ID: bottling_trailer5853v2

Sandra Swanson, Branch Manager
PBB Global Logistics
400 Oyster Point Blvd. #539
S. San Francisco, CA 94080




Dear Mr. Swanson:

This responds to your letter in which you ask if a trailer your client is considering to import into the United States is a "motor vehicle" as defined in our standards. As explained below, our answer is yes.

In your letter, you state that the trailer is not equipped with an engine and is not primarily for "road use". You state that the trailer is equipped with bottling equipment and would be transported to wineries to assist in the bottling of wine. You also state that in the vehicles country of origin (France), it was licensed as a semitrailer and not considered a motor vehicle.

Chapter 301 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles. Section 30102(a)(6) of that chapter defines "motor vehicle" as:

[A] vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.

We have issued a number of letters addressing this language. We have stated that vehicles equipped with tracks, agricultural equipment, and other vehicles incapable of highway travel are not motor vehicles. We have also determined that certain vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining vehicles) are not motor vehicles, even if they may be operationally capable of

highway travel. Also, vehicles are not motor vehicles if they were designed to be used primarily at off-road job sites and, although capable of being operated on public roads from one job site to another, their on-road use is infrequent and incidental to the primary purpose for which they were manufactured (e.g., mobile cranes).

In our previous determinations that vehicles were designed primarily for use off-road, the work-oriented equipment was integral to the design of the vehicle, i.e., the mobility-oriented characteristics of the vehicle reflected the off-road use of the vehicle. For example, in a recent letter to Ms. Melissa A. Burt (March 21, 2005), we noted that the vehicle in question had a lower speed differential than that commonly found on vehicles manufactured for use on public roads, which permitted slow, consistent operating speeds necessary for its off-road use. Further, that vehicles engine was equipped with a front or rear end power takeoff that can run the mixers machinery in the farmers field. The vehicle discussed in the Burt letter was determined not be a motor vehicle as its characteristics, without respect to the work-oriented equipment, demonstrated that the vehicle was not manufactured primarily for use on public roads.

You state that the trailer your client is seeking to import contains bottling equipment, which is intended to be used off-road, i.e., at wineries. However, at issue is the vehicle and not the equipment transported by the vehicle. The characteristics of the trailer you described in your letter, aside from the bottling equipment housed in the trailer, are indistinguishable from trailers manufactured primarily for use on public roads. In your letter, you further state that the vehicle is classified as a "semitrailer" in its country of origin. We note that the definition of "motor vehicle" extends to vehicles that do not have engines, i.e., those that are drawn by mechanical power. "Semitrailer" is specifically defined as a class of motor vehicles in 49 CFR 571.3.

Based on the above discussion we would classify the vehicle your client is seeking to import as a "motor vehicle".If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Chris Calamita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Wood
Assistant Chief Counsel
for Vehicle Safety Standards and Harmonization

ref:571
d.8/10/05

ID: nht78-2.37

DATE: 06/20/78

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Joseph J. Levin Jr.; NHTSA

TO: Minnesota Motor Company

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Administrator Claybrook has asked me to respond to your recent letter concerning the installation of safety belts in the cargo area of a van vehicle for the purpose of securing wheelchair patients. Apparently, your legal counsel has advised you that such installation might be prohibited by Federal law or might give rise to private litigation problems in the future.

In answer to your questions, there is nothing under Federal law or the Federal motor vehicle safety standards that would prevent the installation of safety belts in the cargo area of a van to secure wheelchairs. In fact, Administrator Claybrook and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration encourage you to make the installation requested by the senior citizens home. The safe transportation of disabled persons is currently a serious problem and every effort should be made to ameliorate the situation.

The only instance in which you would have any responsibilities under Federal law would be an installation of additional safety belts prior to first purchase of the van by a consumer. In that case you would be a vehicle alteror, and under our certification regulations you would be required to place an additional label on the vehicle specifying that, as altered, the vehicle is still in compliance with all applicable safety standards (49 CFR 567.7, copy enclosed). For example, you could not destroy the vehicle's compliance with our Fuel System Integrity standard by penetrating the gas tank with the safety belt anchorage bolts.

Concerning your liability in private litigation, the general provisions of negligence law would be applicable, as with any maintenance, repair or alteration done by a motor vehicle repair business. I must defer to the advice of your own counsel on that matter, however.

Once again, the agency does encourage the installation of safety belts for the securement of wheelchairs, since the disabled are seriously endangered without some type of restraint to protect them in a crash. Further, I believe that your fears of liability should be minimal as long as the installation is accomplished with normal consideration and due care.

Please contact Hugh Oates of my office if you have any further questions (202-426-2992).

SINCERELY,

MINNESOTA MOTOR COMPANY

May 19, 1978

Joan Claybrooke National Hwy Traffic Safety Adm.

Dear Ms. Claybrooke:

We have been approached by a local senior citizens home to install safety seat belts in the rear cargo area (of a 1978 Chevrolet Sport Van) to protect patients confined to wheelchairs when being transported.

We have discussed this matter with our state auto dealer legal counsel and they are reluctant to give an affirmative opinion in view of possible litigation in the future. In your recent talk to the Economic Club of Detroit, one of your suggestions concerning safety belts was to "look for ways to increase usage." The administrator of the home is asking us to put them in, but our concern centers around recent court decisions regarding liability, which apparently lasts forever. We would be willing to do the installation, we have found a local supplies of webbing to be used, and the people want it done. However, where do we go.

Possibly, some of the answer could lie in lesser degree of governmental intervention in all phases of business, and getting away from the idea that because some individual has a disagreement with a small business firm or a large manufacturer, the individual is always the one who has been wronged. As a general rule, anyone in business knows full well that he has to satisfy the customer to stay in business and make a profit. Certainly, there are the marginal and downright crooked businessman, as there are in many other portions of our working population. But, the majority of businessmen are conscientious enough to outweigh the bad apples.

Getting back to the problem at hand - what would be your suggestions in the matter of the seat belt installation. Are we asking for problems in case of a failure, or should we try to protect our senior citizens by offering them some safety?

Please advise at your earliest opportunity.

Warren L. VanderLinden Sales Manager

ID: nht80-1.48

DATE: 04/10/80

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Whitley & Whitley, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. William N. Whitley Vice President, Whitley & Whitley, Inc. 20600 Chagrin Boulevard, Tower East Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122

Dear Mr. Whitley:

This responds to your February 8, 1980, letter asking whether the CarVan that you manufacture would be required to comply with Federal safety standards. The CarVan is designed to be mounted over the trunk of a car and weighs approximately 80 pounds.

The CarVan is considered a piece of motor vehicle equipment for purposes of compliance with the motor vehicle safety standards. Since it does not slide into the cargo area of a truck, however, it would not be considered a slide-in camper subject to Standard No. 126, Truck-Camper Loading. However, as a piece of equipment, it would be required to comply with Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials. I am enclosing an information sheet detailing where you can obtain a complete copy of all motor vehicle safety standards.

The agency notes that the CarVan would be installed in such a location that it would obscure the rear lights of the vehicle upon which it is mounted. The agency considers this to be very dangerous and concludes that you should adopt a tail light system for the CarVan. The Federal safety standard for lighting is Standard No. 108. Without a tail light system, the agency concludes that the installation and use of your CarVan would constitute a safety related defect, and we would exercise our authority to require any such defect to be remedied. We note also that many States prohibit any device that covers the license plates.

The agency would like to take this opportunity to correct some misinformation that was supplied to you on May 4, 1978, when we responded to your previous request for information on a camper that was designed to be loaded in a car's trunk. In that letter, the agency stated that the camper would be required to comply with Standard No. 126. That statement is incorrect. Since your camper is designed for a passenger car and not a truck, it would not be required to comply with Standard No. 126. It would be subject to the other standards mentioned above for the CarVan. We regret any inconvenience our error may have caused you.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

February 8, 1980

U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Washington, D.C. 20590

Attention: Administrator for Rulemaking

Dear Sir:

We are considering manufacturing the CarVan. The CarVan is described in the enclosed resume.

Please indicate how the CarVan will be classed and be regulated by the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Please note the CarVan will not slide into the car trunk but will be supported over the trunk.

I am enclosing a copy of your response to my request on a larger but similar type unit.

Sincerely,

WHITLEY & WHITLEY, INC.

William N. Whitley Vice President

WNW:Cj

The CarVan is a new light weight (80 pound) foldable gas saving recreational vehicle (RV). The unit can be attached to a standard or compact automobile trunk and meet the minimal living needs of two adults without increasing the gas comsumption of the automobile. The CarVan provides safe, secure, private space for sleeping, resting, cooking, eating, changing clothes and can be used for all day sports activities, fishing, hunting, skiing, overnight recreational or business travel.

The CarVan will appear and function (without wheels) as an extension of the car. The dimensions of the CarVan in the up position provide sufficient room for comfortable sitting, sleeping and standing, but extend the length of the car by only two feet. The unit folds down for easy road travel. The rear view mirror and regular side view mirrors of the car are functional while driving with the CarVan attached. No additional driving skills are required. Standard size garages and parking spaces may be used for car storage with the CarVan attached.

ID: nht92-4.7

DATE: September 14, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Lyle Walheim -- Lieutenant, Motor Carrier and Inspection Services, Wisconsin Department of Transportation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6/30/92 from Lyle Walheim to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC-7495)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter seeking a clarification of whether Wisconsin's current requirements for the activation of stop signal arms on school buses would comply with the stop signal arm requirements set forth in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrian Safety Devices. Your letter was prompted by my June 17, 1992 interpretation to Blue Bird Body Company. After evaluating the information provided in your letter, together with the information previously supplied by Blue Bird, we have reconsidered our assessment of the Wisconsin requirements. Subject to the qualifications discussed below, it is our reconsidered view that the Wisconsin requirements are not preempted by Standard No. 131 and that Blue Bird can continue to supply buses meeting Wisconsin's specifications, with the addition of the audible warning device described in Blue Bird's letter.

The distinguishing feature of Wisconsin's requirement is that it ties the operation of the stop arm to the opening of the service door, not to the operation of the red flashing lamps. In practice, the lamps on a Wisconsin bus equipped with a four-lamp system would operate like those on a bus equipped with an eight-lamp system, with the red lamps (instead of yellow lamps) flashing while the bus is coming to a stop. Since S5.1.4(b)(ii) of Standard No. 108 requires the yellow lamps on an eight-lamp system to turn off automatically and the red lamps to turn on automatically whenever the entrance door opens, and since the red lamps on the Wisconsin buses would operate whenever the entrance door is open, the Wisconsin buses would conform to the requirements of Standard No. 108. That standard does not prohibit the flashing of red lamps on a four-lamp system while the service door is closed.

For purposes of Standard No. 131, the question is whether there is any circumstance in which the stop arm may be deactivated while the red lamps are flashing. From the standpoint of practicality, we agree with you that the stop arm should not function before the bus has stopped and the driver has opened the service door. We further believe it is consistent with the purpose of the standard for the stop arm to be deactivated on a Wisconsin bus before the bus stops, even though the bus's red lamps may be flashing. To reconcile this view with the language of the standard, however, requires us to address the requirement of the standard that the arm must extend "at a minimum whenever the red signal lamps required by S5.1.4 of Standard No. 108 are activated...."

Standard No. 131 expressly contemplates a situation in which the stop arm would not automatically extend despite the operation of the red lamps. The final clause of S5.5 provides that "a device may be installed that prevents

the automatic extension of a stop signal arm." The question in Wisconsin's situation is whether the manual switch that activates the red signal lamps but not the stop arm would qualify as such a device. In our view, it does. Since the only time the red lamps are required by Standard No. 108 to operate is when the entrance door is open, and since the Wisconsin system would automatically extend the stop arm when the entrance door opens, we believe that the manual switch in the Wisconsin system can be fairly characterized as an override device that prevents the automatic extension of the stop signal arm until the red lamps are required to operate. For an override to be permitted, the device must comply with the other provisions set forth in S5.5, including the presence of a continuous or intermittent signal.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-6.5

DATE: June 17, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Thomas Turner -- Manager, Engineering Services, Blue Bird Body Company

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/21/92 from Thomas D. Turner to Paul J. Rice (OCC 7241)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 131, School Bus Pedestrian Safety Devices, with respect to the automatic extension of a stop signal arm. You were especially concerned with the interaction between a provision in Wisconsin's Administrative code requiring activation of the stop signal arm under specified conditions and the stop signal arm activation requirements set forth in Standard No. 131. I have responded in detail to your questions below.

Before I answer your question about your company's design for complying with both the Wisconsin Code and Standard No. 131, I would like to note that it does not appear that the Wisconsin regulation is inconsistent with Standard No. 131 with respect to the stop signal arm activation requirements. The Wisconsin Administrative Code states that:

"Any bus manufactured after January 1, 1978, shall have the stop signal arm controlled by the service door. The stop signal arm shall not become operational until the service door opens. The stop signal arm shall be installed in such a manner that it cannot be activated unless the alternating red lamps are in operation."

S5.5 of Standard No. 131 states that "The stop signal arm shall be AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED in such a manner that it complies with S5.4.1, at a minimum whenever the red signal lamps required by S5.1.4 of Standard No. 108 are activated..." (emphasis added) Both the Wisconsin requirement and the requirement in Standard No. 131 tie the activation of the stop signal arm to the operation of the red signal lamps. In addition, the Wisconsin regulation also ties the activation of the stop signal arm to the opening of the service door. Based on this information, it appears that a manufacturer could comply with both Standard No. 131 and the Wisconsin regulation by designing its school buses so that opening the service door automatically activates both the stop signal arm and the red flashing lamps. If the Wisconsin regulation were interpreted in a way that does not tie the automatic extension of the stop signal arm to opening the service door, then there could be an inconsistency with Standard No. 131.

You asked whether Blue Bird's system for activating the stop signal arm in accordance with Wisconsin's requirement complies with the requirements of Standard No. 131. You explained that, on its school buses sold in Wisconsin, Blue Bird provides a system by which the alternating red flashing lamps are activated by a driver controlled manual switch and the stop signal arm is activated by opening the service door. Under this system, the red flashing lamps are activated before the service door has been opened and before the stop

signal arm has been extended. Based on the information provided in your letter, we conclude that Blue Bird's system would not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 131.

Standard No. 131 explicitly requires the stop signal arm to be automatically deployed whenever the red signal lamps required by Standard No. 108 are activated. As explained in the final rule adopting Standard No. 131, "any system of activation is permissible provided the stop signal arm is extended during, at least, the entire time that the red warning lamps are activated." (56 FR 20363, 20368, May 3, 1991). As described in your letter, the system your company has developed for its Wisconsin school buses has the red warning lamps activated by a manual switch and the activation of those lamps does not activate the stop signal arm. Hence, that system does not comply with the explicit requirement of Standard No. 131 that the stop signal arm be automatically extended whenever the red warning lamps are activated.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-4.98

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 26, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Arthur H. Bryant, Esq. -- Executive Director, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice

TITLE: Neilson v. Porsche, et al., D. Idaho, Civ. No. 87-1121

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter to Kenneth Weinstein, the Assistant Chief Counsel for Litigation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), regarding the above-referenced case, in which the District Court ruled that the plaintiff 's claims are preempted by Federal law. You have requested that the United States file an amicus curiae brief with the Ninth Circuit in support of the plaintiff.

Although this agency strongly disagrees with both the result and the rationale adopted by the District Court, we have decided not to request the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief in this appeal. A discussion of our views on this legal issue and the basis for our decision not to participate is set forth below.

As you are aware, it is the position of the United States, as expressed in amicus briefs filed in Ritt v. General Motors, No. 88-1822 (7th Cir.), and Wood v. General Motors, No. 89-46 (U.S. S.Ct.), that under certain circumstances, claims seeking to hold a motor vehicle liable in tort for its failure to install airbags in a vehicle are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Act"), 15 U.S.C. S 1381 et seq., and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") No. 208, 49 CFR S 571.208, issued at 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (July 17, 1984). However, in both of those briefs, the United States emphasized that, as a general matter, the fact that a motor vehicle complies with applicable federal safety standards neither preempts state law tort actions nor provides a complete defense to such claims.

Those briefs noted that NHTSA had, for many years, interpreted the Act to allow such claims to proceed, and referred to a January 5, 1981 letter from Frank Berndt, NHTSA's Chief Counsel, to Daniel L. Thistle. As that letter noted:

Section 108(c) (15 U.S.C. 1397(c)) of the Act provides that compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard "does not exempt any person from liability under common law." The House Report (H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess (1966)) on se ction 108(c) states that, "It is intended, and this subsection specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law, particularly those relating to warranty, contract, and tort liability."

This principle has been upheld consistently by the courts, as reflected in the cases cited in the plaintiff's brief in opposition to Porsche's motion for summary judgment in this case. (Of course, NHTSA takes no position on the merits of this case; i.e. , whether Porsche should be held liable for not making the seat backs in the vehicle in question stronger.)

Thus, as noted above, in our view the District Court's opinion misstates the law on this issue. In relying upon cases in which courts have found claims involving airbags to be preempted, the court ignored the vital distiction between claims challenging a manufacturer's failure to install airbags rather than other forms of occupant protection that were specifically authorized by FMVSS No. 208, and claims such as the one at issue here, in which it is alleged that the manufacturer should have provided a h igher level of protection than that required under a NHTSA safety standard. However, to our knowledge, this is the first case in which a court has misapplied the airbag precedents to reverse a consistent body of law that permits claims such as this to p roceed. In keeping with NHTSA's long-standing policy of minimizing its involvement in private tort litigation, we believe that it would not be appropriate to participate formally in this case, particularly since the plaintiff will be able to provide the Ninth Circuit with our views on the issue. In the unlikely event that this erroneous view of the extent of Federal preemption proliferates in the future, the agency may decide to participate in a subsequent case.

ID: nht91-1.33

DATE: February 1, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jeffrey S. Malinowski -- Small Business Center

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11-14-90 from Jeffrey S. Malinowski to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 5461)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter on behalf of Mr. Leo McCallum, asking whether any Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard applies to his invention, a tie rod, safety bracket. You stated that the product would typically be installed by a vehicle owner to reduce tie rod end wear. As explained below, while no Federal safety standard directly applies to your client's product, he may nevertheless have certain responsibilities under this agency's regulations.

As way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (the Safety Act") authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue safety standards applicable to motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. The Safety Act also requires that these safety standards establish minimum levels of performance for vehicles or equipment. Once the necessary performance level has been established, vehicle or equipment manufacturers are free to choose any means they wish to achieve the required level of performance. In other words, the safety standards do not require the use of any particular manufacturer's product or particular materials; the standards permit the use of any manufacturer's product that achieves the necessary performance level. Section 114 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1403) requires manufacturers to certify that each of its vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment complies with all applicable safety standards. NHTSA does not approve, endorse, or certify any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment.

NHTSA has no safety standard directly about tie rods or safety brackets used with tie rods.

As for installation of your client's device on vehicles in the aftermarket, such installations may be limited by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from knowingly rendering inoperative any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard. If installation of your client's product resulted in a vehicle no longer complying with a safety standard, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business that installed the product would have rendered inoperative a device or element of design installed on the vehicle in compliance with a standard. To avoid a "rendering operative" violation, your client should examine his product to determine if installing his product would result in the vehicle no longer complying with a standard's requirements.

Section 109 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1398) specifies a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation of the render inoperative provision.

Please note that the Safety Act does not establish any limitations on an individual vehicle owner's ability to alter his or her own vehicle. Under Federal law, individual owners can install any device they want on their own vehicles, regardless of whether that device renders inoperative the vehicle's compliance with a safety standard.

Other statutory provisions in the Safety Act could affect your client's product. Manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment such as the "tire rod safety bracket" are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1411-1419) on the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. The Safety Act specifies that if either the manufacturer or this agency determines that a safety-related defect exists in your client's product, your client as the manufacturer must notify purchasers of the safety-related defect and must either:

(1) repair the part so that the defect is removed; or

(2) replace the part with an identical or reasonably equivalent part which does not have a defect.

Whichever of these options is chosen, the manufacturer must bear the full expense and cannot charge the owner for the remedy if the equipment was purchased less than eight years before the notification campaign.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: aiam4267

Dear Ms. Cunningham: This is in response to your letter of November 5, 1986, concerning th new Federal odometer law and the Washington Attorney General's proposed legislation.; As you know, on October 28, 1986, President Reagan signed into law th Truth in Mileage Act of 1986, P.L. 99-579, which amends Title IV of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1981 *et seq*. Beginning April 29, 1989, a motor vehicle may not be licensed in a State unless the transferee includes with the application for title the transferor's title. If the transferor's title contains the space for the transferor to disclose the mileage as required by Federal regulation, the mileage disclosure must be included on the title and it must be signed and dated by the transferor. If the transferor's title does not contain a space for the transferor to disclose the mileage, the transferor must issue a separate odometer disclosure statement. In addition, the law provides that, beginning April 29, 1989, all motor vehicle titles issued must meet the following requirements.; >>>1. Titles must be set forth by means of a secure printing process o other secure process.; 2. Titles must indicate required mileage disclosure information. 3. Titles must contain space for the transferee to disclose, in th event of future transfer, the mileage at the time of such future transfer and to sign and date such disclosure.<<<; A copy of the Act is enclosed for your reference. We are aware that the titling and disclosure provision of the new Ac will require changes in many state motor vehicle titling laws and title forms. For that reason, the Act authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to provide assistance to any State in revising its laws to meet the new Federal criteria. It is our desire to cooperate with the states to the maximum extent possible, to assure a smooth and timely transition to the new Act.; NHTSA intends to conduct a rulemaking proceeding to implement the ne Act and resolve technical issues. Because that process will take several months, we recommended to the States through the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators that they may wish to defer changes to their vehicle title forms and titling procedures until the rulemaking has been completed. In that way, they will be in a better position to assure full compliance with the new Act and implementing regulations.; We have been advised by the Washington Attorney General's Office however, that the State law which local prosecutors currently enforce is a relatively weak statute and that strong State odometer laws are needed as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, in an effort to assist the State in combatting odometer fraud, I offer the following comments to point out inconsistencies between portions of the proposed State legislation and the new Federal law.; Section 3 of the proposed legislation concerns the issuance of odomete disclosure statements by owners, lessees and lessors. While Section 3 does not apply to vehicles leased for a period of less than six months, Section 2(e) of the Truth in Mileage Act of 1986 defines a leased motor vehicles as 'any motor vehicle which is leased to a person for a term of at least 4 months by a lessor who has leased 5 or more motor vehicles in the past 12 months.' Furthermore, under Section 2(e) of the Truth in Mileage Act of 1986, lessors are required to provide lessees written notice regarding mileage disclosure requirements and penalties for failure to comply with them. The proposed legislation includes no analogous provision.; In addition to the above comments that pertain to the new Federal law I also offer the following comments regarding differences between the proposed State law and the Federal law and regulations now in effect.; Section 7 of the proposed legislation states as follows: >>>(1) The department shall adopt an odometer disclosure statement tha complies with the federal motor vehicle information and cost savings act of 1972, P.L. No. 12-513, as amended.<<<; However, the minimum requirements contained in Section 7 of th proposed legislation vary from the requirements of the regulation promulgated under the statute. Federal regulation, 49 C.F.R. S 580.4(a)(3), requires the disclosure of the transferor's current address. In addition, 49 C.F.R. S580.4(b) requires that the odometer disclosure statement refer to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act and shall state that incorrect information may result in civil liability and civil or criminal penalties. (Reference to State law is acceptable in lieu of a reference to Federal law.) Furthermore, 49 C.F.R. S580.4(e) states that 'The transferee shall acknowledge receipt of the disclosure statement by signing it.' Neither the transferor's current address nor a penalty notice and signature are required by the proposed legislation.; Section 7(k) of the proposed legislation requires the disclosure o both miles and kilometers when the odometer is 'altered to reflect miles instead of 'kilometers.' This Agency has not required any similar type of disclosure. We have determined that 15 U.S.C. S1987 could be relied upon to lawfully replace odometers which register kilometers travelled with those that register miles travelled. (To convert the odometer reading from kilometers to miles, multiple (sic) the kilometer reading by .62.) It is NHTSA's position that transferors who convert the odometers from kilometers to miles should check the first box of the first set of certifications which reads:; >>>I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odomete reading as stated above reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described below.<<<; Furthermore, these transferors should check the second box in th second set of certifications which reads:; >>>I hereby certify that the odometer was altered for repair o replacement purposes while in my possession, and that the mileage registered on the repaired or replacement odometer was identical to that before such service.<<<; With regard to Section 4 and the question you raised in your letter, understand that the Section has been amended so that the dealer's disclosure will be included on the assignment and title.; I hope these comments assist you in your efforts to ensure th coordination of Federal and State odometer laws so that no undue burden is placed upon your members.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel

ID: aiam5561

Dear Mr. Grubb: This responds to your letter asking whether thi agency's requirements apply to several products you are selling. One is called the 'California Go-Ped,' a small push scooter with non-pneumatic tires, a 2-cycle motor mounted above the rear wheel, and a top speed of 20 mph. Another is called the 'Tsi Power Scooter,' and resembles a scooter in frame style, but has larger pneumatic tires and can be outfitted with a seat. The Power Scooter has a top speed of 15 mph. You cited a previous interpretation stating that a scooter (similar to the Go-Ped) is not a motor vehicle, and thus not subject to our requirements, so I assume that you are asking whether the products you sell are motor vehicles. You also asked about motorized 'skateboards' and motors for mounting on a conventional bicycle. The short answer to your question is that the Go-Ped is not a motor vehicle but the Power Scooter may be, depending on whether it is sold with a seat. Motorized 'skateboards' are not motor vehicles, but motors for mounting on bicycles are 'motor vehicle equipment.' You indicated that you have a copy of a letter dated April 1, 1991, in which we discussed whether a small push scooter called a 'Walk Machine' is considered a motor vehicle for purposes of our standards. In that letter, we discussed the general principles for determining whether a product is a motor vehicle. As discussed in that letter, vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. On the other hand, vehicles that are or can be operated off-road, but are also used on the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, utility vehicles like the Jeep are plainly motor vehicles, even though they are equipped with special features to permit off- road operation. If a vehicle will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, even though its greatest use will be off-road, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a 'motor vehicle.' Further, if a vehicle is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, NHTSA has found the vehicle to be a motor vehicle. This finding was made with respect to dune buggies and regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicles were to be operated. In discussing whether the Walk Machine is considered a motor vehicle, we noted that NHTSA has stated in previous interpretations that vehicles that regularly use the public roads will not be considered 'motor vehicles' if such vehicles have a maximum attainable speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) or less and an abnormal configuration which readily distinguishes them from other vehicles. We concluded that the Walk Machine is not a motor vehicle since it has a top speed of 16 mph and a configuration that readily distinguishes it from motorcycles and other two-wheeled vehicles. I will now apply these principles to the products you ask about in your letter. First, the California Go-Ped has an almost identical configuration to that of the Walk Machine and a maximum speed of 20 mph. Therefore, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle, for the same reasons that apply to the Walk Machine. Second, the Power Scooter has a maximum speed of 15 mph and, when sold without a seat, has a configuration similar to that of the Walk Machine. In that configuration, we do not consider it to be a motor vehicle. When equipped with a seat, however, the Power Scooter is considered to be a motor vehicle. Although the advertising literature states that the Power Scooter is 'not for in-street use,' NHTSA believes that it is indistinguishable from a moped, which is an on-street vehicle that we have long interpreted as a motor vehicle. Although most mopeds have chain drives, pedal starters, and lower-mounted engines, we do not think that these distinctions are important. The seated rider on the power scooter appears to other traffic to be riding a moped. We also note that the low ground clearance of the central platform appears poorly suited to off-road use. Further, we consider the Power Scooter, when equipped with a seat, to be a type of motorcycle. A motorcycle is defined as 'a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground' (Title 49, section 571.3 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)). Motorcycles are subject to our regulations in 49 CFR Part 571, including Standards for lights (No. 108), rear view mirrors (111), brakes (122), and controls and displays (123). The materials you sent do not disclose the horsepower of the 21 cc engine, but we assume that it is less than 5 brake horsepower. If that assumption is correct, the vehicle would be a 'motor-driven cycle,' a type of motorcycle that is subject to less stringent requirements under our regulations. However, the Power Scooter does not appear to meet even the less stringent requirements. For example, the Scooter lacks lights, dual braking systems, and rear view mirrors. The motors for mounting on a conventional bicycle are designed specifically to convert the bicycle into a motorcycle. Therefore, they are motor vehicle equipment. Despite the notation 'not for in-street use' in the advertising brochure, bicycles are predominantly used in the streets. Merely adding a motor does not change this fact. The motorized 'skateboard' is not a motor vehicle because it was not manufactured for in-street use and is also not used on the public roads. You stated in your letter that you want to clarify the application of our motor vehicle requirements to your products so that you can advise your customers exactly where they can and cannot operate them. We strongly encourage you to read the enclosed information sheet on your responsibilities under Federal law as a retailer of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. In addition, while the location of use of particular vehicles can affect our determination of whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle, the actual regulation of the operation of vehicles and motor vehicles is a matter of State law. For information on State laws, you may contact the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators at: 4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 600, Arlington, VA 22203. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Mr. Paul Atelsek at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure;

ID: aiam4372

Dear Mr. Fujitani: This letter responds to your inquiries addressed to Joan Tilghman of m staff. Your letters concern buses purchased by the State of California, and manufactured by Champion Home Builders, Commercial Vehicle Division (Champion). You inform us that Champion is a final stage manufacturer of vehicles built on a Ford chassis. You have rejected delivery of these vehicles because you assert that they do not comply with either California or Federal motor vehicle regulations. This response addresses only those issues arising from Federal requirements.; As I understand your letters, you pose two principle questions. First you ask whether classifying an incomplete vehicle as a 'chassis' rather than as a 'chassis cab' means that a final stage manufacturer can not alter the original chassis manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR). You assert that Champion's altering of the GVWR on a vehicle classified as a 'chassis' is a noncompliance under 49 CFR sections 567.5 and 568.4 which you may use as grounds for rejecting delivery of Champion's vehicles.; Your second question involves data set out in your letter of April 14 suggesting that Champion's certified GVWR for these vehicles is less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, the rated cargo load, and 150 lbs. times the vehicles' designated seating capacity. You state that this circumstance is a second noncompliance with Federal regulations upon which you have rejected delivery of Champion's buses.; >>>*The Cutaway Chassis/Chassis Cab Question*.<<< In both your letters, you refer to provisions of 49 CFR 567.5 an 568.4, and to a 1977 Federal Register document (42 FR 37814, 37816, July 25, 1977). You state your interpretation of these 49 CFR provisions as 'mean(ing) that final stage manufacturers (who build on RV cutaways) are not authorized to alter the (GVWR) imposed by incomplete vehicle manufacturers since final stage manufacturers do not have any basis for certifying a greater load carrying capaci(ty) without altering axle components to handle the extra load.' As I understand it, when you speak of an RV cutaway you mean a vehicle chassis with an incomplete occupant compartment, intended for completion as a recreational vehicle. For any incomplete vehicle (including a cutaway or chassis cab), Part 568 requires the incomplete vehicle manufacturer to provide a document that describes how to complete the vehicle without impairing the vehicle's compliance status. This document is *not* a certification.; If the incomplete vehicle is other than a chassis cab, the final stag manufacturer who builds on the incomplete vehicle must certify its compliance with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). On the other hand, the certification process is different if an incomplete vehicle meets the agency's definition of 'chassis cab.' The Federal Register document to which you refer amended 49 CFR Parts 567 and 568 to conform with a court decision holding that NHTSA could not require a final stage manufacturer to make the 'sole certification' of compliance for a vehicle built on a chassis cab. As a consequence of this decision, NHTSA established a dual certification scheme for such vehicles in which the chassis cab manufacturer makes one certification statement in each of three categories, and the final stage manufacturer makes corresponding statements depending on how the final stage manufacturer affects any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS).; Under this dual certification scheme, the original chassis ca manufacturer may provide instructions telling a final stage manufacturer how to complete a vehicle so that it conforms with applicable FMVSS. The final stage manufacturer has the choice of either conforming his work to the chassis cab manufacturer's instructions and shifting the burden under Part 567 of certifying compliance to the chassis cab manufacturer, or deviating from those instructions, and assuming the certification burden for himself. Further, the final stage manufacturer must certify compliance respecting any FMVSS for which the chassis cab manufacturer makes no representation.; While you are correct that in the 1977 Federal Register document th agency decided to exclude RV cutaways from the definition of 'chassis cab,' the only effect of this exclusion is that dual certification requirements do not apply to vehicles completed on an RV cutaway.; Therefore, the answer to your first question is that a final stag manufacturer may change the GVWR for any incomplete vehicle, irrespective of whether he builds the completed vehicle on an RV cutaway or a chassis cab. However, if the final stage manufacturer changes the GVWR for the vehicle, it must certify that the vehicle complies with all applicable FMVSS at this new GVWR. Compliance with Standards No. 105, *Hydraulic Brake Systems*, and No. 120, *Tire Selection and Rims for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars* might well be affected by an increase in the GVWR. The final stage manufacturer is required to exercise 'due care' when certifying that its vehicle complies with all safety standards at this increased GVWR. Our Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance has asked the final stage manufacturer of these vehicles to provide the data and other evidence that were the basis for Champion's certification of compliance at this higher GVWR.; >>>*Champion's Certified GVWR Calculation*.<<< Part 567 of NHTSA regulations sets out requirements for affixing certification label or tag to a motor vehicle. Section 567.4(g)(3) of that Part states that the certified GVWR:; >>>'...shall not be less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight rated cargo load, and 150 pounds times the vehicle's designated seating capacity. However, for school buses the minimum occupant weight allowance shall be 120.'<<<; In your April letter, you supply weightmaster readings for the tw Champion motor vehicles that are the subject of your inquiry. While Champion certifies the GVWR for both these vehicles at 12,000 pounds, you indicate that according to your S567.4(g)(3) calculation, the sums are 12,147 pounds and 12,580 pounds. This agency considers vehicle overloading a serious safety problem for the affected vehicle and for the motoring public, and NHTSA may take appropriate remedial action against any manufacturer whose vehicle, laden with its intended cargo load, exceeds the manufacturer's GVWR. NHTSA's Office Of Vehicle Safety Compliance is investigating this matter further.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel