ID: nht73-2.12

DATE: 08/22/73

FROM: RICHARD B. DYSON For Lawrence R. Schneider -- NHTSA

TO: Alfa Romeo Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of August 9, 1973, in which you inquire whether Alfa Romeo may add to the consumer information "handouts" for prospective purchasers, required by NHTSA regulations, the consumer information required by the Environmental Protection Agency.

As long as the information required by NHTSA is presented in conformity with 49 CFR Part 575, we have no objection to the inclusion within the same covers of additional information relative to EPA requirements.

The wall posters you mentioned are not required by our regulations, so you may do with them as you please.

Alfa Romeo, Inc.

August 9, 1973

Richard Dyson --

N.H.T.S.A.

Dear Mr. Dyson:

I'm enclosing a copy of our consumer information handout that is used by our dealers in their showroom. This, as you know, is given to prospects.

This same layout is also given to each dealer in poster size format (about 30" x 40") for his showroom display.

What we'd like to do, is to add to both the handout and the poster, EPA's fuel consumption table. Ms. Sue Hickey of Dr. Briceland's office has already discussed this with you, and explained their program. It was suggested that we write you asking for your authorization to modify the Part 375 format to include EPA's table.

Our sample will give you an idea of the type of approach we'd like to use. We feel that this will present to prospective buyers all of the C.I. in one source, and possibly avoid some confusion.

Sincerely,

D. Black

Technical Director

Enclosure

cc: Claire Bain

ID: nht73-2.13

DATE: 12/12/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Mark I. Schwimmer; NHTSA

TO: To interpretations file

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

ID: nht73-2.14

DATE: 11/09/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Jack Edwards; House of Representatives

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Your request for information on the Federal Odometer Disclosure regulation on behalf of Mr. Charles J. Fleming has been referred to as for reply.

I am enclosing a copy of the regulation which includes an example of an acceptable format. Other formats are acceptable if all the required information is included.

We are unable to advise Mr. Fleming about the effect of a particular typographical error without knowing its nature, but as a general matter a typographical error would not give rise to liability unless it were deceptive in a way which misleads a purchaser.

Sincerely.

Enclosure

LANE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY --

EUGENE, OREGON

October 12, 1973

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Gentlemen:

We wish to submit the following questions to you for your review and response:

(1) Under the Federal Odometer Disclosure Act, is an automobile dealer required to include six (6) digit figures if the vehicle's odometer has gone over 100,000 miles?

(2) What duty does an automobile dealer have in checking the vehicle or former owner to see if the vehicle has gone over 100,000?

(3) Must a dealer reveal the former owner of a vehicle upon the request of the prospective purchaser?

We would greatly appreciate your cooperation in providing the answers to the above questions at your earliest possible convenience as we receive many inquiries regarding these matters.

Very truly yours,

J. PAT HORTON, District Attorney; Marcia Mellinger, Investigator

cc: Tom Trent

ID: nht73-2.15

DATE: 11/09/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Greg Beck

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: Your letter of October 18, 1973, asks what violations of the Federal odometer laws may have occurred in your purchase of a 1962 Tempest which was misrepresented as a 1964 model.

Misrepresentation of the model year, which appears to be your principal grievance, is not a violation of Federal law but could be a violation of local laws against fraudulent merchandising.

Bill Tillett's failure to give you a disclosure statement may be a violation of the Federal odometer disclosure regulation, a copy of which is enclosed. After March 1, 1973, the regulation requires each seller to make a signed, written disclosure of a vehicle's recorded mileage to his purchaser. If he knows the odometer reading is inaccurate, he must also state that the actual mileage is unknown. This statement must be made before the vehicle is sold.

If your seller violated these regulations with fraudulent intent, a civil remedy is available to you under @ 409 of the Act for $ 1,500 or treble damages, whichever is greater. To obtain your remedy, @ 409 provides that you may bring a private civil action in State or Federal court. You may wish to consult an attorney about the possibility of bringing an action in your case.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

October 18, 1973

Local Consumer Protection Commission and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Re: Used Car

Dear Sirs:

My wife and I purchased for her a used car in the beginning of August however the recent newspaper articles on used car dealings leads me to believe that I was swindled.

The car dealer, Bill Tillett of Lancaster Pennsylvania, promised delivery of a 1962 Corvair on August 2, 1973 so on the previous day I gave him a check for $ 156.50 (check #791) which included title, license, state tax, etc on the car which cost $ 125.00. In return I received only a receipt of the money stating said car would be ready the following day. This car was not ready for a week, and even then it was not able to pass inspection (one of my conditions) so being in immediate need of a car he said that he would give us a 1964 Pontiac Tempest 4 cylinder. This car was suited for our needs so we agreed. Then he said that since the Tempest was 2 years newer that it would cost us $ 40.00 more. This we paid reluctantly August 8 (check # 800). I had to return the Corvair's receipt and a new receipt with just Tempest written on it with the total cost of $ 196.50 at the bottom. The bill was not itemized. I received a small slip of paper containing the year (1964) and model # and number of cylidners to send to my insurance company. Mr. Tillett took care of the title and sent us to pick up the license. When I received the title two weeks ago I noticed that only the serial number and model - Tempest appeared on the title. This was ignored until yesterday when I saw a 1964 Tempest - it was not like my car in style. Further checking revealed that I purchased a 1962 Tempest.

1. I received no mileage disclosure statement as I now see was required by law.

2. I was told, as was my insurance company, that I purchased a 1964 Tempest and thus paid another $ 40 for this car over the 1962 Corvair's price. Recently Bill Tillett ran an ad for a 1963 Tempest for $ 95 while I paid $ 165 for a 1964 which was really a 1962.

I wish to press any charges which will enable me to get my money back.

Sincerely,

Greg and Sandra Beck

1715 Swarr Run Rd.

Lancaster, Penna. 17601

or

c/o Lancaster Theological Seminary

555 West James Street

Lancaster, Pa. 17604

cc: both addresses

ID: nht73-2.16

DATE: 11/09/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Lawrence R. Schneider; NHTSA

TO: Lane County District Attorney

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: You have asked what information an automobile dealer must provide in a Federal odometer statement concerning prior vehicle ownership and mileage over 100,000 miles

The Federal regulation only requires information which the transferor knows or has good reason to know about the vehicle's mileage. It does not require that he disclose the name of the former owner. It does not require that he state the recorded mileage, and if he knows or has good reason to know that the recorded mileage is not correct he must make a further statement that the actual mileage is unknown. In your example, therefore, he would only state the five-digit figure appearing on the odometer, and make the further statement if he knew or had been told that the vehicle had traveled more than 100,000 miles. He is not required to check with former owners as to vehicle history, but he would be accountable under local consumer protection laws for any misleading statements he made about the vehicle's history.

Please contact me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

ID: nht73-2.17

DATE: 11/08/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; James B. Gregory; NHTSA

TO: Department of California Highway Patrol

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of October 1, 1973, in which you asked that we review an enclosed opinion by the California Attorney General on the question of preemption of California motor vehicle regulations by Federal standards. The opinion concluded that the California requirement that motorcycles be wired so that their headlamps are lit whenever their engines are running was not preempted. This conclusion was contrary to the position taken in an NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney.

We adhere to the position stated in the November 14, 1972, letter that the California requirement is preempted, and consider the legal opinion by the California Attorney General to be an erroneous view of the Federal law.

The opinion properly viewed the question as turning on the application of the phrase in @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392(d), "applicable to the same aspect of performance." If the Federal standard (Standard No. 108, 49 CFR 571.108) covers a given aspect of performance, any State requirement must be identical to it. The California opinion relied on the language in the main opinion of one of the Super Lite cases, Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969), that preemption should be "narrowly construed", and went on to find that since Standard 108 does not specifically address the matter of wiring the headlamps when the engine is running, that aspect of performance is not covered by the standard and the California law is valid.

More important, however, than the nebulous concept of whether preemption is "narrowly" construed (a concept with which Judge Friendly, concurring in Chrysler, did not agree) is the point made at the end of the main opinion, that the administering Federal agency was supporting the State's position regarding the scope of the Federal regulation. The Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969):

[W]hen construing an administrative regulation,'a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . .[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'

In this case the situation is the opposite of that in the Super Lite cases. The NHTSA's position is that the standard does cover the aspect of performance in question. As stated in the NHTSA letter of November 14, 1972, the standard "establishes requirements for motorcycle headlighting, along with special wiring requirements for motorcycles and other vehicles." It is the intent of the NHTSA that its requirements for headlamp performance, configuration, and wiring cover all aspects of performance directly involving headlamps, and thus preempt any non-identical State Standards relating to headlamps.

The implication of the California opinion is that any mode of design or performance that is not expressly dealt with in the Federal standard is open to regulation by the States. Such a position is impractical, where the agency's intent is to have a comprehensive, uniform regulation in a given area. In order to preempt the field it would be necessary for a Federal agency to anticipate the imaginative regulatory impulses of future State agencies or legislatures and include in a standard such provisions as, "It is not required that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running." Congress clearly intended the NHTSA to establish a single set of uniform standards to which manufacturers must comply, and that intent would tend to be defeated by the position taken in the California opinion. Federal regulation has a negative as well as a positive aspect: in determining that there should be certain requirements in an area, we also are deciding against imposing others. The only way to effectuate such a decision is to declare, as we have done here, that our regulation is intended to be exclusive, and to describe as necessary its outer limits.

The California opinion's factual comparison with the Super Lite cases is also inapt. The Super Lite itself was a new type of lighting equipment, a supplementary lamp, for which Standard 108 contained no requirements. Headlamps, by contrast, are comprehensively regulated by the standard.

For these reasons, we conclude that the California requirement that motorcycle headlamps be wired to operate when the engine is running is preempted by Standard 108, and void.

While we feel constrained by law to so conclude, I want you to know that I have instructed my staff to consider the merit of amending the Federal lighting standard to include the California requirement in 108.

Sincerely,

October 1, 1973

James B. Gregory -- Administrator, U. S. Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Dr. Gregory:

A copy of Mr. Douglas Toms' letter of November 14, 1972, to Mr. Edward Kearney expressing his opinion that a recently passed California law relative to motorcycle headlamps was preempted by Federal Standard 108, was received by this Department on November 20, 1972.

The opinion expressed by Mr. Toms prompted a request by this Department to the Office of the Attorney General of the State of California for an opinion on the question of federal preemption as related to this recently enacted statute. A copy of the Attorney General's Opinion on this matter is enclosed for your review.

You will notice that the Attorney General's Opinion is not in accord with that expressed by Mr. Toms; therefore, we are proceeding on the premise that all motorcycles first manufactured and registered in California after January 1, 1975, will be required to meet these headlamp requirements.

After your review of the enclosed material, I would appreciate your comments on this very important issue.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

W. PUDINSKI Commissioner--Dept. of California Highway Patrol

Enclosure

cc: Senator Donald L. Grunsky; Edward Kearney

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAN FRANCISCO

September 13, 1973

W. Pudinski, Commissioner-- Department of California Highway Patrol

Dear Commissioner Pudinski:

You have requested the opinion of this office on the question of whether California Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

We conclude that these Vehicle Code provisions are not pre-empted by that Federal Act.

Our conclusion is based upon the following analysis:

In 1966 the Federal Government assumed a paramount role in the field of motor vehicle safety with the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. @ 1381 et seq. (hereafter Federal Act). Basically this Act establishes a comprehensive system for the formulation and implementation of safety standards for the performance and equipment of new motor vehicles.

The enactment of such an extensive federal law naturally gave rise to the question of whether State legislation in the same field was pre-empted. n1E. g., see Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1969); Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (1969).

n1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, @ 2, the so-called Supremacy Clause.

Congress anticipated the question in their enactment of a provision in the Federal Act expressly dealing with issue of pre-emption, 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d). It provides: "(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard."

This pre-emption provision (15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)) was succinctly summarized by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, supra, 419 F.2d 499 (1969). In that case the Court declared:

"This provision indicates that state regulation of an item of motor vehicle equipment will be preempted only if the following factors appear in combination: (1) a federal standard in effect which covers that item of equipment; (2) a state safety standard . . . for the item which is not identical to the federal standard; and (3) application of the state and federal regulations to 'the same aspect of performance' of the item of equipment." 419 F.2d at 506.

In connection with the present inquiry, the question of federal pre-emption has arisen with respect to two provisions in the State Vehicle Code: Vehicle Code section 25650.5 (relating to the activation of motorcycle headlights) and Vehicle Code section 24253 (relating to the duration of tail lamp illumination). It is noted that there are federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act which are (1) applicable to the same "items of equipment" (viz., motor cycle headlights and tail lamps); and (2) which are "not identical" to the State regulations. Hence in determining whether or not the State regulations are preempted, the specific question here is whether the State and federal regulations apply to "the same aspect of performance" of these specified items of equipment. In making this determination, it would be appropriate to first ascertain whether the phrase "same aspect of performance" is to be given a narrow or broad construction; i.e., whether the pre-emptive effect of the Federal Act is to be narrowly or broadly applied.

This specific point was considered by the United States Court of Appeals in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d 499. In evaluating Congressional intent with respect to the Federal Act's pre-emptive effect, the Court noted that "uniformity through national standards" was merely "a secondary objective." 419 F.2d at 511. On the other hand, the Court declared that "the clear expression of purpose in section 1381 and other evidence of legislative intent indicate that the reduction of traffic accidents was the overriding concern of Congress. We think that these expressions of legislative purpose should govern our assessment of the preemptive effect of the Act and the standards issued under it." 419 F.2d at 508. (See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431, 438 (1971), where the Court reiterates this conclusion.) Accordingly, the Court determined that "the 'aspect of performance' language in the preemption section of the Act must be construed narrowly." 419 F.2d at 510. The Court further stated: "If traffic safety is furthered by a traditional type of state regulation under the police power, . . . a narrow construction of the preemptive effect of the federal Act and [the standards issued pursuant thereto] is required." 419 F.2d at 511. n2.

n2 See Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F.Supp. 1120, 1124 (1972), which cites Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, for the proposition that "[w]here exercise of the local police power serves the purpose of a federal Act, the preemptive effect of that Act should be narrowly construed." See also Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, supra, 416 F.2d 319, 324, n. 8 (1969).

Thus in view of the judicial constraint upon the scope of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions, it is apparent that the states are still afforded substantial leeway in the enactment of vehicle equipment safety regulations.

In this light we now compare the State statutes in question with the pertinent federal standards issued pursuant to the Federal Act to determine if they cover the "same aspect of performance."

With respect to motorcycle headlamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 25650.5 provides that after January 1, 1975, all motorcycle headlamps shall "automatically turn on when the engine of the motorcycle is started and which remain lighted as long as the engine is running."

(2) Federal Standards

The standard pertinent to motorcycle headlamps is found in 49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsection S4.5.7(b). This standard provides: "When the headlamps are activated in a steady-burning state, the taillamps, parking lamps, license plate lamps and side marker lamps shall also be activated."

In comparing these two provisions, it can be seen that the State law relates to the mechanism or event of activation and duration of activation of the headlamps. The federal standard, on the other hand, is unconcerned with these factors. It merely constitutes a designation of other lamps whose activation is to accompany the activation of headlights. It would appear reasonable to conclude that these two provisions apply to different aspects of performance of motorcycle headlamps and that, accordingly, the State provision is not pre-empted. As will be seen, our conclusion is the same as to State law regulating taillamps.

With respect to taillamps:

(1) State Law

Vehicle Code section 24253 provides in essence that all motor vehicles and motorcycles shall be equipped with taillamps that will remain lighted at least one-quarter hour if the engine stops.

(2) Federal Standards

49 CFR section 571.108, Standard 108, subsections S4.5.3 and S4.5.7(b) provide that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the headlamps. Subsection S4.5.7(a) provides that the taillamps shall be activated upon the activation of the parking lamps.

Thus the State law is solely concerned with the duration of illumination, while the federal standards are directed to the event of activation. Again, it would appear that, just as in the case of headlamps, these State and federal regulations are each addressed to separate and distinct aspects of taillamps performance. Accordingly then, the State provision is not pre-empted by the Federal Act.

Our conclusion that the State headlamp and taillamp regulations relate to aspects of performance different from those covered by federal standards, is fortified by the analysis engaged in by the Court in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, as it compared the state and federal standards at issue in that case. There state law prohibited a type of auxiliary headlight because of its unacceptable glare and dazzle effect (419 F.2d at 502, n. 5, 503) and because it emitted a blue light, a color of light which the states had reserved for emergency vehicles (419 F.2d at 503). The pertinent federal standards prohibited such auxiliary headlights only if they impaired the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 506). The Court concluded that the federal standard applied to the impairment of light emission from the required headlights to the extent that such impairment affected the visibility of the driver of the car (419 F.2d at 511). On the other hand, the Court determined that the state provisions purported to regulate the effects of the light upon drivers of oncoming cars. The Court concluded that this was "a different aspect of performance" and thus the states' "attempts at regulation are not preempted." (Ibid.)

Thus we have a case where even though the state and federal regulations both related to the quality of the illumination itself which was emitted by the headlight, the Court nonetheless found that these regulations were directed to "different aspects of performance," because of the distinction between the effect of the illumination upon the driver of the car in question, and the effect upon drivers of oncoming cars.

If such closely related factors are deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance," a fortiori, such manifestly distinct elements of operation as the event or mechanism of light activation on the one hand, and the duration of illumination on the other hand, must be deemed to constitute "different aspects of performance."

In view of the explicit quality of this difference, our conclusion that it constitutes a different "aspect of performance" would appear to be warranted whether the phrase "aspect of performance," as used in the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(d)), is given a narrow or broad construction. n3 It is thus our opinion that Vehicle Code sections 25650.5 and 24253 are not pre-empted.

n3 The concurring opinion in Chrysler Corporation v. Tofanv, supra, 419 F.2d at 512-515, argued that the pre-emptive provisions of the Federal Act should be broadly construed (419 F.2d at 512-513). Yet it concluded that the state regulations were not pre-empted because one of the basis for restricting the auxiliary headlight was the fact that it emitted light of a blue color (a color reserved for emergency vehicles), and that this was an aspect of performance different from that encompassed by the federal standard; viz., impairment of the effectiveness of the required lights (419 F.2d at 515). It would appear that the aspects of performance under consideration here are at least as distinct as those aspects of performance found to be different under the concurring opinion's broad construction of the Federal Act's pre-emption provisions.

Very truly yours,

EVELLE J. YOUNGER --

Attorney General,

VICTOR D. SONENBERG --

Deputy Attorney General

ID: nht73-2.18

DATE: 04/24/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; R.B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Flex-N-Gate

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: In your letter of April 17, 1973 to Mr. Schneider you ask whether the Federal lighting standard, No. 108, applies to you as a manufacturer of rear step-hitch bumpers for pick-up trucks. Since the bumper installation interferes with the original vehicle license plate mounting bracket, provision is made for relocating the license plate mounting bracket, provision is made for relocating the license plate in the bumper. You apparently do not yourself mount the bumper to the vehicle, as your letter indicates that they are sold as after market items "to purchasers of new trucks" and to two truck manufacturers "who install these items before the trucks are released to the dealers".

Under the circumstances you describe, Standard No. 108 would not apply to you. Compliance and certification of new vehicles is the responsibility of the truck manufacturers who install the bumpers, although you may have a contractual obligation with them to provide license plate lighting meeting Federal requirements. In the aftermarket, if the bumper is installed prior to delivery of the truck to the purchaser, the dealer making the installation is legally responsible for compliance with Standard No. 108.

Yours truly,

April 17, 1973

Lawrence R. Schnieder Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Mr. Schnieder:

We manufacture rear step-hitch bumpers for pick-up trucks, and market them through dealers who sell them as add on accessories to purchasers of new trucks. We also are an O.E.M. supplier to Jeep Corporation and Toyota who install these items before the trucks are released to the dealers. As the bumper installation interferes with the original license light mounting bracket on the vehicle we make provisions for relocating the license plate onto the bumper (see attached brochure).

I would like to get your interpretation of Standard 108, i.e. whether it applies to us or not, if it does then the proper way of certifying that the license lights meet the federal requirements.

Sincerely,

SHAHID R. KHAN Engineer -- FLEX-N-GATE (Graphics omitted)

ID: nht73-2.19

DATE: 08/20/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: American Safety Equipment Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: In reference to your August 3, 1973, petition for rule making pertaining to Standard No. 213, we require additional information on your harness release mechanism prior to reaching any decision on this matter.

Specifically, we require data on the amount of force required to open your release mechanism under the following conditions:

1. When the harness system is preloaded with the child body block to 45 pounds (according to the existing procedure in Standard No. 213);

2. When the harness system is preloaded to 45 pounds with a three-year-old Sierra child dummy (by pulling on the arms and legs of the dummy); and

3. When the child seating system with an actual child occupant is suspended upside down and when the harness system is not unloaded (pulling only on the latch mechanism without releasing the load on the harness).

Your cooperation in furnishing us this data will aid in resolving this matter.

ID: nht73-2.2

DATE: 08/30/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Electrical Testing Laboratories, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of June 18, 1973, concerning the conformity of certain designs of type III seat belt assemblies with Standard No. 209.

The first feature which you describe is a restraint consisting of a waist band with a single shoulder strap. The shoulder strap is attached to the buckle in front and is looped around the waist band in back. Unless this restraint has more elements then you describe, we haver serious questions about its conformity with the requirements for type III seat belts under Standard 209. Section S4.1(c) provides that the assembly must restrain the upper torso without shifting the pelvic restraint into the abdominal region and that the upper torso restraint shall be designed to minimize its vertical forces on the shoulders and spine. It appears doubtful that the described assembly meets either of these requirements.

The second feature you described is a strap through the harness assembly that passes around the seat back and is anchored to the floor by means of the vehicle's seat belt assembly anchorage. Your question appears to be whether such a restraint is a seat back retainer as required by Section S4.1(h). The attachment you describe would not be a seat back retainer under Section S4.1(h).

The third feature described, a closed loop strap without floor attachment would also violate the requirements of S4.1(h), unless it is designed and labelled for use only in specific models having adequate seat back restraints, as specified in that paragraph.

The fourth feature is the ability of a harness to move freely up and down on the restraint strap. This feature is the ability of harness to move freely up and down on the restraint strap. This feature is allowable under Standard 209.

Yours truly,

ELECTRICAL TESTING LABORATORISE, INC.

June 18, 1973

Richard Dyson -- Office of the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Subject: Type 3 Seat Belt Assemblies.

Dear Mr. Dyson:

We have recently been asked to perform tests on type III seat belt assemblies, the design of which has caused us some doubt as to their meeting some of the requirements of FMVSS 209. What we would like to know is whether or not the following design features are acceptable under the requirements for type III seat belt assemblies as outlined in FMVSS 209.

1. Upper torso restraint: Restraint consists of single strap starting at the midpoint of the pelvic band (strap around the waist). The anchor point is the buckle tongue hardware. The strap then passes over on shoulder of the child and is terminated in a loop through which the pelvic belt passes freely.

2. Seat Back Retainer: Strap passes through harness assembly around seat in a closed loop and is anchored to the vehicle by a narrow anchor plate using the same bolt as used to secure the seat belt assembly. This installation is performed by the purchaser.

3. Strap: The harness assembly is secured to the seat back by a closed loop strap. No seat back restraint provided.

4. Harness assembly: The harness assembly is secured by either the seat back retainer or strap and is free to move up or down on this section of webbing.

The specimens we have in for test are combinations of the above features and as such we would appreciate knowing what features are acceptable and which are not.

Should you require any additional information on this subject, in relation to the descriptions, please contact either Mr. H. D. Pomponio or myself.

Very truly yours,

C. F. Robb -- Manager, Automotive/Mechanical Division

ID: nht73-2.20

DATE: 12/22/73

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Robert L. Carter; NHTSA

TO: American Safety Equipment Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reference to our letter of August 20, 1973 (copy enclosed), requesting additional technical information on your harness release mechanism (the subject of your August 3, 1973, Petition for Rule Making).

Please inform us within ten days whether or not you intend to furnish us the information we requested in our letter, so that we may make a final decision on your Petition for Rule Making action.