ID: nht95-4.57

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: October 14, 1995

FROM: Samuel J. Dubbin -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Bob Clement -- U.S. House of Representatives

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 10/03/95 Letter from Bob Clement to Ricardo Martinez

TEXT: Dear Congressman Clement:

Thank you for your letter of October 3, 1995, enclosing correspondence from Mr. Dale Allen Pommer concerning his attempts to have a third seat belt installed in the back seat of his 1983 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer. Mr. Pommer has been told that this cannot b e done because of safety laws. You requested comments on Mr. Pommer's letter. As explained below, there is not Federal prohibition against the modification Mr. Pommer would like done to his vehicle. However, Federal law does place some limits on how t he modification is done. The installation of additional seat belts must be done in a way that does not compromise the performance of the existing seat belts.

Some background information about the agency may be useful. NHTSA has the authority to issue federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Federal motor vehicle safety standards are mi nimum standards, and may be exceeded by manufacturers. Federal law prohibits the manufacture or sale of any new motor vehicle or new item of motor vehicle equipment which does not conform to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect at the time of manufacture.

After the first retail sale, there is a limit on the modifications that can be made by certain businesses to vehicles. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "knowingly making inoperative" any device or element o f design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard (49 USC @ 30122). In general, the "make inoperative" prohibition would require a business which modifies motor vehicles to ensure that it does not remove, disco nnect, or degrade the performance of safety equipment installed in compliance with an applicable safety standard.

A safety belt is an item of motor vehicle equipment and all safety belts sold in the United States must be certified as complying with Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as a replacement part, Standard No. 209 sets forth strength, elongation, webbing width, durability, and other requirements for seat belt assemblies. The additional belt which might be added to Mr. Pommer's vehicle must comply with the re quirements of Standard No. 209.

In addition to Standard No. 209, the agency has issued two additional safety standards which apply to new vehicles and affect safety belts: Standard No. 208, Occupant Crast Protection, which sets forth requirements for occupant protection at the various seating positions in vehicles, and Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, which establishes strength and location requirements for seat belt anchorages. The 1983 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer would have been required to have, at a minimum, a lap belt at each rear designated seating position.

A "designated seating position" is defined by NHTSA regulations as:

any plan view location capable of accommodating a person at least as large as a 5th percentile adult female, if the overall seat configuration and design and vehicle design is such that the position is likely to be used as a seating position while the vehicle is in motion . . . Any bench or split-bench seat . . . having greater than 50 inches of hip room (measured in accordance with SAE Standard J1100(a)) shall have not less than three designated seating positions.

Since the 1982 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer had a rear bench seat with 49.5 inches of hip room, that seat was required to have a minimum of two lap belts.

The "make inoperative" prohibition discussed earlier would not prohibit a business from adding a third seat belt to Mr. Pommer's vehicle. In addition, the anchorages would not have to comply with Standard No. 210. However, in adding the third seat belt , is is possible that the existing belts and anchorages would have to be relocated. The businesses contacted by Mr. Pommer may be concerned that the belts and anchorages could not be removed and replaced without "making inoperative" the compliance of th ose belts and anchorages.

I hope this information has been helpful.

ID: nht90-2.63

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/31/90

FROM: BARRY FELRICE -- ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR RULEMAKING NHTSA

TO: MIKE LOVE -- MANAGER, SAFETY COMPLIANCE PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC.

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM BARRY FELRICE -- NHTSA TO STEPHEN WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL ENTITLED PORSCHE'S MODIFIED ANTITHEFT EXEMPTION, LETTER DATED 04/12/90; LETTER DATED 03/30/90 FROM MIKE LOVE -- PORSCHE TO JERRY CURRY -- NHTSA ADMINISTRATOR ON 49 CFR PART 543 EXEMPTION

TEXT: This responds to your request that this agency determine that the new feature added to the antitheft device proposed to be installed on the MY 1991 911 and 928 Porsche car lines, represents a de minimis change in the system that was the basis for the age ncy's previous granting of a theft exemption for those car lines beginning in MY 1990, and that therefore Porsche 911's and 928's containing the new device would be fully covered by that exemption.

As you are aware, the Porsche 911 and 928 car lines were granted an exemption, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 543, from antitheft marking because Porsche showed that the antitheft device to be used in lieu of marking on these car lines was likely to be as effec tive as parts marking. This exemption was issued on May 25, 1989, and appeared in the Federal Register on June 2, 1989 (54 FR 23727).

The agency granted the exemption from theft marking because the agency found that based on substantial evidence, the agency believed that the antitheft device is "likely to be as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle theft as compliance with the parts-marking requirements of the theft prevention standard (49 CFR Part 541)." In the granting of the exemption from theft marking, the agency stated that it believed that the device will provide the types of performance listed in 49 CFR Part 543.6( a)(3): Promoting activation; attracting attention to unauthorized entries; preventing defeat or circumventing of the device by unauthorized persons; preventing operation of the vehicle by unauthorized entrants; and ensuring the reliability and durability of the device.

In your letter, it was stated that beginning from MY 1991, Porsche plans to modify the antitheft device that is standard equipment on the Porsche 911 and 928, as follows: integrate the alarm control unit with the central locking and interior light contro l units; incorporate a feature that will also monitor the glove box for unauthorized opening; improve

P2

diagnostic capability in order to enhance serviceability; and install a capability to accept other features (such as motion sensors) if they are desired in the future.

In addition, it was stated that the changes in the system will be virtually unnoticeable to the operator, and that the system will still be armed passively by locking either door with the key. Further, with the addition of the glovebox, all the same poi nts of entry, such as the doors, hood, and hatch, will be monitored by the system and the engine disabling and alarm features will be the same. Porsche further stated that the system "will be as protected and tamper resistant as the current system."

After reviewing the proposed changes to the componentry and performance of the antitheft device on which the exemption was based, the agency concludes that the changes are de minimis. While the new device has enhanced componentry and provides some aspec ts of performance not provided by the original device, it also continues to provide the same aspects of performance provided by the original device and relies on essentially the same componentry to provide that performance. Therefore, it is not necessar y for Porsche to submit a petition to modify the exemption pursuant to 49 CFR Part 543.9(c)(2).

If Porsche does not implement the new antitheft device as described in your letter, or delays implementation until after MY 1991, we request that Porsche notify the agency of such decisions.

It is my understanding that, in an April 13, 1990 telephone conversation with Dorothy Nakama of NHTSA's Office of Chief Counsel, you stated that Porsche was not requesting confidential treatment of any information provided in your letter. Therefore, a c opy of your letter, and this response, will be placed together in NHTSA's public docket.

REF: PART 543

ID: nht79-4.23

DATE: 10/22/79

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Uniroyal GmbH

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of October 12, 1979, asking whether the character height of 5/32nds of an inch, stated in the Uniform Tire Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards (49 CFR 575.104, Figure 1), is considered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to specify the only acceptable height for UTQG sidewall molding, or whether the agency interprets this measurement as a minimum value.

The specification of 5/32nds of an inch tire sidewall characters was intended by NHTSA to establish a minimum requirement to assure readability of the UTQG information presented. The agency has no objection to the use of characters of a height greater than 5/32nds of an inch, so long as all characters used to convey UTQG information are of the same height.

ID: aiam4704

"Dear Mr. Cooper: This responds to your letter asking this agency t consider a problem your company faces with respect to Standard 217, Bus Window Retention and Release (49 CFR 571.217). More specifically, you asked how some of your buses could be certified as complying with the emergency exit labeling requirements set forth in Standard 217 for buses other than school buses. I apologize for the delay in this response. Paragraph S5.5.1 of Standard 217 provides that, in buses other than school buses, each push-out window or other emergency exit shall have the designation 'Emergency Exit' followed by concise operating instructions, describing each motion necessary to unlatch and open the exit, located within 6 inches of the release mechanism. The purpose of this requirement is to identify for bus occupants the location and explain the use of specially-installed emergency exits. As I understand your letter, you have no difficulties providing appropriate instructions in the specified location. Paragraph S5.5.1 continues with the following language: When a release mechanism is not located within an occupant space of an adjacent seat, a label...that indicates the location of the nearest release mechanism shall be placed within the occupant space. The terms 'adjacent seat' and 'occupant space' are defined in S4 of Standard 217 as follows: 'Adjacent seat' means a designated seating position located so that some portion of its occupant space is not more than 10 inches from an emergency exit, for a distance of at least 15 inches measured horizontally and parallel to the exit. 'Occupant space' means the space directly above the seat and footwell, bounded vertically by the ceiling and horizontally by the normally positioned seat back and the nearest obstruction of occupant motion in the direction the seat faces. You stated that many of your buses have seats that face the aisle and that back up against windows designated as emergency exits. These aisle-facing seats are 'adjacent seats' with respect to the emergency exits. The release mechanism for the emergency exit is not within the 'occupant space' for these aisle-facing seats, since the release mechanisms are behind, not above, these seats. You enclosed a group of photographs to further illustrate this situation. Since the release mechanism for the emergency exit is not within the occupant space of these adjacent aisle-facing seats, paragraph S5.5.1 of Standard 217 requires a label indicating the location of the release mechanism for the emergency exit to be placed within the occupant space for these seats. You have noted that the occupant space for these seats does not include any place to which this label could be attached. The nearest obstruction of occupant motion in the direction the aisle-facing seats face is the aisle facing seat on the opposite side of the bus. There are no intervening objects other than narrow vertical stanchions in the center of the aisle. Additionally, you suggested that placing the label on the floor or ceiling of the bus would not serve the purposes of this requirement, since those locations would not be readily visible to the seated occupant in an emergency situation. In response to your letter, we have carefully considered the labeling requirements of S5.5.1 as they apply to aisle-facing seats in front of windows that serve as emergency exits. The final rule adopting this additional labeling requirement explained that NHTSA was concerned that an occupant of an adjacent seat might hinder egress through an emergency exit if the occupant did not know how to use the emergency exit. See 37 FR 9394, at 9395, May 10, 1972. In instances in which the release mechanism itself is not within the occupant space of an adjacent seat, a label within the occupant space directing the occupant of the seat to the emergency exit instructions will help reduce the likelihood that the occupants would inadvertently obstruct egress through the emergency exits. NHTSA's goal of minimizing the likelihood of inadvertent obstruction of emergency exits is equally applicable to forward-facing and aisle-facing seats. However, the means of achieving that goal (i.e., placing a label within the occupant space of an adjacent seat, if the release mechanism is not within that occupant space) may not be equally successful for forward-facing and aisle-facing seats. The agency did not focus upon aisle-facing seats when it adopted this labeling requirement. With respect to forward-facing seats, it is relatively simple to locate a label within the occupant space that will be readily visible both to seated occupants and to persons standing in the aisle, as required by S5.5.2. However, with respect to aisle-facing seats, there may not be any location within the occupant space of such seats where a label could be placed so that the label would be visible to occupants of the seat and to persons standing in the aisle. If the labels were not visible in an emergency, such labels would not further NHTSA's goal of minimizing inadvertent obstruction of emergency exits. Accordingly, we plan to issue a notice proposing to amend and clarify the requirements of S5.5.1 of Standard 217 as they apply to aisle-facing seats. Please note that, unless and until a final rule amending S5.5.1 of Standard 217 becomes effective, the current requirements of S5.5.1 remain in effect for aisle-facing seats. However, the agency believes that it would be inappropriate at this time to enforce the requirement in S5.5.1 that additional information be labeled within the occupant space of aisle-facing seats given the uncertainty that such labels will serve the purpose for which the labeling requirements were established, as noted above. Accordingly, until the agency makes a final decision on the proposed rulemaking mentioned above, NHTSA will not take any enforcement actions against bus manufacturers that do not place a label indicating the location of the nearest emergency exit release mechanism within the occupant space of adjacent aisle-facing seats. Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel";

ID: aiam3964

Dear Mr. Locker: This responds to your recent letter to Steve Kratzke of my staff seeking an interpretation of the requirements of Standard No. 213, *Child Restraint Systems* (49 CFR S571.213). Specifically, you asked if a belt which is attached to and is not easily removed from a movable shield is an integral part of the shield within the meaning of section S6.1.2.3.1(c), and may therefore be attached when the restraint is tested in test configuration II of Standard No. 213. Such a belt is an integral part of the movable shield and may be attached during test configuration II.; Your client, Collier- Keyworth, has designed a child restraint tha integrates the webbing of the upper torso restraint with the crotch strap and the movable shield in a continuous connection, with the bottom of the crotch strap webbing intended to be buckled to the base of the seat between the child's legs after the child is positioned in the restraint. As described in your letter and shown in the photographs enclosed therewith, the crotch strap portion of the webbing is considered an integral part of the movable shield, because it is formed as a unit with that shield. Hence, section S6.1.2.3.1(c) of Standard No. 213 allows you to attach the crotch strap portion of the webbing to the base of the seat during configuration II testing.; I suggest, however, that Collier- Keyworth incorporate into th restraint some means of alerting parents each time they place a child in the restraint that the crotch strap must be buckled into the base of the seat. This suggestion is based on past experience with child restraints which have both a movable shield and a crotch strap which must be buckled to adequately protect the child.; In the late 1970's, there were several child restraint designs whic had a crotch strap permanently attached to the base of the seat and a movable shield which lowered in front of the child. The designers of these restraints intended that the crotch strap be attached to the shield to properly restrain the child. However, such restraints were often misused by consumers who did not attach the crotch strap to the shield. NHTSA was concerned that in the event of a crash, a child occupant would submarine partly or completely out of restraints whose crotch straps were not fastened to the shield.; When amended Standard No. 213 was being promulgated, the agency decide to include some procedure for testing those child restraints whose design could lead a parent to believe that a child was adequately protected when the restraint was, in fact, being misused. In the case of restraints with movable shields, the agency believed that some parents would conclude that a child was protected by the restraint simply by lowering the movable shield in front of the child without buckling the crotch strap. Test configuration II in Standard No. 213 was intended to address this situation, by attempting to ensure that child restraint designs which would likely be misused would afford some minimal level of protection when they were misused. To achieve this end, test configuration II requires that child restraints with a movable shield in front of the child be tested in a 20 mile per hour crash with the shield in front of the test dummy, but without attaching any belts which are not an integral part of the shield.; Many previous interpretations of this standard explained that sectio S6.1.2.3.1(c) allows belts which are an integral part of the movable shield to be attached during configuration II testing because the agency believed that the need to buckle such belts would be more readily apparent than in the case of nonintegral belts. That is, a parent would be less likely to conclude that the child was adequately protected if the integral belt was not buckled.; During 1980, the manufacturers of the restraints with movable shield to which crotch straps were to be attached asked NHTSA if the crotch straps could be attached to the shield during configuration II testing if the movable shield were spring-loaded so that it would not stay in front of the child unless the crotch strap were attached. The agency concluded that the rationale for not allowing the nonintegral crotch strap to be fastened during configuration II testing would not apply if the crotch strap were to be fastened to spring-loaded movable shields. Unless these crotch straps were attached, there would be nothing in front of the child to restrain him or her in the event of a crash. Therefore, NHTSA decided it was unlikely that a parent would conclude that a child would be adequately protected without attaching these crotch straps, and permitted spring-loaded movable shields to attach nonintegral crotch straps during configuration II testing under Standard No. 213.; The shield on the Collier-Keyworth child restraint is not spring-loade and thus would remain in front of an occupant regardless of whether the crotch strap is fastened. Our examination of the photographs and materials enclosed with your letter suggests that it is possible a parent might conclude that a child was adequately protected simply by lowering the shield in front of the child without buckling the crotch strap. For instance, Figure 5 of Exhibit B shows the shield lowered and staying in place without buckling the crotch strap. I am sure that Collier-Keyworth wants to minimize the chances of this sort of misuse occurring, and will want to incorporate some means of alerting parents each time they place a child in the restraint that the crotch strap must be buckled. Such a means could be spring-loading the movable shield, sas would be required if the crotch strap were not an integral part of the shield, or could be a 'warning' label on the front of the shield explaining the need to buckle the crotch strap.; If you have any further questions or need more information on thi subject, please contact Mr. Kratzke at this address or by telephone at (202) 426-2992.; Sincerely, Jeffrey R. Miller, Chief Counsel

ID: nht95-1.75

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: February 24, 1995

FROM: David T. Holland -- President, Europa International, Inc.

TO: Mary Versailles -- Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: Via fax # 202-366-3820 RE: Request for clarification of passive restraint phase-in requirements of FMVSS 208.

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 4/3/95 LETTER FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO DAVID T. HOLLAND (A43; STD. 208)

TEXT: Dear Ms. Versailles,

This letter is to follow up our recent phone conversation where-in you acknowledged that if Europa International, Inc. (R91-002) imports Canadian specification MPV's, such as the Chrysler Minivan, that meets the MPV passive restraint phase-in requirement s of FMVSS 208, Europa will be in compliance as it can count these vehicles toward the required percentage.

Please acknowledge this letter by signing below and faxing back or by a letter from your office.

Thank you for your assistance.

Acknowledged by:

Mary Versailles Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

ID: nht76-2.28

DATE: 10/08/76

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; S. P. Wood for F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of September 23, 1976, asking for an interpretation of the spacing requirements for motorcycle turn signal lamps specified in Table IV of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.

Standard No. 108 requires that motorcycle turn signal lamps be located so that their edges are at least 4 inches from the edge of the headlamps (on the front) and tail or stop lamps (on the rear). You have asked for confirmation "that the minimum separation distance is measured between the edges of the illuminated lenses of the respective lamps on a line passing through each lamp . . . rather than being measured on a horizontal line between two planes touching the edges of the illuminated lenses".

This will confirm your interpretation that the minimum separation distance is to be measured at the point where the edges of the two lamps are closest to each other.

ID: 1769y

Mabel Y. Bullock, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
State of North Carolina
Department of Justice
P. O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602-0629

Dear Ms. Bullock:

Thank you for your letter to Ms. Susan Schruth of my staff, regarding North Carolina General Statute 20-127, Windshields must be unobstructed. I regret the delay in responding. You enclosed a copy of the statute, the regulations implementing it, a copy of a December 18, l987 legal memorandum prepared by your department concluding that a State statute or regulation allowing 35% light transmittance through windows in motor vehicles would be preempted by current Federal safety laws and standards regulating this same subject matter, and a copy of a May 6, 1988 letter from the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) to Mr. William S. Hiatt, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for North Carolina, asserting that the North Carolina statute was not preempted by Federal laws and regulations. You asked for my opinion as to whether the North Carolina statute conflicts with any provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. /1381 et seq.) or with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (49 CFR 571.1 et seq.).

Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. As you are aware, our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards that we have issued under this authority is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR /571.205), which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor vehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that, "No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard ..." Because of this statutory requirement, any manufacturer, importer, or dealer that installs solar films or other sun screen devices on new glazing materials or the glazing installed in new vehicles must certify that the vehicle continues to comply with the light transmittance and other requirements of Standard No. 205.

The requirement that a car comply with all applicable safety standards applies only until the car is first sold to a consumer. See section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). Both before and after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, any modifications to the vehicle's windows, including tinting, are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from "rendering inoperative" any device or element of design installed in a vehicle in compliance with any safety standard. In the case of windows in a passenger car, this means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install a sun screen device or window tinting that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any window of the car, or otherwise cause the car to no longer comply with the other requirements of Standard No. 205. Violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition can result in Federal civil penalties to the manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business of up to $1000 for each noncomplying installation.

Please note that Federal law does not affect vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, no provision of a Federal statute or this agency's regulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The authority of States to regulate glazing is affected by section 103(d) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. /1392(d)). This section provides that:

[w]henever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.

The effect of this provision of the Safety Act, with respect to the light transmittance requirements of Standard No. 205, is to expressly prohibit any State from specifying some level of light transmittance other than the 70 percent specified in Standard No. 205 for new motor vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Each of the individual States has authority to enforce identical standards (i.e., a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance) for new motor vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Additionally, each of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in that State.

Having provided this background, we want to turn now to the results of our review of the North Carolina statute and regulations, along with your office's memorandum concluding that the statute is preempted by Federal law.

1. New vehicles and new glazing for use in vehicles. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum that the North Carolina statute would be preempted if it specifies any requirements other than the requirements of Standard No. 205 (minimum of 70 percent light transmittance) for new vehicles or for new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act and Standard No. 205 require all new vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles to be delivered to the first purchaser with a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Section 103(d) of the Safety Act expressly preempts any non-identical State standard on the subject of window tinting. Section 20-127(d) of the North Carolina statute appears to permit a single application of tinted film with a light transmittance of as little as 35 percent to be applied to vehicle glazing after factory delivery, but before sale to the public. This provision is preempted by Federal law, as is any other provision of North Carolina law which specifies that new glazing and glazing in new vehicles shall have some level of light transmittance other than the 70 percent minimum light transmittance requirement specified in Standard No. 205.

2. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum that the North Carolina statute would be preempted by Federal law if it permits the commercial installation of sunscreen materials so that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing no longer meet the 70 percent light transmittance requirement specified in Standard No. 205. This conclusion is based on the conflict between the North Carolina statute and the "render inoperative" provision of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That provision prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or an item of glazing with any of the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement.

Apart from the issue of preemption, I want to note that the provisions of State law cannot alter the effect of the "render inoperative" prohibition in Federal law. Regardless of how North Carolina law treats the combination of the glazing and the tinting, if it results in less than 70 percent light transmittance, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business that installed such tinting on a vehicle would be liable for the Federal civil penalty discussed above.

3. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by individual owners themselves after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. As noted above, Federal law does not regulate modifications that individual owners themselves make to their vehicles or glazing after the first purchase in good faith for purposes other than resale, even if those modifications result in the vehicles or glazing no longer complying with the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the requirement for at least 70 percent light transmittance. The State of North Carolina is free to establish whatever restrictions, if any, it deems appropriate on individual owner modifications, without regard to the requirements of Standard No. 205. To the extent that the North Carolina statute seeks to address these individual owner modifications, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

4. Requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State of North Carolina. An individual State is free to establish whatever requirements it deems appropriate for vehicles to be registered in the State, provided that those State requirements would not prohibit the registration of vehicles that complied with the requirements of the Federal safety standards. Thus, the State of North Carolina is free to permit vehicles that do not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205 to be registered in North Carolina. To the extent that the North Carolina window tinting statute seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

We have also reviewed the May 6, 1988 letter from MEMA to Mr. Hiatt, in which MEMA discusses why it believes North Carolina's statute would not be preempted by Federal law. The MEMA discussion does not address the "render inoperative" provision in section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act, which prohibits commercial businesses from adversely affecting the compliance of elements of design installed in a vehicle or item of equipment in compliance with a safety standard, regardless of whether the vehicle is new or used. As was previously stated, Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from ever installing window tinting material for the owner of a car if the combination of the original glazing and the tinting material results in less than 70 percent light transmittance through any window of the car.

To summarize, the North Carolina statute would be preempted to the extent that it seeks to permit some level of light transmittance other than that specified in Standard No. 205 for glazing in vehicles prior to the first purchase of the vehicles in good faith for purposes other than resale. Similarly, the statute would be preempted to the extent it seeks to permit the commercial installation of sunscreen materials with the result that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing no longer complies with the requirements of Standard No. 205. However, the North Carolina statute would not be preempted to the extent that it seeks to regulate the modifications that owners themselves can make to their vehicles or to the extent that it seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, even if those requirements differ from those specified in Standard No. 205.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

/ref:205#VSA d:4/4/89

ID: nht89-1.70

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 04/13/89

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TO: MABEL Y. BULLOCK -- ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER FROM MABEL Y. BULLOCK AND LACY H. THORNBURG TO SUSAN SCHRUTH -- NHTSA RE WINDOW TINTING, FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS, OCC 2142; NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE REGULATING WINDOW TINTING; LETTER DATED 12/18/87 FROM LACY H. THORNBURG A ND MABEL Y. BULLOCK, SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLES REGULATIONS OF DARK SHADED WINDOWS; PREEMPTION; LETTER DATED 05/06/88 FROM DAIRL BRAGG TO WILLIAM S. HIATT; LETTER DATED 10/28/82 FROM FRANK BERNDT -- NHTSA TO LAWRENCE T. HIROHATA, NOA-30; LETTER DATED 04/04/8 5 FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER TO ARMOND CARDARELLI; REGULATIONS DATED 07/01/85 EST, FEDERAL AUTO SAFETY LAWS AND MOTOR VEHICLE WINDOW TINTING.

TEXT: Dear Ms. Bullock:

Thank you for your letter to Ms. Susan Schruth of my staff, regarding North Carolina General Statute 20-127, Windshields must be unobstructed. I regret the delay in responding. You enclosed a copy of the statute, the regulations implementing it, a copy of a December 18, 1987 legal memorandum prepared by your department concluding that a State statute or regulation allowing 35% light transmittance through windows in motor vehicles would be preempted by current Federal safety laws and standards regulati ng this same subject matter, and a copy of a May 6, 1988 letter from the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) to Mr. William S. Hiatt, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for North Carolina, asserting that the North Carolina statute was no t preempted by Federal laws and regulations. You asked for my opinion as to whether the North Carolina statute conflicts with any provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq.) or with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (49 CFR 571.1 et seq.).

Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. As you are aware, our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehic les and certain items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards that we have issued under this authority is Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials (49 CFR @ 571.205), which applies to all new vehicles and all new glazing materials for use in motor v ehicles. Among the requirements set forth in Standard No. 205 are specifications for minimum levels of light transmittance (70 percent light transmittance in areas requisite for driving visibility, which includes all windows in passenger cars).

Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) specifies that, "No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or

import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard . . ." Because of this statutory requirement, any manufacturer, importer, or dealer that installs solar films or other sun screen devices on new glazing materials or the glazing installed in new vehicles must certify that the vehicle continues to comply with th e light transmittance and other requirements of Standard No. 205.

The requirement that a car comply with all applicable safety standards applies only until the car is first sold to a consumer. See section 108(b)(1) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(1)). Both before and after a vehicle is first sold to a consumer, any modifications to the vehicle's windows, including tinting, are affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)). That section prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from "rendering inoperative " any device or element of design installed in a vehicle in compliance with any safety standard. In the case of windows in a passenger car, this means that no manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business could install a sun screen device or win dow tinting that would result in a light transmittance of less than 70 percent for any window of the car, or otherwise cause the car to no longer comply with the other requirements of Standard No. 205. Violations of this "render inoperative" prohibition can result in Federal civil penalties to the manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business of up to $ 1000 for each noncomplying installation.

Please note that Federal law does not affect vehicle owners. Vehicle owners may alter their own vehicles and operate them on the highways as they please, even if the vehicle's windows no longer comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205. Hence, n o provision of a Federal statute or this agency's regulations prevents individual vehicle owners themselves from tinting the windows on their vehicles.

The authority of States to regulate glazing is affected by section 103(d) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)). This section provides that:

[whenever] a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or ite m of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from en forcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.

The effect of this provision of the Safety Act, with respect to the light transmittance requirements of Standard No. 205, is to expressly prohibit any State from specifying some level of light transmittance other than than 70 percent specified in Standar d No. 205 for new motor vehicles and

new glazing for the use in motor vehicles. Each of the individual States has authority to enforce identical standards (i.e., a minimum of 70 percent light transmittance) for new motor vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Additionally, eac h of the individual States has the authority to regulate the modifications that may be made to vehicles by their owners and to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in that State.

Having provided this background, we want to turn now to the results of our review of the North Carolina statute and regulations, along with your office's memorandum concluding that the statue is preempted by Federal law.

1. New vehicles and new glazing for use in vehicles. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum that the North Carolina statute would be preempted if it specifies any requirements other than the requirements of Standard No. 205 (minimum of 70 per cent light transmittance) for new vehicles or few new glazing for use in motor vehicles. Section 108(a)(1) of the Safety Act and Standard No. 205 require all new vehicles and new glazing for use in motor vehicles to be delivered to the first purchaser w ith a light transmittance of at least 70 percent. Section 103(d) of the Safety Act expressly preempts any non-identical State standard on the subject of window tinting. Section 20-127(d) of the North Carolina statute appears to permit a single applicat ion of tinted film with a light transmittance of as little as 35 percent to be applied to vehicle glazing after factory delivery, but before sale to the public. This provision is preempted by Federal law, as is any other provision of North Carolina law which specifies that new glazing and glazing in new vehicles shall have some level of light transmittance other than the 70 percent minimum light transmittance requirement specified in Standard No. 205.

2. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by manufacturers, distributors, dealers and repair businesses after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. We concur with the conclusions in your memorandum tha t the North Carolina statute would be preempted by Federal law if it permits the commercial installation of sunscreen materials so that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing no longer meet the 70 percent light transmittance r equirement specified in Standard No. 205. This conclusion is based on the conflict between the North Carolina statute and the "render inoperative" provision of section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That provision prohibits any manufacturer, distributor , dealer, or repair business from rendering inoperative the compliance of a vehicle or an item of glazing with any of the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the minimum 70 percent light transmittance requirement.

Apart from the issue of preemption, I want to note that the provisions of State law cannot alter the effect of the "render inoperative" prohibition in Federal law. Regardless of how North Carolina law treats the combination of the glazing and the tintin g, if it results in less than 70

percent light transmittance, a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business that installed such tinting on a vehicle would be liable for the Federal civil penalty discussed above.

3. Modifications to vehicles and glazing by individual owners themselves after the first purchase of the vehicle or glazing in good faith for purposes other than resale. As noted above, Federal law does not regulate modifications that individual owners themselves make to their vehicles or glazing after the first purchase in good faith for purposes other than resale, even if those modifications result in the vehicles or glazing on longer complying with the requirements of Standard No. 205, including the requirement for at least 70 percent light transmittance. The State of North Carolina is free to establish whatever restrictions, if any, it deems appropriate on individual owner modifications, without regard to the requirements of Standard No. 205. To the extent that the North Carolina statute seeks to address these individual owner modifications, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

$4. Requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State of North Carolina. An individual State is free to establish whatever requirements it deems appropriate for vehicles to be registered in the State, provided that those State requirements would n ot prohibit the registration of vehicles that complied with the requirements of the Federal safety standards. Thus, the State of North Carolina is free to permit vehicles that do not comply with the requirements of Standard No. 205 to be registered in N orth Carolina. To the extent that the North Carolina window tinting statute seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, it would not be preempted by Federal law.

We have also reviewed the May 6, 1988 letter from MEMA to Mr. Hiatt, in which MEMA discusses why it believes North Carolina's statute would not be preempted by Federal law. The MEMA discussion does not address the "render inoperative" provision in secti on 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act, which prohibits commercial businesses from adversely affecting the compliance of elements of design installed in a vehicle or item of equipment in compliance with a safety standards, regardless of whether the vehicle is new or used. As was previously stated, Federal law prohibits any manufacturer, dealer, distributor, or repair business from ever installing window tinting material for the owner of a car if the combination of the original glazing and the tinting materi al results in less than 70 percent light transmittance through any window of the car.

To summarize, the North Carolina statute would be preempted to the extent that it seeks to permit some level of light transmittance other than that specified in Standard No. 205 for glazing in vehicles prior to the first purchase of the vehicles in good faith for purposes other than resale. Similarly, the statute would be preempted to the extent it seeks to permit the commercial installation of sunscreen materials with the result that the combination of the sunscreen material and the existing glazing n o longer complies with the requirements of Standard No. 205. However, the North Carolina statute would not be preempted to the extent that it seeks to regulate the modifications that owners themselves can make to

their vehicles or to the extent that it seeks to establish requirements for vehicles to be registered in the State, even if those requirements differ from those specified in Standard No. 205.

Sincerely,

ID: nht71-1.11

DATE: 03/29/71

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; E. T. Driver; NHTSA

TO: American Motors Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of March 12, 1971, to Mr. Lewis C. Owen of this office concerning an interpretation on your lens assembly, SF-3610703.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 requires a minimum effective projected illuminated area for Class A turn signal lamps of 12 square inches on motor vehicles other than passenger cars and motorcycles. The subject lens assembly used in a turn signal lamp assembly with the opaque ornament does not appear to meet the 12 square inches minimum requirement. The calculations for the area, as determined by the method contained in our October 28, 1970, letter to Mr. E. W. Bernitt, were based on measurements of the ornament, because the detail dimensions were not supplied.

The backup lamp design you discussed in a telephone conversation with Mr. Owen also apparently does not meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 108. If you would like an interpretation on this backup lamp, please furnish information on the design similar to that supplied with the subject letter.