Interpretation ID: aiam1311
Commissioner
Department of California Highway Patrol
P.O. Box 898
Sacramento
CA 95804;
Dear Mr. Pudinski: This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1973, in which yo asked that we review an enclosed opinion by the California Attorney General on the question of preemption of California motor vehicle regulations by Federal standards. The opinion concluded that the California requirement that motorcycles be wired so that their headlamps are lit whenever their engines are running was not preempted. This conclusion was contrary to the position taken in an NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney.; We adhere to the position stated in the November 14, 1972, letter tha the California requirement is preempted, and consider the legal opinion by the California Attorney General to be an erroneous view of the Federal law.; The opinion properly viewed the question as turning on the applicatio of the phrase in S. 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), 'applicable to the same aspect of performance.' If the Federal standard (Standard No. 108, 49 CFR 571.108) covers a given aspect of performance, any State requirement must be identical to it. The California opinion relied on the language in the main opinion of one of the Super Lite cases, *Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany*, 419 F.2d 499 (1969), that preemption should be 'narrowly construed', and went on to find that since Standard 108 does not specifically address the matter of wiring the headlamps when the engine is running, that aspect of performance is not covered by the standard and the California law is valid.; More important, however, than the nebulous concept of whethe preemption is 'narrowly' construed (a concept with which Judge Friendly, concurring in *Chrysler*, did not agree) is the point made at the end of the main opinion, that the administering Federal agency was supporting the State's position regarding the scope of the Federal regulation. The Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in *Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham*, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969):; >>>[W]hen construing an administrative regulation, 'a court mus necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . . [T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'<<<; In this case the situation is the opposite of that in the Super Lit cases. The NHTSA's position is that the standard does cover the aspect of performance in question. As stated in the NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, the standard 'establishes requirements for motorcycle headlighting, along with special wiring requirements for motorcycles and other vehicles.' It is the intent of the NHTSA that its requirements for headlamp performance, configuration, and wiring cover all aspects of performance directly involving headlamps, and thus preempt any non-identical State standards relating to headlamps.; The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design o performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area. In order to preempt the field it would be necessary for a Federal agency to anticipate the imaginative regulatory impulses of future State agencies or legislatures and include in a standard such provisions as, 'It is not required that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running.' Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits.; The California opinion's factual comparison with the Super Lite case is also inapt. The Super Lite itself was a new type of lighting equipment, a supplementary lamp, for which Standard 108 contained no requirements. Headlamps, by contrast, are comprehensively regulated by the standard.; For these reasons, we conclude that the California requirement tha motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running is preempted by Standard 108, and void.; While we feel constrained by law to so conclude, I want you to kno that I have instructed my staff to consider the merit of amending the Federal lighting standard to include the California requirement in 108.; Sincerely, James B. Gregory, Administrator