latched position.

3. Is it correct that FMVSS 209 3.21 preclude [sic] certification of any buckle which requires more that 5 lbs. to release from any position of partial engagement? Specific reference should be made to the language "a metal buckle shall separate when in any position of partial engagement by a force of not more than 5 pounds (2.3 Kg)" in interpreting this provision.

ANSWER: Again, we note that Standard No. 209 does not contain the section cited in your question. However, the language cited in your question is found in S4.3(g) of the Standard. If this is, in fact, that section that your question refers to, the answer is yes.

4. Assuming no testing of maximum engagement is required under FMVSS 209 5.27 if it is determined that partial engagement is not possible "by means of a technique representative of actual use", how important is it to conduct a fair and adequate test of "representative use?"

ANSWER: In answering this question, we assume that you are referring to S5.2(g) of Standard No. 209. In certifying compliance with a standard, manufacturers must make efforts to ensure that they have exercised due care. If the agency testing shows that an apparent noncompliance exists with a vehicle or item of equipment, the manufacturer is asked to show the basis for its certification that the vehicle or equipment complies with the relevant safety standard or standards. If there is a noncompliance, the manufacturer must conduct a recall campaign to remedy the problem. In addition, the manufacturer is subject to civil penalties unless it can establish that it exercised "due care" in the design and manufacture of the product and in the checks (through actual testing, computer simulation, engineering analyses, or other means) to ensure compliance, but nevertheless did not have reason to know that the vehicle or item of equipment did not comply with the safety standards.

5. What is a fair and adequate test to determine "whether partial engagement is possible by means of a technique representative of actual use" under FMVSS 209 5.27?

ANSWER: This agency has long stated that it is unable to judge what efforts would constitute "due care" in advance of the actual circumstances in which a noncompliance occurs. What constitutes "due care" in a particular case depends on all relevant facts, including such things as the limitations of current technology, the availability of test equipment, the size of the manufacturer, and, above all, the diligence exercised by the manufacturer.

6. Would the NHTSA interpretations provided above be the same in 1988-91 as they have been provided in response to the request for interpretation herein.

ANSWER: Yes.

7. If the response to request No. 6 is negative, please identify all interpretations which would have been different and the underlying basis for the change in interpretation between 1988-91 and present.

ANSWER: See the answer to item 6 above.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Otto Matheke of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
ref:209
d.7/8/2000

ID: 1930y

Mr. Ted Aston
3218 Sheffield Place
Concord, CA 94518

Dear Mr. Aston:

This is in reply to your letter with respect to your wish to import motor vehicle parts from England, to be used in the construction of a kit car for your own use. I regret the delay in responding.

You have informed us that you are not importing parts controlled by the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, such as "lights, tires, brake hoses, glazing materials," or "the engine, transmission, wheels, instruments, and miscellaneous items that are readily available here". Instead, you will be importing "body parts, frame parts, suspension and some steering parts, some electrical parts and the gas tank."

From your description, we believe that your intention is to import motor vehicle equipment and not a motor vehicle. The only items of motor vehicle equipment which are covered by the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and hence must comply or be brought into compliance with those standards are: brake hoses, brake fluid, lighting and reflective devices, passenger car tires, retreaded tires, tires and rims for vehicles other than passenger cars, wheel covers, warning devices, glazing, seat belt assemblies, and child seating systems. If the motor vehicle equipment you are importing includes none of these items, then the equipment may be entered without the necessity of giving a bond for the production of a statement that it has been brought into compliance.

I hope that this letter is helpful to you.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel

ref:VSA d:8/7/89