ID: 571.108 -- AMA -- Schaye--front color changing light

Paul Schaye
CEO, Pedestrian Safety Solutions
245 Park Avenue, 41st Floor
New York, NY 10167

Dear Mr. Schaye:

This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of whether your auxiliary lamp, the Auto Motion Alert (“your product”), is permissible under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108, Lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.  Because your product would be installed as aftermarket equipment, not as original equipment, and would not replace original equipment, and because FMVSS No. 108 applies only to equipment installed as original equipment or that replaces original equipment, we have interpreted your request as asking whether the installation of your product is permissible under the “make inoperative” provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Safety Act).  The Safety Act prohibits most automotive businesses from installing aftermarket lighting equipment if doing so would take the vehicle out of compliance with FMVSS No. 108.  For auxiliary lamps, the primary restriction imposed by FMVSS No. 108 is that the lamps cannot impair the effectiveness of a vehicle’s required lighting equipment.

We have tentatively concluded that your product is unlikely to impair the effectiveness of required lighting equipment, and is therefore unlikely to violate the “make inoperative” provision.  However, we wish to emphasize that the existence of impairment would depend on the context in which your lamp is used, and thus must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  It is the responsibility of the business installing your product to determine whether doing so constitutes a “make inoperative” violation. We explain our reasoning below.

Description of your product
You describe your product as a lamp that is designed to be installed above a vehicle’s front license plate using the two top mounting screws.  You state that the purpose of installing the lamps on a vehicle is to communicate to road users ahead of the vehicle whether the vehicle is decelerating, accelerating, or maintaining a constant speed. You state that your product consists of a strip of amber and white LEDs, although you do not provide the exact photometric intensity.  Either the white or amber LEDs are activated, depending upon the underlying condition.  You state that the white LEDs are activated and steadily burn while the vehicle is accelerating or travelling at a constant speed, and that the amber LEDs are activated and steadily burn while the vehicle is decelerating or stopped.  The LEDs are actuated by a microcontroller that detects the vehicle’s acceleration using internal accelerometers.  We also understand, based on our communications with you, that the brightness of the LEDs, the threshold levels of acceleration or deceleration activating the LEDs can be controlled through software, although it is our understanding that the product will be sold as a sealed unit that is not adjustable by the end user. You state that, although the LEDs activate independently of other vehicle systems (including the braking system), your product is powered by either a direct connection to the vehicle’s battery, or a 12-volt DC wire supply that is live when the vehicle is turned on.  The exterior housing consists of a weather-resistant polymer enclosure with gasket type seal. 

Applicable Requirements
Because you state that you intend to sell your product aftermarket, the primary potential restriction on its installation is the Safety Act’s “make inoperative” provision. 49 U.S.C.           § 30122.  The “make inoperative” provision states that manufacturers, distributors, dealers, rental companies and motor vehicle repair businesses may not “knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard” promulgated under the Safety Act.  This means that the businesses subject to the “make inoperative” provision would be prohibited from installing your product on a vehicle if doing so would take the vehicle out of compliance with any FMVSS.  The “make inoperative” provision does not apply vehicle owners, and these owners are not precluded from modifying their vehicle by NHTSA’s statutes or regulations.  State and local laws, however, may impact whether an owner may use a vehicle they have modified in a particular jurisdiction.

NHTSA considers the installation of an aftermarket lamp to violate the “make inoperative” provision if the installation of the same lamp as original equipment would violate FMVSS No. 108.[1]  As a non-required (“auxiliary”) lamp, your product is not required to meet any of the performance requirements in FMVSS No. 108 that it would need to meet if it were installed as original equipment.[2]  However, your product would be prohibited under FMVSS No. 108 (and thus, would violate the “make inoperative” provision) if it would “impair[] the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by this standard.” FMVSS No. 108, S6.2.1.    

Because the existence of impairment is, in part, a function of the context in which an auxiliary lamp is used, impairment must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  If a business subject to the “make inoperative” provision installs an aftermarket auxiliary lamp, that entity is responsible for determining whether doing so causes impairment.  If NHTSA determines that a business to which the “make inoperative” provision applies has impaired the effectiveness of required lamps, that business would be subject to a fine of up to $22,329 per violation.[3]  

Discussion
Based on the information you provided in your interpretation request, we have tentatively concluded that your product, if configured and installed in conformance with the restrictions described in letter, is unlikely to impair the effectiveness of a vehicle’s required lighting, and its installation on a vehicle would be unlikely to constitute a “make inoperative” violation.  There are four aspects of auxiliary lamps that are relevant to impairment: brightness (i.e., photometric intensity), color, location, and activation pattern.  What follows is a brief explanation of NHTSA’s safety concerns for each of these characteristics, along with examples of instances in which the agency would consider an auxiliary lamp to violate the impairment prohibition.  It should be noted that determining whether an auxiliary lamp impairs the effectiveness of required lamps involves a holistic assessment of the context in which the auxiliary lamps are used, and the examples provided are not exhaustive.  Thus, although this letter discusses these four characteristics separately, they should not be considered in isolation, nor should they be considered an exhaustive list of all the considerations that should be taken into account when making an impairment determination.

Brightness (Photometric Intensity)
NHTSA interprets the impairment provision to prohibit auxiliary lamps that are so bright as to obscure or distract from a vehicle’s required lamps.  For example, NHTSA has in the past stated that auxiliary lamps that were so bright as to “mask” adjacent required turning signal lamps would be prohibited due to impairment.[4]   While you do not state the precise brightness of your product, you state that its brightness “is limited and so would not impair or mask the vehicle’s headlamps or turn signals.”  Although the extent to which your product would interfere with a vehicle’s required lighting may vary depending on the design and performance of a particular vehicle’s required lamps, we do not believe your product would impair the effectiveness of a vehicle’s required lamps on the basis of brightness if its photometric intensity is sufficiently limited such that your product’s LEDs are noticeably dimmer than the vehicle’s required head lamps and front turn signal lamps.

Color
NHTSA interprets the “impairment” provision to prohibit auxiliary lamps that are colors the agency believes are likely to cause confusion to other road users.  For auxiliary lamps located on the front of the vehicle, colors that could cause confusion include red (which could be confused for a tail lamp), green (which could be confused for a traffic signal), and blue (which could be confused for a law enforcement vehicle).  By contrast, we have consistently said that amber and white lamps are permissible on the front of the vehicle.[5]  Because your product illuminates as either amber or white, depending on the underlying condition, we do not believe your product would impair a vehicle’s required lamps on the basis of color.

Location
NHTSA interprets the “impairment” provision to prohibit auxiliary lamps that are mounted in locations that cause them to interfere with the ability of a vehicle’s required lamps to achieve their purpose. For example, NHTSA has stated in the past that auxiliary lamps placed too close to FMVSS No. 108-compliant identification lamps would be prohibited because they may confuse other road users.[6]  The agency has long maintained that highway traffic safety is enhanced by the familiarity of drivers with established lighting schemes, which facilitates their ability to instantly recognize the meaning the lamps convey and respond accordingly. Therefore, any auxiliary lighting on the front of a vehicle must be located such that it would not interfere or be confused with other required lamps.  Your product is designed to be no wider than a license plate.  In the case where a license plate holder is mounted at the centerline of the vehicle at a lower mounting height than the vehicle’s required lamps, we think your product would, in most cases, be unlikely to interfere with the required lamps’ ability to achieve their function based on proximity.  However, we note that if a vehicle’s front license plate were located somewhere other than the centerline of the front bumper, and especially if it were located near a vehicle’s required lamps, it would be likely that the installation of your product on the front license plate holder would cause impairment.  Our determination in this letter that your product would be unlikely to impair the effectiveness of required lamps on the basis of mounting location assumes that your product is mounted on front centerline of the vehicle.  If your product were mounted somewhere other than the front centerline of the vehicle, we believe that it would be more likely to impair the effectiveness of the vehicle’s required lamps.

Activation Pattern
NHTSA interprets FMVSS No. 108 to require that all auxiliary lamps be “steady burning,” with the sole exception being auxiliary lamps that supplement required lamps that flash, such as turn signals.[7]  While this requirement has been relatively straight-forward to apply in the past, the introduction of new, programable lighting devices (such as your product) that are intended to communicate driver intent to other road users, has convinced the agency that it is necessary to clarify the meaning of “steady burning.”  To this end, we are clarifying here that the requirement that auxiliary lamps be steady burning does not mean that an auxiliary lamp is prohibited from being activated or deactivated automatically.  Rather, it means that the lamp must be steady burning when activated, and that the event that triggers its activation or deactivation (in this case, the vehicle’s rate of acceleration or deceleration exceeding a certain minimum threshold) cannot be so frequent or random that the lamp would distract or confuse other road users.  For example, a lamp that activated and deactivated on an extremely short time interval due to sensitivity to slight changes in the underlying conditions, would not be considered steady-burning.[8]  More traditional examples of lamps that are not steady-burning include, but are not limited to, strobes and turn signals.  By contrast, an auxiliary lamp that gradually changes in intensity based on ambient lighting conditions may be considered steady burning.[9] 

We have determined that your product would likely be considered steady burning because the event that triggers the activation of the LEDs—the deceleration of the vehicle—is likely not something that occurs so frequently or randomly that it would cause your product to appear to flash, which could confuse or distract other road users.  We note that this determination rests on the assumption that your product’s accelerometer is calibrated not to be overly sensitive to small changes in acceleration.    

We acknowledge that this interpretation supersedes some of our prior, more restrictive interpretations of the concept of “impairment.”  In particular, this letter specifically supersedes our previous interpretation concluding that all auxiliary lamps used to communicate “non-standard signals” (i.e., information other than what is communicated by required lamps) to other drivers would categorically impair the effectiveness of a vehicle’s required lamps.[10]  We reiterate, however, that auxiliary lamps may not be used to communicate non-standard signals (or, in fact, any signals) if doing so impairs the effectiveness of required lighting. 

Other Considerations
You should be aware that, even if your product is permissible under FMVSS No. 108 and the “make inoperative” provision, it is possible that State and local laws or restrictions may apply to your product. You may wish to consult the State and local transportation authorities in the areas you intend to market your product to make sure it is permissible under these laws. 

Finally, regardless of whether your product is subject to the restrictions of FMVSS No. 108 or the “make inoperative” provision, please be aware that if you or this agency finds your product to contain a safety-related defect after you market the product, you are responsible for conducting a notice and recall campaign as required under 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118-30120.

If you have further questions, please contact Daniel Koblenz of my staff at 202-366-2992.

Sincerely,

Jonathan C. Morrison
Chief Counsel

Dated: 9/9/19

Ref: FMVSS No. 108

[1] E.g., Letter to Timothy C. Murphy (Nov. 1, 2004), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/GF006332.html.

[2] We note that auxiliary lamps that use plastic optical materials must comply with S14.1.2, and are subject to various other minor restrictions that are not relevant here.

[3] See 49 CFR part 578.

[4] E.g., Letter to Mark Wallach (Oct. 17, 2006), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Wallach.3.htm.

[5] E.g., Letter to Anthony M. Cooke (Oct. 19, 2006), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Legg1.htm.

[6] E.g., Letter to [REDACTED] (Jan. 21, 2004), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/GF007705.html.

[7] Prior to 2007, FMVSS No. 108 included an explicit requirement that, with the exception of certain types of required lamps (e.g., turn signal lamps), all lamps on a vehicle, including auxiliary lamps, must be steady burning.  In 2007, NHTSA implemented an administrative reorganization of FMVSS No. 108 which, among other things, converted the blanket “steady burning” requirement (and its exceptions) into individual activation requirements for each type of required lamp.  See 72 FR 68234 (Dec. 4, 2007).  Although the reorganized rule no longer includes a blanket “steady burning” requirement, NHTSA stated in the preamble to the reorganized rule that its “rewrite of FMVSS No. 108 is considered administrative in nature because the standard’s existing requirements and obligations are not being increased, decreased, or substantively modified.” Moreover, NHTSA continues to believe that flashing auxiliary lamps would impair the effectiveness of required lamps by distracting or confusing other road users.

[8] E.g., Letter to Timothy C. Murphy (Nov. 1, 2004), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/GF006332.html.

[9] E.g., Letter to Ian Goldstein (July 21, 1998), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/18164.ztv.html.

[10] E.g., Letter to Kerry Legg (Feb. 21, 2008), available at https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/07-001583as.htm.

ID: nht87-2.78

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/26/87

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: TAK FUJITANI -- PROGRAM MANAGER, INSPECTION SERVICES OFFICE OF FLEET ADMINISTRATION CALIFORNIA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/24/89 EST; FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER -- NHTSA TO MICHAEL E. KASTNER -- NATIONAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION; REDBOOK A34; STANDARD 204; LETTER DATED 08/01/89 FROM MICHAEL E. KASTNER -- NATIONAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATI ON; TO SAMUEL K. SKINNER -- DOT; OCC 3809; LETTER DATED 06/29/89 FROM SAMUEL K. SKINNER -- DOT TO ERNEST F. HOLLINGS -- SENATE

TEXT: Dear Mr. Fujitani:

This letter responds to your inquiries addressed to Joan Tilghman of my staff. Your letters concern buses purchased by the State of California, and manufactured by Champion Home Builders, Commercial Vehicle Division (Champion). You inform us that Champio n is a final stage manufacturer of vehicles built on a Ford chassis. You have rejected delivery of these vehicles because you assert that they do not comply with either California or Federal motor Vehicle regulations. This response addresses only those issues arising from Federal requirements.

As I understand your letters, you pose two principle questions. First, you ask whether classifying an incomplete vehicles as a "chassis" rather than as a "chassis cab" means that a final stage manufacturer can not alter the original chassis manufacturer 's gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR). You assert that Champion's altering of the GVWR on a vehicle classified as a "chassis" is a noncompliance under 49 CFR sections 567.5 and 568.4 which you may use as grounds for rejecting delivery of Champion's vehi cles.

Your second question involves data set out in your letter of April 14, suggesting that Champion's certified GVWR for these vehicles is less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, the rated cargo load, and 150 lbs. times the vehicles' designated sea ting capacity. You state that this circumstance is a second noncompliance with Federal regulations upon which you have rejected delivery of Champion's buses.

The Cutaway Chassis/Chassis Cab Question.

In both your letters, you refer to provisions of 49 CFR 567.5 and 568.4, and to a 1977 Federal Register document (42 FR 37814, 37816, July 25, 1977). You state your interpretation of these 49 CFR provisions as "mean(ing) that final stage manufacturers ( who build on RV cutaways) are not authorized to alter the (GVWR) imposed by incomplete vehicle manufacturers since final stage manufacturers do not have any basis for

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certifying a greater load carrying capaci(ty) without altering axle components to handle the extra load." As I understand it, when you speak of an RV cutaway you mean a vehicle chassis with an incomplete occupant compartment, intended for completion as a recreational vehicle. For any incomplete vehicle (including a cutaway or chassis cab), Part 568 requires the incomplete vehicle manufacturer to provide a document that describes how to complete the vehicle without impairing the vehicle's compliance sta tus. This document is not a certification.

If the incomplete vehicle is other than a chassis cab, the final stage manufacturer who builds on the incomplete vehicle must certify its compliance with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS). On the other hand, the certification process is different if an incomplete vehicle meets the agency's definition of "chassis cab." The Federal Register document to which you refer amended 49 CFR Parts 567 and 568 to conform with a court decision holding that NHTSA could not require a final stage manufacturer to make the "sole certification" of compliance for a vehicle built on a chassis cab. As a consequence of this decision, NHTSA established a dual certification scheme for such vehicles in which the chassis cab manufacturer makes one c ertification statement in each of three categories, and the final stage manufacturer makes corresponding statements depending on how the final stage manufacturer affects any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS).

Under this dual certification scheme, the original chassis cab manufacturer may provide instructions telling a final stage manufacturer how to complete a vehicle so that it conforms with applicable FMVSS. The final stage manufacturer has the choice of e ither conforming his work to the chassis cab manufacturer's instructions and shifting the burden under Part 567 of certifying compliance to the chassis can manufacturer; or deviating from those instructions, and assuming the certification burden for hims elf. Further, the final stage manufacturer must certify compliance respecting any FMVSS for which the chassis cab manufacturer makes no representation.

While you are correct that in the 1977 Federal Register document the agency decided to exclude RV cutaways from the definition of "chassis cab," the only effect of this exclusion is that dual certification requirements do not apply to vehicles completed on an RV cutaway.

Therefore, the answer to your first question is that a final stage manufacturer may change the GVWR for any incomplete vehicle, irrespective of whether he builds the completed vehicle on an RV cutaway or a chassis cab. However, if the final stage manufa cturer changes the GVWR for the vehicles, it must certify that the vehicle complies with all applicable FMVSS at this new GVWR. Compliance with Standards No. 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems, and No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Vehicles Other Than Pass enger Cars might well be affected by an increase in the GVWR. The final stage manufacturer is required to exercise "due care" when certifying that its vehicle complies with all safety standards at this increased GVWR. Our Office of Vehicle Safety Compl iance has asked the

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[Illegible Word] stage manufacturer of these vehicles to provide the data and other evidence that were the basis for Champion's certification of compliance at this higher GVWR.

Champion's Certified GVWR Calculation.

Part 567 of NHTSA regulations sets out requirements for affixing a certification label or tag to a motor vehicles. Section 567.4(g)(3) of that Part states that the certified GVWR:

". . . shall not be less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo load, and 150 pounds times the vehicle's designated seating capacity. However, for school buses the minimum occupant weight allowance shall be 120."

In your April letter, you supply weightmaster readings for the two Champion motor vehicles that are the subject of your inquiry. While Champion certifies the GVWR for both these vehicles at 12,000 pounds, you indicated that according to your $ 567.4(g)( 3) calculation, the same are 12,147 pounds and 12,580 pounds. This agency considers vehicle overloading a serious safety problem for the affected vehicle and for the motoring public, and NHTSA may take appropriate remedial action against any manufacturer whose vehicle, laden with its intended cargo load, exceeds the manufacturer's GVWR. NHTSA's Office of Vehicles Safety Compliance is investigating this matter further.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

February 17, 1987

Dear Ms. Tilghman:

This letter is in reference to our telephone conversation on February 6, 1981, concerning the interpretation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) statutes, regulations and standards. Particularly in 49 CFR 567.5, paragraph (c), ( iii), labeling and certification requirements for final stage manufacturers who complete certain incomplete vehicles. and 49 CFR 568.4 which requires the incomplete vehicle manufacturer to furnish with the incomplete vehicle a document that contains:

(1) Name and mailing address of the incomplete vehicle manufacturer,

(2) Month and year during which the incomplete vehicle manufacturer performed his last manufacturing operation on the incomplete vehicle.

(3) Identification of the incomplete vehicle to which the document applies.

(4) Gross vehicle weight rating of the completed vehicle for which the incomplete vehicle is intended.

(5) Gross axle weight rating for each axle of the completed vehicle.

(6) Listing of the vehicle types as defined in 49 CFR 571.3 of this chapter (e.g., truck, MPV, bus, trailer) into which the incomplete vehicle may appropriately be manufactured.

(7) Listing by number of each standard, in effect at the time of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, that applies to any of the vehicle types listed in this paragraph (a)(6) of this section, followed in eaxch case by one of the following three types o f statement, as applicable:

(i) A statement that the vehicle when completed will conform to the standard if no alterations are made in identified components of the incomplete vehicle.

(ii) A statement of specific conditions of final manufacture under which the manufacturer specifies that the completed vehcile will conform to the standard.

(iii) A statement that conformity with the standard is not substantially affected by the design of the incomplete vehicle, and that the incomplete vehicle manufacturer makes no representation as to conformity with the standard.

In referencing 49 CFR 567.5, paragraph (c)(iii), we interpret the regulation to mean that the RV Cutaway chassis rated at 11,000 lbs. GVWR by the incomplete vehicle, manufacturer, is not classfied as a chassis-cab, therefore, no allowance is made to perm it alterations as they do for chassis-cabs.

In the Federal Register, 42 FR 47816. July 25, 1977, NHTSA denied the Recreation Vehicle Industry Association's (RVIA) request to change the definition of chassis-cab to include certain incomplete vehicles that are completed as motor homes and cutaway ch assis, etc. RVIA requested this rule change possibly because chassis-cabs may be altered and new GAWR and GVWR ratings may be certified by the final stage manufacturer.

The provisions in part 56B - vehicles manufactured in two or more stages - prescribes methods by which manufacturers of vehicles manufactured in two or more stages ensure conformity of those vehicles with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and ot her regulations issued under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

We interpret the regulations, 567.5(c)(iii). and 568.4(4) (5). to mean that final stage manufacturers are not authorized to alter the gross vehicle weight ratings imposed by incomplete vehicle manufacturers since final stage manufacturers do not have any basis for certifying a greater load carrying capacities without altering axle components to handle the extra load.

The types of vehicles in question are;

Incomplete vehicle, Ford RV Cutaway chassis, 176" wheel base, rated at 11,000 lbs. GVWR.

The completed vehicles may be:

- 16 passenger bus with two (2) wheelchair stations and chair lift. - 22 passenger bus with a drive line Telma electric retarder. - 24 passenger bus.

The new gross vehicle weight ratings may be:

- 11,550 lbs. GVWR

- 11,900 lbs. GVWR

The buses being questioned are manufactured by Champion Home Builders, Commercial Vehicle Division; however, there are other manufacturers following similar guidelines.

We are holding up three purchases which we feel may be overloaded when maximum passengers are being carried.

Please advise us of you legal opinion on this matter at your earliest convenience. This issue is safety related and I believe that manufacturers are not in compliance with the aforementioned regulations and instructions provided by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer.

Sincerely,

Tak Fujitani Program Manager Inspection Services

cc: George Williams

California Highway patrol Motor Carrier Section Sacramento, California 95814 (916) 445-1526

April 14, 1987

Dear Ms. Tilgman:

This is supplemental letter following my letter of request for interpretation of 49 CFR 567.5(c)(iii) and 49 CFR 568.4 dated February 17, 1987, and telephone discussions held during the past week.

As I have mentioned in my letter of February 17, 1987, be interpret the regulations 567.5(c)(iii), and 568.4(4)(5), to mean that final stage manufacturers are not authorized to alter gross axle weight ratings and gross vehicle height ratings imposed by i ncomplete vehicle manufacturers, particularly, on GVWR cutaway chassis which are rated at 11,000 lbs. GVWR

The factor affecting the 11,000 lbs. limitation is based on the least rated component, which is the rating of 7,400 lbs. imposed on the rear axle, Adding additional springs on the rear axle will not increase the load carrying ability of the completed veh icle. We have confirmed this through Ford Light Truck Applications and Dana Axle Applications Engineers; both have stated that the application of the completed vehicle remain; at 11,000 lbs. GVWR in RV cutaway chassis.

Champion Home Builders Company rates the completed vehicle at 12,000 lbs. GM, which is not consistent with the incomplete vehicle manufacturers instructions, and it is misleading to owner/operators to have two load ratings.

Three buses manufactured or Champion Home Builders Company and ordered for the State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation at Angle Island State Park were inspected on April 1 and again on April 7 for compliance with the State specifications at TW Bus Sales in West Sacramento.

Two of these buses are 25 passenger perimeter seating tour buses, and the other is a 21 passenger forward seating bus with rear storage compartment 33 inches deep. All three buses are equipped with a Telma electric brake retarder system, CD 30, or equal. One 25 passenger bus and one 21 passenger bus were weighed to calculate the loaded weight of the buses. Following are the weighmaster readings with load calculations: 21 passenger bus 25 passenger bus forward facing seats perimeter seating rear luggage compartment seats front axle, unladen weight 3,520 lbs. 3,660 lbs. rear axle, unladen weight 5,180 lbs. 4,920 lbs. total 8,700 lbs, 8,580 lbs. 21 passengers and 25 pass engers and driver at 150 lbs. 3,300 lbs. driver at 150 lbs. 3,900 lbs. luggage-day packs or small picnic baskets 7 lbs. atx 21 people 147 lbs. 4 bicycles & rack 100 lbs total 12,147 lbs 12,500 lbs.

Certification labels on the buses are:

* Ford Incomplete Vehicle label * Champion Home Builders Co. label 11,000 lbs. GVWR Date of Mfg 11-86 type bus 12,000 lbs. GVWR WB Type Body Trans Axle Sp Inc Veh Mftg by Ford 176" E303 AK G 52 OL Dste of Mfg 9-85

* Incomplete Vehicle Manual

GVWR 11,000 lbs. F GAWR R GAWR F GAWR R GAWR 4,200 lbs 7,400 lbs. 4,200 lbs. 8,200 lbs. LT215/85R16D LT215/85R16D LT215/85R16D LT215/75R16D 16X6K 16K6K 16X6K 16X6K dual 58p Champion Ser No. 5573241F1984

May be completed as: Multi Pur Pass Veh Truck

The Office of Fleet Administration has rejected the three buses delivered to the State by Champion Home Builders Company on grounds of noncompliance with State and Federal Regulations. * California Vehicle code, Division 12, Equipment of Vehicles Section 24002: Vehicle not Equipped or Unsafe

Section 24011: Federal Safety Standards

* Code of Federal Regulation, Title 69, Transportation 49 CFR 567.5(c) (s)(iii), Certification Label

49 CFR 578.4(4) 95). Requirements for Incomplete Vehicle Manufactur4r's

* Gross Vehicle Weight Rate in. Final stage manufacturers of vehicles manufactured in two or more stages are required to affix a label to each vehicle which contains, among other statements, Gross Vehicle height Rating or GVWR" followed by the appropriat e value in pounds, which shall not be less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo load, and 150 pounds time the vehicle's designated seating capacity.

The gross vehicle weight rating posted on the certification label is less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo load, and 150 pounds times the vehicle's designated seating capacity, the incomplete Vehicle Manufacturers rating of 11,000 pounds should be applied, however, it is also out of compliance with Champion's GVWR of 12,000 pounds.

We believe that the final stage manufacturer is not in compliance with the aforementioned regulations and instructions provided by the incomplete Vehicle manufacturer.

Please advise us or your legal opinion and interpretation of the regulations we have discussed

Sincerely,

Tak Fujitani Program Manager Inspection Services

Attachments

cc: George William

California Highway Patrol Motor Carrier Section

Tom McCauley Office of procurement

ID: nht74-2.13

DATE: 09/30/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R. B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Nabors Trailers, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your August 21, 1974, question whether a "logging pole trailer", which consists of a beam to which an axle-mounted bolster can be clamped at different points to accomodate different log lengths, qualifies as a heavy hauler trailer as that term is defined in Standard No. 121, Air brake systems:

"Heavy hauler trailer" means a trailer with one or more of the following characteristics:

(1) Its brake lines are designed to adapt to separation or extension of the vehicle frame; or

(2) Its body consists only of a platform whose primary cargo-carrying surface is not more than 40 inches above the ground in an unloaded condition, except that it may include sides that are designed to be easily removable and a permanent "front-end structure" as that term is used in @ 393.106 of this title.

This also acknowledges receipt of your September 5 and September 17, 1974, letters on the same subject.

The logging pole trailer you describe is a heavy hauler trailer, and as such, Standard No. 121 does not apply to this trailer until September 1, 1976. The beam or "reach", together with the bolster, constitutes the frame of the trailer, and the brake lines are designed to adapt to extension of the bolster element along the beam.

This arrangement differs from the standard highway van which has a one-piece frame with an adjustable tandem axle. The purpose of this sliding arrangement is unrelated to an extension of the frame itself to accomodate the transportation of heavy or oversize loads.

Yours truly,

ATTACH.

NABORS TRAILERS, INC.

Sept. 17, 1974

Sidney Williams -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Williams:

It should be of interest and concern to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that we have not had the sight nor the specifications nor the price of a brake equipped axle assembly that can be certified to meet the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 121. We are wholly dependent upon the one source for our brake axle assemblies. From that source we have been told that they have encountered one delay after another in their program to develop and test brakes that will meet the new requirements. Their best hope now is that by the end of October they will be able to give us technical information and sometime in November they will be able to begin shipping certifiable brakes.

The same situation prevails with respect to wheel and drum assemblies. Our supplier of drums have told us that they are conducting tests now and that they should be able to tell us in November what drums will be required for compliance with the new Safety Standard.

You can guess from this information the predicament in which we find ourselves when trailers that we put into production in December scheduled for completion in January will be required by law to be in compliance with SS 121. We are certain that there are many other trailer manufacturers who are dependent upon the same sources of supply that we are who are in the same predicament. There may be other sources of supply for brake axle assemblies and for wheels and drums who are ready to describe and certify their products to meet the new Safety Standard, but we, for one, could not at this time get in schedule with new suppliers.

Sincerely yours, B. H. Smith -- President

NABORS TRAILERS, INC.

Sept. 5, 1974

Sidney Williams -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Williams:

On November 15, 1973 I sent a collection of our pole trailer catalogs and of photographs of logging pole trailers in service to the Truck Trailers Manufacturers Association in Washington. I thought that these had been sent over to your offices. Perhaps they never did get there. My letter went to Mr. M. L. Higgins who at that time was handling these matters for TTMA, and very shortly after that he resigned and Mr. Burt Weller took his place.

With this letter I am sending you two each of our Catalog 196 and our Form 198 describing our standard types of pole trailers.

The logging pole trailers described in Catalog 196 are those about which we are primarily concerned with respect to MVSS 121. Those trailers are designed and used exclusively in logging operations and move logs from the woods to the saw mills or to storage areas. Logging pole trailers are subjected to unbelievably difficult conditions, or at least unbelievable to those who have never witnessed difficult logging operations. Maintaining brakes and lights on logging pole trailers when the very minimum of equipment is used is difficult and often impossible. When the hardware that is required for compliance with MVSS 121 is added to braking equipment as now being used, the difficulties of maintenance will be multiplied and the likelihood that the brakes will be kept operational is reduced.

On the inside of Catalog 196 you will see good views of the rear assembly of our two popular models, the Logmaster and the SPR. These two trailers are identical in capacity and in usage, and the two models are built simply because some loggers like one type and some like the other. In both models you will see that the rear bolster sits on a frame that sits on the two-spring suspension that sits on the axles. A pole or drawbar connects the front bolster assembly to the rear assembly. The rear assembly can slide along the pole to change the distance between the front and rear bolsters to accommodate various log lengths. If you look closely you will see that the rear assembly is locked into place on the pole by means of clamping collors around the coupling pole ahead of and behind the rear assembly. Also, for safety purposes a pin is dropped through the pole at the rear to avoid the possibility that the trailer might slide off the pole.

You will see in the illustrations that the two hoses for the brakes and the cable for the lighting on the rear assembly are connected to the truck or to the front bolster assembly at the front and are connected to the rear assembly at the rear with quick detachable couplings. You will see that when the distance between the bolsters is relatively short these brake and light lines must be coiled up and supported by the pole. If the trailer should be extended in length, the full length of these lines would be required. It is a characteristic of these trailers that the brake lines are designed to adapt to permitting the distance between the front and rear bolsters to contract and to expand.

Another common practice in the use of logging pole trailers is to load the rear frame assembly on the back end of the truck when the trailer and truck are being carried unloaded back into the woods. This practice is for both economic and safety reasons. When the rear assembly is loaded on the truck the brake lines must be disconnected. Also, no part of the brake system can extend below the bottom of the axles because the axles must rest on the truck frame or on the runners that are put on the truck frame to carry the trailer.

When you look closely at these pictures of these logging pole trailers you will observe that the space between the axles and the load-carrying bolster is limited and is filled with equipment with current types of brakes. The trailers shown have only one air reservoir. In order to comply with MVSS 121 another larger air reservoir will have to be added. There simply is no place to put it on these logging pole trailers without interfering severely with their intended usage. If in addition to this other air reservoir we must add spring-loaded power chambers and the valves and logic boxes and electrical connections required for the anti-skid brake system, it is up to now inconceivable to us how to add that hardware in such a way that it could reasonably be expected to stay on the trailers when they are used in the log woods.

The Models TP and TPC Pole Trailers illustrated in our Form 198 are designed and used primarily for hauling pipe and poles and reinforcing rods and long steel beams and other, long and self-supporting objects. The same difficulties in adding the anti-skid brake equipment and the spring loaded power chambers apply to these trailers as to the logging pole trailers. However, since these two models are used primarily on improved roads the difficulties of maintaining the equipment would not be as great. Trailers of these two models constitute no more than perhaps 50 units a year for us. They do have the same characteristic of logging pole trailers in that the brake lines are designed to be adapted to permitting the distance between the front and rear bolsters to change. There would be the same difficulties on these trailers in getting the speed of brake application and release that there would be on other pole trailers.

I can understand the difficulty of writing an exemption for any one class or category of trailers without letting the exemption be subject to unintended interpretations. However, it has seemed to me since we first became concerned with the problems of MVSS 121 that pole trailers as defined in Part 371.3 of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards could be exempted without any reasonable misunderstandings. Pole trailers as defined in Part 371.3 were exempted from the requirements of MVSS 108 and have been exempted from certification requirements. I have not understood why they could no also be exempted from MVSS 121, and I think that their categorical exemption would be beneficial rather than detrimental to the highway safety program. I have made all of these statements previously in letters to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association.

We appreciate very much your consideration of our problems and I thank you again for your telephone call on September 3rd in response to our letter of August 21st.

If it might be helpful to giving you and others concerned a better understanding of our problems, which we think are shared by many others, I would be willing to come to Washington for a conference.

Sincerely yours, B. H. Smith -- President

Enclosures

NABORS TRAILERS, INC.

August 21, 1974

Sidney Williams -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Subject: FMVSS 121 - Air Brake Systems, Docket #74-10, Notice 5

Dear Mr. Williams:

We are unable to determine from the subject Notice 5 and from the discussions and considerations that preceded it whether or not it is the intention of NHTSA that Logging Pole Trailers be considered "Heavy Hauler Trailers" within the definition of that category.

In one way of looking at it nearly all Logging Pole Trailers come within Characteristic (1) of the definition because the brake lines are designed to adapt to permitting the rear frame assembly of the pole trailer to slide on the pole or drawbar and thereby to adapt to extension or contraction of the effective length between the load bearing members. In another way of looking at it, pole trailers would not come within Characteristic (1) because there is no actual separation or extension of the vehicle frame. Actually, in pole trailers there is no frame as such connecting the front and rear load bearing members.

The one consistent and definitive characteristic of pole trailers, as we understand them, is that they consist of a front bolster that rests on the towing tractor and a rear bolster that rests on the trailer suspension and axles with the two connected with a pole on which the rear assembly can slide forward and backward.

In some logging operations the length between the front and rear bolsters is changed frequently, maybe daily. In some operations the length between the bolsters is changed only as the species or types of logs being hauled change. In some operations, on every unloaded trip the rear assembly is moved forward on the pole and is loaded on the truck to be hauled back into the woods. Since logging conditions and practices require different effective lengths between the front and rear bolsters and different problems with respect to the brake lines, practically all of our Logging Pole Trailers are rigged out with quick disconnectors for the brake and light lines at the rear assembly, and to that extent the rigging is similar to that on extendable platform trailers. The difficulties of maintaining good air line connections and unrestricted flow of air are certainly as great on pole trailers as on extendable frame trailers.

There are other inherent problems in applying and maintaining brakes on Logging Pole Trailers that in our opinion should be considered before there is a requirement upon trailer manufacturers to add anti-skid devices, spring loaded power chambers, dual or triple air reservoirs, and the other hardware that goes with the system. For example, up to now we have not been able to devise a way to put spring loaded power chambers on the axles of Logging Pole Trailers without swinging them under the axles. We definitely do not have sufficient clearance for putting the spring loaded power chambers over the axles with the suspensions and construction that we are using now. To put the (Illegible Word) chambers under the axles on pole trailers that are destined for the logging woods is, in our opinion, impracticable. The operators will not be able to keep the power chambers in place. The net result will be that they will knock them off or take them off the trailers and run the trailers without brakes. We run into similar but not insoluble problems with respect to installing additional air reservoirs and all of the other wiring and hardware required in an anti-skid system, but the trailers will have to be redesigned, they will be made substantially more expensive, and they will be less suited to their purpose.

Opinions have been expressed that we should simply assume that the definition of Heavy Hauler Trailers does embrace Logging Pole Trailers and that we should bother ourselves and our customers no more about the problem. We are not willing to leave it there because we cannot afford to be found in violation of the law and to be required to go back and add equipment which we did not furnish when the trailers were built. If we must put the anti-skid equipment on Logging Pole Trailers we must be getting ready for it in our designs and in our production methods, and we must be preparing our customers for the added cost and for the maintenance problems that will be inevitable.

Pole Trailers make up hardly more than 1% of the truck trailers that are manufactured. According to the Bureau of the Census Industrial Report for May, 1974, 189 pole trailers were shipped in May 1974, 214 in April 1974, and 177 in May 1973. For ourselves, the total volume in pole trailers is less than 300 units per year, but that is a substantial portion of our total volume and we are one of the largest suppliers of such trailers to the Southern lumber industry. Could you tell me exactly where we stand with respect to Logging Pole Trailers and MVSS 121?

Sincerely yours, B. H. Smith -- President

ID: 571-108--motorcycle rear lamp--Triumph Designs

ID: nht89-3.33

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 11/06/89

FROM: JOHN G. SIMS -- CHAMPION MOTOR COACH INC

TO: Robert F. Hellmuth -- Director Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance NHTSA

TITLE: FMVSS 217 Your Reference No. NEF-31RSh CIR 2996

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 01/26/90 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO JOHN G. SIMS -- CHMPION MOTOR COACH INC; REDBOOK A35; INTERPRETATION STANDARD 217

TEXT: Dear Mr. Hellmuth:

This is in response to your September 8, 1989 letter to Jim Nolin of our Imlay City, MI manufacturing division and a series of telephone conversations we have had with Roy Shannon of your office. This also serves as our defect and noncompliance repor t and proposed notification, in accordance with Parts 573 and 577.

After carefully reviewing our bus design, we have determined that we have not been properly labeling the passenger side exit door on our cut-away chassis buses as an "emergency exit" and we have not always been providing the necessary operating instru ctions for use of that exit. Our vehicle design has been based on the assumption that the door which is normally the main passenger entrance way or the passenger side OEM cab door would also serve as part of the required emergency exit requirements, how ever, we failed to mark the door accordingly. We, therefore, intend to voluntarily recall all affected buses in the manner described below.

The side mounted main passenger entrance door for our cut-away buses are one of six different designs, each of which provides over 536 sq. in. of exit area and which when properly marked, can serve as an emergency exit or is used in conjunction with a nother side door that can be the emergency exit. See enclosure 1. We have reviewed your charts 1 and 2 and we are in agreement with them except for chart 2 where you did not permit credit for 536 sq. in. provided by door type A (extended cab front door ) on the right side. If that credit is given then each of the identified "failures" would become "passes". We believe that if properly marked, the door will meet the requirements of "emergency exit" and therefore the credit should be given.

All cut-away buses built since 1984 and not accounted for on your charts have similar egress characteristics, specifically:

1) One emergency exit window with an open area in excess of 536 sq. in. on each side of the bus at the rear of the bus.

2) A rear emergency exit door or window with an area of at least 536 sq. in., or an emergency exit roof hatch with approximately 400 sq. in.

3) A left (driver's) side emergency exit front OEM cab door with greater than 536 sq. in.

4) A main passenger entrance/exit door with a minimum 536 sq. in. area, provided by one of the type doors described in enclosure 1. When the main passenger entrance/exit door is a rear door (designated C on enclosure 1) or a passenger side bi-fold do or in the body side (B), a OEM cab door is always provided.

Also, some buses had optional additional emergency exit windows installed at the customer's request, thereby providing at least two on each side of the bus, each with greater than 536 sq. in. opening.

The maximum seating capacity of any of these buses is 30 passengers so they will all meet the emergency exit area requirements when a passenger side door is treated as an emergency exit. Currently, all main passenger exit side doors are marked "exit" rather than "emergency exit" and none of the doors are provided with operating instructions except the rear door and the curved side door.

In addition to our cut-away buses, Champion has developed two new rail chassis buses: the "CTS/Challenger" floor plans with seating capacities ranging from 20 to 32 passengers, and the "CTS-Star" with capacity ranging from 31 to 38 passengers (see att ached brochures). The buses have the following egress characteristics:

1) One emergency exit window with an open area in excess of 536 sq. in. on each side of the bus at the rear of the bus.

2) A rear emergency exit window or roof escapt hatch with an area of at least 536 sq. in. for the window or 400 sq. in. for the hatch.

3) The CTS-Star has an additional emergency exit window with an open area in excess of 536 sq. in.

on each side of the bus towards the front of the bus.

4) Each bus has a main passenger entrance way which is marked "exit" rather than "emergency exit".

Based on the above analysis, it appears that we will need to conduct two separate recalls of buses. The first will be to recall all applicable cut-away buses in order to identify a passenger side door as an "emergency exit". That will involve provid ing a decal for the appropriate door which states "EMERGENCY EXIT", and a decal for each operating mechanism which will be placed on the door within six inches of the operating mechanism, except for the curved side door which already has operating instru ctions.

We have produced approximately 3,900 cut-away buses, of which we estimate approximately 900 do not need to be included in the recall because they were either equipped with optional added emergency exit windows or had 20 or fewer designated seating pos itions. We will prepare a list of each of the applicable cut-away buses and mail a letter and decals, to each owner of record, based on the letters a, b, and c given in enclosure 2.

The second recall will be for all CTS/Challenger buses that did not have optional additional emergency exit side windows in order to add additional emergency exits at both front sides. There are approximately 50 such buses and we will provide each ow ner of record a latter similar to that given in enclosure 3.

Two other issues raised in NHTSA's May 12, 1988 letter do not require any corrective action. The allegation that the driver door was not labeled with the words "emergency exit" is not correct. The label was located on the stanchion immediately behin d the driver's seat. It is our opinion that S5.5.1 of FMVSS 217 only requires that operating instructions be located within 6 inches of the operating mechanisms. The bases for that opinion include:

a) The words of the standard can be read that way.

b) There is no logical basis for tying in the location of "emergency exit" marking to the operating mechanisms.

c) The operating mechanisms are often located below shoulder level of seated passengers where the visibility of an "emergency exit" sign would be substantially reduced.

d) The more stringent (and clearer) requirement for school buses in S5.5.3 clearly permits separation

of the emergency exit sign and the operating instructions.

e) NHTSA's contractor called the marking "confusing" rather than in violation of the standard (Report No. 217-MSE-87-11-TR7122-11).

f) In NHTSA's 8/24/88 letter, NEF-31MPa, CIR 2996, our initial offer to relocate the emergency exit sign for clarification reasons was accepted by NHTSA as fully adequate even though the relocation would not move the sign to within 6 inches of the ope rating mechanism. Even though NHTSA now states that that letter was in error, the letter still indicates that some staff agreed with our position.

g) IN NHTSA's 6/12/84 letter, NEF-31RSh, CIR 2678.1, we were asked to supply details of "a) Location of each emergency exit identification. b) Operating instructions of the release mechanisms for the emergency exits and the distances of these instruc tions from the release mechanisms." It is plain from the way the question was worded that NHTSA considered that the required location of the emergency exit identification was separate from the location of the operating instructions and that only the latt er had to be within 6 inches of the operating mechanisms.

The other issue raised in the 5/12/88 letter was if the operating instructions for the side window emergency exits were legible to occupants standing in the aisle. However, it is our opinion that the legibility requirement of S5.5.2 applies only to t he "emergency exit" marking and not to the operating instructions. The bases for that opinion include:

a) The words of the standard can be read that way.

b) There is no practical reason to require the operating instructions to be legible until a person is about one arm's length away from the mechanisms.

c) The level of performance anticipated by the standard does not require the operating instructions to be visible even to someone in the adjacent seat, inasmuch as it is is permissible to place a sign that refers an occupant of the adjacent seat to th e operating instructions that may be located in the seat ahead.

d) Herr International, Inc., a major industry supplier of windows discussed this issue with Jeff Jiuseppe on October 23, 1989. Herr specifically stated the position that ". . . the legibility requirements of paragraph 5.5.2 require and apply to anoth er (other than operating instructions) label that identifies the emergency exit." Herr has reported to us that Jiuseppe agreed with that position along with Robert Kraus' concurrence.

Because of the above analysis, it is not our intention to include these two issues in the recalls we intend to initiate.

If further information is needed, please contact me. We will be prepared to send out our mailings on the recall upon approval from your office. The recall of the cut-away buses will be completed upon the mailing, and we will make appropriate reports to you on the progress of our repairs of the Challenger buses, as is required under the regulation.

Sincerely,

John G. Sims Governmental Affairs CHAMPION DOOR DESIGNS Door Door Operating Operational Designation Type Location Mechanism Instructions A Extended Cab OEM Door Pull handle Cab Handle and push door B Bi-fold Body None * C Rear Body RV Lock ** E Curved Side Body RV Lock *** F Single Leaf Cab Cleveland Pull handle Door Operator and push door G Bi-fold Cab Cleveland " Door Operator H Passenger- Cab OEM Door Pull handle side OEM Handle and Push door * Bi-fold door in body cannot be used for emergency exit because the operating mechanism is not located within the area required by the standard. However, whenever this door is used, a passenger side OEM cab door (H) is also used which can be made an emergency exit.

** Rear door, when used, has already been properly designated as emergency exit. Rear door used in addition to side passenger entrance/exit door (A,B,E,F, or G) and/or OEM cab door (H) which will be designated emergency exit.

*** Operating instructions already provided for RV locks.

Enclosure 1

Preliminary Draft

Letter to Cut-away Bus Owners For Main Passenger Door

Re: (Champion Serial Number )

Dear Champion Bus Customer or Dealer:

This notice is sent to you in accordance with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Champion has determined that certain Champion buses including the one referenced above fail to conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, which has specific requirments for emergency exit capacity on buses. Your bus has sufficient egress capacity to meet those requriements but, unfortunately, the main passenger door was marked "exit" rather than "emergency exit" in the manner prescribed by the standard. Furthermore, operating instructions for the operatin g mechanisms of those doors were not provided. This may have some negative effect on a passenger's ability to egress the bus in the case of an emergency.

In order to remedy this noncompliance, we are providing you with an "emergency exit" decal that must be permanently affixed to the inside glass of the main passenger entrance/exit door. We are also providing a decal which provides the operating instr uctions for the operating mechanisms. The decal must be placed within 6 inches of where the mechanism connects to that door.

No further action is required. If you feel this remedy is inadequate, you may submit a complaint to the Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 30590, or call the toll-free Auto Safety Hotline at 800-424-9393.

We apologize for any inconvenience this matter may cause you and we thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Jim Nolin General Manager Commercial Vehicle Division

Enclosure 2

Letter a

Preliminary Draft

Letter to Cut-away Bus Owners For OEM Cab Doors

Re: (Champion Serial Number )

Dear Champion Bus Customer or Dealer: This notice is sent to you in accordance with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Champion has determined that certain Champion buses including the one referenced above fail to conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, which has specific requirements for emergency exit capacity on buses . Your bus has sufficient egress capacity to meet those requirements but, unfortunately, one of the passenger side doors was not marked "emergency exit" in the manner prescribed by the standard. Furthermore, operating instructions for the operating mec hanisms for that door were not provided. This may have some negative effect on a passenger's ability to egress the bus in the case of an emergency.

In order to remedy this noncompliance, we are providing you with an "emergency exit" decal that must be permanently affixed to the inside panel of the OEM cab door. We are also providing a decal which provides the operating instructions for the opera ting mechanisms. The decal must be placed within 6 inches of the door handle.

No further action is required. If you feel this remedy is inadequate, you may submit a complaint to the Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 30590, or call the toll-free Auto Safety Hotline at 800-424-9393.

We apologize for any inconvenience this matter may cause you and we thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Jim Nolin General Manager Commercial Vehicle Division

Enclosure 2

Letter b

Preliminary Draft

Letter to Cut-away Bus Owners For Curved Side Passenger Door

Re: (Champion Serial Number )

Dear Champion Bus Customer or Dealer:

This notice is sent to you in accordance with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Champion has determined that certain Champion buses including the one referenced above fail to conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, which has specific requirements for emergency exit capacity on buses . Your bus has sufficient egress capacity to meet those requirements but, unfortunately, the main passenger door was marked "exit" rather than "emergency exit" in the manner prescribed by the standard. This may have some negative effect on a passenger' s ability to egress the bus in the case of an emergency.

In order to remedy this noncompliance, we are providing you with an "emergency exit" decal that must be permanently affixed to the inside glass of the main passenger entrance/exit door.

No further action is required. If you feel this remedy is inadequate, you may submit a complaint to the Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 30590, or call the toll-free Auto Safety Hotline at 800-424-9393.

We apologize for any inconvenience this matter may cause you and we thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Jim Nolin General Manager Commercial Vehicle Division

Enclosure 2

Letter c

Preliminary Draft

Letter to Challenger Bus Owners

Re: (Champion Serial No. )

Dear Champion Bus Customer or Dealer:

This notice is sent to you in accordance with the requirement of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Champion Motor Coach, Inc. has determined that certain CTS/Challenger buses, including the one referenced above, fail to conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, which requires that a certain amount o f area for emergency exit be provided for each designated seating position on the bus. Champion's design was two emergency exit windows located on each side of the bus but several of the CTS/Challenger buses were erroneously produced with only one such window per side. The reduced emergency exit capacity may restrict passenger's ability to evacuate the bus in the case of emergency.

Champion will remedy this noncompliance without charge to you by replacing front windows on both sides of the bus with emergency exit windows, and provide the proper markings and operating mechanisms. This work will only take a few hours of time and will not affect the appearance or utility of the vehicles.

Please contact your selling dealer to arrange for the work to be done. The dealer should already be stocked with the necessary parts, or if not, we will provide him with those parts within 10 days of his request.

If you feel this remedy is inadequate, you may submit a complaint to the Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 30590, or call the toll-free Auto Safety Hotline at 800-424-9393.

We apologize for any inconvenience this matter may cause you and we thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Jim Nolin General Manager Commercial Vehicle Division

Enclosure 3

ID: perea

Gilbert A. Perea, State Transportation Director
New Mexico Department of Education
School Transportation Unit
Education Building
300 Don Gaspar
Santa Fe, NM 87501-2786

Dear Mr. Perea:

This responds to your letter asking about the modification of your large school buses (school buses with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of over 10,000 pounds) by the installation of a new seating system that has an integral lap and shoulder belt system. I regret the delay in responding.

You explain that an equipment manufacturer, Busbelts Development Corporation (BDC), has been promoting its seating systems for school buses in New Mexico. You enclose photographs of the BDC product and copies of material provided by BDC. The seating systems appear to be standard school bus bench seats that have been modified to incorporate an integrated lap and shoulder belt system. The shoulder belt portion of the system attaches to the top of the school bus seat back. You state that Mr. Gary H. Murphy of BDC has informed you that "all of the required tests have been completed to conform to applicable [FMVSSs] in a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration certified and approved testing Lab." ⁽¹⁾ Further, a BDC brochure states that its system "enhances and complies with compartmentalization . . . ."

In a telephone conversation with Dorothy Nakama of my staff, you asked that we respond to four questions. Each question concerns the safety of the BDC system and whether a school bus that has had its original seats replaced with the BDC seating systems would continue to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection. Our answers are provided below. In addressing those questions, it might be helpful to have some background information concerning seat belts on school buses.

In response to the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, we issued a number of safety standards under our Vehicle Safety Act (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.) to improve protection to school bus passengers during crashes. One of these standards was Standard No. 222, which provides for passenger crash protection through a concept called "compartmentalization." Prior to issuance of Standard No. 222, we found that the school bus seat was a significant factor contributing to injury. We found that seats failed the passengers in three principal respects: by being too weak; too low; and too hostile. In response, we developed requirements to improve the performance of school bus seats and the overall crash protection of school buses. Those requirements comprise the "compartmentalization" approach we adopted for providing high levels of crash protection to school bus passengers.

Compartmentalization is directed toward ensuring that passengers are surrounded by high-backed, well-padded seats that both cushion and contain the children in a crash. If a seat is not compartmentalized by a seat back in front of it, compartmentalization must be provided by a restraining barrier. The seats and restraining barriers must be strong enough to maintain their integrity in a crash yet flexible enough to be capable of deflecting in a manner which absorbs the energy of the occupant. They must meet specified height requirements and be constructed, by use of substantial padding or other means, so that they provide protection when they are impacted by the head and legs of a passenger.

It is helpful to bear in mind the following highlights about compartmentalization:

1. Compartmentalization provides effective occupant crash protection, minimizes the hostility of the crash environment and limits the range of movement of an occupant, without using seat belts;
2. Compartmentalization ensures that high levels of crash protection are provided to each passenger independent of any action on the part of the occupant; and,
3. Seat belts are needed on passenger cars and other family vehicles and on small school buses (school buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less) because the crash pulse, or deceleration, experienced by the lighter vehicles is more severe than that of larger vehicles in similar collisions. Large school buses are inherently safer vehicles because they are larger and heavier than the vast majority of the other vehicles on the road. In addition, occupants in large school buses sit above the forces that are typically imparted to the bus by smaller impacting vehicles during a crash. The training and qualification requirements for school bus drivers and the extra care taken by other road users in their vicinity add to the safety of school buses.

With this background in mind, we now turn to your questions.

1. Does the Busbelts Development Corporation's integrated shoulder belt and/or occupant restraint system meet all applicable FMVSSs?

Because the BDC system is an item of equipment that is sold separately from a school bus, there are almost no safety standards that directly apply to it. Our safety standards for school buses apply to new, completed vehicles, not to separate components systems such as the bench seat and integrated belt system. As such, Standard No. 222 does not apply to the BDC product, assuming the product is sold in the aftermarket and is not sold as part of a new school bus. Our standard for seat belt anchorage strength (Standard No. 210) also applies to new, completed vehicles. A representation that a product meets crash protection standards that do not apply is misleading.⁽²⁾

The only safety standard that applies to the aftermarket product is Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. Standard No. 209 specifies strength, ease-of-use and other requirements for seat belt webbing, buckles, and other components. Section S4.1(c) of Standard No. 209 requires that a lap-and-shoulder belt system (a "Type 2 seat belt assembly") must provide upper torso restraint without shifting the pelvic restraint into the abdominal region. Some of the photographs you provided depict children wearing the Type 2 seat belt with the lap portion in the middle of their bodies, above the pelvic region. Placement of the lap portion of the seat belt in the abdominal area of a passenger is prohibited by S4.1(c). A belt positioned over the abdominal area will load the abdomen in a crash, resulting in a greater likelihood of injury to the abdomen and surrounding organs.

It appears from some of the photographs that the lap belt is pulled on to the abdominal area of some of the children by a device that adjusts the positioning of the lap and the shoulder belts on small children. We refer to these types of devices as "belt positioning devices." Due in part to our concerns about positioning a lap belt over a child's abdominal area and about how some devices introduce excessive slack into the shoulder belt, we recently began a rulemaking action to regulate these devices. We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to require belt positioning devices to be labeled with a warning not to use them with children under a certain size (e.g., a child smaller than the average 6-year-old), and not to have the lap belt positioned over the child's abdomen. A copy of our NPRM is enclosed for your information.

If the BDC system were installed on new school buses, the vehicle would have to meet Standard No. 222 and the other school bus standards with the product installed. Without testing a vehicle, we cannot make a positive determination of whether the standard could be met with the product installed. However, as explained below, we believe that a new school bus may not be able to meet the standard with the seating system. We have other safety concerns as well, apart from whether the requirements of Standard No. 222 could be met.

2. Would retrofitting a school bus with the Busbelt integrated shoulder belt system make the school bus no longer meet Standard No. 222?

We believe it is possible that the incorporation of a shoulder belt into existing school bus seats would reduce the benefits of compartmentalization. As we explained in the background section, Standard No. 222's compartmentalization requirements rely on the school bus seat backs to help cushion and contain the occupants in a crash. Each seat back protects not only the occupant of that seating position, but also the occupant seated rearward of that seating position. If a shoulder belt were attached to a school bus seat back, the belt may prevent the seat back from deflecting forward in the manner required by S5.1.3 of Standard No. 222 to protect the rearward passenger. In other words, in a crash the seat back will not perform in a manner that would provide protection to an unrestrained passenger.

Even if the seat back deflects as required by Standard No. 222, it is possible that compartmentalization could be compromised by the attachment of a shoulder belt to a school bus seat back. These relate to possible problems resulting from a load application of two different forces on the school bus seat in a severe crash. In a forward collision, a passenger restrained by the shoulder belt would load the belt at an earlier point in time than the point at which the seat back is impacted by an unbelted occupant seated directly rearward of the seat. The forward force on the seat back from the shoulder belt would tilt the seat back forward prior to the impact of the rearward unbelted occupant against the seat back. The unbelted occupant would ramp up the tilted seat back in the crash, rather than be contained in what had been a compartmentalized space. That occupant not contained in the compartment would be at greater risk of injury due to possible ejection and/or impacts against hard or unforgiving surfaces.⁽³⁾ Both the head of the unrestrained passenger and the head of the restrained passenger could impact, possibly injuring both children.

The head of the unrestrained passenger could impact the head of the restrained passenger, resulting in possible injury to the two passengers.

Compartmentalization could be compromised in other ways as well. The seat backs of school buses must meet head protection requirements specified in S5.3.1. The performance requirements in S5.3.1 generally lead manufacturers to pad their seat backs with energy-absorbing foam and to ensure that there are no hard structures in the seat back that can cause head injuries to the passenger rearward of the seat back in a crash. Anchoring a shoulder belt to the seat back may require the installation of rigid components, which may cause the seat back to no longer meet S5.3.1.

The seat backs must also meet leg protection requirements specified in S5.3.2 of Standard No. 222. The requirements are generally met by padding and other measures to protect passengers' knees as they impact seat backs in a crash. Apparently BDC modifies the school bus seat by installing a cross bar and D-ring structure to mount the belts and by installing a steel lap and shoulder belt retraction system within the seat back. The knee and leg protection requirements of the standard must continue to be met with the retrofitted components in the seat back.

In addition to the issues discussed above, care should be taken to ensure that passengers will not be entangled in the shoulder belt webbing material in a crash. Shoulder belts that have a considerable amount of webbing around the head and neck area of children pose a risk of strangulation or other neck injuries.

For the above reasons, we believe that a school bus seating system with an integrated lap and shoulder belt system might reduce the crash protection provided by compartmentalization. ⁽⁴⁾ There is limited information about how an integrated lap and shoulder belt system on a school bus seat would perform in a crash or affect the current safety of school buses. We are undertaking a comprehensive school bus safety research program to evaluate better ways of retaining occupants in the seating compartment. As part of that program, we will be looking into possible ways of redesigning the school bus seat as well as integrating a lap and shoulder belt into the seat that is compatible with compartmentalization. Also, we plan on conducting some research on extra padding, not only for the seat itself but also for the bus side wall. Information from this research program will help researchers better understand and develop the next generation of occupant protection systems for school buses.

3. Would retrofitting a school bus with an integrated shoulder belt system make inoperative the bus's compliance with FMVSS 222?

Section 30122 of our statute prohibits a motor vehicle manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from installing any modification that "make[s] inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard . . . ." Any person in the aforementioned categories that makes inoperative the compliance of a device or element of design on the vehicle would be subject to fines of up to $1,100 per violation and to injunctive relief.

The compartmentalization requirements of Standard No. 222 include requirements that a protective seat back must be provided to protect an unrestrained passenger. We believe that replacing a school bus seat with a seating system that has a torso belt is likely to make inoperative an element of design installed as part of the compartmentalization concept. We are concerned about the continued compliance of the bus with Standard No. 222's seat deflection and head and leg protection requirements. We are concerned about the ability of the bus to continue to provide required crash protection to children regardless of whether a belt is used.

4. If a school bus were retrofitted with the Busbelt integrated shoulder belt system, will the school bus continue to meet all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards?

Compartmentalization is intended to restrain passengers in a crash regardless of whether they buckle up. A torso belt may reduce that level of safety to an unbelted passenger. As previously stated, we have concerns about a product that might interfere with the ability of a school bus to protect unbelted occupants. We will be evaluating integrated lap and shoulder belt systems in our school bus research program. The program will provide information that will help us better assess the merits, costs and feasibility of having integrated seat belts on school buses.

Before closing, we wish to address a statement that BDC made in its marketing literature in support of seat belts on large school buses. BDC states that its "dynamic test data" shows that in a 30 mile per hour (mph) school bus crash, an unbelted occupant "suffered fatal head injuries (2000 HIC level) when his/her head came in contact with a standard school bus seat." These test data apparently result from computer simulations conducted for BDC. The data do not reflect the data we have obtained in actual crash testing of school buses. Actual crash test data from a 30 mph barrier crash conducted by NHTSA indicate that HIC measurements recorded by calibrated test dummies are all well below the 1,000 threshold level.

On a final note, we would like to point out that many of your newer school buses may still be under the school bus manufacturer's warranty. Before you decide to retrofit any school bus with any seat belt, it may be prudent for you to share BDC's information with the school bus manufacturer, and request a determination whether the school bus manufacturer will continue to honor warranties if the BDC seat belts are placed on school buses.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,
Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel
Enclosure
ref:222
d.10/28/99

^1. We note that this statement is misleading. NHTSA does not "certify" or "approve" test laboratories or facilities to conduct compliance testing or for any other purpose.

^2. Regardless of whether a safety standard applies to the product, our statute at 49 U.S.C. 30120 requires manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle replacement equipment to provide remedies if it is determined their products have safety-related defects. If it were determined that the seating systems had a safety-related defect, the manufacturer would have to notify all purchasers and repair or replace the defective item without charge.

^3. Another concern associated generally to the use of lap and lap and shoulder belts on large school buses relates to the potential for seat failure resulting from combined stresses exerted simultaneously or in close succession on a school bus seat by: (1) the belted occupant of the seat, where the seat belt is attached to the seat frame; and (2) an unbelted occupant, seated directly rearward of the seat, impacting the seat back. In a severe crash, the combined force applications on a particular seat resulting from a belted occupant and an unbelted occupant in the rearward seat could increase the likelihood of seat failure or seat deformation. We do not believe that school buses are frequently involved in the type of severe frontal crashes where this phenomenon is likely to occur. However, there is a risk that compartmentalization could be compromised in this circumstance.

^4. The concerns discussed above relating to the compatibility of compartmentalization with existing designs of lap and shoulder belts also apply to the situation where a belt system is retrofitted to existing school bus seats (i.e., where the original bench seat is modified but not replaced).

ID: 16-004482-Weight Distribution Truck Camper Trailer-Roy

ID: 16-2706 (GM load limiters on buses Aug 8)_v2 incorporating circulation comments

ID: nht87-1.32

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/20/87

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Martin V. Chauvin

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your two letters to this agency concerning safety belts on school buses. Your October 24, 1986 letter to this office asked for clarification of a Federal Register notice issued by NHTSA in 1976 which stated that seats on large school bu ses are strong enough to absorb the seat belt loads set for belts on smaller school buses. Your October 29, 1986 letter to NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, which has been referred to my office for reply, concerned manufacturers' test data for head form impact requirements of Standards No. 222 and No. 208. I apologize for the delay in responding to your letters.

Your first letter pertained to retrofitting safety belts on large school buses meeting Standard No. 222. You referred to a 1976 Federal Register notice in which NHTSA said that seats on large school buses that meet Standard No. 222 are strong enough to absorb safety belt loads. You explained that school bus manufacturers disagree with those statements and have indicated that they are not true for most seats on large school buses manufactured since 1977. Your question asked whether manufacturers are r equired to equip large school buses with seats that are strong enough to meet the load requirements set for safety belts in small school buses.

The answer to your question is no. Seats installed on large school buses must meet their own strength requirements set by Standard No. 222. Manufacturers are not required to install seats on large school buses that are capable of meeting the load requi rements set for safety belts on small school buses.

For your information, I am enclosing a May 11, 1978 letter from former Chief Counsel Joseph Levin to Dr. Arthur Yeager, in which we discuss the statement made in Notice 5 of Docket 73-3 you referenced in your letter. Mr. Levin's letter explains that NHT SA had proposed safety belt requirements for large school buses that would have set lower belt load requirements than those currently applicable to small school buses. (In addition, the proposed seat strength requirement was higher than that adopted in Standard No. 222.) Mr. Levin explains that the statement made in Notice 5 was referring to the safety belt requirements formerly proposed for the seats on large school buses, which the seats would be capable of withstanding. It did not mean to imply tha t the seats on large school buses were strong enough to be retrofitted with safety belts and meet the requirements applicable to belts on small school buses.

We believe that manufacturers can design the seats on large school buses to accommodate safety belts which meet the load requirements applicable to belts on the smaller school buses. As you know, NHTSA proposed an amendment to Standard No. 222 which wou ld set such a strength requirement for safety belts voluntarily installed on new large school buses, to ensure that proper belt installations are made. If adopted, the amendment would supersede any conflicting statements in the Yeager letter concerning the load requirements applicable to new large school buses.

In your second letter, you explained that New York enacted a law which sets certain head form impact requirements for school buses. You would like to obtain information from manufacturers regarding the values they obtained for the actual axial accelerat ion of the head form pursuant to Standards No. 208 and No. 222. You asked whether motor vehicle manufacturers are required to submit such test data to NHTSA.

The answer to your question is no. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer of motor vehicles or items or motor vehicle equipment is responsible for certifying that its pr oducts meet all applicable motor vehicle safety standards. This process requires each manufacturer to exercise due care in selecting and conducting the mathematical calculations, computer simulations or testing that form the basis for that certification . That data is retained by the manufacturer, and is not submitted to NHTSA for approval. NHTSA can request manufacturers to produce records to show how it determined compliance if a question should arise as to the compliance of a particular product wit h NHTSA requirements.

Please note that the New York legislation you mentioned raises an important preemption issue. Federal preemption of State motor vehicle safety standards is governed by @103(d) of the Vehicle Safety Act, which states:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of moto r vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that requi red to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard. We understand that New York's law requires passenger safety belts and additional seat padding on all new school buses manufactured for use in New York. The New York law applies to the same a spect of performance (i.e., passenger crash protection) as Standard No. 222 but specifies performance requirements that are not identical to the Federal standard. In requiring the belts and the additional padding, the New York law is specifying higher r equirements than those in the FMVSS. Section 103(d) preempts higher state requirements except to the extent that they apply to vehicles procured for the State's use. Therefore, the New York law is preempted under the first sentence of @103(d) to the ex tent that the law requires all school buses manufactured for use in New York to be equipped with belts and extra padding. The law is not preempted to the extent that it requires belts and additional padding for public school buses. The phrase "vehicles procured for [the State's] own use" includes public school buses and school buses operated and owned by a private contractor under contract to transport children to and from public school.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you have further questions.

ENC.

STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

October 24, 1986

Erika Z. Jones Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Ms. Jones:

The New York State Department of Transportation has been designated by New York statute as the agency responsible for promulgating regulations dealing with seat belts on school buses. In pursuing this assignment, we have been presented with a problem th at needs clarification from your office.

Enclosed are two documents that refer to standards being considered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). One document is a copy of a page (4017) of the Federal Register. Vol. 41-No. 19-Wednesday, January 28, 1976 (the specific date is somewhat blurred but it is definitely January 20 something 1976). The second document is identified as "Preamble to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222" and is dated October 26, 1976. The question we need clarification on is addressed in bot h documents.

We have been provided an interpretation of these documents (underlined or otherwise marked to identify particular item in question) that indicates that school buses, since 1977 have been required to provide seats that meet safety standard 222 and as such must be capable of accomodating seat belts. School bus body manufacturers advise us that this is not true. In fact, the manufacturers advise us that better than 95 percent of the buses manufacturered since 1977 would not be equipped with seats that ca n accomodate seat belts.

We are looking to you to help clarify this matter. In essence, we want to know if manufacturers are required to equip school buses with a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds with seats that can accomodate seat belts (for example, meet the federal standards that have been spelled out for buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less).

We are faced with some severe time constraints so we would appreciate a response at your earliest possible convenience.

Thank for your help.

MARTIN V. CHAUVIN, Chief Carrier Safety Bureau

ENCLS.

STATE OF NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

October 29, 1986 William, Smith Department of Transportation

Dear Mr. Smith:

Enclosed is a copy of a bill that was enacted into law on July 30, 1986 and sets certain requirements for seat belts and seat back padding for school buses.

Section 142 of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law provides a broad definition of school bus and applies to passenger cars if used by a school district or by others on a for hire basis to transport pupils. This law specifies that these school bus es (including passenger cars) must meet the head form impact requirement as spelled out in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS), 49 CFR Section 571.222 except the impact requirement shall not exceed 800 whereas the federal standard allows 1000.

We are interested in finding out if the automobile manufacturers are required to provide any specific test data that would indicate the actual axial acceleration of the head form as described in FMVSS Section 571.222, S5.3 Impact zone requirements or Sec tion 571.208, S6 Injury criteria. We are trying to determine if the information we are seeking is already available at one central point or if we must deal directly with each manufacturer individually.

Any assistance you can provide in helping us deal with this issue would be greatly appreciated.

MARTIN V. CHAUVIN, Chief Carrier Safety Bureau

STATE OF NEW YORK

10596 -- B

R. R. 872

IN ASSEMBLY

March 25, 1986

Introduced by M. of A. WEINSTEIN, GRABER, PASSANNANTE, LASHER, BRODSKY, SCHMIDT -- Multi-Sponsored by -- M. of A. BIANCHI, BURROWS, CONNELLY, EVE, HALPIN, HARENBERG, LIPSCHUTZ, NEWBURGER, VITALIANO -- read once and referred to the Committee on Transpo rtation -- reported and referred to the Committee on Rules -- Rules Committee discharged, bill amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to the Committee on Rules -- amended on the special order of third reading, ordered reprinted as amended, retaining its place on the special order of third reading

AN ACT to amend the vehicle and traffic law and the education law, in relation to seat safety belts for school buses

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows: Section 1. Subdivision five of section three hundred eighty-three of the vehicle and traffic law is renumbered subdivision six and a new subdivision five is added to read as follows:

5. (a) Passenger seat safety belts for school buses. Every school bus, as defined in section one hundred forty-two of this chapter, manufactured for use in this state on and after July first, nineteen hundred eighty-seven, shall be designed so that all passenger seats on such vehicle are equipped with seat safety belts and increased seat back padding on passenger seats of a type and specification as approved by the commissioner of transportation through the adoption of rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall provide that when any contactable surface of the school bus, as specified in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 49 CFR Section 571.222, is impacted from any direction at twenty-two feet per second by the head form, the axial acceleration at the center of gravity of the head form shall be such that the head form impact requirement shall not exceed eight hundred.

(b) Passenger seat safety belts for existing school buses. Any school bus as defined in section one hundred forty-two of this chapter, which is scheduled for retrofitting pursuant to action by a board of education or board of trustees under section t hirty-six hundred thirty-five-a of the education law shall be retrofitted so that all passenger seats on such vehicles are equipped with seat safety belts and additional padding of a type and specification as approved by the commissioner of transportatio n through the adoption of rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall provide that when any contactable surface of the school bus as specified in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, 49CFR Section 571.222 is impacted from any direction at twenty-two feet per second by the head form, the axial acceleration at the center of gravity of the head form shall be such that the head form impact requirement shall not exceed eight hundred. Furthermore, the commissioner shall have the power thro ugh rules and regulations to exempt certain design school buses from retrofitting in granting such exemptions the commissioner shall consider safety factors, structural integrity of the school buses and any other items deemed necessary to preserve the sa fety and welfare of the school bus passengers. Provided further however that the commissioner of transportation shall not authorize retrofitting of any school bus manufactured prior to April first, nineteen hundred seventy-seven.

@ 2. Paragraph b of subdivision seven of section thirty-six hundred two of the eduction law, as amended by chapter fifty-three of the laws of nineteen hundred eighty-five, is amended to read as follows:

b. For the purposes of this apportionment, approved transportation expense shall be the actual expenditure incurred by a school district and approved by the commissioner (i) for those items for which an allowance would be provided under section thirt y-six hundred twenty-seven for the transportation of pupils as defined in section thirty-six hundred twenty-one if the district were eligible for transportation quota state aid under part two of this article, and (ii) for the transportation required or a uthorized pursuant to article eighty-nine, and (iii) for regional or joint transportation systems and (iv) for computerized bus routing services, (v) for the transportation of any pupil during the school day to and from programs at a board of cooperative educational services or to or from approved shared programs at other school districts, which programs may lead to a diploma or a high school equivalency diploma or to or from occupational education programs operated within the district, (vi) for the pur chase of two-way radios to be used on old and new school buses, and (vii) for the purchase of stop-arms as defined by subdivision twenty of section two of this chapter, to be used on old and new school buses and (viii) for the purchase and installation o f seat safety belts on school buses in accordance with the provisions of section thirty-six hundred thirty-five-a of this chapter. Approved transportation expense shall include employers social security contributions for transportation personnel. Approv ed transportation expense shall also include all salaries and retirement benefits related to transportation, except salaries and retirement benefits for assistant drivers on buses transporting nonhandicapped pupils, and health, life and other insurance p remiums for transportation personnel for whom salaries are approved, premiums for collision and other insurance coverage, uniforms, and equipment and other expenses as approved pursuant to regulations of the commissioner.

@ 3. Section thirty-eight hundred thirteen of such law is amended by adding a new subdivision four to read as follows. (Illegible Lines)

(Illegible Words) Safety belt usage. 1. A board of education or board of trustees may in its discretion, following a public hearing for the purpose of determining whether a resolution shall be adopted, provide for the use of seat safety belts on such s chool buses, in accordance with regulations and standards established by the commissioner under subdivision one of section thirty-six hundred twenty-three of this chapter.

2. Such public hearing, conducted upon reasonable notice, shall be held to consider: (a) whether the district shall install seat safety belts on buses purchased and/or contracted for prior to the effective date of this section and require their use; (b) when such installation shall be provided, and (c) whether use of seat safety belts shall be required on all school buses within the district so equipped after a date to be determined by the board of education or board of trustees.

3. Such hearings shall consider the effect of seat safety belts installation on the total number of students that can be transported on such buses.

4. Within twenty days after the public hearing, the board of education or board of trustees shall, by resolution, determine whether to require installation and use of seat safety belts on some or all school buses.

5. This section shall apply only to vehicles owned or leased by school districts and nonpublic schools, and to vehicles used to perform contracts with such school districts and nonpublic schools for the purpose of transporting school children for hir e.

6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose a duty upon boards of (Illegible Word) or boards of trustees to provide seat safety belts on school buses purchased or contracted for prior to the effective date of this section, nor shall any b oard of education or board of trustees be held liable for failure to provide seat safety belts pursuant to this section. A school board member or trustee shall have immunity from any (Illegible Words) liability that might otherwise be incurred or impose d is a result of the provisions of the section provided that such person (Illegible Words) in good faith. For the purpose of any proceeding, civil (Illegible Words) the good faith of any such person shall be presumed.

7. The premissions of this section shall not be apply to school districts which are using safety belts on school buses or have instilled or have (Illegible Word) for the installation of seat safety belts prior to the effective date of this section. @ 8. (Illegible Word) on eof section thirty-six hundred twenty-three of (Illegible Words) amended by chapter two hundred twenty-seven of the laws of (Illegible Words) seventy-nine, is amended to read as follows: (Illegible Lines) efficency and equipment of school buses used to transport pupils, with particular regard to the safety and convenience of such pupils and the suitability and adaptability of such school buses to the requirements of the school district. The capacity of such school buses shall not be in excess of the needs of the school district with reference to the particular route or routes traveled by such school bus. No school bus shall be purchased by a school district or used for the transportation of pupils unless and until it has bee n approved by the commissioner as complying with the rules, standards and specifications relating thereto. No bus manufactured after January first, nineteen hundred seventy-four shall be used to transport pupils under any contract with a school district or board of cooperative educational services unless it has been similarly approved by the commissioner, except that no such approval shall be required for buses used to transport pupils and also used to serve the general public under a certificate of pu blic convenience for the operation of an omnibus line, granted pursuant to the transportation law. The commissioner shall also establish and provide for the enforcement of rules and regulations requiring instruction on the use of seat safety belts as spe cified in subdivision five of section three hundred eighty-three of the vehicle and traffic law and section thirty-six hundred thirty-five-a of this chapter, drills in safe boarding and existing procedures and emergency drills to be conducted on all scho ol buses and shall emphasize specific hazards encountered by children during snow, ice, rain and other inclement weather. All such drills shall include instruction in the importance of orderly conduct by all school bus passengers. A minimum of three su ch drills shall be had on each school bus during the school year, the first to be conducted during the first week of the fall term.

@ 6. This act shall take effect on the thirtieth day after it shall have become a law.

ID: Google -- compiled response to 12 Nov 15 interp request -- 4 Feb 16 final

Chris Urmson

Director, Self-Driving Car Project

Google, Inc.

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway

Mountain View, CA 94043

Dear Dr. Urmson:

This responds to your November 12, 2015 letter[1] requesting that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) interpret a number of provisions in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) as they apply to Google’s described design for motor vehicles that it is in the process of developing and testing.  According to Google, those self-driving vehicles (SDVs) are “fully autonomous motor vehicles, i.e., vehicles whose operations are controlled exclusively by a Self-Driving System (SDS).”  The SDS is an artificial-intelligence (AI) “driver,” which is a computer designed into the motor vehicle itself that controls all aspects of driving by perceiving its environment and responding to it.[2]  Thus, Google believes that the vehicles “have no need for a human driver.” 

In this response, NHTSA addresses each of Google’s requests for interpretation, and grants several of them.   In some instances, the issues presented simply are not susceptible to interpretation and must be resolved through rulemaking or other regulatory means.  NHTSA believes that many of these issues may be resolved on an interim basis through well-supported exemption petition(s), and invites Google to file such petitions.  In other instances, if Google is able to provide sufficient additional information and evidence, it may be possible to resolve open issues through interpretations.

INTRODUCTION

Google describes its vehicles as having what NHTSA’s May 2013 Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles calls Level 4 Full Self-Driving Automation.  According to that Statement, a Level 4 vehicle

is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. This includes both occupied and unoccupied vehicles. By design, safe operation rests solely on the automated vehicle system.

Google is asking for interpretations to determine how it would certify its SDV to the FMVSS.  In essence, Google seeks to produce a vehicle that contains L4 automated driving capabilities, and removes conventional driver controls and interfaces (like a steering wheel, throttle pedal, and brake pedal, among many other things).  Given that the SDS controls all aspects of driving, and given Google’s belief that the SDS consistently will make the optimal decisions for the SDV occupants’ safety (as well as for pedestrians and other road users), the company expresses concern that providing human occupants of the vehicle with mechanisms to control things like steering, acceleration, braking, or turn signals, or providing human occupants with information about vehicle operation controlled entirely by the SDS, could be detrimental to safety because the human occupants could attempt to override the SDS’s decisions.  While the L4 automation is the impetus behind these design decisions, it is Google’s design decisions that create the uncertainty over how to apply the FMVSS to Google’s proposed vehicle. 

Google’s design choices in its proposed approach to the SDV raise a number of novel issues in applying the FMVSSs.  Those standards were drafted at a time when it was reasonable to assume that all motor vehicles would have a steering wheel, accelerator pedal, and brake pedal, almost always located at the front left seating position, and that all vehicles would be operated by a human driver.  Accordingly, many of the FMVSSs require that a vehicle device or basic feature be located at or near the driver or the driver’s seating position.  For vehicles with an AI driver that also preclude any occupant from assuming the driving task, these assumptions about a human driver and vehicle controls do not hold.  As self-driving technology moves beyond what was envisioned at the time when standards were issued, NHTSA may not be able to use the same kinds of test procedures for determining compliance.  And since the Safety Act creates a self-certification system for compliance, NHTSA’s verification of a manufacturer’s compliance (and thus, the agency’s ability to enforce against non-compliance) is based on our established test procedures.

In order to determine where to place vehicle devices and features, or whether to provide them at all, Google has asked who or what is to be considered the “driver” and which seating position is considered to be the “driver’s seating position” in its SDV.  49 CFR 571.3 defines “driver” as “the occupant of a motor vehicle seated immediately behind the steering control system.”  Because Google’s SDV design purposely does not have any mechanism by which human occupants could steer or otherwise “drive” the vehicle, it would be difficult in several instances to determine who the “driver” would be in its SDV, and thus to determine how to certify its motor vehicle design to certain FMVSS provisions that reference that “driver.”  To attempt to solve this challenge, Google has offered different interpretations of “driver” or “driver’s seating position” for NHTSA’s consideration, varying with the specific requirement or circumstances, and requests that we confirm its interpretations.

Specifically, Google suggests two potential interpretations of “driver” and one potential interpretation for “driver’s position” or “driver’s designated seating position” in the context of its described motor vehicle design:

• NHTSA could interpret the term “driver” as meaningless for purposes of Google’s SDV, since there is no human driver, and consider FMVSS provisions that refer to a driver as simply inapplicable to Google’s vehicle design;
• NHTSA could interpret “driver” and “operator” as referring to the SDS; or
• NHTSA could interpret “driver’s position” or “driver’s designated seating position” as referring to the left front outboard seating position, regardless of whether the occupant of that position is able to control the vehicle’s operation or movements.

Google then applies these suggested interpretive approaches to a number of FMVSS provisions in order to justify being able to certify its intended motor vehicle design as compliant with the FMVSSs, without having to change the design in ways that Google finds problematic. 

We will address each of Google’s suggested interpretations in turn.  The critical point of NHTSA’s responses for many of the requested interpretations is that defining the driver as the SDS (or the driver’s position as the left front position) does not end the inquiry or determine the result.  Once the SDS is deemed to be the driver for purposes of a particular standard or test, the next question is whether and how Google could certify that the SDS meets a standard developed and designed to apply to a vehicle with a human driver.  Related, in order for NHTSA to interpret a standard as allowing certification of compliance by a vehicle manufacturer, NHTSA must first have a test procedure or other means of verifying such compliance.

While some of Google’s requested interpretations may be permissible given the facts presented here, we wish to make clear that many of the other requests present policy issues beyond the scope and limitations of interpretations and thus will need to be addressed using other regulatory tools or approaches.  NHTSA further notes that in a number of instances (in particular, several included in Table B), it may be possible for Google to show that certain standards are unnecessary for a particular vehicle design.  To date, however, Google has not made such a showing.  We note that these interpretations are confined to the specific facts and circumstances set forth in Google’s letter, and that they do not apply to other facts and circumstances.  We also emphasize that the interpretations NHTSA is issuing are subject to change or revocation if new or different facts or information comes to light.

DISCUSSION

NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (“Safety Act,” 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301) to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment.  Under the Safety Act, NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment and does not make determinations as to whether a product conforms to the FMVSSs outside of a NHTSA compliance test.  Instead, the Safety Act requires manufacturers to self-certify that their products conform to all applicable FMVSSs that are in effect on the date of manufacture.  Manufacturers are also responsible for ensuring that their products are free of safety-related defects.  NHTSA enforces compliance with the FMVSSs by testing vehicles and regulated equipment.  NHTSA also investigates safety-related defects and conducts related enforcement and recall actions. 

As a foundational starting point for the interpretations below, NHTSA will interpret “driver” in the context of Google’s described motor vehicle design as referring to the SDS, and not to any of the vehicle occupants.  We agree with Google its SDV will not have a “driver” in the traditional sense that vehicles have had drivers during the last more than one hundred years.  The trend toward computer-driven vehicles began with such features as antilock brakes, electronic stability control, and air bags, continuing today with automatic emergency braking, forward crash warning, and lane departure warnings, and continuing on toward vehicles with Google’s SDV and potentially beyond.  No human occupant of the SDV could meet the definition of “driver” in Section 571.3 given Google’s described motor vehicle design – even if it were possible for a human occupant to determine the location of Google’s steering control system, and sit “immediately behind” it, that human occupant would not be capable of actually driving the vehicle as described by Google.  If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify the “driver” as whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving.  In this instance, an item of motor vehicle equipment, the SDS, is actually driving the vehicle. 

NHTSA will consider initiating rulemaking to address whether the definition of “driver” in Section 571.3 should be updated in response to changing circumstances, as contemplated by Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review.  Section 5, Reducing Regulations, of that Order provides that each federal regulatory agency will

[i]n order … to determine whether regulations promulgated by the executive branch of the Federal Government have become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances …  periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives …

NHTSA recognizes that it can take substantial periods of time to develop some rulemaking proposals and final rules, including time spent obtaining review of those proposals and seeking and analyzing public comments.  NHTSA further understands that the time it takes to conduct rulemakings may, in some instances, make such proceedings ill-suited as first-line regulatory mechanisms to address rapidly-evolving vehicle technologies.  That said, there are limits to the result the agency may reach in an interpretation, even if it believes that result might be sound policy.  An interpretation describes an agency’s view of the meaning of an existing statute or regulation.  It can make sense of the overall legal framework and provide clarity for regulated entities and the public.  For example, an interpretation may clarify a statutory or regulatory term or provide crisper and more detailed lines than the regulation or statute being interpreted.  An interpretation may not, however, make a substantive change to the statutory or regulatory regime or to the clear language of a provision.  In particular, an interpretation may not adopt a new position that is irreconcilable with or repudiates existing statutory or regulatory provisions.   

In many instances, interpreting the term “driver” in a manner that Google has requested does not necessarily change the requirements of the regulation or otherwise fully resolve the issue Google seeks to address. Because the interpretations provided by this letter do not fully resolve all of the issues Google has raised, Google may wish to explore the interim step of seeking exemptions.  Exemptions are available under 49 U.S.C. 30114 and 49 CFR Part 555 for manufacturers able to demonstrate that features of their products provide equivalent levels of safety to those required by the FMVSS.  

1. “Priority Interpretive Issues”

Google requested NHTSA’s interpretation of several “priority interpretive issues” related to the absence of a human driver.  Google also provided two tables, Attachments A and B, listing FMVSS provisions for which Google requested that NHTSA interpret the “driver” or “operator” to be the SDS (provisions in Attachment A) and other provisions for which Google requested that NHTSA interpret “driver” to be the human occupant seated in the left front designated seating position (primarily provisions in Attachment B).  We address these interpretation requests in the order presented by Google’s November 12 letter.

FMVSS No. 135, “Light Vehicle Brake Systems”

Deeming the SDS to be the “driver” of a motor vehicle does not excuse that vehicle from compliance with the brake requirements of applicable standards.  FMVSS No. 135 contains requirements for service brakes and associated parking brake systems.  Among these requirements is S5.3.1, which states that service brakes “shall be activated by means of a foot control,” and also that “control of the parking brake shall be independent of the service brake control, and may be either a hand or foot control.”  Google’s described motor vehicle design does not include hand or foot controls for either the service brakes or the parking brake.  Google argues that because the SDS will control all aspects of braking, it would not be necessary or beneficial for safety for a human occupant to be able to brake the vehicle.  Google therefore requests that NHTSA interpret these provisions regarding the activation or control of braking systems to be inapplicable to its described motor vehicle design.  Similarly, Google requests that NHTSA interpret S6.5.1 of FMVSS No. 135 to allow the service brake system performance requirements to be met if the SDS activates the service brakes, rather than “solely by use of the service brake control” as the provision directs. 

We agree that Google’s SDS may be deemed to be the driver for purposes of compliance with these provisions.  Given that there will be no foot (or even hand) control to be activated – indeed, given that the SDS will have neither feet nor hands to activate brakes – we understand that Google’s described vehicle design would not comply with S5.3.1 as written.  We also understand Google’s assertions that the SDS will be able to activate the brakes electronically such that its vehicle will “stop [] safely and in accordance with all performance requirements of FMVSS No. 135.”  The fact that the SDS may be programmed to perform the tests enumerated in FMVSS No. 135 does not, however, overcome the plain language of S5.3.1.  NHTSA would need to commence a rulemaking to consider how FMVSS No. 135 might be amended in response to “changed circumstances” in order to ensure that automated vehicle designs like Google’s, i.e., ones that control all braking through an AI driver and do not provide brake controls to vehicle occupants, have a way to comply with the standard.  Such a rulemaking would also consider S6.5.1 and any other provisions that implicate the potential use of a foot-actuated service brake control.  In the interim, Google may wish to consider petitioning the agency for an exemption from these provisions.[3]

FMVSS No. 101, “Controls and Displays”

FMVSS No. 101 contains requirements for location, identification, color, and illumination of motor vehicle controls, telltales, and indicators.  S5.1.1 requires the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 of the standard to be “located so that they are operable by the [belted] driver.”  S5.1.2 requires the telltales and indicators in those Tables and their identification to be “located so that, when activated, they are visible to a [belted] driver.”  Google states that its motor vehicle will not have any of the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 because there will not be a human driver in its vehicle.  Further, Google believes that allowing the human occupants to affect the operation of, for example, lamps or turn signals otherwise controlled by the SDS could be detrimental to safety.  Google therefore asks that NHTSA interpret S5.1.1 to be inapplicable to its motor vehicle design, or that NHTSA interpret Google’s SDS to be the “driver” for the purposes of S5.1.1.  For S5.1.2, Google says it will equip its vehicle’s occupant compartment with the telltales and indicators required by other FMVSSs (like the telltales/indicators for malfunctions of the brake system, electronic stability control system, or tire pressure monitoring system).  For purposes of placement of those telltales and indicators, Google requests that NHTSA interpret the “driver position” to be the left front seating position.

Because we interpret “driver” as referring to the SDS, we agree with Google that the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 may simply be operable by the SDS and need not be located so that they are available to any of the human occupants of the motor vehicle.  Similarly, telltales and indicators must also be “visible” to the SDS.  For purposes of both S5.1.1 and S5.1.2, we interpret the SDS to be the “driver.”  However, we have no defined way at this time of verifying Google’s compliance with this interpretation of these requirements.  Thus, if Google certified its compliance with these provisions consistent with this interpretation, NHTSA would be unable to conduct confirmatory testing to satisfy ourselves that the Google vehicle is compliant.  Therefore, unless and until NHTSA has a standard and testing procedures to confirm compliance with S5.1.1 and S5.1.2, or a standard providing equal or greater safety, it cannot conclude that Google’s SDV is compliant with those requirements.  In order to determine what “operable by” and “visible to” the SDS mean, and to establish procedures for testing compliance with those requirements using its existing regulatory tools, NHTSA would be required to conduct a rulemaking.

In the interim, Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions.[4]  Additionally, we agree with Google that it could be beneficial to vehicle occupants to be aware of certain aspects of vehicle status through telltales and indicators while they are traveling in the vehicle.  Given the historical status of the left front seating position as the location of the human in charge of vehicle operation, we agree that Google may voluntarily locate telltales and indicators so that they are visible to that position.  However, if it is foreseeable that a different seating position is more likely to be occupied, it may make more sense for the telltales and indicators to be located so that they are visible in another position.

FMVSS No. 108, “Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment”

FMVSS No. 108 contains requirements for original and replacement lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.  Google states that it “recognizes that all vehicles must comply with all of the performance requirements of FMVSS No. 108 with respect to external lamps and reflectors,” but asks that NHTSA interpret S6.6.1 of FMVSS No. 108 to allow certain internal controls “to be excluded from the occupant compartment, as long as their functions are performed by the vehicle autonomously.”  S6.6.1 requires all vehicles covered by FMVSS No. 108 to be “equipped with a turn signal operating unit, a turn signal flasher, a turn signal pilot indicator, a headlamp beam switching device, and an upper beam headlamp indicator meeting the requirements of S9.” 

With respect to turn signal operating units, Google requests that NHTSA interpret the term “operator” in the S4 definition of “turn signal operating unit” to mean the SDS.  That definition states that the unit is “an operating unit that is part of a turn signal system by which the operator of a vehicle causes the signal unit to function.”  Google notes that, in its vehicle, the turn signals will be operated and controlled by the SDS.  Google’s letter also addresses S9.1.1, which requires that the “turn signal operating unit…must be self-canceling by steering wheel rotation and capable of cancellation by a manually operated control.”  Google requests that NHTSA interpret this provision to be met by Google’s SDS since there would not be any steering wheel or conventional turn signal stalk.  Google also argues that providing either a steering wheel or the ability to control turn signal operation to the vehicle occupants could be detrimental to safety.  Google further asks that NHTSA “expressly acknowledg[e]” that a steering wheel is not required by the FMVSS.  The supplemental information Google provided on January 11, 2016 stated that the SDV’s turn signal operating unit self-cancels based on the position of the steering rack (which is controlled by the SDS), “which is what happens in a conventional vehicle by virtue of the link between the steering rack, steering column, and steering wheel,” and that Google therefore believes that the SDV complies with S9.1.1.

With respect to the S9.4 requirement for headlamp beam switching devices, which provides that “[e]ach vehicle must have a means of switching between lower and upper beams designed and located so that it may be operated conveniently by a simple movement of the driver’s hand or foot,” Google again states that the SDS will control headlamp beam switching “fully and appropriately” and that human occupant control over such functions could be detrimental to safety.

For purposes of these provisions of FMVSS No. 108, we interpret the SDS to be the “driver.”  We also agree that the “operator” of a turn signal operating unit is the SDS, because NHTSA has typically used “driver” and “operator” interchangeably in its interpretations over time.  We further agree that a steering wheel is not expressly required by any FMVSS.  We agree with Google that, as described, the SDV appears to be designed to self-cancel the turn signal operating unit as NHTSA would have intended, had vehicles without steering wheels been available when FMVSS No. 108 was developed.  Similar to the provisions of FMVSS No. 135, however, the fact that the SDS may be programmed to cancel the turn signal and switch headlamp beams does not overcome the (other) plain language of S9.1.1 and S9.4.  Even if we agree that Google’s self-cancelation for the turn signal operating unit is consistent with our intent in S9.1.1., that provision further expressly requires that the turn signal be capable of cancellation by a “manually operated control.” We understand Google’s argument that in the case of the SDV, manual cancelation of the turn signal operating unit by a human occupant could interfere with decisions already made by the SDS in ways that could affect safety.  However, this is an issue that cannot be addressed through interpretation alone.  Similarly, S9.4 specifically requires operation of headlamp switches by movement of the “driver’s hand or foot”.[5]  Under existing test procedures, we cannot verify Google’s compliance with these express requirements. 

Unless and until NHTSA has a standard and testing procedures to confirm compliance with these provisions, it cannot interpret Google’s SDV as compliant with these standards and requirements.  In order to determine what requirements would be appropriate, and to establish procedures for testing compliance with those standards, using its existing regulatory tools, NHTSA would be required to conduct a rulemaking.  NHTSA would need to consider how it could propose to amend FMVSS No. 108 in order to ensure that automated vehicle designs like Google’s, i.e., those that control all lighting and signals through the AI driver and do not provide lighting or signal controls to vehicle occupants, have a way to comply with the standard.  Meanwhile, Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions.  An exemption petition could seek to demonstrate that Google’s SDV would provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided by compliance with the FMVSS.[6] 

1. Interpretive Issues regarding “Miscellaneous Provisions in Other FMVSS”

Google also requested interpretation of several other “miscellaneous provisions in other FMVSS” relating to the absence of a human driver.

FMVSS No. 111, “Rear Visibility”

FMVSS No. 111 contains requirements for rear visibility devices and systems, requiring that vehicles have external and internal rear view mirrors to provide the driver with certain fields of view around and behind the vehicle.  FMVSS No. 111 also requires that vehicles display a rearview image (of a specified area of certain dimensions behind the vehicle) to the vehicle operator.  Google asks that NHTSA interpret these provisions as requiring that the specified view be provided to the SDS, rather than to the human occupant.  Google further requests that “the vehicle would be deemed compliant if the SDS receives sensor input at least equivalent to the images a driver would be able to view through mirrors and a rear visibility system meeting the field of view and other performance requirements of the standard.”

As above, because we are interpreting “driver” and “operator” in this instance to refer to the SDS, we agree that the information required by the provisions of FMVSS No. 111 that must be provided to the “driver” or “operator” may be provided to the SDS.  Here again, we have no defined way at this time of verifying Google’s compliance with this interpretation of those requirements.  Thus, if Google certified its compliance with these provisions consistent with this interpretation, NHTSA would be unable to conduct confirmatory testing to satisfy ourselves that such certification was valid. 

Therefore, unless and until NHTSA develops and adopts appropriate performance criteria and test procedures for evaluating whether the sensor input received by the SDS provides enough information to ensure that the SDS is as well informed by its sensors of the conditions behind and around it as a human driver of a conventional vehicle that meets the existing requirements of FMVSS No. 111 (or a standard providing equal or greater safety), it cannot interpret Google’s SDV as compliant with these standards and requirements.  This would need to be undertaken through rulemaking.  NHTSA may also consider as part of such a rulemaking whether there is benefit to conveying this information to human occupants in the case of vehicle designs like the Google SDV.  Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions, in which it could seek to demonstrate that its SDV would provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided by compliance with the FMVSS.[7] 

FMVSS No. 114, “Theft Protection and Rollaway Prevention”

FMVSS No. 114 contains requirements intended to reduce the incidence of crashes resulting from theft and accidental rollaway of vehicles.  Among these requirements is S5.3, which requires vehicles with an automatic transmission that includes a “park” position to have a system that “requires the service brake to be depressed before the transmission can be shifted out of ‘park.’”  Google states that its vehicle will not have any brake pedal, and that its SDS “will determine the appropriate transmission position and will not select a position other than park unless the service brake is first applied by the SDS.”  Google therefore requests that NHTSA interpret S5.3 as met by this described approach.

We agree that the language of S5.3 requiring the service brake to be depressed does not necessarily require the service brake itself to be pressed or applied by any particular object or function, such as a human foot.  We also agree that if the SDS is controlling the service brake, in theory, it would be able to make the decisions that would accomplish the intent of this provision.  In order for NHTSA to assess compliance of Google’s vehicle with this standard, however, we would need more information regarding how the SDS applies the service brake.  We would also intend to develop and adopt through rulemaking performance standards and test procedures for evaluating how (for example) the SDS “determines the appropriate transmission position” and avoids “selecting a position other than park unless the service brake is first applied.”  NHTSA might also consider as part of such a rulemaking the safety intent of the standard, and how human occupants should be protected when the vehicle is making decisions about when to initiate movement.  Google may wish to petition the agency for an exemption from these provisions.[8] 

FMVSS No. 126, “Electronic Stability Control Systems”

FMVSS No. 126 contains performance and equipment requirements for electronic stability control (ESC) systems.  Google argues that because its vehicle will not have a steering wheel, and the SDS will control all aspects of steering, NHTSA should interpret the relevant provisions of FMVSS No. 126 “to allow compliance with the performance requirements of the standard to be tested on the basis of appropriate steering inputs provided by the SDS.”  Google cites in particular the definition of an ESC system in S4 as referring to “a means to monitor driver steering inputs” and the test conditions in S6 and test procedures in S7, which refer to steering wheel velocity and angle.

Test procedure provisions in S7 (such as S7.5.2, S7.5.3, S7.6, S7.6.1, S7.9.3, and others) refer specifically to measurement of “steering wheel angle,” which is, literally, a measurement of the angle of the steering wheel in degrees.  Without a steering wheel, we agree that Google cannot certify its vehicle design to such provisions.  As above, in order for NHTSA to assess compliance of Google’s vehicle with this standard, we would need to determine how to evaluate the SDS’ control of the steering inputs, and whether and how to modify test conditions and procedures to address more clearly the situation of a vehicle with steering controlled entirely by an AI driver, with no mechanism for the vehicle occupants to affect the steering.  Google could petition for exemption from the relevant provisions of FMVSS No. 126

and the agency could work to develop alternate test procedures.  Over the longer term, NHTSA would need to undertake rulemaking to incorporate test procedures into FMVSS No. 126 to provide a clearer path to compliance for similar future vehicle designs.

Google’s letter concludes with two attachments, summarily listing numerous additional provisions for which it seeks interpretation.  Attachment A lists “Requirements for which the ‘Driver’ or ‘Operator’ should be considered to be the Self-Driving System.”  The letter provides no further explanation or justification for those requested interpretations.  Attachment B provides a similar list of FMVSS “Requirements for which the ‘Driver’ should be considered to be a person seated in the left front designated seating position.”  We address these numerous items in Attachments A and B in Tables A and B, to this letter, respectively (attached).  The Tables in those attachments reproduce each of Google’s requests in the first three columns, and provide NHTSA’s response in the final column.

In closing, we note that, in some instances, it may be possible for Google to provide more information and explanations that would allow NHTSA to expand or otherwise revise interpretations set forth in this letter.  If Google believes it can address concerns and limitations expressed in this letter that prevent us from providing the full interpretation it seeks, we encourage the company to submit more information to do so. In addition, as discussed above, Google may wish to seek exemptions from standards and requirements addressed in this letter. I hope this information provided in this letter and its attachments is helpful.  If you have further questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 366-2830, or Steve Wood, Assistant Chief Counsel for Vehicle Safety Standards and Harmonization, at (202) 366-2992.

                                                                        Sincerely yours,

                                                                        Paul A. Hemmersbaugh

                                                                        Chief Counsel

III.  Table A

NHTSA interprets the SDS to be the “driver” or “operator” for the following specific FMVSS provisions.  As discussed above, we have no defined way at this time of verifying Google’s compliance with this interpretation of these requirements.  Thus, if Google certified its compliance with these provisions consistent with this interpretation, NHTSA would be unable to conduct confirmatory testing to satisfy ourselves that such compliance was valid.  Therefore, unless and until NHTSA develops performance criteria and test procedures for evaluating whether the SDS satisfies the FMVSS provision in question to be met, or a standard providing equal or greater safety, it cannot interpret Google’s SDV as compliant with these standards and requirements.  Google may wish to petition the agency for exemption from these petitions in the interim.

1. Table B

For specific FMVSS provisions set forth on Google’s Attachment B, Google requested that NHTSA interpret the human occupant seated in the left front designated seating position (‘DSP’) as the “driver.”  As discussed above, NHTSA defines “driver” for purposes of the FMVSS at 49 CFR 571.3.  We also discuss above the need to amend that definition in light of the possibility that Google raises, that an AI driver could be the sole means of driving a vehicle.  Given the focus of the definition of “driver” as, essentially, the entity that controls steering, and given that Google’s proposed vehicle design gives the human occupant no means to steer the vehicle, the human occupant of the left front DSP could not be the driver.  Moreover, interpreting “driver” as the human occupant of the left front DSP in the instances below that Google cites would not, in most cases, provide Google with a means of certifying that its proposed vehicle design complies with the applicable standard, because the agency would need to establish standards and tests to verify that the design complies. 

It may be that for some of these provisions, the elimination of a human driver makes the provision unnecessary, as Google implies in its letter.  NHTSA will consider these issues further and looks forward to receiving additional information from Google to assist us in this consideration.  For the following provisions, we are therefore continuing to interpret “driver” as referring to the SDS, and discuss what steps would need to be taken next in order to provide a path forward:

[1] Google also submitted a supplemental letter date January 11, 2016, providing more detailed information on its approach to canceling the turn signal, which is discussed below.

[2] NHTSA considers this AI driver to be an item of motor vehicle equipment within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 30102 and other applicable law and regulations.

[3] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that a pedal may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with a pedal’s absence.

[4] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that the controls listed in Tables 1 and 2 of S5.1.1 may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence.

[5] We note that S9.4.1 of FMVSS No. 108 provides a mechanism by which a manufacturer can certify a “semi-automatic headlamp beam switching device,” but Google did not ask for interpretation of this provision, nor do we have enough information to assess whether Google’s proposed design would comply with this provision.

[6] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that a steering wheel and the vehicle occupants’ ability to control any lighting and signals may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence.

[7] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that rear visibility devices and systems may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence.

[8] Google may also wish to reconsider its view that a pedal may never be needed in any circumstance, and that there is not a risk of harm associated with a pedal’s absence.

[9] We note that NHTSA has previously interpreted this provision as prohibiting automatic (i.e., non-driver initiated) control of turn signal lamp flashing, but we do not consider this interpretation as inconsistent with those, because in this instance we are interpreting the “driver” (the SDS, given that the human occupants have no mechanism by which they can drive the vehicle) as being the entity controlling the vehicular hazard warning signal operating unit.  NHTSA would like to explore further with Google the instances in which Google would intend for the SDS to flash the hazard warning signals.