ID: nht92-2.50

DATE: 11/01/92 EST

FROM: Guy Boudreault

TO: U.S. Dept. of Transportation; U.S. Senate Committee on Science, Commerce & Transportation; U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; National Transportation Safety Board; U.S. Office of Motor Carriers

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 1/13/93 (est) from Paul Jackson Rice to Guy Boudreault (A40; Std. 105; Std. 121)

TEXT:

unfortunately, I am compelled to send you a copy of a letter sent by me to Mr. Wayne Mc Neil, the safety department head at Sunbury Transport Limited, in regard to the obligations imposed upon the drivers and asking him to act in reference to these present conditions.

I would appreciate your cooperation in regards to general rules applied within the United States relevent to the said letter. I sincerely think that safety on the roads are of major interest to you and therefore I consider it my duty to inform you as to the conditions imposed, although never expressed in writing.

I have confidence that Mr. Mc Neil will do his outmost to rectify the situation, nevertheless, I consider it my duty to report to you in order to get the whole story as to the application of the laws, for often have I seen drivers that I have worked with be charged in different accident cases causing death.

Thanking your for your cooperation in this matter, I remain respectfuly yours,

DATE

Subsequent to writing the following document, I did not send it immediately for I wanted to be sure that this document would be taken seriously considering that I am not very much educated and that many mistakes can be found in spelling as well as a lack of vocabulary to express myself reasonably well. However, I was rather encouraged to send it when the personnel company for which I work decided to give me a lay-off for lack of work. It also asked that I not send the present document for if I did, it would hurt the transportation industry. I do not believe for a minute that this would happen, but I do beleive that it might help other drivers to get better conditions in the future and thus have decided to go forward with this mailing and also have decided to walk away from driving as a proffession like many more before me. It is in my view a shame that company needs have become such important that workers' rights are diminished to the point of endangering public lives for the profit of too often subsidised companies who pride themselves in total disregard for their workers as well as the general public.

I have included a list of my calculations which can be revised at your will and have come up with the the following balance owing from the company to me. The personnel agency, has given me a part of this balance owing but has not as yet collected from the transport company and will definitely not collect all of the

amount for already, a member of the dispatching staff has refused to pay some time period claimed saying that my instructions were to go home on a certain day when in fact, he did not know that I was to wait for over eighteen (18) hours.

I finish my letter by asking that road transportation be looked into thouroughly and that logbooks be compared with payroll or tripsheets so as to find the real facts behind what every driver calls "SWINDLE SHEETS". May I add that in the last twenty-four years, my logbooks have been checked but four times, from where I seriously believe that encouragement to ignore laws is thereby given.

Respectfully yours, GUY BOUDREAULT

ILE PERROT, le 18 Octobre, 1992

Sunbury Transport Ltd Mr. Wayne McNeil P.O. Box 905 Station "A" Fredericton, N.B. E3B 5B4

Mr. McNeil,

I hereby wish to inform you of my agravated state of mind in relation with work at your employ. Of course you will understand that I realy mean employment Sunbury Transport" contracted by "A & F Personell of Montreal, Montreal, driving at leased "Renteway" tractor and pulling either leased "Caravan" trailers or "Sunbury" trailers.

I thought this situation seems to be of the most complexe category, the fact remains that "Sunbury" transport is where I get (direct orders) as to the manner in which I must perform my duties and therefore, I firmly believe that I should direct my questions, worries and suggestions to you since you are the at the helm of the safety department for transport division. Many anomalies have conflicted with the terms of my employment in comparison to the first interview I have had with you in May 1992. As I describe the discrepencies I have found, I hope that you will understand as well as appreciate my present frustations.

I was lead to believe that "Sunbury Transport insisted to our driving legaly in all aspects of the law and that we must under no circumstance drive overlog, use two log books or the use of other means for bypassing any Canadian or U.S. laws. I was also promissed by you personally that we would be allowed plenty of time for deliveries, however this is definitely not the feeling I have gotten since I first started driving at your service on June 25th, 1992. I also was promised an honest day's pay for an honest day's work. I have kept my end of the deal, but somehow I have difficulty in understanding the payroll. I have therefore tabulated my log book trips as well as my paychecks and at this point I cannot yet see the equilibrium between the two. I have mentioned before that as human beings, we needed time for meals, for showers, for shaving

and sleep. It is my finding that the aforementioned have been ignored and that the appointments are taken with customers much too soon giving us no time our basic personal needs. On this subject may I suggest that (E T A)s (estimated time of arrival) be annulled. In my experience, only airlines have such ETAs' and in many cases they are delayed although they do not have to deal with scales, police, DOT checks, speed limits, school buses, school zones, stop signs, traffic lights, heavy traffic and road construction. It is also my understanding that we are paid by the shortest practical way from point A to point B and calculated schedules of delivery are at an average speed of 50 mph. or 80 km/h. while these shortest practical routings are often limited to 25, 35, and 45 mph. Please, let me know how we actually make the scheduled time of delivery within the allowed time, for after spending 24 years driving a commercial vehicle, I still donot acheive such performances. Please consider equally as important the fact that for a driver to be getting two days off every fifth or sixth week while he is working a minimum of twelve hours per day awaiting these precious days off. A driver cannot be alert, competant and comfortable in his performances under such conditions. We have to realise that we weigh 40 tons and that we are loaded to the limit most of the time and also that sometime we have to run on low fuel in order to respect the weight limit laws. In restrospect, I firmly disaprove of these working conditions and strongly suggest that some improvement be implemented, where appointments are concerned. I myself wish to advise you that I shall no longer consider the times of appointments for delevery unless reasonable time is granted to do so in consideration of the forementioned personal needs.

Mr. McNeil please consider the following duties we must perform and that for wich is paid or unpaid or benevolant.

Paid Benevolant 28/practical mile run a) Fulling tractor delivry time after 2 1/2 hrs b ) 2 1/2 per client(loading) at customer c) Calling dispatch(average 2 hrs/day) d) customer clearance e) 2 1/2 hrs per client(unloading) f) waiting for load g) paperwork

In resume on this point,I usually am at work for 16 hrs a day while being paid for miles only wich adds to my frsutations when I calculate my meal expenses etc which does not permit me to at least drive without worring about my rent and other utilities usually late paid.

Another point brought to my attention is the fact that you now want us to adjust the brakes on trailers. So I was told on October 14th, 1992 when I asked a dispatches for a P.O. for brake adjustments on trailer # 4403 and was asked to buy a 9/16" key so as to do it myself. It would be easier if I was informed asto its legality in the United States where we do most of our driving. I already know that in some Canadian provinces, it isn't legal and even if it is, brakes are too important considering the weight we carry for me to take that responsibility.

In reference to responsibility, I think it should be understood that I cannot perceive your way of thinking when people don't earn enough to make a decent living have to accept responsibility so costly that an important and prosperous international conglomerate such as the "Irving Group" would not think of being liable for such responsibilities from where the use of leased trucks trailers and Personal Agencies are hired. If a mishap should happen, and they do, the driver is sent to judgement as alone and as easily as old time Christians were sent to the Arena and fed to the lions. This has proven to be the case before in the trucking industry and it is the main reason for my intervention in this situation. It has to change in order for professional drivers to be reinstated in the industry as responsible and respected as professionals and not regarded as happy go lucky Bozos endangering public lives. I have spoken to many drivers and they were saying that alternatives to legalities needed to be used in order to make it and these alternatives ranged from a multitude of logbooks to electrical speedometers that shut off with ignition thus permitting to improve miles driven and comsequently payroll. This is not my way of operating and therefore I insist that the present conditions be revised so as to improve the safety on the roads, not only for us drivers, but for the population in general. It is your duty to improve these conditions as it is mine to report them.

Thanking you for your cooperation in this matter and hoping to hear from you very soon, I remain

respectfuly yours,

GUY BOUDREAULT - 9020

P.S.: Enclosed, you will find :

a) logbook sheets b) trip sheets c) pay slips d) payroll breakdown e) Sunbury "Memorandum" f) today's trucking exherps g) Copies of presentation to all organisms concerned.

ID: nht91-7.26

DATE: December 3, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Matthew J. Plache -- Esq., Gardner, Carton & Douglas

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter 10-17-91 from Matthew J. Plache to Paul Jackson Rice (OCC 6577)

TEXT:

This responds to your request for an opinion of whether Daihatsu America, Inc. would be in violation of Federal law, including section 108(a)(1)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act," 15 U.S.C. S 1397(a)(1)(A)), if it were to sell Daihatsu HIJET vehicles in accordance with specifications contained in a recent Request for Bid issued by the City of Los Angeles. According to your letter, HIJETS are general purpose off-road utility vehicles that are not intended for use on the public roads, streets or highways and, as such, do not comply with Federal motor vehicle safety standards. The City of Los Angeles Request for Bid, among other things, specifically required vehicles that are capable of being registered for street use in California and required the contractor to apply to register the vehicles and obtain license plates for them.

As discussed below, it is our opinion that it would be a violation of section 108(a)(1)(A) for a manufacturer or dealer to knowingly sell or offer to sell a HIJET vehicle to a customer for use on the public roads, streets or highways. A Request for Bid containing provisions similar to those set forth by the City of Los Angeles would indicate that the customer intends such use of the vehicle.

By way of background information, the issue of whether vehicles such as HIJETs are considered motor vehicles under the Safety Act was addressed by NHTSA in an October 31, 1988 interpretation letter addressed to Mr. Hiroshi Kato of Mitsubishi. That letter addressed the Mitsubishi SH27 lightweight industrial truck, which we understand, and you state, is very similar to the Daihatsu HIJET. At that time, Mitsubishi was considering whether to import the SH27.

In addressing the SH27, NHTSA noted that section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as "any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails." The agency has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold SOLELY for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. NHTSA has also concluded that vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles AND a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles.

On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary

and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle." Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

In addressing the SH27, NHTSA noted that the vehicle was not easily classified under these groupings. On the one hand, it has a body configuration nearly identical to standard trucks, can obtain a maximum speed of approximately 25 mph, and could be registered for use on the highways of several foreign countries. These factors suggested that the vehicle should be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, Mitsubishi stated that the vehicle was intended to be used only for off-road applications, that it would be advertised and promoted for off-road purposes only, and that it would contain four warning labels stating "Warning: Off Road Use Only." These factors suggested that the vehicle should not be classified as a motor vehicle.

In instances where the agency is asked whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle when it has both off-road and on-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, the agency has applied five factors in offering its advice. These factors are:

1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use.

3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use.

4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles.

5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads.

Based on the representations in Mitsubishi's letter, NHTSA concluded that the SH27 did not appear to be a motor vehicle under the Safety Act. In addition to the other factors noted above which suggested that the SH27 should not be considered a motor vehicle, Mitsubishi had stated that its dealers would be instructed that the vehicle was to be used solely for off-road purposes-and that no assistance should be given to obtain a title for the vehicle or to register the vehicle in this country. NHTSA stated, however, that it would reexamine its conclusion if it learned,

for example, that the vehicle was in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of its owners.

With this background information in mind, I will now address your question whether Daihatsu America, Inc. would be in violation of Federal law, including section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act, if it were to sell HIJET vehicles in Accordance with City of Los Angeles bid specifications that require vehicles that are capable of being registered for street use in California and require the contractor to apply to register the vehicles and obtain license plates for them. Section 108(a)(1)(A) reads as follows:

No person shall --

(A) manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard and is covered by a certification issued under section 114 . . . .

It is our opinion that it would be a violation of this section for a manufacturer or dealer to knowingly sell or offer to sell a HIJET vehicle (which does not comply with Federal motor vehicle safety standards) to a customer for use on the public roads, streets or highways. The reason for this is that the only possible argument that a HIJET vehicle is not a motor vehicle is that it is intended solely for off-road use. The knowing sale to a customer for use on the public roads, streets or highways would nullify this possible argument. Moreover, a Request for Bid containing provisions requiring vehicles that are capable of being registered for street use in California and requiring the contractor to apply to register the vehicles and obtain license plates for them demonstrates that the customer intends such use of the vehicle.

Further, such action by Daihatsu or its dealers would demonstrate that HIJETs should be considered motor vehicles under the Safety Act and subject to Federal motor vehicle safety standards. I note that NHTSA's October 31, 1988 opinion that the similar Mitsubishi SH27 would not be considered a motor vehicle under the Safety Act was premised on certain representations by Mitsubishi. The knowing sale of such a vehicle to a customer for use on the public roads, streets or highways would be inconsistent with the representation that the vehicle was intended solely for off-road use. I also note that the provision in the City of Los Angeles Request for Bid requiring the contractor to apply to register the vehicle and obtain license plates for them is inconsistent with one of the specific understandings set forth in that opinion.

You stated that Daihatsu is concerned about this matter because it has recently received a number of similar solicitations for HIJET-like vehicles which could be interpreted as solicitations for on-road vehicles. You stated that because of its concerns about potential violations of Federal law, Daihatsu has refrained from submitting a bid in accordance with the City of Los Angeles request. You also expressed concern that

other suppliers of similar vehicles apparently do not share Daihatsu's concern and indicated that the Los Angeles contract was recently awarded to a supplier of the Mitsubishi SH27. Please be advised that we are referring your allegations to our Office of Enforcement to determine whether there has been a violation of section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act.

With respect to Daihatsu, I note that the receipt of a number of such solicitations may suggest a general perception that the HIJET is appropriate for on-road use. NHTSA has determined that a vehicle is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding appropriate use. Thus, if Daihatsu wishes to continue to classify the HIJET as a non-motor-vehicle, it should ensure that its customers do not plan to use them for on-road use.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this topic, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: 571.108--NCC-230201-001 LED Headlights_ M. Baker

February 13, 2024

Mr. Mark Baker, B.S.E.E. Soft Lights

9450 SW Gemini Drive PMB 44671

Beaverton, OR 97008

mbaker@softlights.org

Dear Mr. Baker:

This responds to your letter and email dated June 27, 2021 and October 31, 2021, respectively, regarding the legal status and safety of motor vehicle headlamps that use light-emitting diode (LED) technology as the light source. Please note that our answer below is based on our understanding of the specific information provided in your letter and email.

You ask about the “legality of LED headlights.” You state your belief that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108 does not regulate “peak luminance, absolute spectral power distribution or flicker” and that the standard “only applies to spherical emitters such as tungsten- filament and gas-discharge and is not applicable to non-uniform luminance flat-source emitters such as LED chips.” You ask whether it is “NHTSA’s position that FMVSS No. 108 is only applicable to uniform luminance emitters which can be regulated by setting maximums for luminous intensity without the need of setting peak luminance maximums” and whether “NHTSA [has] approved the use of spatially heterogeneous visible radiation for use as the light source used in vehicle headlights.” You state your concerns about adverse health impacts due to the performance characteristics of LEDs, such as high peak luminance, high-color temperature, high-energy blue wavelength light, and flicker. You request NHTSA’s opinion about the “sufficiency” of FMVSS No. 108 regarding these health concerns.

We understand you to use “uniform luminance emitters” to refer to filament (halogen/tungsten) and high-intensity discharge (HID) light sources, and “non-uniform” or “heterogenous emitter” to refer to LED light sources. We therefore understand you to be asking whether LEDs are legal as a light source in motor vehicle headlamps under FMVSS No. 108, and, if they are legal, what is NHTSA’s position on the safety of LED light sources in headlamps with respect to “eye safety, mental safety, and visual performance.”

Background

NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301) to issue FMVSS that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. The Safety Act requires manufacturers to self-certify that their vehicles and equipment conform to all applicable FMVSS in effect on the date of manufacture. NHTSA also investigates safety-related defects.

FMVSS No. 108, “Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment,” applies to “[p]assenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, trailers (except pole trailers and trailer converter dollies), and motorcycles” and covers, among other things, “original and replacement lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment” for motor vehicles. The standard specifies performance requirements for headlamps. The most common types of headlamps are integral beam (S10.14) and replaceable bulb (S10.15, S11) headlamps.

NHTSA has stated that LED light sources are permitted as part of an integral beam headlamp if they are wired in series such that a failure of one LED would cause all the LEDs to cease functioning, and they otherwise comply with all relevant FMVSS.1 Paragraph S4 of FMVSS

No. 108 defines an integral beam headlamp as “a headlamp … comprising an integral and indivisible optical assembly including lens, reflector, and light source, except that a headlamp conforming to paragraph S10.18.8 or paragraph S10.18.9 may have a lens designed to be replaceable.” The standard does not contain performance requirements for a light source that is part of an integral beam headlamp, but instead specifies performance requirements for the complete headlamp. These include (among other things) photometry, through minimum and maximum candela at specified test points,2 color, which must remain within specified boundaries,3 and that the headlamp be steady burning.4

While LED light sources that are part of an integral beam headlamp are permitted as noted above, no LED light source is currently permitted to be used in a replaceable bulb headlamp. FMVSS No. 108 contains specific requirements for the replaceable light sources (i.e., bulbs) used in replaceable bulb headlamps. These requirements are intended to support light source interchangeability. Paragraph S11 of the standard requires that “[e]ach replaceable light source must be designed to conform to the dimensions and electrical specifications furnished with respect to it pursuant to part 564 of this chapter[.]”5 Part 564 requires that replaceable bulb manufacturers submit to NHTSA for review and acceptance various design specifications for the bulb. If accepted, this design information is then placed in a publicly available docket to facilitate the manufacture and use of those light sources. As of the date of this letter, no submission that includes LEDs as the light source for a replaceable bulb headlamp has been listed in the docket. Therefore, no LED replaceable light source may be used in a replaceable bulb headlamp.

Discussion

Pursuant to FMVSS No. 108, paragraphs S4 and S10.14, LEDs are allowed to be used as a light source in integral beam headlamps as long as the headlamp conforms to all applicable headlamp requirements in FMVSS No. 108. However, LEDs are not currently permitted in a replaceable bulb headlamp. Nevertheless, illegal LED headlamp replaceable light sources may be available for purchase on the internet, and although these lights do not conform to the requirements of FMVSS No. 108, some consumers purchase and install these LED light sources in their replaceable bulb headlamps. While NHTSA regulates the manufacture and sale of light sources, it generally does not regulate the modifications individuals make to their own vehicles. It is therefore left to State law to address installation of an LED replaceable light source in a headlamp.

FMVSS No. 108 does not directly regulate what you describe as peak luminance as measured in nits or the spectral power distribution of the headlamp light source. However, this is indirectly regulated through the headlamp performance requirements, such as the photometry and chromaticity requirements. Additionally, flicker is regulated through the requirement that lower beam headlamps be steady burning. We also note that, although FMVSS No. 108 requires that the light emitted by headlamps be white, the permissible boundary of white includes colors that may be perceived by the human eye as white with a yellow tint and white with a blue tint.6

In your communications, you raise concerns about the health impacts of LED headlamps. We are aware of concerns raised about possible adverse effects of certain LED devices, particularly as used in street lighting that emits excess blue light.7 NHTSA’s focus is on automotive safety, but the agency recognizes that separate expertise resides in sister agencies that are health-focused, such as the Food and Drug Administration.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Eli Wachtel of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
 

John Donaldson
Acting Chief Counsel

1 Letter from Stephen Wood, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Takayuki Amma, Manager, Koito Manufacturing Co. (Dec. 21, 2005). Letter from O. Kevin Vincent, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Junichi Hasegawa, Stanley Electric Co. (Apr. 8, 2013). Interpretation letters are available on NHTSA’s online interpretations database at https://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa-interpretation-file-search.

2 Photometry requirements for headlamp systems can be found in FMVSS No. 108, Tables XVIII and XIX.

3 See FMVSS No. 108, Table I-a (headlamp color). Chromaticity requirements are pursuant to FMVSS No. 108 S14.4.

4See FMVSS No. 108 Tables I-(a and c). NHTSA has stated that “steady burning” means “light that is essentially unvarying in intensity.” See Letter from Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to United Sidecar Association, Inc. (Feb. 9, 1982). A device may fail to meet this requirement where the driver “would not see a signal that was consistent or reliable in its meaning.” See Letter from Paul Jackson Rice, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Bob Abernathy, Idea’s Inc. (Sept. 7, 1990) (applying steady burning in a taillamps context). In the context of a modulating motorcycle headlamp, we have stated that “there is no failure to conform if the modulating light from the lamp is perceived to be a steady beam.” Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Joe De Sousa (March 10, 1994).

5 See Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Nancy Tavarez, Beitrix Industries (Aug. 30, 1995) (clarifying application of Part 564 to replaceable headlamp bulbs).

6 Letter from Frank Seales, Jr., Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Richard Hodson, (July 4, 2000) (stating that “SAE J578c defines white by blue, yellow, green, red, and purple boundaries within a chromaticity diagram. Thus, it is possible to design a headlamp that emits a light that approaches the blue boundary and is perceived as having a blue tint but which nevertheless remains within the boundaries that define "white." These headlamps would comply with the color requirements of Standard No. 108.”).

7 See “AMA adopts guidance to reduce harm from high intensity street lights,” American Medical Association, June 14, 2016, available at https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-adopts-guidance-reduce-harm-high- intensity-street-lights.

ID: 86-5.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 10/01/86

TITLE: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/32/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS; REDBOOK A31; STANDARD 208 LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Docket Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705, 63224 cons -- Agenda 40 -- May 1986.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants, v. ELIZABETH J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

PER CURIAM: The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section).) In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants -- Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene -- have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of a motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1),

(b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not to exceed $ 25." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.I(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. While (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a "'compelling state interest,'" and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178, 93 S. Ct. 705, 728. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) However, "'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]'" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed.2d 147, 176, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726), or those liberties "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L.Ed. 2d 140, 146, 106 S.

Ct. 2841, 2844; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed.2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 462, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2639. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2346; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 420-21, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1166.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , , 92 L. Ed.2d 140, 148, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. , 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 231, 244, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 714, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1444 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 540, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1010, 79 S. Ct. 962, 968), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033, we reject any notion that the right of privacy includes the right to "do one's thing" on an expressway:

"There is no place where any such right to be let alone would be less assertable than on a modern highway with cars, trucks, busses and cycles whizzing by at sixty or seventy miles an hour. When one ventures onto such a highway, he must be expected and required to conform to public safety regulations and controls, including some that would neither have been necessary nor reasonable in the era of horse-drawn vehicles." (42 Wis. 2d 42, 55, 165 N.W.2d 377, 384.)

We are unwilling to graft onto the Constitution a right of privacy to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt where there is no textual basis or a clear historical precedent for such a right in the language of the Constitution or the opinions of the Supreme Court. To do so woul be to place the court in a position of acting as a super legislature,

nullifying laws it does not like. That is not our proper role in a democratic society. Therefore, we hold that the section does not infringe upon defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Neither does it infringe upon any right to privacy arising under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 6).

Defendants also argue that the section does not further the health, safety or welfare of the general public, asserting that the statute only protects the safety of the individual driver and passenger. They contend that since the section interferes with their right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt, and has no corresponding public benefit, the statute exceeds the State's police power and violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions.

It is well established that the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary role in our democratic society in deciding what the interests of the public require and in selecting the measures necessary to secure those interests. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 127.) Recognizing the legislature's broad power to provide for the public health, welfare and safety, the courts are hesitant to second-guess a legislative determination that a law is desirable or necessary. Only when the statute in question affects a fundamental constitutional right will the courts subject the legislation to strict or exacting scrutiny. In such cases, the State must have a "compelling" purpose for the law and show that it's goals cannot be accomplished by less restrictive means. (Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 685, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2016.) Few rights, however, have been identified as "fundamental," since only those rights "that lie at the heart of the relationship between the individual and a republican form of nationally integrated government" are deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97.) Thus, in most cases involving substantive due process challenges to statutes, the courts give substantial deference to the legislative enactments.

In the present case we already have determined that the section here involved does not infringe upon the defendants' right of privacy protected by the fourteenth

amendment, and defendants do not argue that the statute implicates any other fundamental constitutional right or liberty. As such, the State need not show a "compelling interest" for the law. It is sufficient that there is a rational basis for the statute. That is, the law will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368; Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453.) Under the rational-basis test, a statute is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the statute has the burden of proving that the statute is irrational. (Hayen v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 419; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) As long as there is a conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the law will be upheld. McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 399, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368.

In challenging the section as exceeding the scope of the State's police power, the defendants principally rely on the case of People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446. In Fries the court held that a statute requiring the operator or passenger of a motorcycle to wear protective headgear was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the purpose of the headgear requirement was to "safeguard the person wearing it" and was unrelated to the safety of the public at large. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) It concluded that the statute constituted a "regulation of what is essentially a matter of personal safety" and exceeded the scope of the State's police power. (42 Ill. 2d 446, 450.) Here, too, defendants argue that the decision of whether or not to wear a safety belt is "essentially a matter of personal safety" and that any regulation restricting the individual's right to make such a decision exceeds the State's police power.

The State, on the other hand, maintains that Fries was wrongly decided, and it urges us to overrule that decision. It correctly notes that at present Fries stands alone in holding that a motorcycle helmet law is unconstitutional. The overwhelming weight of authority is that motorcycle-helmet laws are a valid exercise of the State's police

power. (See Kingery v. Chapple (Alaska 1972), 504 P.2d 831; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Penney v. City of North Little Rock (1970), 248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118;State v. Brady (Del. Super. 1972), 290 A.2d 322; Hamm v. State (Fla. 1980), 387 So. 2d 946; State v. Cotton (1973), 55 Hawaii 138, 516 P.2d 709; State v. Albertson (1970), 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300; City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287; Everhardt v. City of New Orleans (1968) 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400, appeal dismissed and cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 212, 23 L. Ed. 2d 214, 89 S. Ct. 1775; State v. Quinnam (Me. 1977), 367 A.2d 1032; Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463; Commonwealth v. Howie (1968), 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 999, 21 L. Ed. 2d 464, 89 S. Ct. 485; City of Adrian v. Poucher (1976) 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798; State v. Edwards (1970), 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40; State v. Cushman (Mo. 1970), 451 S.W.2d 17; State v. Eight Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Merski (1973), 113 N.H. 323, 307 A.2d 825; State v. Krammes (1969), 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223; City of Albuquerque v.Jones (1975), 87 N.M. 486, 535 P.2d 1337; People v. Bennett (1977), 89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506; State v. Anderson (1969), 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49; State v. Odegaard (N.D. 1969), 165 N.W.2d 677; State v. Stouffer (1971), 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651; Elliott v. City of Oklahoma City (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), 471 P.2d 944; State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996; Commonwealth v. Kautz (1985), 341 Pa. Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969), 128 Vt. 197, 260 A.2d 377; State v. Laitinen (1969), 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789; State v. Zektzer (1975), 13 Wash. App. 24, 533 P.2d 399, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 1020, 46 L. Ed. 2d 392, 96 S. Ct. 457; Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 655, 89 S. Ct. 2033.) Alternatively, the State contends that the statute being challenged here promotes valid public

interests and thus is distinguishable from the motorcycle helmet law found to be unconstitutional in Fries.

Defendants are correct in asserting that the primary goal of the section is to protect the individual driver and front-seat passenger from death or serious injury. As such, the statute interfers with the individuals' choice concerning his or her personal safety. However, arriving at those conclusions does not ipso facto mean that the law is devoid of any public benefit and is unconstitutional. Regardless of a law's primary objective, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368-69; Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 I11. 2d 443, 453.) In that regard, the defendants have not persuaded us that the legislature could not have found that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. The legislative debates clearly indicate that the legislators believed that safety-belt use would protect persons other than the belt wearers by helping drivers to maintain control of their vehicles, and that the law would promote that economic welfare of the State by reducing the public and private costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents.

During debates in the House of Representatives, a principal sponsor of the safety-belt legislation remarked:

"The Bill would not only protect drivers and passengers in the front seat, the Bill would also protect other people. It would protect other drivers. It would protect pedestrains on our highways and on our sidewalks. The reason for that, of course, is that even a minor * * * accident, can if * * * a car is driven by a person who doesn't have a seat belt, * * * result in that person losing control of the car and injuring other people on or about the car." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).)

Another legislator argues that if she were to drive an automobile without her safety belt fastened "and I lose control of my car, I am endangering others." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 223 (statement of Representative Josephine Oblinger).) The Governor, in signing the seat-belt law, also agreed that the law would help drivers to maintain control of their vehicles and avoid accidents with other motorists and pedestrians:

"Unbelted passengers in a motor vehicle literally become human projectiles in the event of a crash. Unbelted passengers

can interfere with the ability of an operator to respond to the collision, and unbelted drivers may lose control of a vehicle and thus cause death and injury to others." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

The State can enact laws aimed at reducting traffic accidents, since such laws are clearly related to the health, welfare and safety of the public. We also believe that the legislature could rationally conclude that unbelted drivers and passengers endanger the safety of others. In upholding a law similar to the one here under review, the court in People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, stated:

"A driver who is injured or who is jolted away from his vehicle's controls during a skid or by an initial impact, may well be less able to prevent or minimize injuries caused by an accident. Also, an unrestrained occupant of a vehicle may injure others inside or out of the vehicle during an accident. The preventing or reduction of such an injury seems to the Court to be a valid State interest." (129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963.)

It also is conceivable that drivers who wear safety belts are less likely to fall asleep at the wheel, or to lose control of their vehicles in situations where the driver must apply the brakes suddenly, or in cases where a vehicle begins to skid or swerve. Safety belts can also prevent passengers from being thrown against the driver. And, as the State observes, children and other occupants who are wearing safety belts are less likely to distract the driver. See People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, , 494 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963; Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat Belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290, 296 (1986); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 217, 244 (1980).

Defendants argue that there is no statistical evidence showing that seat-belt use helps the driver to maintain control of his vehicle and avoid accidents with other motorists or pedestrains. Even assuming this argument is correct, it is without merit. "The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people * * * is not a sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitutional" (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 62, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 460, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2638), and a court "will not disturb a police regulation merely where there is room for a difference of

opinion as to its wisdom, necessity and expendiency." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 I11. 2d 111, 115. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 504, 515.) Moreover, "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464.) Here, we think that the legislature could rationally determine that the seat-belt-use law would serve the public safety and welfare by reducing the likelihood that a driver would lose control of his vehicle and jeopardize other motorists or pedestrians.

Another reason advanced by the State for the section is that the law promotes the economic welfare of the State by reducing the public costs associated with serious injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. The legislative history of the section indicates that legislators were concerned about the financial costs associated with highway accidents. Representative Cullerton remarked that, the safety-belt legislation "would clearly save money," asserting that "it cost the State over 800,000 dollars for a 26 year old person who is made a paraplegic as a result of a car crash." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 212 (statement of Representative John Cullerton).) Another Representative stated: "The lives we were save and the injuries that we avoid are the injuries and lives that we, the taxpayers, are very likely to be responsible for in the long run. We're not talking about somebody's own individual decision to end up in a car crash and find him or herself in a hospital for 20 years with that individual paying the bill. It's the taxpayers that are going to be paying those bills." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Debates, May 16, 1984, at 220 (statement of Barbara Currie).) Senator James Philip, in urging passage of the seat-belt law, observed that " in 1982 in Illinois some seventy-five people were killed in automobiles [while] performing their job * * *. This costs Illinois employers some twelve million dollars." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 159 (statement of Senator James Philip).) Senator Dawn Netsch remarked: "We intrude because the consequences of the thousands of people * * * who are injured and whose affictions then are passed on

to their families, to all of us in society * * *." (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Debates, June 21, 1984, at 162 (statement of Senator Dawn Netsch).) Governor Thompson, in explaining his reasons for signing the legislation, estimated that the seat belt law would "save more than 300 lives in Illinois in the first year, will avoid nearly 43,000 injuries and save more than $ 400 million in costs." Letter of Governor James R. Thompson to the General Assembly indicating his intent to sign House Bill 2800 (Jan. 8, 1985).

It cannot be seriously questioned that the police power may be used to promote the economic welfare of the State, its communities and its citizens. "[I]n the interest of general welfare, the police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, [and] it may be exercised to protect the governments itself against potential financial loss." (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 323, 326.) A law whose aim is to reduce the private and public costs resulting from injuries and deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents is therefore within the police power of the State. In finding that a motorcycle helmet law was rationally related to the public welfare, the court in Simon v. Sargent (D. Mass. 1972), 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463, stated:

"From the moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned." (346 F. Supp. 277, 279, aff'd (1972), 409 U.S. 1020, 34 L. Ed. 2d 312, 93 S. Ct. 463.)

Because of the drain on private and public financial resources caused by highway accidents, society has a legitimate interest in minimizing injuries which result from such accidents. See Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960; State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (1985), 101 Nev. 658, 708 P.2d 1022; State v. Beeman (1975), 25 Ariz. App. 83, 541 P.2d 409; Love v. Bell (1970), 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118; See also Druhot, The Constitutionality of the Illinois Mandatory Seat belt Use Legislation, 74 Ill. B.J. 290 (1986); Note, The Illinois Seat Belt Law: Should those Who Ride Decide?, 19 John

Marshall L. Rev. 193 (1985); Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Seat Belt Issues, 29 Cleve, St. L. Rev. 217, 222 (1980).

Defendants make several arguments concerning the effectiveness of safety belts in reducing injuries and arguments regarding the merits of alternative safety devices such as air bags. Defendants also contend that in some instances safety belts may cause injuries instead of preventing them. We need not consider these arguments, however, since they are proper subjects of discussion for the legislature, not the courts. (Hayden v. County of Ogle (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421; City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 111, 115; Pozner v. Mauck (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) We believe that the General Assembly could reasonably assume that a law requiring drivers and front-seat passengers to wear safety belts will reduce traffic-related injuries and fatalities. (Wells v. State (1985), A.D.2d , 495 N.Y.S.2d 591; People v. Weber (1985), 129 Misc. 2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 960.) Therefore, we hold that section 12.603.1 does not violate the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. To the extent that People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, is inconsistent with our opinion, it is overruled.

Defendant Greene also filed a motion to strike certain portions of the briefs and appendices filed by the State and certain parties amicus curiae. This motion was taken with the case. Our review of the record shows that certain safety statistics relied on by the State and the amicus were not presented in the trial courts. Accordingly, defendant Greene's motion to strike this information is allowed.

For the reasons stated the judgments of the circuit courts of Marion, Effingham, Fayette and Champaign counties in cause Nos. 62719, 62799, 63705 and 63224 are reversed, and said causes are remanded to those respective courts for further proceedings.

Motion allowed;

judgments reversed;

causes remanded.

CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ID: 09-002613 BMW positioning the seat

ID: 1983-2.20

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/23/83

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Middletown Van Pool Association

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your note of May 27, 1983, attaching correspondence between yourself and a District Manager for Ford Motor Company. You requested that we investigate the Ford E-150 van (which you state is a 15-passenger van) to determine if the stated Gross Vehicle Weight Rating of that vehicle is accurate.

Each manufacturer of a motor vehicle is required by the agency's regulations to place a certification label on the vehicle specifying that the vehicle is in compliance with all Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations (issued pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966). This certification label must include information regarding the vehicle's Gross Vehicle Weight Rating, as specified in 49 CFR 567.4(g)(3):

"(3) "Gross Vehicle Weight Rating" or "GVWR", followed by the appropriate value in pounds, which shall not be less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo load, and 150 pounds times the vehicle's designated seating capacity. However, for school buses the minimum occupant weight allowance shall be 120 pounds."

Thus, you are correct in your assumption that the GVWR for a 15-passenger vehicle would have to include 2,250 pounds for occupant weight. Further, if a 15-passenger vehicle has a stated GVWR of 6,200 pounds, its unloaded vehicle weight could not exceed 3,950 pounds. I cannot state whether the Ford E-150 van has an unloaded vehicle weight in excess of this figure. However, I am sending a copy of your correspondence to our Office of Enforcement so that they may review this matter.

SINCERELY,

Marriott Hotels

5/27/83

MR. FRANK (Illegible Word) CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

THE ATTACHED FILE I BELIEVE POINTS TO A PROBLEM FORD MOTOR CO. HAS AND THEY NEED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION ON.

THANKS FOR LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

(Illegible Words) May 21, 1983

Mr. J. R. Rose - District Manager Ford Motor Company

Dear Mr. Rose

Just a note to let you know that I received your May 17 letter which contains various specific accuations that "you (refering to the writer) apparently intensified the problem of load by actually carrying an overload". Sorry to inform you Mr. Rose, but you are totally misinformed and there is some question on the facts you put forth. Consider:

1. A Ford representative, Mr. Frank Palbo, speced out the Van in question. . . .as per the attached specification sheet. He had very simple guidelines.

(a) Want a 15 passenger Ford Van

(b) Want to carry 10 passenger in Captains Chairs

(c) Want individual reading lights for each Captains Chair.

2. Frank's note of August 17, 1981 and vehicle layout (copy attached) indicate,

(a) Seats will fit

(b) Van converter will do the job

(c) Finance Company approved the lease.

3. Consider Mr. Rose, I specified a 15 Passanger Ford Van. . . .which normally contains:

(a) Two front seats . . . . equals 2

b) Three bench seats holding three persons each . . . equals 9

(c) One rear bench seat holding four people . . . equals 4

(d) If my math holds up . . . that is 2 + 9 + 4 = 15 people

(e) If your letter is correct, I quote "10 passengers possibly totally 1500 lbs" is correct . . . then your Ford 15 passenger van carries a payload of 15 times 150lbs = 2250 pounds of payload.

(f) Since we are saving 5 passengers we should be saving . . . . 5 times 150lbs = 750 pounds.

(g) Now, we added 8 captains chairs on bases verses your 4 bench seats . . . and since our seats our top quality, we'll agree they probably weigh on a two for one bases, 50 pounds each more than seats . . . so eights seats times 50lbs. = 400 pounds.

(h) O.K. - I saved 750lbs. by carrying 5 less passengers - I added 400lbs by using Captains Chairs . . . so basic subtraction says 750 minus 400 equals 350 pounds.

(i) Now the Van converter recommended we beef-up your flooring along with insulating the floor so we added 3/4" plywood to the floor in under your luxurious carpeting. Say that added 100lbs. to the Van. Let's see, I still have 350lbs. I saved and I take away 100lbs. from that and I have 250lbs. . net savings.

(j) We also added reading lights, electrical wire, front wood console, rear tire carrier . . . must all total out to at least 50lbs . . . . so I reduce my 250pounds savings by 50 and my new net savings is 200 pounds.

(k) Now our regular riders are of hearty stock and probably average 20lbs. overweight to your 150lbs. standard . . . so 10 passengers being 201lbs. each overweight equals 200lbs . . . can you believe it . . . 200 plus and 200 minus and I come out to . . . ZERO.

Now that we've finished our basic math quiz we can get down to the heart of the problem. Ford is selling a Cargo/Passenger vehicle that can't possibly meet their stated weights . . . . once again simple math says: GVW is 6200 pounds 15 Passengers -2250 pounds NVW is 3950 pounds

There is no way that vehicle or any Ford Vehicle setting on your showroom floor, equipped with bench seats and ready accept 15 passengers can weigh less than 400 pounds.

So, by your own figures, you show that you are falsely representing your product, that you are endangering peoples lives and worst of all you don't give a damn. And to prove that statement, I'll take a Saturday and in your facility, take out the eight captains chairs and bases and let you weigh the Van. And so that everyone knows things are on the up and up, let's invite the President of Ford to be the official weighing judge. He certainly has a vested interest. And just in case you don't want to accept the challenge, rest assured I'll do it on my own, having everything (Illegible Word) so that TV Stations, Consumer Organizations, FTC, and NHTSA can all benefit from this information.

So, back to you Mr. Rose and this time please do your homework and get the facts straight before you respond. I want to know why a Ford Motor Company representative speced and sold our group a Van that could not possibly conform to what we requested.

A VERY UNHAPPY FORD VAN LEASEE:

WILLIAM E. MEITER Middletown Van Pool Association

Ford Motor Company

May 17, 1983

William E. Meiter Middletown Van Pool Association

Dear Mr. Meiter:

This is in response to your recent letter to Mr. Peck in which you relate the problems experienced with replacement of brake linings and pads on your 1982 Ford E-150 Van.

While the warranty which you received with the Ford E-150 Van covers defects in material and workmanship within the first 12 months or 12,000 miles, it does not cover replacement of normal maintenance items such as brake linings (friction material). There are several factors that may effect brake life; for example: individual driving habits, road conditions, stop and go traffic into and within Manhattan and optional equipment such as 10 captian chairs causing extra load. You apparently intensified the problem of load by actually carrying an overload which is indicated in the following: Your vehicle's GVW is - 6,200 lbs. After alterations, your vehicle's net weight registered as - 5,720 ibs. Allowing you - 480 lbs. to use as load; i.e.: passengers.

By transporting 10 passengers possibly totalling 1,500 lbs., you are overloading your vehicle by approximately 1,000 lbs.

We regret that our response could not be more favorable, but appreciate having had the opportunity to review this matter for you.

J. R. Rose District Manager New York District

MANHATTAN FORD, LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC. (Illegible Words) 555 WEST 57th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019 (201)581-7860

PRICE BOOK DATE PAGE DATE SALESMAN: SALBO

CUSTOMER: J.C. PENNY

ADDRESS

ATTENTION: W.E. MEITER 60 WALLACE ROAD, MIDDLETOWN, N.J. 07748 PHONE: 212-957-0092. MODEL: EIEO WINDOW VAN SUPER (Illeg.) 6941.- PAYLOAD PACKAGE: #2 GVM: 6200 N/C ENGINE: 302-V8 101.- TRANSMISSION: AUTOMATIC 352.- AXLES FRONT: (TRACTION LOK) REAR RATIO: 4.75 170.- TIRES: P235 75R 15XL STD.- SPARE TIRE: P235 75R 15XL 111.- AIR CONDITION DASH [] HI CAPACITY [] 1020.- ALTERNATOR: 60 AMP INCL W/AIR. - BATTERY: HD 36.- BRAKES: POWER STD BUMPER: REAR STEP. 84.- OUT CONVENIENCE GROUP: INTER WIPERS-12" O/N MIRROR-RHVANITY MIRROR 50.- COOLING SYS EXTRA [] SUPER [] 55.- DOOR SIDE: SLIDING OR HINGED N/C FUEL TANK: AUX. TOTAL CAP. 40 GALS 112.- (Illeg.) SPEED CONTROL 135.- GLASS (Illeg.): SWING OUT REAR. 40.- GLASS TINTED [] PRIVACY [] 264.- (Illeg.): COMFORT RIDE 15.- HEATER AUX [] HI OUTPUT [] 25.- INSULATION: DELUX 362.- LIGHT (Illeg.): COURTESY SWITCHES 24- LOCK GROUP: SECURITY 51.- MIRRORS: WESTERN LOW MTG. 69.- PAINT: ONE COLOR N/C PROTECTION GROUP RADIO: AM. FM. CASSETTE (4 SPEAKERS.) 224.- SEATING: QUAD CAPTS. CHAIRS. (2 ONLY) 1100.- 550 SHOCKS: HD FRONT & REAR (Illeg.) SPRING FRONT: HD REAR: HD 62.- STABILIZER BAR: FRONT 25.- STEERING: POWER 197.- (Illeg.): OUTSIDE SWING AWAY TIRE CARRIER. 117.- (Illeg.): CIGAR LIGHTER. 17.- FREIGHT 509.- DELIVERY & PREPARATION CHARGE 75.- 1981 PRICE (Illeg.) 82 ESTIMATED INCREASE 4% 500.- 12926- BILL, THE VAN PEOPLE ON LONG ISLAND WANT X 355.00- EACH INSTALLED FOR CAPTAINS CHAIRS FIGURING ANOTHER SEVEN TX 368.00-297.50 25.00- 2.972 I STILL WANT TO SHOP THIS ITEM LIGHTS 34.35 15 TOTAL 212.45 504.00 15.286

(Illegible Words)

P.S. ALL ACCESSORIES ARE FIGURED AT COST SO ANYTHING YOU THINK YOU DON'T WANT JUST DELETE.

LENNIE (Illegible Words) - 914-638-2972 3 YR. #562 MO PLUS INSURANCE. DOWN #600 + ONE MOS. PAYMENT $ 8,500 BUY BACK

MANHATTAN FORD, LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC

8-17-81

BILL,

JUST A QUICK NOTE TO TELL YOU THE FINANCE CO. APPROVED THE LEASE.

ALSO ATTACHED IS A LAY OUT. I GOT THE SEAT PEOPLE TO DROP THEIR PRICE TO $ 297.50 AND THE READING LIGHTS INSTALLED EACH SEAT $ 34.95 EACH.

I THINK WE HAVE EVERYTHING, GIVE ME A CALL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Frank

THIS IS THE SEAT MOVES BACK & FORWARD & SWIVELS DOES NOT RECLINE.

MAIN CUT OFF SWITCH FOR LIGHTS INSTLD. IN DASH

8 (Illegible Word) SEATS INSTLD ON SWIVEL BASES W/SLIDE TRACKS AS SHOWN

SEAT INSTALLATION NOTE:

POSITION ALL SEATS APPROXIMATELY 4 (Illegible Word) FROM SIDE TO ALLOW FOR:

- SWIVEL OF SEATS

- STOREAGE OF BLUE CASES ON FLOOR BETWEEN SEAT AND SIDE WALL

WE WILL USE 8 OF THESE DRIVE & PASSENGER WILL BE FORD.

SPECIAL NOTE:

CENTER THIS SEAT (MOVE INTO AISLE) SO PASSENGERS CAN ENTER BEHIND SEAT AND (Illegible Words) AISLE TO THEIR SEATS

9 SINGLE AIRCRAFT LIGHT W/SEPARATE SWITCHES INSTLD OVER EACH SEAT AS SHOWN.

(Graphics omitted)

ID: nht76-3.2

DATE: 07/16/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: Jeep Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to Jeep Corporation's March 9, 1976, petition for rulemaking as supplemented by its letter of April 1, 1976. The petition requested an amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301-75, Fuel System Integrity, that would add the following sentence at the end of S7.1.6(b):

For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-performing accessories.

The supplement to the petition included a list of 15 examples of such work-performing accessories. The amendment would require the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to remove these accessories before performing compliance testing pursuant to the standard.

In Section 108 of the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, (15 U.S.C. 1392 note), Congress directed that the fuel system integrity standard take effect in the form in which it had been most recently published. Conditions for amending the standard were specified in Section 108(b) as follows:

Amendment or Repeal of Standard. -- The Secretary may amend the standard described in subsection (a) in order to correct technical errors in the standard, and may amend or repeal such standard if he determines such amendment or repeal will not diminish the level of motor vehicle safety.

The practical result of the amendment requested by Jeep would be that certain vehicles would not, as is presently specified, be required to conform to the standard in the form in which they are actually delivered to purchasers and used on the highways. In fact, the presence of work-performing accessories could seriously degrade a vehicle's performance in the standard's barrier crash tests. We therefore cannot conclude that the requested amendment "will not diminish the level of motor vehicle safety." Furthermore, the amendment goes beyond the mere correction of technical errors in the standard. Consequently, Jeep's petition must be and is hereby denied.

Despite this denial, however, the NHTSA interprets the term "unloaded vehicle weight" in a manner that provides some of the relief that Jeep has requested. The term is defined in 49 CFR Part 571.3 as follows:

'Unloaded vehicle weight' means the weight of a vehicle with maximum capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of the vehicle, but without cargo or occupants.

The "weight of a vehicle" includes the weight of those accessories that are installed on a vehicle before delivery and are not ordinarily removed. Among such accessories are the following: air bag suspension systems

draw bars

headlamp and radiator protectors

helper-springs

hitches

pintle hooks

power take-offs

push bumpers

step bumpers and side steps

tire carriers

wreckers

The weight of those accessories that are ordinarily removed from a vehicle when they are not in use, however, is not included in the "weight of a vehicle". Consequently, accessories in this latter group would be removed by the NHTSA prior to testing for conformity to Standard No. 301-75. Among these are the following:

snow plows

spreaders

tow bars

Categorization of winches, the remaining accessory that you have listed, depends on the nature of the particular winch. One that is generally removed only when its presence interferes with other vehicle functions would be included in the evaluation of "unloaded vehicle weight". A portable winch that is ordinarily removed after use, however, would not be included in that evaluation.

SINCERELY,

Jeep Corporation

April 1, 1976

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

On March 9, 1976 the Jeep Corporation petitioned the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for rulemaking to exempt work-performing accessories from the test requirements of FMVSS No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, as the standard applies to multi-purpose vehicles and light trucks. This letter transmits additional information to supplement our March 9 petition.

It has occurred to us that a summary of the types of available work-performing accessories referenced in our petition might be of benefit to you in your efforts to evaluate the merits of the Jeep petition. We, therefore, submit the following list of work-performing accessories, or work-related accessories, for your information and review:

Air bag suspension systems

Draw bars

Headlamp and radiator protectors

Helper springs

Hitches

Pintle hooks

Power take-offs

Push bumpers

Snow plows

Spreaders

Step bumpers and side steps

Tire carriers

Tow bars

Winches

Wreckers

In addition, we have attached copies of the booklet "Jeep Vehicle Special Equipment and Jeep Vehicle Accessories Catalog" which includes illustrations of the type of accessories and devices discussed above as well as descriptions of other factory-approved equipment and accessories that are available on these unique vehicles.

We request your prompt and favorable acceptance of this petition since less than five months remain before FMVSS No. 301 becomes effective as applied to MPV's and light trucks.

George E. Brown Executive Director - Vehicle Emissions & Safety

ATTACHMENTS Jeep Corporation

March 9, 1976

James B. Gregory Administrator National Highway Traffic Safety Administration U.S. Department of Transportation

RE: Petition For Rulemaking Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity

On October 16, 1975, Jeep Corporation submitted a petition to amend the definition of "unloaded vehicle weight" so that work-performing accessories would not be included. That petition was subsequently denied (your letter N40-30) on the grounds that the NHTSA has adopted a policy of evaluating potential dynamic testing problems with heavy or protruding accessories on a "standard-by-standard" basis.

In accord with that stated NHTSA policy, Jeep Corporation, herewith, submits the attached petition to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, so that the test conditions specified by the standard do not include the work-performing accessories used on trucks and multi-purpose vehicles.

George E. Brown Executive Director Vehicle Emissions and Safety

March 9, 1976

PETITION TO AMEND FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD (49 CFR PART 301) FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY

Pursuant to Section 124 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Jeep Corporation petitions the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to undertake rulemaking to amend Motor Vehicle Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, so that the test conditions specified by the standard do not include work-performing accessories for trucks and multipurpose vehicles. Thus, the test conditions for Standard No. 301 would then be consistent in this respect with those for Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion.

The Jeep Corporation requests the Administrator's consideration of this petition for the amendment to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, for the following reasons:

Currently, the Test Conditions of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, Are Not Consistent with Those of Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion

In the preamble to the proposal for Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, Docket No. 74-21; Notice 2, the Administrator stated:

"Finally, the NHTSA is continuing to promote compatibility and economy in barrier crash testing by adopting vehicle loading and dummy restraint requirements in Standard No. 219 identical to those set out in proposed amendments to Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, 49 CFR 571.301 (40 FR 17036, April 16, 1975)."

Jeep Corporation fully supports the Administrator's efforts to promote compatibility and economy in barrier testing; however, the requirements for Standard No. 219 and 301 do not provide the desired compatibility or economy.

Section 7.7b of Standard No. 219 referring to the test loading and dummy requirements for multi-purpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses states:

"For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work performing accessories."

Standard No. 301 does not provide for the exemption of work-performing accessories and, therefore, is not compatible with Standard No. 219 and thus requires clarification regarding the loading conditions for barrier testing.

Barrier Tests Including Work-Performing Accessories Would Not Be Representative of Normal Production Vehicles

Multi-purpose vehicles, because of their nature, are used in many ways with equipment not typical of normal passenger car usage. Barrier tests involving work-performing accessories would not be representative of most production vehicles. For example, the barrier test results of a truck with a snow plow on its front and carrying a salt spreader on its rear should not be used to depict base vehicles because of the possible protection offered to the base vehicle by its work-performing devices.

Excessive Barrier Test Requirements May Cause Some Accessories Specifically Engineered for Jeep Vehicles to be Removed From the Marketplace

Jeep Corporation offers a full range of work-performing accessories ranging from snow plows and push plates to power winches and wrecker assemblies. Such accessories are highly desirable to customers who want to more fully utilize the multi-purpose features of their Jeep vehicles or who want to utilize the capabilities of any class of vehicle for recreational or work purposes.

These accessories, which are marketed as Jeep Special Equipment, are specifically designed to be compatible with Jeep vehicles, thereby requiring a minimum of vehicle modification, and are offered either as factory-installed or dealer add-on equipment. Aftermarket universal-type accessories may not be so readily adaptable to Jeep vehicles resulting in major vehicle modifications which may compromise the safety performance of the original vehicle.

Marketing of these engineered accessories may not be possible, however, if the dynamic testing procedures of Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, differ from the test procedures specified for other standard such as Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, and require multi-purpose vehicles to be tested with a myriad of special equipment accessories. Programs to assure compliance to any Federal Safety Standard specifying barrier testing with all possible equipment combinations would create a testing and financial burden which Jeep Corporation could not bear. The end result would be the withdrawal from the marketplace of certain original equipment, manufacturer-installed accessories or dealer-installed, manufacturer-approved accessories which may not be in the best interest of public safety.

Summary

In recognition of the above arguments, Jeep Corporation petitions the Administrator to amend Section 7.1.6(b) of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, by adding the sentence underlined here:

". . . same. Each dummy shall be restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle for protection at its seating position. For the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle weight does not include the weight of work-performing accessories."

Jeep Corporation submits that such rulemaking is both in the public interest and in the best interest of vehicle safety.

ID: nht94-4.40

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 30, 1994

FROM: Arthur W. Perkins -- Perkins, Philips and Puckhaber

TO: John Womack -- Assistant Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Re: Robert E. Dwyer, Administrator of the Estate of Sean P. Dwyer, Kelly Nedeau, Steven Nedeau and Diane E. Surran, Administratrix of the estate of Ronald G. Reed, Jr. v. Dobles Chevrolet, Inc., Van-Go, Inc., and Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom 's Unlimited

ATTACHMT: Attached to 2/3/95 letter from Philip R. Recht to Arthur W. Perkins (A43; Std. 207; Std. 208; Std. 301; Part 567.7); Also attached to 7/12/91 letter from Paul Jackson Rice to Samuel Albury

TEXT: Dear Assistant Chief Womack:

This office has had numerous conversations with Attorneys Marvin Shaw and Mary Versaille of your office relative to the applicability of various federal regulations to a motor vehicle that was converted from its original intended purpose as a cargo va n to a passenger vehicle. My office represents the interests of two estates and two injured parties in a products liability and negligence action which has been brought against a retail automobile dealership and the customizing company.

During our conversations with Mr. Shaw and Ms. Versaille, they informed me that by directing a letter to you outlining certain issues, we could obtain an opinion letter relative to the application of various sections of the Federal Motor Vehicle safet y Standards Act.

I expect this case will go to trial sometime in late 1994 or early 1995, and I would appreciate receiving a response from you at your earliest convenience.

Factual Summary

Defendant Dobles Chevrolet, Inc. of Manchester, New Hampshire ordered a 1985 cargo Astro Van from General Motors. (See Exhibit 1A and 1B General Motors invoice to Dobles Chevrolet, Inc.) Dobles Chevrolet, Inc., after having the cargo van in its inven tory for approximately three months, permitted Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited, to take the van for the purpose of converting it from a cargo to a passenger van. (See Exhibit 2, Dobles Chevrolet Purchase Order (#43031) to Customs Unlimite d). Mr. Young was a jobber and had an arrangement with Defendant Van-Go of New England, Inc. of Saugus, Massachusetts to customize cargo vans to passenger vans for a fixed price. (See Exhibit 3, Customs Unlimited sales order of 7/25/85).

1. Van-Go Accessories performed the following modifications:

The two Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) front driver and front passenger seats were removed and were replaced with "after market" captains style seats which were attached to rotating pedestals that were mounted on the original seat floor studs m anufactured by General Motors.

2. The van was further modified as follows:

A. The exterior of the van was cut to install three windows two 26" x 18" and one 30" x 18".

B. The ceiling and interior walls were covered with fabric.

C. The corrugated metal floor was covered with plywood (held in place with sheet rock screws) over which there was an application of foam pad and carpeting.

D. Two "after market" bench seats, middle and rear, (which folded to a platform bedding) were installed by using four mounting clips per seat frame. The mounting clips were held in place by one non-graded bolt, which passed through the elongated slot in the clip, through the carpet, the pad, the wood floor and the corrugated floor of the van and was bolted underneath using a washer and nut. (See Exhibit 4A, B & C, photos of bench seats and clips.)

E. Type 2 seatbelts for each seating position, two in the middle and three in the back, were attached to the frames of these seats. (See Exhibit 5A & B, photos of bench seats with attached seatbelts.)

The van was returned to Arthur Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited, absent any certification or any disclosure indicating that any work had been performed by Van-Go. Arthur Young performed some exterior painting, striping, put on new wheels, and affixed a 1 1/2" x 6" placard advertising that his firm had worked on the vehicle. Mr. Young then delivered the van to Dobles Chevrolet who prominently placed it in the showroom area and offered it for sale as a new vehicle.

Mr. Paul Nadeau went to Dobles Chevrolet for the purpose of acquiring a family vehicle, and purchased the van on August 31, 1985 (see Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7.)

The placard affixed by Mr. Young was removed from the vehicle prior to Mr. Nadeau purchasing the vehicle.

The motor vehicle was being used by Paul Nadeau's son, Scott Nadeau, on September 20, 1987 when he was driving the vehicle together with four passengers, one of whom was buckled in the front passenger seat. The other three passengers, two in the midd le seat and one in the rear seat, were not wearing seatbelts. Scott Nadeau lost control of the vehicle at approximately 45 miles per hour, and the vehicle struck a tree in a rearward rotating fashion at approximately 28 miles per hour, whereupon the sea ts rotated from underneath the clip and came loose from the floor, allowing the two bench seats and their three occupants to load against the rear cargo doors. The front passenger was ejected rearward from underneath her belt, when her seat back collaps ed and was catapulted to the rear of the van. As the vehicle rotated from the point of impact with the tree, an accelerated force was exerted by the four bodies and the two bench seats on the rear door, and the welds holding the latching mechanism yield ed, allowing the four occupants to be ejected out the rear cargo doors.

Two of the passengers were killed and the other two sustained serious personal injuries. The back of the front passenger seat collapsed, in part because of the negligent manner in which the seat was affixed to the pedestal (only three nuts were insta lled although it was designed to be held by four), allowing the front passenger to slide under of the searbelt and be ejected out the rear door. The two occupants of the middle seats were ejected and killed, and the rear passenger, lying down on the ben ch seat, was ejected and sustained a head injury.

The Plaintiffs have brought an action against the dealer (Dobles), the converter (Van-Go), and the broker (Arthur Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited) in strict liability in tort because the seats and the seat anchoring mechanism were inherently dangerous .

The Plaintiffs claim 1) that the seats lacked sufficient strength, and 2) the anchoring system used for the seats in the vehicle did not comply with the minimum federal safety standards.

The Defendants are using the following as defenses:

1. The seats met Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 207 because they withstood the force of 20 g's times the weight of the seat. The seat weighed 50 pounds, therefore, if the seats and seat backs could withstand 1000 pounds of force, they com plied with the FMVSS. (The manufacturer tested the seats when they were attached to a metal surface with a clamp arrangement using two bolts and the seas withstood 20 times their weight. The manufacturer assumed that seatbelts would be attached to the floor and not to the frame of the seats. The seats were never tested as attached using a clamp with a single bolt to the plywood and carpeted surface of the customized van. Nor were the seats tested after the seatbelts were attached to them.

2. The components installed by Van-Go are "readily attachable" components and they are accordingly exempt by @ 567.7 from certifying the vehicle.

3. Since the Plaintiffs on the bench seats were not wearing seatbelts, the FMVSS relative to the strength of the frames of the seat, seat backs and anchoring system are not applicable, as they apply to forward forces only.

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Van-Go Accessories of New England, Inc.:

1. Are the items installed by Van-Go on the cargo van (e.g. windows, sub-flooring, padding, carpeting, seats, changing the seating arrangements, and attaching the seatbelts to the frames of the bench seats not designed to accommodate seatbelts) class ified as "readily attachable" and therefore exempt under @ 567.7?

2. If the items installed on the cargo van by Van-Go are not classified as "readily attachable", is Van-Go required under @ 567.7 to certify that they altered the vehicle? If so, what is the procedure for such certification?

3. Is it required that the vehicle as altered, including the seats and seat anchoring systems, be subjected to and be able to withstand the forces which would be applied to them under the fuel integrity test as set forth in Regulation 308?

4. Pursuant to the seat anchoring system requirements as set forth in Section 210, although they are applied in a forward direction, is it a reasonable assumption that the seat anchoring system should likewise resist the same forces in a rearward dir ection?

5. Do the requirements of Regulation 308 mean that the seats and seat backs must be able to withstand the forces which would be applied to them under fuel integrity testing in Regulation 308?

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Arthur "Lucky" Young, d/b/a Custom's Unlimited:

1. Are the items installed on the cargo van (e.g. exterior painting, striping and new wheels) by Arthur Young classified as "readily attachable" and therefore exempt under @ 567.7?

2. If the items installed on the cargo van by Arthur Young are not classified as "readily attachable", is Arthur Young required under@ 567.7 to certify that he altered the vehicle?

3. If the van has been altered by Van-Go, is Arthur Young as the broker between Dobles and Van-Go required to certify the van prior to returning it to Dobles?

The Plaintiffs request your opinion on the following with respect to Defendant Dobles Chevrolet:

1. Is Dobles Chevrolet, as a dealer and first time seller of new motor vehicles, required to make certain that before it sells a new motor vehicle which has been altered, that the vehicle complies with the FMVSS as of the date of the alteration?

2. Who is ultimately responsible for making certain that a new vehicle, once certified by the manufacturer (General Motors) but subsequently altered, meets the FMVSS requirements prior to sale - the converter or the seller of the new vehicle?

If you need any additional information please contact us and we will be pleased to immediately answer your requests. If the questions we have posed are too burdensome and you would like us to narrow our focus, please let us know right away and we wou ld be happy to modify our questions posed. It is my understanding that your department can normally respond to inquiries such as this within a sixty day time period. If that is not possible would you please contact us and let us know the expected date of your reply.

Very truly yours,

ID: nht76-1.40

DATE: 02/18/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Miller Spreader Company

COPYEE: MR. WELTZER -- REGION OFC. V

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of January 1, 1976, to Regional Office V of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), concerning whether your company's spreader product must comply with the requirements of Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations, paricularly Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires.

The NHTSA issues safety standards and regulations for "motor vehicles." Section 102(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act defines a motor vehicle as a vehicle "manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways." Thus, a motor vehicle is a vehicle which the manufacturer expects will use public highways as part of its intended function. The primary function of some vehicles is of a mobile, workperforming nature, and, as such, their manufacturer contemplates a primary use of the highway. Mobile cranes, rigs, and towed equipment such as chippers and pull-type street sweepers that travel at a normal highway speed are examples in this area. These motor vehicles qualify as trucks or trailers. As such they are subject to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations. On the basis of the information you have sent us your company's towed paver appears to be in this category of vehicles, and would therefore be considered a "motor vehicle."

There are some vehicles which are excepted from the motor vehicle classification despite their use on the highway. Highway maintenance and contruction equipment, lane stripers, self-propelled asphalt pavers, and other vehicles whose maximum speed does not exceed 20 mph and whose abnormal configuration distinguishes them from the traffic flow are not considered motor vehicles. Your company's paver would not appear to qualify in this category of vehicles since, as a towed paver, it would travel at a speed greater than 20 mph, at least when moving between job sites.

Consequently, your product must comply with the requirements of the Federal standards and regulations. Standard No. 119 does not directly impose any duty on you, because it applies to tires rather than vehicles. However, the NHTSA has recently issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars (copy enclosed). This standard does require, effective September 1, 1976, that your vehicles be equipped with tires that conform to Standard No. 119 and are of sufficient load rating.

Please contact us if we can be of any further assistance.

YOURS TRULY,

Miller Spreader Company

December 30, 1975

Bob Webtzer U. S. Department of Transportation

Enclosed please find the following items:

A. Literature describing two (2) models of Towed Pavers manufactured by the Miller Spreader Company:

1) Dial-A-Mat Paver

2) MS-708A Paver

B. Drawing 41001 showing the general arrangement of the rubber tired undercarriage used on both paver models above.

C. One photograph showing rubber tired undercarriage mounted under a Paver (See photograph marked "C")

D. One photograph showing towed paver carried on the rear of the dump body of a drump truck (see photograph marked "d").

E. One photograph showing paver elevated off the ground and being pulled by a tow bar assembly (see photograph marked "E")

F. Copy of Internal Revenue Service ruling exempting the Miller Paver when used in conjunction with a Miller Tow Bar from Excise Tax Regulations.

The Miller Towed Paver is a piece of construction machinery used specifically to spread asphalt or base materials on a prepared surface. This machine is used by both governmental bodies and commercial contractors to build and maintain driveways, parking areas, roads, etc.

A rubber tired undercarriage provides running gear for this paver. We have used a 530/450 6" wheel and pneumatic tire assembly in either 4 or 6 ply design. Our present models of this towed paver use eight (8) of these tire assemblies per paver (See drawing 41001).

To date we have no recorded incidents of wheel or tire failure other than an occassional flat, on these towed pavers.

We are interested in how the use of our present wheel and tire assembly on our Towed Paver meet current Department of Transportation specifications for this type of construction machinery. Specifically, we are interested in information pertaining to the particular application of our Towed Paver with a tow bar for highway use.

For purposes of our discussions we can treat both the Miller Dial-A-Mat Towed Paver and the Miller MS-708A Towed Paver as similar units in that changes in accessory components change the model designation and not the basic function of the machine. Hereafter we will refer to either machine as "Towed Paver".

The operation of the Towed Paver involves attaching the paver to the dump truck rear wheel assembly by means of an in-a-wheel hitch (see cover of Miller Dial-A-Mat literature). The dump body of the truck is then elevated, dumping asphalt materials into the hopper of the paver. The dump truck then moves forward pulling the paver which deposits a thickness of asphalt.

Transportation of the Towed Paver to and from the jobsite is done in either of two (2) ways. The most common method of transportation is to suspend the paver on the rear of a dump body (see photograph marked "d").

The second method of transportation of the paver to and from the jobsite is to use a tow bar (see photograph marked "e"). The towed paver is lifted off the ground by use of two (2) hydraulic cylinders and locked into the elevated position. The tow bar is attached to the rear of the paver. The tow bar is then attached to rear of the towing vehicle. Safety chains, lights, etc. are provided. The Paver is pulled from jobsite to jobsite much in the same manner as portable concrete pumps, concrete mixers, etc.

The distance the paver would be towed would not normally exceed 10-15 miles. I don't know whether the enclosed information for a excise tax exemption will be of any help but I have enclosed it for any useful purpose it might serve. I trust the enclosed information is complete. Please let me know if you need further information. Thank you for your assistance.

W. Thomas James, III

Internal Revenue Service

May 13 1974

Miller Spreader Company

Attn: Mr. W. Thomas James, II Vice President

This is in reply to your letter of April 3, 1974, requesting a ruling whether the proposed manufacture and sale of a towing device described below will be subject to the manufacturer's excise tax imposed by section 4061(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

The towing device (Tow Bar) is specially designed to be attached directly to an asphault spreader (Miller Paver) and will be used to connect the Miller Paver to a towing vehicle (truck) for the purposes of job to job moves. The Tow Bar will be limited to use only with a Miller Paver and will not be adaptable for use with other machinery.

Section 4061(b)(1) of the Code imposes a tax on parts or accessories (other than tires and inner tubes) for any of the articles enumerated in subsection (a)(1) sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer.

Section 48.4061(b)(2) of the Excise Tax Regulations defines the term "parts or accessories" as including (1) any article the primary use of which is to improve, repair, replace, or serve as a component part of an automobile truck or bus chassis or body, or other automobile chassis or body or taxable tractor, (2) any article designed to be attached to or used in connection with such chassis, body or tractor to add to its utility or ornamentation, and (3) any article the primary use of which is in connection with such chassis, body, or tractor, whether or not essential to its operation or use.

We have previously ruled in Revenue Ruling 72-479, published in the Internal Revenue Cumulative Bulletin 1972-2 at page 544, that a self-feeding spreading device designed to be attached to a standard dump truck body is not a "part or accessory" subject to excise tax. The Miller Paver is a self-feeding spreading device as described in Revenue Ruling 72-479 and is therefore not a "part or accessory" subject to excise tax.

The Tow Bar described is designed to be used primarily as a component part of, to add to the utility of, and in connection with the non-taxable Miller Paver rather than primarily with a taxable towing vehicle. Therefore the proposed manufacture and sale of the Tow Bar would not be subject to the tax imposed by section 4061(b)(1) of the Code.

We are enclosing a copy of Revenue Ruling 72-479 for your information.

Richard L. Crain Acting Chief, Excise Tax Branch

For the best paving job, greater profits . . . chec miller MS - 708A with Hydraulic Beam Electric/Hydraulic Controls Rubber Tires Heat

FOR MATERIAL SAVINGS

You'll need Miller's exclusive Hydraulic Beam. This feature alone will save time and material as well as reduce operator fatigue. Two levers on the operator's console let him make thickness corrections on either or both sides of the paver.

Corrections are made quickly and accurately . . . WITH HYDRAULIC BEAM a correction can be made in less than 4 feet of paver travel . . . with other pavers the same correction takes from 12 to 15 feet of travel.

FOR A SMOOTHER MAT

Check Miller's wide stance rubber tire undercarriage. The tires are staggered so they won't follow truck ruts and will provide a smoother ride over rough base.

(Graphics omitted)

(Graphics omitted)

FOR QUALITY MAT FINISH

Miller's heavy duty screed wear plate features rolled edges to assure a better mat seal on both straight pulls and on a radius. Both edges are rolled making the wear plate reversible.

A 31 jet in line screed heater provides even heat along the entire screed to assure a uniform mat finish. The even heat also eliminates plate warpage.

An insulated cover running the entire width of the paver shields the operator from the heat and minimizes fuel consumption.

FOR BETTER MATERIAL FLOW Miller's clean, unobstructed hopper design provides excellent material flow. Enlarged gate and bleed out openings increase the flow of material to the screed and extensions.

FOR MOBILITY

Only Miller utilizes a 4-point chain hook up for transporting the paver from job to job. This system assures safe, even support along the entire width of the truck body and prevents damage to the body or tailgate.

FOR GREATER RETURN ON INVESTMENT

In addition to all these outstanding performance features, Miller pavers are built to hold up under high tonnage and extreme paving conditions. All stress points (*) are engineered to provide maximum strength, thus assuring extended paver life.

MAKE US PROVE MILLER IS BEST . . . ASK US TO DEMONSTRATE.

(Graphics omitted)

ID: toyo.ajd

Mr. Harold van der Meijden
Toyo Tire (USA) Corporation
6261 Katella Avenue
Suite 2B
Cypress, CA 90630

Dear Mr. van der Meijden:

This is in reply to your telefaxed note of August 29, 2003, to Taylor Vinson of the Office of Chief Counsel and your e-mail of September 2, 2003, to Jonathan White of the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) asking for a clarification of certain provisions of the early warning reporting (EWR) regulation, 49 CFR Part 579 Subpart C, and certain provisions of ODIs EWR Compendium that track the EWR regulation.

In your fax to Mr. Vinson, you advised that Toyo Tire Corporation (Toyo), in its warranty provisions, handles claims for "early ride" complaints and warrants projected mileages on certain tire lines. You assert that tires subject to such claims do not have a failure condition other than they did not meet the subjective expectancy for comfort or warranted mileage projections. You would like to know whether these types of claims have to be reported under component code 98 (other) for ride disturbances or 71 (tread) for mileage, respectively?

Also in your fax, you cited the preamble to the final rule, 67 FR 45822 at 45853 (July 10, 2000), where we stated that we did not think warranty claims that merely concern "cosmetic, ride or wear concerns or did not concern a failure would be useful to early detection of safety-related tire defects." You stated that it was your understanding that "claims with no failure condition fall into the category of tires that would not be useful in the early detection of safety-related tire defects."

We concur with your understanding that you do not have to report warranty adjustments that do not involve the component categories specified in 49 CFR 579.26(c). As we explained in our response to the Rubber Manufacturers Associations (RMA) August 26, 2002 Petition for Reconsideration, "we adhere to our view that we do not want to receive data on warranty adjustments that do not relate to one or more of the four identified component categories." 68 FR 35132 at 35137 (June 11, 2003).

I now address your questions raised in your e-mail to Mr. White regarding the EWR Compendium. At the outset, we note that the EWR Compendium is not an interpretation of Part 579 or the terms used therein, but merely is intended to assist manufacturers in submitting information to NHTSA pursuant to the requirements of the EWR regulation. In addition, the Compendium was updated on September 18, 2003, after your e-mail to Mr. White. In the future, any interpretive questions that you may have concerning substantive reporting regulations should be sent to the Office of Chief Counsel.

Your first question concerns Section IV A of the Compendium. You stated that:

Section IV A. Note reads: &"For tires that are produced or imported in quantities less than 15,000 annually..., the manufacturer need only report information on incidents involving deaths." Toyo interprets the term &"tires&" to mean all those products within a complete tire line with various SKU's whose production or importation is less that 15,000 units annually.

Your understanding is incorrect. We refer you to the introductory paragraph of Section 579.26 for clarification. See 49 CFR 579.26, as amended at 68 FR 35132. That section states:

For each group of tires with the same SKU, plant where manufactured, and year for which the volume produced or imported is less than 15,000, or are deep tread, winter-type snow tires, space saver or temporary use spare tires, tires with nominal rim diameters of 12 inches or less, or are not passenger car tires, light truck tires, or motorcycle tires, the manufacturer need only report information on incidents involving a death or injury, as specified in paragraph (b) of this section.

We note that the regulation refers in part to groups of tires with the same SKU. Therefore, if a tire line has SKUs, if fewer than 15,000 tires with a given SKU are produced (or expected to be produced) in a given year, only incidents involving a death or injury have to be reported.

Second, in connection with Compendium Section IV B.1 Reporting Production Data, you state:

"g.) Manufacturing Plant - code as appearing within the TIN per 574.5 and 574.6, and&" Referencing the Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 112 / Wednesday, June 11, 2003 / Rules and Regulations - page 35144/Section 579.26 Reporting requirements for manufacturers of tires states: &"For purposes of this section, the two-character DOT alphanumeric code for production plants located in the United States assigned by NHTSA in accordance with 574.5(a) and 574.6(b) of this chapter may be used to identify plant where manufactured. If the plant is located outside the United States, the full plant name must be provided&". Toyo's interpretation is since many of our tires are produced in foreign plants for distribution and sale in the United States, we must report the full plant name in our data. What is the requirement criteria for the &"plant name&" that will be noted in the Plant Code field of the template?

Pursuant to 49 CFR 571.109 and 571.119, every tire manufactured for use on the roads and offered for sale in the United States must have a Tire Information Number (TIN) in accordance with 49 CFR Part 574. However, if the tire is manufactured outside of the United States, the TIN need not include the plant name. If a tire that is the subject of an EWR report has a TIN that does not include the plant name of a foreign plant, the manufacturer is required to type in the name of the plant where it is manufactured, up to 25 characters. In typing the name of the plant, the manufacturer may either abbreviate or truncate the name of the plant to fit within the 25 character limitation so long as it uses the same abbreviation or truncation in all EWR reports, including future ones. This approach will satisfy 49 CFR 579.26. When a manufacturer provides the plant name in this manner, it indicates to NHTSA that the tire is manufactured in a foreign plant. We also note that manufacturers are allowed to provide the country of origin (and date of importation), rather than plant and date of manufacture, when the TIN is unknown. See Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Ann Wilson, Senior Vice President, RMA, of October 10, 2003, at 3.

Third, in connection with Compendium Section IV B. 3, you stated:

Reporting Numbers of Warranty Adjustments (including Extended Warranty and Good Will) reads: &"A warranty adjustment need not be reported when: c.) The claim/adjustment is denied&". Toyo's interpretation is that any claim that fails to meet the adjustabilility requirements that are explicitly stated in the applicable warranty, and is therefore denied to the dealer or consumer, need not be reported.

We concur in your understanding that you would not have to report a warranty claim/adjustment that is denied in its entirety. In applying the EWR definition of warranty adjustment, a tire manufacturer would only report warranty adjustments when it paid or provided other reimbursement to a consumer pursuant to a warranty program offered by a manufacturer or goodwill. See 49 CFR 579.4, as amended at 68 FR 35132 at 35142. Therefore, under the circumstances suggested in your e-mail, Toyo would not have to report any claim that was denied because it failed to meet the "adjustability" requirements that are explicitly stated in the applicable warranty.

Fourth, in connection with Compendium Section IV B. 4, you stated:

Reporting Claims and Notices of Death and Injury reads: &"A manufacturer need not file a report for a claim or notice of death and injury when: b.) The claim alleges one or more deaths in a foreign country involving a tire that is identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States&". This seems to contradict the statement on page 16 (paragraph 2): &"Similar reporting is also required when a claim alleging or proving that one or more deaths in a foreign country was caused by a defect in a tire that was identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States&". Toyo's interpretation is that we will need to report on any identical or substantially similar tire involved with a foreign death if it meets minimal specificity requirements.

In connection with the Section IV B. 4, the Compendium (Version 1.0) inadvertently left out the word "not" in the sentence you reference. The Compendium should have read:

A manufacturer need not file a report for a claim or notice of death and injury when:

b.) The claim alleges one or more deaths in a foreign country involving a tire that is not identical or substantially similar to one offered for sale in the United States.

This omission has been corrected in "Version 2.0" of the Compendium.

Lastly, in connection with one-time historical reporting section in the Compendium you wrote:

Section V One-Time Historical Reporting Requirements B. What To Report: reads: &"Historical data concerning production totals, number of warranty adjustments for the preceding 12 quarters (July 1, 2000 through June 30, 2003) covering production year 1998 and later tires (see 579.28(c))&". Referencing the Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 112 / Wednesday, June 11, 2003 / Rules and Regulations - page 35148/Section 579.28 Due date of reports and other miscellaneous provisions. (c) (iii) reads: &"Each manufacturer of tires covered by 579.26 of this part shall file separate reports covering the number of warranty adjustments recorded in the manufacturer's warranty adjustment system for tires that it received in each calendar quarter from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, for tires manufactured from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003&". Toyo interprets this to mean that the production data for the one-time historical report should only include production numbers for the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1998 to June 30, 2003 and not the entire calendar production for 1998.

We do not agree with your understanding.The historical reports are expected to provide a baseline so that we will be able to compare current rates to historical rates. In order for NHTSA to evaluate the EWR information, we need annual production for the five previous years. Our intent is for tire manufacturers to provide annual production for all of 1998 until 2003 is complete and we have first quarter 2004 production. See 49 CFR 579.28, as amended at 68 FR 35132 at 35148. Therefore, when reporting for each quarter from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2003, for tires manufactured from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2003, a manufacturer should include the total annual production of tires produced from the beginning of each calendar year included in the report until the close of the quarter that is the subject of the report.

If you have any questions, you may phone Andrew DiMarsico of my staff at (202) 366-5263.

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

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