ID: nht75-4.40

DATE: 06/03/75

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; J. C. Schultz; NHTSA

TO: Blue Bird Body Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of May 19, 1975, inquiring as to the effect of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release, on a Connecticut law relating to school bus window emergency release.

As you are aware, section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1392(d)) provides that no State or political subdivision of a State may promulgate or continue in effect standards applicable to an aspect of motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance which is covered by a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, unless the standards are identical.

Standard No. 217 includes provisions relating to emergency exit force applications. A differing State specification for emergency release force applications is voided by @ 103(d) since the Federal standard is intended to cover all aspects of emergency window release performance.

As explained in our November 29, 1974, letter to Mr. Donald L. Gibson (copy enclosed) a Federal standard will preempt any State law that relates to the same aspect of motor vehicle performance yet imposes different requirements.

Your responsibility as a manufacturer is to comply with the Federal safety standard. You should note, however, that purchase specifications may be imposed by any person or organization, including a State or municipality, with respect to vehicles purchased for the person or organization's own use. Such specifications are not limited by Federal law, and in the case of governmental bodies are specifically allowed by S 103(d), although of course they cannot alter a manufacturer's duty to conform to Federal standards.

SINCERELY,

May 19, 1975

Richard Dyson Assistant Chief Counsel U. S. Department of Transportation NHTSA

The State of Connecticut recently adopted new school bus specifications which will become effective on school buses manufactured after January 1, 1976. In two areas these specifications are more restrictive than FMVSS 217 Bus Window Retention and Release.

In section 14-275B-16 (d) and 14-275B-17 (a), (see attached copies), the Connecticut specifications call for emergency exit release forces of between 5 and 15 pounds and 5 and 20 pounds respectively. Since these forces are different than those required by FMVSS 217, this imposes an additional constraint on school bus manufacturers for that state. Also, we are concerned that latch forces as low as 5 pounds could result in inadvertent opening of emergency exits.

We are in receipt of a copy of a letter which you sent to Mr. Donald L. Gibson, dated November 27, 1974, with file reference N40-30 (KK). In that letter you state:

"The federal requirements must be regarded as conclusive with regard to parking brake performance and emergency braking capability in order to maintain the uniformity necessary in a federal regulatory scheme. If states were permitted to impose additional requirements in an area regulated by a federal safety standard, manufacturers would be confronted with an impossible task of compliance. This reasoning formed the bais of the recent decision rendered in a case brought by the Motorcycle Industry Council, Inc., against the State of California in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California concerning the preemption of a California State requirement that motorcycle lamps be wired to operate when the engine is running. The court held that the California requirement is preempted by the Federal Motor Vehicle Standard 108 since the NHTSA intended to cover all aspects of performance directly involving motorcycle headlamps."

It appears to us that this current conflict between the new Connecticut regulations and FMVSS 217 is similar to the matter which you addressed in your letter quoted above.

In the light of such conflicting specifications, what is our responsibility as a school bus manufacturer.

W. G. Milby Staff Engineer

CC: JOHN O'CONNELL; DAVE PHELPS

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR TYPE I SCHOOL BUS CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT the release mechansism should be turned to open the emergency door shall be painted on the outside of the emergency door in black on the national school bus yellow background. The emergency door shall have a horizontal opening of at least 30 inches and a vertical opening of at least 48 inches measured from the floor level. No steps shall lead to the emergency door. The emergency door or exit shall be devised so as to be opened from the inside and the outside.

(b) The passage to the emergency door shall be kept clear of obstructions. For rear doors the horizontal clearance of 30 inches shall be maintained for a distance of at least twelve inches inside the bus. When the emergency door is in the left side, a minimum horizontal clearance of 30 inches and a vertical clearance of 48 inches shall be maintained between it and the center aisle.

(c) The upper and lower portion of the central rear emergency door shall be equipped with approved safety glass, the exposed area of which shall be not less than four hundred (400) square inches in the upper portion and not less than three hundred (300) square inches in the lower portion. The left side emergency door shall be equipped with safety glass in the upper portion and the lower portion shall be of at least the same gauge metal as the body outer panels. The emergency door shall be hinged on the right side if it is in the rear end of the bus and on the front side if it is in the left side and shall open only outward. Control from the driver's seat shall not be permitted.

(d) The emergency door shall be equipped with a slide-bar, cam-operated latch which shall have a minimum stroke of one inch. The latch shall be equipped with a suitable electric plunger-type switch connected with a distinctive audible signal automatically operated and located in the driver's compartment which shall clearly indicate the unlatching of this door and no cutoff switch shall be installed in the circuit. The switch shall be enclosed in a metal case, and wires leading from the switch shall be concealed in the body. The switch shall be so installed that the plunger contacts the farthest edge of the slide bar in such a manner that any movement of the slide bar will immediately close the circuit and activate the signal. The door latch shall be equipped with an interior handle which shall be capable of quick release upon application of a force between 5 and 15 pounds but shall be protected agains accidental release. It shall lift up to release the latch. The outside handle shall be installed in a vertical position when latched so as to minimize hitching and shall be a non-detachable device.

(e) An audio alarm shall indicate to the driver when any door is in the locked position while the ignition switch is in the "on" position.

Sec. 14-275b-17. Emergency Windows. (a) A rear emergency window at least 16 inches in height and as wide as practicable shall be provided in any bus where the emergency door is not in the rear. The rear window shall be designed so as to be opened from either the inside or the outside. It shall be hinged at the top and be equipped with a linkage or mechanism that will automatically hold the opened window against the force of gravity at a hinge opening angle of 60 +/- 5 degrees measured from the closed window position. Such linkage or mechanism shall not prevent the window from opening a full 90 degrees due to gravitational forces should the bus be inverted. A positive latch on the inside shall provide for quick release upon application of a force between 5 and 20 pounds but offer protection against accidental release. The outside handle shall be non-detachable and designed to minimize hitching.

(b) Labeling shall indicate in 1/2 inch letters on the inside how the window operates and in letters at least two inches in height the words "Emergency Exit" above on the inside and directly below on the outside.

(c) A distinctive audible signal automatically operated shall clearly indicate to the driver the unlatching of the rear emergency window or the opening of any push-out emergency windows and no cutoff switch shall be installed in the circuit.

(d) If there is a space between the top of the rear divan seat and the inside lower edge of the rear emergency window, such space shall be covered by a material of sufficient strength to sustain 600 pounds weight.

Sec. 14-275b-18. Exhaust System and Muffler. The exhaust system shall include the exhaust manifold and gaskets, piping leading from the flange of the exhaust manifold to and including the muffler(s). The system shall not extend into the body and shall be attached to the chassis. The tail pipe(s) shall be non-flexible sixteen gauge steel or equivalent and shall extend beyond the rear end of the chassis frame but not beyond the rear limit of the bumper. The complete exhaust system shall be tight and free from leaks and shall be properly insulated from the electrical wiring or any combustible part of the bus. It shall not pass within twelve inches of the fuel tank or its connections except that the exhaust system may come within four inches of the fuel tank or its connections if a suitable heat baffle is installed between the exhaust system and such tank or connections. The size of the pipes in the exhaust system shall not be reduced below that at the engine manifold.

$99(Illegible word)

1-28-75

ID: 2636y

Mr. Jack E. Eanes
Chief, Vehicle Services
State of Delaware
Department of Public Safety
Division of Motor Vehicles
P. O. Box 698
Dover, Delaware, 19903

Dear Mr. Eanes:

This is in response to your letter asking whether very darkly tinted rear windows that obscure the center highmounted stop lamp (CHMSL) required in passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 would violate any Federal laws or regulations. Let me begin by apologizing for the delay in this response. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations for you.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue two safety standards that are relevant to your question. The first of these is Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR 571.108), which applies to all new vehicles and new replacement equipment for motor vehicles. Among the requirements set forth in this Standard is a requirement for all passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 to be equipped with a CHMSL of specified minimum size, brightness, and visibility from the range of locations set forth in the standard. The second relevant standard is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR 571.205). This standard applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing for use in motor vehicles, and includes specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance of the glazing (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person may manufacture or sell any vehicle unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. A new passenger car with a rear window tinted so darkly that the CHMSL was not easily visible would probably not be in conformity with Standards No. 108 and 205, and so could not legally be manufactured or sold in the United States. However, this prohibition on the manufacture or sale of a nonconforming vehicle does not apply after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer.

Both before and after the first sale of a vehicle, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ." If any of the listed commercial entities were to install tint film or otherwise darken the rear windows on passenger cars so that the light transmittance of that window plus the darkening material was below 70 percent, those entities would be "rendering inoperative" the light transmittance of the rear window of the car, in violation of Federal law. This same prohibition in Federal law makes it unlawful for a service station to permanently remove the safety belts or permanently disconnect the brake lines on a car.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of individual vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle no longer complies with the safety standards after such alterations. Hence, no provision of the Safety Act or our safety standards makes it unlawful for vehicle owners themselves to tint or otherwise darken the rear window of their car so that its light transmittance is below 70 percent and/or its CHMSL is obscured.

The individual States, however, do have authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles. The States also have the authority to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that State.

You indicated in your letter that the State of Delaware "allows vehicle rear windows to be tinted as dark as the owner desires." While I am not familiar with Delaware law, I assume that this statute, and similar statutes adopted by other States, does not purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing and CHMSLs by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, any commercial firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittance of less than 70 percent and/or reduces the required brightness of the CHMSL would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Delaware permits individual owners to make such modifications themselves and to register and operate vehicles with rear windows and CHMSLs that would not comply with the requirements of the Federal safety standards for new vehicles. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifications commercial enterprises can make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Delaware from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in the State of Delaware.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and Delaware law, and Delaware would be free to enforce the provisions of its law. We would, however, urge the State of Delaware to carefully consider the adverse safety consequences that will result from the provision of its law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety, and that the CHMSL on passenger cars enhances motor vehicle safety. It is not clear why the State of Delaware would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance and CHMSLs in new passenger cars is satisfied by allowing far lower light transmittance levels and lower-brightness CHMSLs in passenger cars to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel /ref:108#205#VSA d:7/3l/90

ID: 21492volvotension

William Shapiro, P.E.
Director, Regulatory Compliance and Environmental Affairs
Volvo Cars of North America, Inc.
Volvo Drive
Rockleigh, NJ 07647-0913





Dear Mr. Shapiro:

This responds to your letter asking about a certain aspect of the dynamic test procedure of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, as applied to a new add-on rear-facing child restraint system that Volvo has developed. Your question relates to a movable surface, a "tension bracket," on the child restraint system that a consumer installing the child restraint would adjust. The tension bracket would increase the tension of the vehicle belt system that attaches the child restraint to the vehicle seat. You ask whether we would deploy the tension bracket in our compliance test of Standard No. 213. Our answer is no.

Background
You explain that the child restraint system ("CRS") is designed in both an infant-only configuration (for children with a mass of up to 10 kilograms (kg)), and a "toddler" configuration (children in the range of 9 to 18 kg). You state that both configurations use a base, or frame, that attaches to the vehicle seat by way of the vehicle belt system and by components that attach to the lower bars of a child restraint anchorage system (see FMVSS No. 225, 49 CFR 571.225).

Your inquiry relates to attaching the child restraint system by way of the vehicle belt system. Volvo designed a tension bracket for this means of attachment, described by you as: "an inverted "U"-shaped surface, attached near the edge of the CRS base or CRS frame (the edge of the CRS which is closest to the vehicle's seat bight)." When the tension bracket is deployed, it "increases tension on the vehicle's belt system, enhancing the coupling of the CRS to the vehicle seat...."

Section 6.1.2(d)(ii) of Standard No. 213 specifies that, when a child restraint is tested on the standard seat assembly when attached by a Type I (lap belt), the belt is tightened to a tension of not less than 53.5 Newtons (N) and not more than 67 N. Volvo believes that the dynamic test should be conducted by "first, routing the standard vehicle lap belt through the CRS belt path/guide, second, adjusting the belt tension to be in the range of 53.5-67 N, and then third, pushing the tension bracket ("U"-shaped surface) against the vehicle seat back by pushing the handle at the top of the tension bracket and the padded top crossbar of the CRS frame apart." Deploying the tension bracket in the sequence will increase the belt tension above 67 N.

You believe that the dynamic test procedure (S6.1.2) of Standard No. 213 permits the deployment of the tension bracket and the resultant increase in belt tension (above 67 N) because S6.1.2 specifies that the add-on child restraint system is installed at the center seating position of the seat assembly "in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions provided with the system." You state that your instructions tell the consumer to (a) "tighten the lap belt fully" while pressing the base into the seat cushion, then (b) deploy the tension bracket. You therefore believe that the dynamic test should be conducted with the tension bracket deployed, since deploying it would be in accordance with your instructions.

Discussion
We do not agree that, for purposes of conducting the dynamic tests in Standard No. 213, the tension bracket should be deployed after the lap belt has been adjusted to 53.5 to 67 N.

The dynamic test procedures of Standard No. 213 are carefully controlled to ensure that all child restraints are tested in the same manner, under identical conditions. Section 6.1.2(d)(ii) of Standard No. 213 specifies the amount of tension that must be on the lap belt (not less than 53.5 N to not more than 67 N) to control the means of attaching each child restraint, thereby reducing variability, and to better assess the performance of the restraint. Under the test procedures of the standard, the tension of the lap belt is checked and controlled immediately before the dynamic test. (See S6.1.2(d)(ii) and S6.1.2(e).) Contrary to your suggestion, we do not subsequently adjust the child restraint to make sure that various features of the restraint that may have been added by the manufacturer are deployed.

Further, specifying the amount of tension that is in the lap belt helps ensure that all child restraints can provide a minimum level of safety when attached in a standardized manner. In our view, no child restraint can be tested with more than the specified 67 N of tension, since that would make the test less stringent. We note that the child restraint requires action on the part of the consumer to increase the belt tension. It does not do so automatically. If the tension adjustment in the seat operated automatically, such that it was impossible to install the seat at a tension below 67 N, we would test at the higher tension.

With your child restraint system, the benefits from the increased tension of the vehicle belt will not be realized by consumers who neglect to deploy the tension bracket or who do so incorrectly. The possibility of the tension bracket not being used is not insignificant, since child restraints do not generally use a tension bracket. The attachment of child restraints to vehicle seats is intended to be standardized. Thus, child restraints must meet the minimum performance requirements of Standard No. 213 regardless of whether a tension bracket is deployed, to guard against a degradation of safety in cases where the bracket is misused.

Accordingly, we conclude that child restraints must meet the minimum performance requirements of Standard No. 213 when the lap belt has a tension of not more than 67 N. We realize that your feature can tension a vehicle belt further and that the removal of slack in the belt system is generally beneficial to child restraint performance. However, our conclusion ensures that child restraints provide a minimum level of safety even when features that are supplemental to the standard means of attaching a child restraint are not used as intended.

If you have any further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Frank Seales, Jr.
Chief Counsel

ref:213
d.10/17/00

ID: nht88-1.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/18/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: HOWARD SMOLKIN -- MANAGING DIRECTOR

TITLE: THE MEANING OF PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

TEXT: Attached per your request is a discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the Vehicle Safety Act, for use in connection with the next meeting of the Research Advisory Committee.

Attachment

PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

This paper provides a general discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle Safety Act). The Vehicle Safety Act directs the Secretary of Transportation, or his or her delegate, to issue Feder al motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(a). (Emphasis added.) See also 15 U.S.C. @ 1391(2). In issuing these standards, the Se cretary is directed to consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescri bed, and the "extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of the Act." 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). (Emphasis added.)

The dictionary defines "practicable" as "capable of being done, effected, or put into practice, with the available means; feasible: a practicable solution." Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged edition). Courts construing the term under the Vehicle Safety Act have generally relied on the following statements in the legislative history:

House Report: "In establishing standards the Secretary must conform to the requirement that the standard be practicable. This would require consideration of all relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the goal of a particular sta ndard as well as consideration of economic factors." H. R. Rep. 1776 at 16.

Senate Report: "The committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill. The committee recognizes . . . that the Secretary will necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate leadtime." S. Rep. 1301, p.6.

The court decisions construing the term "practicable" have established several general principles about its meaning. First, while NHTSA must bear in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Vehicle Safety Act, the agency is to look at costs as well as benefits. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 54-55 (1983), a case reviewing a recission by the agency of the automatic restraint requirements, the Supreme Court concluded that the agency had been correct to look at the costs as well as the benefits of the requirements. NHTSA had determined that the incremental costs of the requirements were no longer reasonable based on its prediction that the safety benefits of the regulation might be minimal. In this instance, the court required a reexamination of the agency's conclusion that the safety benefits might be minimal. The court stated that when the agency examined its findings as to the likely safety benefits, it must also reconsider i ts judgment of the reasonableness of the monetary and other costs associated with the standard, bearing in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Act.

A second principle is that NHTSA must conduct careful analysis of the economic impacts of safety standards. In H & H Tire Co. v. DOT, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring retreaded tires to meet many of the same per formance requirements as new tires, the court concluded that NHTSA had not adequately investigated the practicability of the standard. The court found that current retread tires could not comply with the requirements and that there was a possibility tha t the industry's best efforts might be insufficient to insure prompt compliance. The court concluded that NHTSA had acted precipitately, adopting a rule which might possibly destroy a well-established industry, without adequate study. The court also in dicated that NHTSA must consider possible economic hardships of both manufacturers and customers. Note: The court agreed with the government that "the fact that a government regulation may cause economic hardship to a party does not make such regulation unreasonable" and stated that the deleterious economic effect on the industry of compliance with the standard at issue might be permissible if retreads unquestionably were major safety hazards and if compliance with the standard clearly enhanced retread s' safety under on-the-road conditions. 471 F.2d at 354.

A third principle is that NHTSA may issue safety standards that are technology-forcing. In Chrysler v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restraints, the court held that NHTSA has authority to issue safety standards which require improvements in existing technology or which require the development of new technology, and is not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already developed.

A fourth principle is that NHTSA must consider the public acceptability of safety standards. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restrain ts, the court held that consideration of public reaction is part of the requirement that standards be practicable. The court stated that "(m)uch as economic analysis must evaluate both supply and demand conditions, motor vehicle safety standards cannot be considered practicable unless we know both that the needed production capability is within reach and that motorists will avail themselves of the safety system." 593 F.2d at 1345.

Finally, the meaning of the term "practicable" appears to differ depending upon whether it is applied to a mandatory or optional provision in a safety standard. In Chrysler v. DOT, 515 F.2d 1053, 1060 (6th Cir. 1975), Chrysler argued that a standard perm itting use of rectangular headlamps, as an alternative to round headlamps, for a specified time period was impracticable because that company could not complete the necessary engineering and retooling in time to produce automobiles equipped with the new headlamps before the option expired. In dicta, the court stated that it had "some doubt that practicability is a significant principle in the context of an optional provision in a safety standard." The court stated that a review of the cases in this are a suggests the practicability requirement was designed primarily to prevent NHTSA from establishing mandatory safety requirements that are economically or technologically infeasible. The court contrasted that situation with the one at bar, in which the use of rectangular headlamps was not required, and Chrysler was not subject to any statutory penalties for failing to comply with this aspect of the standard. The court also stated that even assuming that an optional requirement were required to be prac ticable, it would be difficult to conclude that the rectangular headlamp option was impracticable in any absolute sense, since at least two manufacturers were capable of producing rectangular headlamps.

ID: ntea.ztv

Mr. Michael E. Kastner
Director of Government Relations
National Truck Equipment Association
1300 19^th Street, NW, Fifth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036-1609

Dear Mr. Kastner:

This is in reply to your letter of October 2, 2002, requesting an interpretation of several provisions of the "early warning reporting" final rule (49 CFR Part 579, Subpart C).

You asked three sets of questions. The first of these was:

All reports . . . require the vehicle make, model, and model year. As many of the bodies and equipment manufactured by NTEA members are installed on a variety of different makes and models of trucks most body and equipment manufacturers have never needed this information nor required it to be provided in normal processing of warranties or consumer complaints. Also, the vehicle make and model year are seldom recorded in field reports because the primary focus is on the truck body or equipment. Give the "Minimal Specificity" provision outlined in 579.28(d), if the historical records do not include the vehicle make, model and model year, it is our interpretation that they are not reportable by the body or equipment manufacturer since there is no way to identify the vehicle make or model. Is this interpretation correct and would it also apply to the one-time three year historical report and the nine years of historical data to be included in the quarterly reports?

Under the Vehicle Safety Act, a manufacturer of "bodies and equipment" is a manufacturer of "motor vehicle equipment." The bodies and equipment manufactured by NTEA members are "original equipment" because they are equipment installed on a motor vehicle at the time it is delivered to its first purchaser. (This answer assumes that the "bodies and equipment" are installed on a chassis by a third person.) The only early warning reporting requirements of Part 579 that apply to manufacturers of original equipment (other than tires) are the limited reporting requirements of 49 CFR 579.27.The one-time historical report established by Section 579.28(c) is required only of manufacturers "covered by Sections 579.21 through 579.26 of this part."This does not include manufacturers covered by Section 579.27, such as manufacturers of original equipment.

If an NTEA member that is a manufacturer of original equipment receives a claim or notice of an incident involving death, the claim or notice need not be reported if it does not identify the equipment with "minimal specificity" (Section 579.28(d)). For bodies and other equipment, "minimal specificity" (as defined in Section 579.4(c)) amounts to the name of the manufacturer (and if there is a model or family of models identified on the item of equipment, the model name or model number). Even if the equipment is identified with minimal specificity, the claim or notice need not be reported if the identified equipment was manufactured prior to four calendar years before the reporting period (Section 579.27(b)).

In sum, it appears to us that NTEA members who are solely manufacturers of original equipment will have very limited reporting responsibilities under the early warning reporting rule.

NTEAs second question was as follows:

In the truck body and equipment industry, typically, a body manufacturer supplies the body to a distributor who installs it on the truck chassis. In this case, the body manufacturer would be a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment and the distributor would be the final stage manufacturer. Distributors (the final stage manufacturer) typically complete warranty work, as it applies to the body, on a customers vehicle and subsequently submit a warranty claim to the body manufacturer for coverage under its warranty plan. If the distributor is the final stage manufacturer of more than 500 vehicles per year, then presumably the distributor must report warranty information to NHTSA. There is the potential that both the distributor and the body manufacturer will submit warranty information to NHTSA on the same warranty claim. How is this situation to be handled?

In the example you give, the body manufacturer is subject to the reporting provisions of Section 579.27. This section requires reporting only of information regarding claims and notices of incidents involving deaths. There is no requirement that the body manufacturer report warranty claims to NHTSA, even if it receives them. However, the entity that you have characterized as the "distributor" would be a vehicle manufacturer under our statute and thus would have to submit warranty data if it produced 500 or more vehicles of a given category per year. It is possible that such claims may also be reported by the chassis manufacturer (although it probably would not have to do so), but our screeners will be able to adjust to avoid double counting.

NTEAs third question was as follows:

Some body manufacturers install the bodies on truck chassis themselves (thus becoming the final stage manufacturer) while also selling some bodies through distributors, who become the final stage manufacturers of those vehicles. Does this body manufacturer need to submit reports as both an equipment manufacturer and a motor vehicle manufacturer? Do they need to submit one form for the bodies sold as equipment and one for the bodies they installed as the final-stage motor vehicle manufacturer? If so, should the equipment manufacturer form cover both those bodies sold via distributors and those bodies installed directly? Does the body manufacturer need to report on behalf of its independent distributors?

The body manufacturer must submit reports as both an equipment manufacturer and a motor vehicle manufacturer when circumstances dictate. However, as discussed above, only the limited reporting requirements of Section 579.27 apply to manufacturers of bodies furnished to persons who become the final stage manufacturer. If the body manufacturer becomes a final stage manufacturer of less than 500 vehicles annually, the limited reporting requirements of Section 579.27 will also apply. Each claim or notice of a death it receives as a body manufacturer and as a vehicle manufacturer must be reported separately. If the body manufacturer is the final stage manufacturer of 500 or more of any category of vehicles annually (e.g., medium heavy vehicle), it must furnish full reports as specified in the sections that apply to the type of vehicle completed.

If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).

Sincerely,

Jacqueline Glassman
Chief Counsel

ref:579
d.4/11/03

ID: nht92-4.18

DATE: September 4, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Kevin B. Brown -- EG&G Idaho, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/6/92 from Kevin B. Brown to NHTSA (OCC-7323)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter concerning 49 CFR 567 requirements for intermediate or final stage manufacture vehicle labeling. I apologize for the delay in responding. You stated in your letter that EG&G Idaho, as prime contractor for the Department of Energy, Idaho Field Office, procures and maintains all government-owned vehicles, and occasionally procures truck chassis purchased through the General Services Administration for subsequent mounting of service bodies.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you. Before addressing the specific issues raised in the letter, some background information may be helpful. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, 15 U.S.C., S1381-1431 (hereinafter "Safety Act") authorizes this agency to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Rather, the Safety Act establishes a self-certification process which requires each manufacturer, in the exercise of due care, to ensure and certify that its products meet all applicable Federal safety standards. Thereafter, NHTSA periodically tests vehicles and equipment for compliance with the standards and investigates allegations of safety-related defects.

In addition, the Safety Act only requires new vehicles to comply with applicable safety standards. The only provision of the Safety Act that would apply after the first purchase of a vehicle is 15 U.S.C. S1397(a)(2)(A), which states in relevant part that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

The first question to be answered is whether EG&G Idaho is a manufacturer. Under 49 CFR 568.3, a final-stage manufacturer is "a person who performs such manufacturing operations on an incomplete vehicle that it becomes a completed vehicle." An incomplete vehicle is "an assemblage consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure..." that requires "further manufacturing operations, other than the addition of readily attachable components... ." Readily attachable components include items such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies. Service bodies are not "readily attachable components." Therefore, in installing service bodies on new chassis, EG&G is acting as a final-stage manufacturer under federal regulations.

49 CFR 586.6 establishes certain requirements for final-stage manufacturers,

including:

(a) Each final-stage manufacturer shall complete the vehicle in such a manner that it conforms to the standards in effect on the date of the manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final completion, or a date between those two dates. ... (b) Each final-stage manufacturer shall affix a label to the completed vehicle in accordance with S567.5 of this chapter.

EG&G must attach the proper label to the completed vehicle as set out in 49 CFR 567.5(c), a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. According to your letter, EG&G mounts bodies in accordance with the original (i.e., incomplete) manufacturer's instructions or recommendations. In that case, EG&G's certification that the completed vehicle conforms to all applicable safety standards can state simply that the vehicle has been completed in accordance with the prior manufacturer's instructions, per S567.5(c)(7).

When EG&G mounts a new body on a new chassis, the resulting vehicle is subject to the Safety Act and the certification requirements of 49 CFR 567 and 568. However, according to your letter, you also mount bodies on "existing used" chassis. 49 CFR 571.7(e) deals with combining new and used components:

When a new cab is used in the assembly of a truck, the truck will be considered newly manufactured for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section (stating that safety standards apply to all relevant motor vehicles), the application of the requirements of this chapter, and the (Safety) Act, unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle.

This means that the vehicle resulting from placing a new body upon a used chassis is a used vehicle. If, in addition to adding a new body, the operation also modifies the chassis by adding new components, such as new engine, transmission, suspension, etc., it is more likely that the resulting vehicle would be considered a new vehicle. If your vehicles produced with "existing used chassis" will incorporate the engine, transmission, and drive axle from the existing used chassis, the completed vehicles would be "used" and would not require vehicle certification. Some of our standards, however, apply to individual items of motor vehicle equipment (e.g., brake hoses and fluids, lighting equipment, tires, seatbelt assemblies, glazing). If your converted vehicles incorporate new items of these types of equipment, the items must comply with the applicable Federal safety standards. For example, lights are subject to requirements specified in Standard No. 108, and glazing is subject to requirements specified in Standard No. 205.

Finally, you ask whether "EG&G Idaho need(s) to be certificated... ." There is no procedure to certify any manufacturer. It is the manufacturer that must certify that its vehicles meet the applicable federal safety standards. However, you should submit the manufacturer's information required by 49 CFR 566 to NHTSA. This information includes the name and address of the manufacturer (in this case, EG&G), a description of the type of vehicle manufactured, the use for which it is intended, and the fact that EG&G is a final stage manufacturer. I have enclosed a copy of Part 566 for your

information.

For your information, I have also enclosed a general information sheet for new manufacturers that gives a succinct outline of the relevant NHTSA regulations and explains how to get copies of those regulations.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, feel free to contact David Elias of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-3.34

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 30, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Betsy Dittemore -- Legislative Liaison, Iowa Department of Public Safety, Office of the Commissioner

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6-14-89 to NHTSA from B. Dittemore; (OCC 3633); and NHTSA bulletin dated 8-85 re Federal Auto Safety Laws and Motor Vehicle Window Tinting

TEXT:

Thank you for your letter regarding a bill introduced in the Iowa Senate that, among other features, would establish light transmittance limits for "sunscreening devices" that may be applied to the windows of motor vehicles operated in Iowa. I apologize for the delay in this response. You requested our office's interpretation about whether provisions of this bill would violate or be preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR S571.205).

As you are aware, this agency is authorized by section 103 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1392) to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standard s that we have issued under this authority is standard No. 205, which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor vehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of ligh t transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that no person may manufacture, import, or sell any vehicle in the United States unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. Pursuant to section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)), this prohibition no longer applies after the vehicle is sold to a consumer. However, both before and after the first sale, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that "No manufacturer, d istributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal moto r vehicle safety standard . . . ."

In the case of windows on a passenger car, this provision of Federal law means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install window tinting film that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any wind ow of the car, because such action would "render inoperative" the vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 205. This same provision of Federal law prohibits a service station from permanently removing safety belts or permanently disconnecting brake lines on motor vehicles.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of vehicle

owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, no provision of a Federal statute or this agency's reg ulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The individual States, however, have the authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles and to establish requirements for vehicles operated or registered in that State. The Iowa Senate bill enclosed with your l etter appears to be an attempted exercise of this inherent authority.

You asked for comments on whether this bill, if adopted as law in Iowa, would be preempted by Standard No. 205. I assume you were referring to the provision in this Iowa bill that would prohibit the operation of motor vehicles required to be registered in the State of Iowa if the vehicle has a "sunscreening device" on the front side windows with light transmittance of less than 35 percent or on the rear window and side windows behind the driver with light transmittance of less than 20 percent. Since t he original glazing on the vehicle could have had light transmittance of as little as 70 percent, this provision would permit overall light transmittance levels of as low as 25 percent for the front side windows and 14 percent for the rear windows.

This provision in the Iowa bill, and similar provisions in statutes adopted by other States, does not purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittance of less than 70 percent on any window of a passenger car would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Iowa had in place a statute that would per mit persons to operate and register vehicles whose windows had light transmittance that was far lower. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifications commercial enterprises ca n make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Iowa from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in the State of Iowa.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and this Iowa bill, and Iowa would be free to enforce the provisions of this bill if it is enacted into law. We would, however, urge the State of Iowa to carefully consider the adv erse safety consequences that would result from enacting this bill into law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety. Your letter indicated that Iowa ha d also adopted this 70 percent light transmittance minimum as a State requirement for new vehicles. It is not clear why the State of Iowa would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance in new ve hicles is satisfied by allowing light transmittance levels as low as 25 and 14 percent in vehicles to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further

questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht90-3.36

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 31, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Jack E. Eanes -- Chief, Vehicle services, State of Delaware, Department of Public Safety, Division of motor Vehicles

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Letter dated 10-20-89 to T. Vinson from J. E. Eanes (OCC 3822)

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter asking whether very darkly tinted rear windows that obscure the center high mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) required in passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 would violate any Federal laws or regulations. Let me begin by apologizing for the delay in this response. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations for you.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act) authorizes this agency to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. We have exercised this authority to issue two safety standards that are relevant to your question. The first of these is standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (49 CFR S571.108), which applies to all new vehicles and new replacement equipment for motor vehicles. Among the requirement s set forth in this Standard is a requirement for all passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985 to be equipped with a CHMSL of specified minimum size, brightness, and visibility from the range of locations set forth in the standard. The second relevant standard is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR S571.205). This standard applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing for use in motor vehicles, and includes specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance of the glaz ing (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides that no person may manufacture or sell any vehicle unless it is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. A new passenger car with a rear window tinted so darkly that th e CHMSL was not easily visible would probably not be in conformity with Standards No. 108 and 205, and so could not legally be manufactured or sold in the United States. However, this prohibition on the manufacture or sale of a nonconforming vehicle doe s not apply after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer.

Both before and after the first sale of a vehicle, section 108(a)(2) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)) provides that: "No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . ." If any of the listed commercial entities were to install tint film or otherwise darken the rear windows on passenger cars so that the light transmittance of that window plus the darkening material was below 70 percent, those entities would be "rendering inoperative" the light transmittance of the rear window of the car, in violation of Federal law.

This same prohibition in Federal law makes it unlawful for a service station to permanently remove the safety belts or permanently disconnect the brake lines on a car.

Please note that the Safety Act does not apply to the actions of individual vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle no longer complies with the safety standards aft er such alterations. Hence, no provision of the Safety Act or our safety standards makes it unlawful for vehicle owners themselves to tint or otherwise darken the rear window of their car so that its light transmittance is below 70 percent and/or its CH MSL is obscured.

The individual States, however, do have authority to regulate the modifications that vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles. The States also have the authority to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered or operated in that Stake.

You indicated in your letter that the State of Delaware "allows vehicle rear windows to be tinted as dark as the owner desires." While I am not familiar with Delaware law, I assume that this statute, and similar statutes adopted by other States, does no t purport to legitimize conduct -- the rendering inoperative of glazing and CHMSLs by firms installing window tinting -- that is illegal under Federal law. In other words, any commercial firms installing window tinting that results in light transmittanc e of less than 70 percent and/or reduces the required brightness of the CHMSL would have violated the "render inoperative" provision in Federal law, even if Delaware permits individual owners to make such modifications themselves and to register and oper ate vehicles with rear windows and CHMSLs that would not comply with the requirements of the Federal safety standards for new vehicles. Conversely, the Federal law setting requirements for the manufacture and sale of new vehicles and limiting the modifi cations commercial enterprises can make to those vehicles does not prohibit the State of Delaware from establishing lesser limits on owner modifications to their own vehicles and as the minimum requirements for vehicles to be operated and registered in t he State of Delaware.

Thus, there does not appear to be any legal conflict between Federal law and Delaware law, and Delaware would be free to enforce the provisions of its law. We would, however, urge the State of Delaware to carefully consider the adverse safety consequenc es that will result from the provision of its law. NHTSA has determined that a 70 percent light transmittance minimum for new vehicles is the appropriate level to assure motor vehicle safety, and that the CHMSL on passenger cars enhances motor vehicle s afety. It is not clear why the State of Delaware would conclude that the safety need that justifies requiring not less than 70 percent light transmittance and CHMSLs in new passenger cars is satisfied by allowing far lower light transmittance levels and lower-brightness CHMSLs in passenger cars to be operated in the State.

I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need additional information about this topic, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202)

366-2992.

ID: 1982-2.40

DATE: 08/16/82

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; C. M. Price; NHTSA

TO: Ichikoh Industries, Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

AUG 16 1982

AIR MAIL

Mr. Fukuo Takata, Manager Certifications Regulations Section Ichikon Industries, Ltd. 80 Itado, Isehara City Kanagawa 259-11 JAPAN

Dear Mr. Takata:

This is in reference to your letter of June 30, 1982, to Mr. Elliott of this agency concerning the effective luminous lens area of a front turn signal lamp under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108 with respect to three proposed designs.

We assume that you wish to know what is the effective projected luminous lens area for a front turn signal on vehicles less than 80 inches in overall width. The SAE Standard No. J588e, "Turn Signal Lamps," which you quote, imposes no additional requirements for a two compartment front turn signal lamp. Thus, it appears that so long as you meet the minimum of 3.5 square inches for a single compartment lamp, your proposed designs (Case 1 and 2) meet the necessary requirements of FMVSS No. 108. Case 3 would not conform as neither of the two section compartments meets the 3.5 square inch minimum.

Sincerely,

Courtney M. Price Associate Administrator for Rulemaking

L57/30 June 30, 1982

Mr. Marx Elliott Program Manager Rulemaking National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 U.S.A.

Subject: Effective projected luminous area of Front Turn Signal Lamp

Dear Mr. Elliott,

We would like to inquire as follows. FMVSS 108 references SAE J588e for turn signal lamps, and SAE J588e prescribe Effective Projected Luminous Area as follows.

SAE J588e

3.2 The effective projected luminous area of a single compartment lamp measured on a plane at right angles to the axis of a lamp must be at least 8.0 sq in. for a rear lamp and at least 3.5 sq in. for a front lamp.

3.3 If a multiple compartment lamp or multiple lamps are used to meet the photometric requirements of a rear turn signal lamp, the effective projected luminous lens area of each compartment or lamp shall be at least 3 1/2 sq. in. provided the combined area is at least 8 sq in.

That is, in the case of front turn signal lamp, section 3.2 provide that Effective Projected Luminous Area should be more than 3.5 sq in.

But when we want to take into account of two compartments of front turn signal lamp, may we understand that the following cases are acceptable for FMVSS 108.

*Insert artwork

Condition of Effective Projected Luminous Area

Area A Area B A + B

Case 1 >/3.5 in.2 >/3.5 in.2 >/3.5 in.2

Case 2

/3.5 in.2

Case 3 < 3.5 in.2 <>/3.5 in.2

We await your early reply.

Very truly yours, ICHIKOH INDUSTRIES, LTD.

Fukuo Takata, Manager Certifications Regulations Section

ID: nht79-2.28

DATE: 09/11/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Dixson, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

NOA-30

Mr. Clay Lansdown Chief Engineer H. D. Instrument Division Dixson, Inc. P. O. Box 1949 Grand Junction, Colorado 81501

Dear Mr. Lansdown:

This is in response to your letter of August 8, 1979, asking whether construction, mining and agricultural machinery must comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 127. In order for a vehicle to fall within the ambit of Standard 127 or any other safety standard it must be a motor vehicle. Section 103(3) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) defines a motor vehicle as

any vehicle drawn or driven by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

Thus, a motor vehicle is a vehicle which the manufacturer expects will use the public highways as part of its intended function.

There are two exceptions to the above rule that permit certain vehicles to use the highways without being considered motor vehicles. Agricultural equipment that is strictly used in farm fields and only incidentally uses the roads adjacent to those fields has been excepted from the definition of motor vehicle. However, not all agricultural equipment is excepted from the definition of motor vehicle. A piece of agricultural equipment, like any other vehicle, that uses the public streets and roads not adjacent to the fields on a necessary and recurring basis would be considered to be a motor vehicle and must meet the requirements of Standard 127 and the other safety standards.

The agency has further excepted certain vehicles from the definition of motor vehicle despite frequent highway use. Some maintenance and construction equipment whose maximum speed does not exceed 20 miles per hour and whose abnormal configuration distinquishes them from the traffic flow are not considered motor vehicles.

I suggest that you contact the manufacturers to whom you are selling your equipment. It is their responsibility initially for determining whether use on the public highways is part of the vehicles' intended function. The enclosed information sheet should be helpful in making that determination.

Sincerely,

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel

Enclosure

August 7, 1979

National Highway Traffic Administration United States Department of Transportation Docket No. 76-06 Speedometer-Odometers 400 Seventh Street S. W. Washington, D. C. 20590

Dear Sir,

Our product line includes electronic speedometer-odometers. A significant portion of the units we manufacture are sold to manufacturers of construction, mining, and agricultural machinery. I am not sure if S3 of Standard 127 defines vehicles of the type listed above. These vehicles do on occasion, travel on highways, and in some cases are used to repair and build highways. The speedometers in these vehicles rarely, if ever, have markings above 40 MPH I wish to know if these vehicles are defined by S3 of Standard 127 in order to determine if the speedometers are required to meet S4.1.1 and S4.1.3 of Standard 127.

Sincerely,

DIXSON, INC.

Clay Lansdown Chief Engineer aH. D. Instrument Division

CL/ms