Interpretation ID: 77-1.41

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/04/77

FROM: FRANK A. BERNDT -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: FRANK W. ALLEN -- ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, General Motors Corp.

TITLE: N40-30[TWH]

TEXT: Dear Mr Allen:

General Motors Corporation advised the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in a March 16, 1976, letter that it disagrees with the agency's construction of the phrase "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance" as it is found in @ 102(2) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1391 (2)). The construction appeared in the preamble to an amendment of Standard No. 105-75, Hydraulic Brake Systems, (41 FR 2392, January 16, 1976) and stated:

"Minimum" performance standards do not equate with "minimal" performance standards, as implied by General Motors and Wagner. The word "minimum" in the statutory definition of motor vehicle safety standards (15 U.S.C. 1391(2)), does not refer to the substantive content of the standards but rather to their legal status -- that the products covered must not fall short of them.

Your letter stated that GM disagrees and believes that the word "minimum" in the definition of "motor vehicle safety standards" refers solely to the substantive content of the safety standards and not to their legal effect.

As the term "minimum" concerns this discussion, it is found in two places in the Act. "Motor vehicle safety standards" are defined in @ 102(2) to mean (in relevant part) "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance." Section 103(i)(1) (A) directs the proposal of school bus standards that "include minimum standards" for enumerated aspects of performance. While the adjective "minimum" has both of the meanings that our constructions would give it, it cannot, in the agency's opinion, be used in the sense of "least possible" or "minimal," given the context of the Act's provisions and their legislative history.

2

Your argument that the "minimum" performance standards contemplated by the Act should be the "least possible" levels of performance that accomplish a stated safety goal is not logically supportable because of the nature of the stated goal. That goal, meeting the need for motor vehicle safety, is not unitary or otherwise bounded in such a way that certain actions (or a level of action) can accomplish the goal. Rather, "meeting the need" is a goal that admits of a virtually infinite number of actions that meet the need in part but don't accomplish the need in its entirety. Thus, in the agency's view, no "minimum" standard is conceptually able to constitute the "least possible" requirement or level of performance that carries out the purposes of the Act.

Beyond this logical difficulty, it is our opinion that various aspects of the Act and its legislative history make clear that "minimum standards" were conceived of as legal thresholds that a manufacturer would be required to meet or exceed. This view also conforms to the general approach to consumer safety regulation utilized in the United States.

The hearings on motor vehicle and tire safety that preceded enactment of the Safety Act demonstrate that witnesses and legislators generally viewed "minimum standards for performance" as thresholds of performance to be met or exceeded by the manufacturers. Senator Nelson and Federal Trade Commission Chaiman Paul Rand Dixon discussed the "proper interpretation of minimum safety" contemplated for tires and appeared to that no absoulute safety level could be required for each safety need but that a threshold should be established, permitting competition in premium tires for greater levels of safety (Hearings on S. 1643 Before the Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Ser. 89-37, at 27, 28 (1965)) (hereinafter referred to as Hearing 1643).

On page 31 of Hearing 1643, the National Bureau of Standards representative discussed "certain minimum specifications which are substantially more stringent than, for example, [industry] specifications for tires." In this context, "minimal" or "least possible" cannot logically be substituted for "minimum" as your construction would require. The General Services Administration (from which many NHTSA initial standards derive) used the term "minimum" in the sense of "least allowable" in describing its requirements for tires with a "minimum tread life" (page 51 of Hearing 1643). These examples are not intended to imply that no other construction can be put on other references to "minimum" in the hearings. The majority of references, however, support the agency's construction.

3

In other hearings, Senator Magnuson discussed two-stage implementation of "interim minimum safety standards" that must be upgraded within two years (Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., ser 89-49, at 1, 2. (1965) (hereinafter referred to as Hearing 3005)). It is clear that use of the term "minimum standards" for the second series of requirements contemplated a level of requirement greater than "minimal" or "least possible". Society of Automotive Engineers standards, in contrast, were described by the Department of Commerce as "minimal in nature" (Hearing 3005, at 64).

The Secretary of Commerce, then contemplated as the person who would administer the Act, expressed the view that the vehicle "meets or exceeds the established safety performance standards." (Hearing 3005, at 67). The Secretary, in discussing economic practicability, noted the definition of standards as "minimum standards" and stated "I would think that it would be impracticable for the Secretary to determine upon a minimum standard that would up the price of the total automobile to such an amount that most Americans wouldn't be able to afford to buy it". This consideration of a stringent and expensive "minimum standard" can only mean that more than minimal changes were considered possible.

The Automobile Manufacturers Association (the AMA, and now the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association) accepted the view that improvement in safety performance evolves continually, with the implication that minimal standards were not contemplated. For example, the Chairman of the AMA's safety administrative committee testified: "While the safety standards of American automobiles have improved significantly over the years, the present traffic accident problem requires that the pace of achievement be further accelerated." (Hearing 3005, at 384). This AMA representative noted that "The aim of title I [of the Act] is to get safety performance standards that guarantee an optimum safety in the vehicles . . . ." (Hearing 3005, at 411).

The Senate and House Reports confirm the agency's view that "minimum" standards refer to "least allowable" performance levels. In the Senate Report, the statement is made that, while American cars were among the world's safest and demonstrated marked improvement over earlier models, further improvement would be needed (S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess., at 2-5 (1966). Your construction of the term "minimum standard" as the "least possible" level of safety performance that meets a safety

need is not consistent with the Senate finding. On page 5 of the House Report is a description of the two-stage statutory provision for the imposition of "interim" standards followed by "new and revised" standards as "safety research and development mature." This statement is followed by the building code analogy cited in your letter:

. . . . Such standards will be analogous to a building code which specifies the minimum load-carrying characteristics of the structural members of a building wall, but leaves the building free to choose his own materials and design.

Our conclusion is that the analogy is directed to the concept of minimum standards as a "threshold" specifying a level of performance to be met or exceeded. It is apparent from the quoted material that the minimum "thresholds" of performance were considered as a means to avoid stifling design.

The House report also emphasises the concept of initial standards that would be followed by "new and revised" standards at a later date (H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong, 2nd Sess., at 19 (1966)). Finally, of course, @ 103 (h) of the Act mandates issuance of interim standards to be followed by upgraded standards.

It is also meaningful that the criteria for a "minimum standard" set forth in @ 103 (a) do not include the concept of their being the "minimal" or "least possible" level that meets a safety need. Sections 103(d) and 103(f) dealing with Federal preemption of State and other regulations both discuss a "higher standard of performance" that implies the "threshold" or "least possible" meaning for minimum standards. A similar construction can be put on the grounds for statutory exemption in @ 123 of the Act that refer to a higher "overall level of safety performance" as grounds for exemption.

While it is arguable that a "minimal" standard can also convey logically the idea of a "threshold" that can be exceeded, the agency finds it difficult to accept that the word "minimum" was intended by Congress to carry both meanings simultaneously. If it is assumed that "minimum" only carries the concept of "least possible", one would then have to accept that the standards are stated as exact "minimal" values. While this line of reasoning is possible, its logical conclusion is that a vehicles only "complies" in the sense of @ 108(a)(1)(A) if it conform exactly to the performance values stated, and that it

5 neither falls short of nor exceeds them. This construction runs counter to the general statutory opinions and interpretations rendered by the NHTSA and accepted by the manufacturers since the Act went into effect. Moreover, making a certification (as required by @ 114 of the Act) that each vehicle complies exactly with the stated requirements would be a physical impossibility, given material, assembly, test condition, and instrumentation variations.

The NHTSA concludes, therefore, that a reasonable construction of the various provisions of the Act does not support the construction put forward by General Motors in your March 16, 1976, letter.

Sincerely,