ID: 2635o

Frank S. Perkin, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel
The Budd Company
Law Department
3l55 West Big Beaver Road
Box 260l
Troy, Michigan 48084

Dear Mr. Perkin:

This responds to your letter expressing concern about a statement in one of our interpretation letters, which you believe could be read as condoning the practice of rebuilding wheels by processes which include heating and welding. As discussed below, our letter's reference to remanufacturing wheels was made only to serve as an illustrative example and was not intended to address either the safety of such processes or the relevant regulations of other Federal agencies.

The interpretation letter in question is one that we sent on September 22, l986, to Steven R. Taylor, responding to a request concerning regulations that apply to manufacturers of reconditioned brake drums. The letter included the following paragraph:

NHTSA has in the past considered the issue of what types of operations make a person a manufacturer with respect to retreaded tires and remanufactured wheels. A person who retreads tires is considered to be a manufacturer under the Vehicle Safety Act. The retreading process involves significant manufacturing operations, which do not differ substantially from those of manufacturing new tires. By contrast, a person who remanufactures wheels is not considered to be a manufacturer under the Vehicle Safety Act. The process of remanufacturing wheels consists of such things as straightening, re-welding parts, and repairing cracks by welding. These types of actions are not significant manufacturing operations, but instead are the type of operations commonly performed in repair shops.

You stated that all of the things mentioned in our letter, i.e., straightening, re-welding parts and repairing cracks by welding, are specifically prohibited by the OSHA standard applicable to truck wheels, both multi and single piece. You also stated that the "out of service" criteria adopted by the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety mandate that a vehicle be placed out of service if welded repairs are found on certain disc wheels. According to your letter, any significant changes made after the manufacture of a steel truck wheel, especially involving bending, heating or welding, carry a significant risk of rendering the wheel unsafe.

As is indicated from the context of our September 22, l986 interpretation letter, the reference to remanufacturing wheels was made solely for the purpose of providing an illustrative example and was not intended to address either the safety of such processes or their permissibility or impermissibility under the relevant regulations of other Federal agencies. I would note that NHTSA has long taken the position that remanufactured wheels are considered to be used wheels instead of new wheels for purposes of Federal motor vehicle safety standards. See, for example, our November 28, l973 letter addressed to Mr. L. Clinton Rich and February 7, l983 letter to Mr. H. J. Lindekugel (copies enclosed). Again, however, these letters do not purport to address the safety of remanufacturing wheels or the relevant regulations of other Federal agencies.

We appreciate your bringing to our attention your concern about the safety of remanufactured wheels. Copies of this correspondence are being placed in the public docket.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosures ref:VSA#110#120 d:1/22/88

ID: 2635y

Mr. David J. Blackwell
Operations Manager
Liquidus Limited
37A Shorncliffe Road
Toronto, Ontario
48Z 5K2, Canada

Dear Mr. Blackwell:

This is in response to your letter asking whether a certain vehicle that you plan to export to the United States would be subject to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. You state that Liquidus has "designed a system" by customizing an existing road tanker for "overhead" loading. The vehicle you plan to export would be used for "aircraft de-icing storage" and "loading of aircraft de-icing tarmac vehicles while in a fixed location." The road tanker used in your system was originally built in Canada by a firm that has since gone out of business. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our statute and regulations to you.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.; the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards for new "motor vehicles" and new items of "motor vehicle equipment." Accordingly, your vehicle is subject to the safety standards only if it is considered within the definition of "motor vehicle" under the Safety Act. Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

We have interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Tractors and other agricultural equipment are also not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., certain airport runway vehicles and underground mining vehicles) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. In addition, items of mobile construction equipment which use the highways only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site are not considered motor vehicles.

On the other hand, vehicles that use the public roads on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, utility vehicles like the Jeep are plainly motor vehicles, even though they are equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA has treated it as a motor vehicle. Further, if a vehicle is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, NHTSA has treated the vehicle as a motor vehicle. This finding was made with respect to dune buggies, notwithstanding the manufacturers' statements that the vehicles were not intended to be used on the public roads.

NHTSA has also stated in many prior interpretations that even vehicles that will regularly be used on the public roads will not be considered motor vehicles for the purposes of the Safety Act, if the vehicles have a maximum attainable speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) or less and have an abnormal configuration that readily distinguishes them from other vehicles on the road.

We would apply these principles to the vehicle identified in your letter as follows. Your letter stated that this vehicle will be immobilized after it reaches the airport. Assuming this immobilization occurs, this vehicle would appear to be designed and sold solely for off-road use, just like certain other airport runway vehicles. In this case, it would not be a motor vehicle, even though it is operationally capable of highway travel before the immobilization.

However, if the vehicle were not subsequently immobilized, and were moved from airport to airport with only a limited stay at any job site, this vehicle might be considered a "motor vehicle." This conclusion would be even more likely if a significant percentage of the vehicle's purchasers were to use the vehicle by moving it from airport to airport, notwithstanding your company's intent that the vehicles not be so used. This situation would be analogous to the classification of dune buggies.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any additional questions, please contact John Rigby of this office by mail at the above address or by telephone at 202-366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel /ref:VSA d:8/20/90

ID: ES09-007169 213

ID: ES16-001603 Listou Trailer Response

ID: etnyre.ztv

Michael J. Hedeen, Esq.
Haldeman & Associates
308 West State Street, Suite 210
Rockford, IL 61101-1140

Dear Mr. Hedeen:

This is in reply to your letter of November 14, 2002, asking for clarification of the "early warning reporting" final rule (49 CFR Part 579, Subpart C) on behalf of your client, E.D. Etnyre & Company ("Etnyre").

You related that Etnyre has an agreement with an entity under which it provides partially-completed trailers, which are completed by the other entity who "rebadges the product [under its own name] for ultimate sale to its customers." In this fact situation, Etnyre is an incomplete vehicle manufacturer and not required to report comprehensive early warning information. It is required only to report claims and notices it receives on incidents involving death, as specified in Section 579.27.

Etnyre also has an agreement with another entity which supplies Etnyre with fully-manufactured trailers which it "rebadges as an E.D. Etnyre & Company product." Etnyre issues the warranties on these trailers and administers any warranty claims. You understand that Section 579.3(b) allows the fabricating manufacturer or brand name owner to report early warning information. You then asked

Where the fabricator reports on its wholly finished products and a brand name owner reports on the "rebadged" products, is the fabricator required to count the "rebadged" products under its production numbers and as part of its aggregate number of trailers manufactured for sale under Sec. 579.24?

With respect to vehicles badged with the Etnyre name but manufactured by another entity, that entity is the "manufacturer" who must report to NHTSA; however, Section 579.3(c) permits Etnyre to assume this obligation. If the brand name owner, Etnyre, does not assume the obligation to report, the fabricating manufacturer must count the rebadged trailers in the aggregate of its own production. If Etnyre chooses to report, the fabricating manufacturer should not include the Etnyre-badged trailers as part of its production. This choice should be made on a consistent basis, and not be revised from year to year or within a given year.

If you have any questions, you may refer them to Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.4/11/03

ID: Evans_10-005739_108

ID: FARRTHFT.ETL

The Honorable Sam Farr
United States House of Representatives
100 West Alisal
P. O. Box 145
Salinas, CA 93902

Dear Congressman Farr:

Your letter to the United States Deparment of Transportation ("DOT") requesting information concerning laws and regulations applicable to car alarms has been referred to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), an agency within DOT, for response. Your letter refers to a request by your constituent, Ms. Merrill Leffmann of Soquel, California, for information on laws and regulations in this area, particularly those that might govern the volume and duration of the alarms.

NHTSA does not administer any Federal statutes that directly regulate the design or performance of car alarms, nor has it promulgated any regulations that seek to do so. The only regulation promulgated by this agency that refers in any way to the subject of car alarms is 49 CFR Part 543, Exemption from Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard. The Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard, 49 CFR Part 541, was promulgated to implement 49 U.S.C. 33102 and 33103. As Congress directed, the theft standard implements this goal by establishing a "performance standard for identifying major parts of new motor vehicles and major replacement parts by inscribing or affixing numbers or symbols on these parts." 49 U.S.C. 33101(11). It does not require the installation of alarm systems in vehicles, nor does it in any way regulate the performance or other characteristics of such systems.

In 49 CFR Part 543, NHTSA implemented the statutory provision authorizing an exemption from the Theft Standard for vehicle lines equipped with an antitheft device as standard equipment. 49 U.S.C. 33106. The only requirements Congress specified for antitheft devices to qualify for this exemption were: that the device must be in addition to the theft devices required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114 (49 CFR 114);

that it must not use a signalling device reserved by state law for use on police, emergency or official vehicles or schoolbuses; and that the vehicle manufacturer must believe that it is capable of reducing or deterring theft. 49 U.S.C. 33106(a)(1).

Likewise, Part 543 does not specify how the antitheft device is to perform or be designed. Instead, it requires a manufacturer applying for an exemption to provide information on how the device is activated and functions in several specified areas: 1) facilitating or encouraging activation by motorists; 2) attracting attention to unauthorized entry; 3) preventing defeat or circumvention of the device by unauthorized persons; 4) preventing operation of the vehicle which an unauthorized person has entered by means other than a key; and 5) ensuring reliability and durability of the device. 49 CFR 543.6(a)(3). The agency then uses the information provided about these functions to decide whether the system will be sufficiently effective in deterring theft to warrant an exemption from parts marking. The regulation does not specify how many of these functions the system must be able to perform, that the system must be capable of performing all of these functions, or how well it must perform these functions. I have enclosed a copy of the Federal theft prevention statute and regulations should you wish to pass them on to your constituent.

I must emphasize that the term "antitheft device" as used in the above statutes and regulations is not synonymous with the term "car alarm" as used in your constituent's letter. A car alarm as commonly understood is a device that emits audio and/or visual signals designed to attract attention to the fact that a theft might be in progress. On the other hand, an antitheft device qualified for exemption under Part 543 may have an "alarm" as one of its elements but is not required to. Indeed, the agency has granted exemptions under Part 543 for a number of vehicle lines equipped with systems that did not include any audible or visual "alarm" or any other means of calling attention to a possible theft.

Since your constituent's letter expressed a particular interest in the noise and duration of car alarms, you might wish to contact the Environmental Protection Agency, the agency responsible for administering Federal noise pollution laws. 42 U.S.C. 4901-4918. Its regulations are found at 40 CFR Chapter I, Parts 201-211. In addition, many localities also have codes or ordinances regulating the loudness and/or duration of noise. Your constituent may wish to contact local jurisdictions for information on their laws and regulations in this area.

I hope this information is responsive to your inquiry. If the agency can be of any further assistance, please contact the Office of Chief Counsel at 202-366-9511, or Mr. L. Robert Shelton, Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards at 202-366-1810.

Sincerely

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures(2)

cc: Washington Office (w/Constituent letter only)

ref:580

d:5/19/96

ID: featherlite(9-15-03).mtg

Mr. Norman L. Helmke
Director of Administration
Featherlite, Inc.
P.O. Box 320
Cresco, IA 52136

Dear Mr. Helmke:

This is in reply to your letter of September 15, 2003, with regard to the reporting of property damage claims under the early warning reporting (EWR) regulation (Subpart C of 49 CFR Part 579).

You advised us that Featherlite, Inc. manufactures a wide variety of trailers, including horse and livestock trailers. You indicated that the company receives property damage claims involving injuries to horses hauled in horse trailers, but that the injuries are not caused by failed components of the trailer. You explain that the injuries, in almost every case, are caused by the actions of the horse itself. With this background you ask whether an injury to a horse, not attributable to a failed component of the trailer, is a reportable property damage claim, and, if so, what is the proper code to use.

Under 49 CFR 579.24(c), a manufacturer of 500 or more trailers per year is required to make

[s]eparate reports on the number of those property damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty claims and field reports which involve the systems and components that are specified in codes 02 through 21 in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, or a fire (code 23). . . . No reporting is necessary if the system or component involved was not specified in such codes, and the incident did not involve a fire.

Property damage is defined as physical injury to tangible property. See 49 CFR 579.4(c).

A horse is tangible property. However, based on your premise that the claim did not refer to a system or component set forth in section 579.24(b)(2) or a fire, no report is necessary under the EWR regulations. The last sentence of section 579.24(c) specifically

confirms that no reporting is necessary in this instance as does the preamble to the final rule where we stated that "we will require reporting of property damage claims only when one or more specified vehicle components or systems has been identified as giving rise to the incident or damage, or there was a fire . . . ." 67 FR 45822, 45846. Please note that in the event that a system or component referred to in Section 579.24(b)(2) was identified in the claim, you would have to report it even if it is disputed.

If you have any questions, you may call Andrew DiMarsico of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.10/30/03

ID: FERBLTR.CRS

Gabriel J. Ferber, Esquire
Nesper, Ferber & DiGiacomo, LLP
501 James Audubon Drive, Suite 300
Amherst, NY 14228

Re: Superior Auto Sales, Inc.

NSA-32 RSH; RII-10/R93-017

Dear Mr. Ferber:

This is in response to your letter of August 27, 1996, to Marilynne E. Jacobs, Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC), regarding 117 vehicles that were imported from Canada by your client, Superior Auto Sales, Inc. (Superior). As described in your letter, and in prior correspondence with OVSC, these vehicles, which consisted of 1994 and 1995 Model Year Plymouth Acclaims, Dodge Spirits, and Mazda Protégés, were not equipped with automatic restraints in the front outboard passenger seating position, as required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. You nevertheless contend that all of these vehicles should be deemed in compliance with that standard, with the exception of seven Mazda Protégés that are the subject of separate correspondence.

To support this contention you cite paragraph S4.1.4.1 of the standard, which provides, in relevant part:

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in non-compliance with this standard if its manufacturer establishes that it did not know in the exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in conformity with this standard.

Your letter contends that Superior is a manufacturer within the meaning of this provision by virtue of the fact that it is a vehicle importer. Moreover, you claim that even though Superior exercised due care, it did not know that the vehicles in question did not comply with FMVSS No. 208. In support of this claim, you note that OVSC released the vehicles in question even though the conformity packages that Superior submitted for them included a vehicle identification number (VIN) deciphering chart that provided the means for the agency to ascertain that each of those vehicles was equipped with a driver side air bag and a passenger side manual seat belt.

To further support your claim that Superior did not have knowledge of the noncompliance in issue, you describe the standard as containing language "so obtuse (sic) as to defy understanding." You characterize "the complexity of the language" found in FMVSS No. 208 as "the very reason that NHTSA incorporated the 'due care' provisions of the Safety Act into the regulation." To support this contention, you cite language from the preamble of a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the standard that was issued by NHTSA in 1985. That language states

The agency recognizes that because of the complexity of the requirements of Standard No. 208, manufacturers are concerned that the rule state that the due care provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act . . . applies to compliance with [this] standard.

50 FR 14589, 14592 (April 12, 1985). You interpret this statement as representing NHTSA's "recogni[tion] at the outset that the language of Standard 208 was so complex that mistakes in interpretation were likely to occur" and that "it would be unfair to penalize affected parties who made such mistakes notwithstanding due care." Accordingly, you assert that the vehicles that Superior "imported in the exercise of due care and without knowledge of their nonconformity must . . . be deemed to be in compliance with Standard 208."

Contrary to your interpretation, NHTSA did not incorporate the due care provision of the Safety Act into FMVSS No. 208 to relieve manufacturers from liability for noncompliances resulting from mistaken interpretations of the standard's language. The agency instead added the due care provision to address a concern expressed by manufacturers, grounded on the belief (disputed by NHTSA) that there was excessive variability in FMVSS No. 208 crash test results, that a noncompliance might be determined to exist on the basis of a single test failure, even though the vast majority of similar vehicles actually complied. NHTSA stated its intention to amend the standard to incorporate the due care provision in the final rule reinstituting the automatic restraint requirements published at 49 FR 28962 on July 17, 1984. As reflected in the enclosed excerpt from that document (at 49 FR 29006), NHTSA was motivated to add the due care language to assure manufacturers

that the agency would exercise appropriate discretion in compliance cases based on apparent failures to satisfy the performance requirements of the standard in OVSC crash tests.

We agree that Superior is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(5) because it imports motor vehicles for resale. However, the due care language in FMVSS No. 208 cannot be relied upon by registered importers (RIs) to insulate themselves from liability for importing vehicles from Canada that do not comply with the standard. To properly exercise its responsibilities, an RI must be aware of the standards that apply to each of the vehicles that it imports and conform the vehicle to those standards when necessary. The principal difference between vehicles manufactured for the U.S. and the Canadian markets is that Canadian vehicles are not required to comply with the automatic restraint requirements of FMVSS No. 208. For that reason, the only passenger cars manufactured for the Canadian market that NHTSA has determined to be eligible for importation into the United States are those manufactured before September 1, 1989, the date on which the automatic restraint requirements were extended to a manufacturer's entire passenger car production, or those manufactured after that date that are equipped with an automatic restraint system that complies with FMVSS No. 208. Before importing a vehicle from Canada manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, the RI must therefore ensure that it complies with the automatic restraint requirements in the same manner as FMVSS No. 208 allows for vehicles produced for the U.S. market on the vehicle's date of manufacture.

As a factual matter, we dispute your assertion that the operative language of FMVSS No. 208 is "complex" or "obtuse." It is clear from S4.1.4.1 of FMVSS No. 208 that the authority to manufacture vehicles with a driver's side air bag and no automatic protection on the passenger side expired as of September 1, 1993 (i.e., it did not apply to model year 1994 or newer vehicles). Even if it could not discern those requirements from the language of the standard, Superior could have made appropriate inquiry with the vehicle's manufacturer or with NHTSA. Finally, if an RI is in fact confused as to the automatic restraint requirements that pertain to any given vehicle, it could not demonstrate that it exercised due care by importing the vehicle despite that confusion.

Your letter implies that Superior was misled by OVSC's "approval" of compliance packages that it submitted for vehicles that were not equipped with required passenger side automatic restraints. The conformity statements included in those packages contained Superior's certification that those vehicles were manufactured in compliance with FMVSS No. 208. OVSC's approval of the compliance packages was predicated on that certification by Superior. OVSC cannot be charged with knowledge that the vehicles it approved for release were not equipped with required automatic restraints simply because a VIN deciphering chart that would have revealed that information was included in the compliance packages. Given the thousands of compliance packages that it must process each month, OVSC cannot be expected to decipher every VIN to ensure that the RI's certification contains no inaccuracies. It is perverse to assert that merely because OVSC did not catch Superior's false statements, Superior is excused from having made them. Moreover, in each case, Superior's false certification preceded OVSC's release of the vehicle, so that release cannot have provided any basis for Superior's actions.

Your letter further cites NHTSA and Center for Auto Safety research reports for the proposition that automatic seat belts, the devices that Superior apparently would install in the vehicles in question in the event of a recall, are less safe than the manual seat belts with which those vehicles are now equipped. In light of these reports, you contend that it would be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion for NHTSA to order a recall. On the contrary, it would be improper for the agency not to require compliance with the existing requirements of a standard in its administration of the vehicle importation program. FMVSS No. 208 requires that passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1993 be equipped with passenger side automatic restraints regardless of whether they have a driver's side air bag. This requirement was adopted in a protracted rulemaking proceeding in which the agency solicited and addressed numerous comments from the public. The requirement for automatic restraints in both front outboard seating positions is buttressed by the action of Congress in enacting the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, section 2508(a)(1), which mandated that FMVSS No. 208 be amended to require air bags in those locations. (See 49 U.S.C. 30127.)

Your letter requests a hearing if NHTSA believes that Superior has not established that in the exercise of due care it did not have reason to know that the vehicles it imported were not in conformity with FMVSS No. 208. We have provided you with our analysis of this issue, as presented in your letter. Based on that analysis, it is unlikely that any further discussion would alter our opinion that the due care defense is unavailable to Superior and similarly situated RIs in this circumstance. Therefore, we decline to hold the hearing you have requested.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please contact Coleman Sachs of my staff at 202-366-5238.

Sincerely,

John Womack

Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:208

d:10/25/96

ID: firestonelaser-2

Michael D. Kane
Vice President, Quality Assurance
Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc.
535 Marriott Drive
Nashville, TN 37214

Dear Mr. Kane:

This responds to your question whether laser etching of the tire identification number (TIN) date code is permitted by the tire marking and tire labeling requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 139 and 49 CFR 574.5, respectively, that go into effect on September 1, 2004. You raised these questions in an April 29, 2003 meeting with us and in a letter of the same date. As explained below, the answerto your question is "yes."

Beginning September 1, 2004, paragraph S5.5 of FMVSS No. 139, "Tire Markings," requiress that each tire must be "marked" with certain information and that "the tire identification and DOT symbol labeling must comply with part 574" of 49 CFR. With respect to the TIN in particular, S5.5.1 of FMVSS No. 139 requires that "each tire must be labeled with the tire identification number required by 49 CFR part 574 on the intended outboard side of the tire." Part 574.5 requires that "each tire manufacturer shall conspicuously labelby permanently molding into or onto the sidewall, in the manner and location specified in Figure 1, a tire identification number containing the information set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section." The TIN contains the manufacturers identification code, the tire size, an optional manufacturer code, and a 4-digit date code representing the week and year of manufacturer. In comments on the Tire Safety Information rulemaking, the Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA) had stated that, under the new labeling requirements, molding the date code portion of the TIN on the intended outboard side of the tire would make it necessary for technicians to change the date code plate in the upper half of the tire mold on a weekly basis.

You state that Bridgestone/Firestone has been exploring the possibility of using laser technology as a means of etching the tire identification number into the tire sidewall. This process would involve a diode pumped, solid state laser beam that etches tire letters or numerals into the rubber with the required character heights and to the required character depths. You state that this technology would avoid the risk that would otherwise result from technicians having to make the weekly date code change in the top half of the tire mold. That risk has been the weekly date code change in the top half of the tire mold. That risk has been a safety concern to the tire industry. You also state that the laser etched characters, while "not molded," are permanent and that the characters are sharp, easy to read, and conform to the letter styles specified in Notes to Figure 1 of 574.5. Finally, you note that paragraph S5.5 of FMVSS No. 139 states that the tire must be "marked" with certain information, instead of "permanently molded." The latter is the language in paragraph 4.3 of FMVSS No. 109, the standard that has been largely superseded by FMVSS No. 139

As a general matter, the term "molding" does not include laser etching. However, in the context of the situation you describe, we would consider permanent laser etching of the date code portion of the TIN to be a satisfactory method of complying with paragraph S5.5 of FMVSS No. 139, so long as it occurred in-line, i.e., as part of the manufacturing process of the tire.In responding to petitions for reconsideration, we will amend the regulatory text to make it clear that this is permissible.

If you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact Nancy Bell of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:109
d.5/30/03