NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
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ID: 10878Open Mr. Musa K. Farmand Dear Mr. Farmand: This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. Your letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law "does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt." As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law. Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars. The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208 . One of the criteria was "a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages..." (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989. Preemption The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law. Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted. The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants; and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law. I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:208 d:5/9/95 Your letter correctly notes that this provision was deleted from Standard No. 208 by a final rule issued on September 2, 1993 (58 FR 46551).
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1995 |
ID: 10878rOpen Mr. Musa K. Farmand Dear Mr. Farmand: This responds to your letter of April 27, 1995. Your letter concerns a law suit in which you represent plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident. In this law suit, the counsel for the defendant has moved to amend his answer to assert that 49 CFR 571.208, paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) requires each state to allow for mitigation of damages in any seat belt use law and that paragraph preempts the Florida mandatory seat belt law. According to your letter, the Florida law "does not allow a mitigation of damages defense with respect to an alleged failure to wear a seat belt." As explained below, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees with you that the Florida safety belt use law is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by Federal law. Purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2) Before discussing the issue of preemption, I want to discuss the background and purpose of Paragraph S4.1.5.2(c)(2). That paragraph was added to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208) as part of a final rule issued July 17, 1984 concerning automatic restraints (49 FR 28962). That final rule required all new cars to have automatic protection (air bags or automatic belts) starting in the 1990 model year. The final rule included a provision that the automatic restraint requirement would be rescinded if the Secretary of Transportation determined, not later than April 1, 1989, that a sufficient number of States had enacted belt use laws meeting certain minimum criteria to cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population (paragraph S4.1.5). Under S4.1.5, the Secretary was not required to make any determination about any State safety belt laws. In fact, the Secretary never did so, in part because not enough States adopted mandatory seat belt use laws of any sort prior to April 1, 1989. Because no determination was made under S4.1.5, the automatic restraint requirements are now in effect for all passenger cars. The minimum criteria were set forth in S4.1.5.2 of Standard No. 208 . One of the criteria was "a provision specifying that the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages..." (S4.1.5.2(c)(2)). However, S4.1.5 neither purported to require nor was intended to require States to enact safety belt use laws. In addition, S4.1.5 did not require that any State safety belt use laws had to incorporate the minimum criteria of S4.1.5.2. Paragraph S4.1.5 merely provided that the Secretary would rescind the automatic restraint requirement if he or she determined that a sufficient number of States enacted laws which met the criteria of S4.1.5.2 by April 1, 1989. Preemption The Florida safety belt use law is not and never has been either expressly or impliedly preempted by Federal law. Standard No. 208 was issued under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 which expressly preempts state laws only to the extent provided by section 30103. That section provides for the express preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards that are not identical to Federal standards. However, the Florida seat belt law is not a motor vehicle safety standard within the meaning of Chapter 301, since it does not regulate motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance. Accordingly, the Florida law is not expressly preempted. The Florida law is not impliedly preempted because (1) Congress has not occupied the field of regulation of the behavior of motor vehicle occupants; and (2) the Florida seat belt law does not conflict with any Federal law or interfere with the objectives of Federal law. I hope this information has been helpful. If you have other questions or need some additional information, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref: 208 d:6/14/95 Your letter correctly notes that this provision was deleted from Standard No. 208 by a final rule issued on September 2, 1993 (58 FR 46551).
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1995 |
ID: 10888Open Mr. Doug Russel Dear Mr. Russel: This responds to your letter asking about the brake power requirements in section S5.4.2 of Federal motor vehicle safety standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.121). You asked whether there are any limitations on the pressure which can be used to achieve the required deceleration rate specified in S5.4.2.2. As explained below, the same limitation on the pressure which can be used to achieve the deceleration rate specified in S5.4.2.1 applies to the deceleration in S5.4.2.2. You also asked whether brakes must be capable of meeting the specific deceleration rate specified in S5.4.2.2. The answer to that question is yes. Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. Congress has authorized this agency the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA has used this authority to establish Standard No. 121, which applies to braking systems on vehicles equipped with air brakes. The agency, however, does not approve motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment, nor does it endorse any commercial products. Instead, Congress has established a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. Standard No. 121's brake power requirements are set forth in section S5.4.2. The purpose of these requirements is to help ensure that brakes retain adequate stopping capability during and after exposure to prolonged or severe use, such as long, downhill driving. The brake power procedure specified by that section is conducted on a dynamometer and is intended to replicate real world brake performance. The specified decelerations are designed to heat the brakes to simulate severe driving conditions. Section S5.4.2 requires that each brake shall be capable of making 10 consecutive decelerations at an average rate of 9 f.p.s.p.s from 50 m.p.h. to 15 m.p.h., at equal intervals of 72 seconds, and shall be capable of decelerating to a stop from 20 m.p.h. at an average deceleration rate of 14 f.p.s.p.s. 1 minute after the 10th deceleration. For the first ten decelerations, section S5.4.2.1 specifies the conditions under which the decelerations must be performed, including that "The service line air pressure shall not exceed 100 p.s.i. during any deceleration." For the eleventh deceleration, S5.4.2.2 specifies that "one minute after the end of the last deceleration required by S5.4.2.1 and with the drum or disc rotating at a speed of 20 m.p.h., decelerate to a stop at an average deceleration rate of 14 f.p.s.p.s." In asking whether there are any limitations on the pressure which can be used to achieve this eleventh deceleration, you noted that S5.4.2.2, unlike S5.4.2.1, does not explicitly specify a pressure limitation. However, reading section S5.4.2 (including S5.4.2.1 and S5.4.2.2) as a whole, the brake line pressure limitation set forth in S5.4.2.1 applies to the eleventh deceleration as well. Section S5.4.2 specifies a test procedure consisting of a series of events, i.e., preparing the dynamometer for the test including a 100 p.s.i. pressure limit, then making 10 decelerations on the dynamometer under the conditions set forth in S5.4.2.1, then making the eleventh deceleration. Section S5.4.2.2 does not specify any change in the dynamometer pressure limit for the eleventh deceleration. The dynamometer pressure limit specified for the brake power test simply reflects the fact that tractor trailer brakes are typically configured to operate at a maximum nominal brake pressure of approximately 100 psi. Use of a higher brake pressure that differed from a vehicle's actual maximum brake pressure would result in the brake power test not being representative of real world brake performance. In response to your second question, section S5.4.2 specifies that a brake must be capable of decelerating to a stop from 20 m.p.h. at an average deceleration rate of 14 f.p.s.p.s. 1 minute after the 10th deceleration. See also S5.4.2.2. A brake which could not achieve this specified deceleration rate for the eleventh deceleration would not comply with the Standard's requirements. I hope this information has been helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:121 d:6/29/95
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1995 |
ID: 10890Open Thomas L. Wright, Acting Manager Dear Mr. Wright: This responds to your request for information about responsibilities of motorcycle manufacturers. As you discussed with Dorothy Nakama, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not "regulate" how an enterprise becomes a "recognized manufacturer." Enclosed is NHTSA's information sheet for new manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, which discusses the main requirements of 49 U.S.C. section 30101 et seq. (formerly the Vehicle Safety Act). A copy of the Act is enclosed. Under section 30112(a) of the Act, a motorcycle manufacturer may not manufacture a motorcycle for sale unless the vehicle complies with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and is covered by a certification issued under 49 U.S.C. section 30115. One safety standard is Standard No. 115 Vehicle Identification Number - Basic Requirements. (See 49 CFR 571.115.) In our regulations, at 49 CFR part 567 Certification, NHTSA has promulgated the requirement that a manufacturer certify compliance of its motorcycle with all applicable safety standards. Under part 566, NHTSA requires manufacturers to submit certain identifying information and a description of the items they produce. Also enclosed is a copy of a July 13, 1992 interpretation letter to Mr. Jeffrey Puentes, discussing serial numbers on motorcycle frames versus motorcycle VINs. As you may be aware, "certificates of origin" are matters relating to vehicle titling, which the State regulates, rather than NHTSA. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Ms. Nakama at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosures ref:115#567 d:6/27/95
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1995 |
ID: 10906Open Mr. Ron Hooker Dear Mr. Hooker: This responds to your question about whether the State of Missouri has authority to promulgate regulations relating to the safety of motor vehicles powered by alternative fuels, particularly compressed natural gas (CNG). The short answer is that while Missouri is generally preempted in this area, it could issue its own more stringent safety standard for State-owned vehicles. Federal law will preempt a State law if (1) there is a Federal safety standard in effect, (2) the State law covers the same aspect of performance as that Federal standard, and (3) the State law is not identical to the Federal standard. Specifically, section 30103(b) of Title 49 of the United States Code states that (b) Preemption. - (1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter. State safety standards applicable to CNG fuel system integrity are generally preempted by Federal law. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has issued Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) No. 303, Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles. (59 FR 19659, April 25, 1994, copy enclosed). The Standard specifies frontal barrier and rear barrier crash tests conducted at 30 mph and a lateral moving barrier crash test conducted at 20 mph. The Standard applies to passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses that have a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less and use CNG as a motor fuel. It also applies to school buses regardless of weight that use CNG as a motor fuel. The Standard takes effect September 1, 1995. Accordingly, after September 1, 1995, Missouri could only issue its own safety standard applicable to CNG vehicle fuel system integrity if the State safety standard is identical to FMVSS No. 303. The one exception to requiring such identical standards is that Missouri could prescribe a standard for motor vehicles obtained for its own use, provided the State law imposed a higher performance requirement than the level of performance prescribed by FMVSS No. 303. Thus, Missouri could issue its own more stringent safety standard for State-owned vehicles. NHTSA further notes that Missouri is free to issue safety standards applicable to the fuel system integrity of vehicles powered by other alternative fuels (e.g., liquid propane, hydrogen), since the agency has not issued any FMVSS applicable to other alternative fuels. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:VSA d:6/8/95
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1995 |
ID: 10907-2Open Mr. Vladimir Salita Dear Mr. Salita: This responds to your letter asking about the applicability of Federal requirements to three inventions you are developing: a warning and teaching device for improving driving habits and fuel economy, a deceleration warning light, and a self-adjustable windshield wiper. The first item would "warn drivers by indicating the excessive deceleration, acceleration and dangerous speed at turns by emitting sound signals," and would be mounted on the dashboard. The second item would measure "actual vehicle deceleration" and control "the frequency of light flashing (preferable high-mounted brake light)," to alert the drivers of following vehicles. The third item would control "the rate of windshield wiper sweeps according to the intensity of rain." I am pleased to provide the information you requested. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. This agency does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, manufacturers are required to certify that their vehicles and equipment meet applicable standards. Also, it is unlawful for dealers to sell motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment that do not meet applicable standards. Vehicle manufacturers wishing to install your devices would be required to certify that their vehicles meet all applicable safety standards with the devices installed. While we do not have sufficient information to identify all the standards that might be relevant to your devices, I would like to bring three standards to your attention. Standard No. 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact, would be relevant to your dashboard-mounted warning and teaching device. That standard specifies requirements to protect occupants from impact with interior components and could affect where or how the device could be installed in a vehicle. Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, would be relevant to the deceleration warning light. That standard requires, among other things, that all original motor vehicle lighting equipment be steady burning in use, unless the standard provides otherwise. Since the standard does not specify deceleration warning lights as an exception to this requirement, they must be steady burning. Therefore, your added flashing deceleration light could not be installed on new vehicles. Because center high mounted stop lamps (CHMSLs) are not permitted to flash and must be activated only by the service brake, your use of the CHMSL as a deceleration light also is not allowed on new vehicles. I am enclosing copies of two recent letters (addressed to Mr. Wayne Ferguson, July 30, 1993, and Ms. Teresa Thompson, May 11, 1995), which provide a more detailed discussion of requirements relevant to deceleration lights. Standard No. 104, Windshield Wiping and Washing Systems, would be relevant to your self-adjustable windshield wiper. That standard specifies a number of requirements for windshield wiping systems. The standard would not preclude the inclusion of a self- adjustable windshield wiping feature. However, a vehicle manufacturer would need to ensure that the windshield wiping system with such a device met all of the requirements of that standard. No standards would apply to your devices to the extent that they were sold as aftermarket equipment. However, Federal law prohibits a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from "making inoperative" a vehicle's compliance with any safety standard. Therefore, your flashing deceleration light could not be installed by such businesses on used vehicles. If your device affects a CHMSL installed in compliance with Standard No. 108, it could not be installed by the above named businesses. Similarly, your other devices could not be installed by such businesses if the installation adversely affected a vehicle's compliance with any safety standard. The "make inoperative" provision does not apply to modifications made by owners to their own vehicles. However, NHTSA encourages vehicle owners not to degrade the safety of their vehicles. Also, individual States have authority to regulate modifications that a vehicle owner may make to his or her vehicle. We are not able to provide you with information on State laws. You may wish to seek an opinion from the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22303. Finally, all three of your devices are considered to be "motor vehicle equipment" under Federal law. This means that the manufacturer would be subject to Title 49 of the U.S. Code, sections 30118-30122, concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. If the manufacturer or NHTSA determined that the product contains a safety related defect, the manufacturer would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge. You have obviously spent a great of time and effort thinking about how to improve driving safety. We appreciate your efforts in this area and the contributions that inventors such as you make to motor vehicle safety. I hope this information is helpful. I am enclosing a general information sheet for new manufacturers which summarizes NHTSA's regulations and explains where to obtain copies of Federal motor vehicle safety standards and other regulations. If you have any further questions about lighting requirements, please contact Mr. Taylor Vinson at (202) 366-2992. For further information about other safety standards, please contact Ms. Dorothy Nakama at the same telephone number. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosures ref:104#108#VSA d:7/3/95
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1995 |
ID: 10908Open
Robert Charles Maltzahn, Esq. 418 Northwest Midland Building 401 Second Avenue South Minneapolis, MN 55401 Dear Mr. Maltzahn: This responds to your request for an interpretation whether Standard No. 115, Vehicle identification number - basic requirements or any other Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) applies to your client's high pressure "waterjet cutting and cleaning equipment" manufactured as a mobile trailer. As explained below, the answer is no. Your letter describe your client's product as "manufactured for use in the construction industry for hydrodemolition and cleaning and for industrial use." The letter states the equipment is mobile to facilitate towing from site to site, but is "not used primarily on the roadways and highways of the United States." In a telephone conversation with Dorothy Nakama of my staff, you explained that the length of time the equipment is at a job site depends on the task. The equipment could be at a ship cleaning site for over a year, or at a hydrodemolition site for five days. You stated that the equipment very rarely stays at a job site for less than a week. The FMVSS's apply only to "motor vehicles," within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. '30102(a)(6). That section defines "motor vehicle" as: a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line. Whether the agency considers your trailer to be a motor vehicle depends on its use. It is the agency's position that this statutory definition does not encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-highway use of the vehicle is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which the vehicle was manufactured. In contrast are instances where vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles for purposes of the Safety Act, since the on-highway use is more than "incidental." Based on your description, it appears that your client's equipment is not a motor vehicle. This is because the equipment appears to stay on job sites for extended periods of time (ranging from a week to over a year). Therefore, your client's equipment need not meet Standard No. 115, or any other FMVSS. I note that, if the agency were to receive additional information indicating that your trailer used the roads more than on an incidental basis, then the agency would reassess this interpretation. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama at (202) 366- 2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:VSA d:6/27/95
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1995 |
ID: 10913Open Ms. Bonnie Ward Dear Ms. Ward: This responds to your May 2, 1995, letter following up on information provided you by Charles Hott and Leon DeLarm of this agency, concerning the safety of school buses and "over-the-road type coaches" (e.g., Greyhound-type buses). You ask for confirmation that our safety standards for school buses "are above and beyond the requirements for over-the-road coaches." That statement is correct. Our Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) apply to vehicles according to vehicle type. We have FMVSSs that apply to "buses," and those that apply to "school buses." Since a "school bus" is a type of "bus" under our regulations, a new school bus must meet the Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to "school buses" in addition to those that apply to "buses." A new over-the-road coach would have to meet our "bus" standards, but not our "school bus" standards. We would like to emphasize the importance that our agency attaches to the use of safe buses to transport children. A school bus meeting the school bus safety standards is the safest means of transportation for school children. It may not be the most comfortable for long trips, since it lacks the reclining seats and restroom facilities of some over-the-road coaches, but it has safety features that the coaches lack, such as seat backs designed to cushion impacts, windows that prevent ejections, and exits that facilitate escape after crashes. In the years since buses began to be manufactured with these features, there has been a marked improvement in school bus safety. We urge schools and school districts to consider these features when making school transportation decisions. For your information, I am enclosing a pamphlet that gives a brief description of the FMVSSs, and an information sheet that explains how you can obtain copies of our standards. If you other questions on this or any other issue, please do not hesitate to call Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure ref:571 d:8/2/95
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1995 |
ID: 10914-2Open Ms. Jane L. Dawson Dear Ms. Dawson: This responds to your letter to Walter Myers of this office regarding the May 9, 1995, amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release. I apologize for the delay in responding. For your future reference, Mr. Myers is no longer assigned to our school bus standards. You may address requests for interpretation directly to me. The May 9 amendment (60 FR 24562) to FMVSS No. 217 permitted, among other things, bus manufacturers to meet the additional emergency exit area (AEEA) requirements of S5.2 by permitting manufacturers to install two emergency exit windows as an alternative to an emergency exit door. You asked what the location requirements (fore and aft) are for the emergency windows that are used as the first additional emergency exit. FMVSS No. 217 contains no explicit fore and aft location requirements for the two additional emergency exit windows. However, the intent of the final rule was to substitute the location requirements of the side exit door when the windows are used to satisfy the requirement for the first additional emergency exit. This intention is reflected in the use of the conjunctive word "or" in Tables 1 and 2 of the May 9, 1995, amendment. If a left side exit door would have been installed pursuant to S5.2.3.1(a)(2)(i), then S5.2.3.2(a)(2) requires that it be located as near as practicable to the midpoint of the passenger compartment. The same fore-aft location should be used for the windows. In cases where the fore-aft location is not specified, such as a right side exit door installed pursuant to S5.2.3.1(b)(2)(i), then the windows should be placed so as to provide bus passengers with maximum accessibility to an emergency exit, in accordance with what is reasonable and practicable. Also note the explicit location requirement in S5.2.3.2(c) that exit windows be evenly divided between the left and right sides of the bus. For example, if two exit windows are used instead of a left side exit door, they should be placed on opposite sides at the midpoint of the bus. I hope this information will be of assistance to you. Should you have any further questions or seek additional information, please feel free to contact Paul Atelsek at this address or by calling (202) 366- 2992. Sincerely,
John Womack Acting Chief Counsel
ref:217 d:8/4/95
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1995 |
ID: 10923Open Mr. Douglas Helbig Dear Mr. Helbig: This responds to your letter asking me to confirm your belief that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) lacks the authority to require the periodic reinspection of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) containers used as fuel tanks on alternative fuel motor vehicles. You are correct. NHTSA has no authority to require the reinspection of motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment. Congress has authorized NHTSA to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. The agency has used this authority to issue FMVSS No. 304, Compressed natural gas fuel container integrity, (49 CFR 571.304) which specifies requirements for the integrity of new CNG containers used to fuel motor vehicles. Each new CNG container manufactured on and after March 27, 1995 (the date the standard took effect) must comply with FMVSS No. 304 and be certified as complying with that standard when it is sold. However, after the first consumer purchase of a motor vehicle or an item of motor vehicle equipment, NHTSA's authority is much more limited and does not extend to the reinspection of motor vehicles or such equipment. I wish to note that another agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), is authorized by Congress to issue standards for containers, including CNG containers, used to transport hazardous materials. RSPA, however, does not have the statutory authority to regulate CNG containers that are used to fuel a motor vehicle. In other words, there are no Federal requirements applicable to the reinspection of CNG containers designed to fuel a motor vehicle. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Marvin Shaw at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:303 d:6/7/95
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1995 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.