ID: nht94-4.23

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 7, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: C. N. Littler -- Motor Coach Industries, Administrator Regulatory Affairs, Winnipeg, Manitoba, CANADA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to Letter Dated 01/06/94 from C. N. Litter to Mary Versailles

TEXT: This responds to your letter concerning whether a New York State law addressing the in-use stopping ability of privately owned motor coaches is preempted by Federal law. I apologize for the delay in our response. The New York law states that a vehicle must be capable of stopping "at a rate of deceleration equivalent to a stop within 22.2 feet from a speed of 20 miles per hour." You believe that @ 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act") preempts the New York law, sinc e the state law is not identical to Federal motor vehicle safety standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems. Please note that the Safety Act has been codified at 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. and that the citation for 103 (d) is now 49 U.S.C. @ 30103.

As explained below, Standard No. 121 currently does not have stopping distance requirements in effect; therefore, the New York law is not currently preempted by a Federal safety standard. Nevertheless, the agency has issued a proposal to reinstate stopp ing distance requirements in Standard No. 121. (58 FR 11003, February 23, 1993). If the agency issues a final rule to reinstate stopping distances, then any more stringent requirements in the New York law (addressing the same aspects of performance as Standard No. 121) would be preempted.

Title 49 U.S.C. @ 30103 states:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipm ent any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

That provision preempts New York's law if there is a Federal safety standard in effect, the state law covers the same aspect of performance as that Federal standard, and the State law is not identical to the Federal safety standard. While you are correct that Standard No. 121 refers to stopping performance in S5.3.1, you apparently were not aware of a provision in S3 that states

Notwithstanding any language to the contrary, sections S5.3.1, S5.3.1.1, S5.3.2, S5.3.2.1, S5.3.2.2, S5.7.1, S5.7.3(a) and S5.7.3(b) of this standard are not applicable to trucks and trailers, and section S5.3.1 of this standard is not applicable to b uses.

The agency amended the standard to include this provision as the result of a ruling in PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978), in which a Federal Court of Appeals invalidated Standard No. 121's stopping distance requirements until the agency obtains "more probative and convincing data evidencing the reliability and safety of vehicles that are equipped with antilock." While the provision did not originally cover buses other than school buses, NHTSA extended the provision to non-school buses in 1987. See 52 FR 20602. Because there are no Federal stopping distance requirements in effect, the New York law is not preempted.

As noted above, NHTSA has issued a notice proposing to reinstate stopping distance requirements for air braked vehicles. The agency is currently reviewing comments to that proposal, and may issue a final rule reinstating stopping distance requirements. If the agency decides to amend Standard No. 121 to include such requirements, then any more stringent requirements in the New York law (addressing the same aspects of performance as Standard No. 121) would be preempted.

I note that the New York law applies to vehicles in use, while Standard No. 121 applies to new vehicles. In general, State laws governing the operation of vehicles are not preempted by inconsistent Federal motor vehicle safety standards unless the State law is more stringent than the Federal standard (with respect to the same aspect of performance). A more stringent law would be preempted, since it would preclude the sale of vehicles that comply with Federal standards.

I also note that the in-use braking performance of many motor coaches is regulated by the Federal Highway Administration. We have referred your letter to that agency's Office of Motor Carrier Standards concerning the issue of whether its regulations pre empt the New York law.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. If you wish to contact someone in the Federal Highway Administratio n's Office of Chief Counsel concerning the motor carrier standards, please call Charles Medalen at (202) 366-1354.

ID: nht94-4.24

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 7, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: David L. Clark -- Aquilino & Welsh, P.C., Arlington, VA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 08/10/94 from David L. Clark to Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TEXT: This responds to your letter of August 10, 1994, asking for "information necessary for obtaining Federal approval and/or meeting Federal safety standards for an add-on seat belt device." In a August 23 phone call with Mary Versailles of my staff, you exp lained that the device is intended to alter the fit of the safety belt.

I am enclosing three letters which explain how Federal laws administered by this agency apply to such devices (3/16/94to Ms. Angela R. Caron; 4/26/93 to Mr. Brett J. Higgins; and 11/16/92 to Angela R. Caron; 4/26/92 to Mr. Michael J. Vacanti). If you ha ve any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-4.25

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 7, 1994

FROM: Vincent A. Ugoletti -- Chief Engineer, Great Lakes Communications, Inc.

TO: Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11/14/94 FROM PHILIP R. RECHT TO VINCENT UGOLETTI (A42; STD. 208; STD. 207; STD. 209; STD. 210; STD. 302)

TEXT: Great Lakes Communications, Inc. is currently in the process of turning a conversion van into a production van. One of our requirements for the production van is for the front seats of the van to swivel. The company wishes to maintain the federal safet y requirements for the seats. If your administration could please provide us with the federal safety standards requirements for swivel front seats in a van so we could convert our van a.s.a.p.

ID: nht94-4.26

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 8, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Mary B. Falls, Esq. -- Sherrard & Roe, Nashville, TN

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 06/13/94 from Mary B. Falls to Office of General Counsel, NHTSA (OCC 10098)

TEXT: This responds to your request for an interpretation of whether, in replacing stolen vehicle identification number (VIN) plates as prescribed by Tennessee state law, your client, Nissan, would conform to this agency's requirements concerning VINs. The an swer is Nissan would not violate our requirements when it replaces the stolen "VIN plate." However, there may be other aspects of replacing stolen VIN plates that are under the U.S. Department of Justice's law enforcement jurisdiction.

By way of background, Standard No. 115, Vehicle identification number - basic requirements, requires manufacturers to assign a VIN to each motor vehicle, to simplify vehicle information retrieval and to increase the accuracy and efficiency of vehicle rec all campaigns. S4.5 of the standard specifies that VINs shall appear on a permanent part of the vehicle or on a separate label or plate, called the "VIN plate." S4.6 requires the VIN for passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles and trucks of 10,00 0 lbs or less GVWR to be included in the passenger compartment, and manufacturers typically meet S4.6 by placing the VIN plate on the vehicle's dashboard.

Your letter explained that Nissan manufacturers cars and light trucks in Tennessee, and leases these vehicles. Sometimes, the VIN plate in the passenger compartment is stolen from the leased vehicle, but the vehicle is otherwise not tampered with. You stated that:

Section 55-5111 of Tennessee Code Annotated provides that it is a Class C misdemeanor for any person to buy, sell, offer for sale, or possess a motor vehicle from which the manufacturer's serial, engine from which the manufacturer's serial, engine, or transmission number or other distinguishing number or identification mark or number has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, or destroyed. In addition, @ 55-5-112 provides that the owner of an original engine, serial, engine, or transmission, or "o ther number or mark" may restore such number or mark pursuant to a permit issued by the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Tennessee Department of Safety.

You asked whether Nissan, the vehicle owner, would be "in full compliance" with NHTSA's regulations if Nissan replaced stolen VIN plates in accordance with Tennessee law. In response to your question, we note that Standard No. 115 applies only to new mo tor vehicles. In the event a VIN plate is stolen from a leased (i.e., used) motor vehicle, NHTSA has no authority to require that any party replace the VIN plate. Thus, under NHTSA's regulations, if the VIN plate is stolen from a used vehicle, Nissan, the owner, may use its discretion whether to replace the VIN plate.

However, please note that there could be other implications under Federal law about replacing stolen VIN plates. The U.S. Department of Justice has jurisdiction over stolen VIN plates as a law enforcement matter. Therefore, I suggest that you consult w ith the Justice Department about possible Federal law enforcement implications of replacing the stolen VIN plates.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-4.27

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 15, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Ralph Harpster -- Laguna Manufacturing, Inc., Turlock, CA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6/21/94 from Ralph Harpster to NHTSA Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC 10119)

TEXT: This responds to your letter of June 21, 1994, requesting information on whether a "replacement rear seat used for the transport of prisoners in police cars" complies with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. During a July 1, 1994 phone conversat ion with Mary Versailles of my staff, you explained that the seat could be installed either before or after the first retail sale of the police car.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you. Some background information on Federal motor vehicle safety laws and regulations may be helpful. Our agency is authorized under 49 U.S.C. @ 30101 et seq. to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, each manufacturer is responsible for "self-certifyin g" that its products meet all applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

NHTSA has exercised its authority to establish five safety standards that may be relevant to a prisoner transport seat. The first is Standard No. 207, Seating Systems (49 CFR @ 571.208), which sets forth strength requirements for all "occupant seats" in passenger cars. The second relevant standard is Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR @ 571.208), which sets forth requirements for occupant protection at the various seating positions in vehicles. The third relevant standard is Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies (49 CFR @ 571.209), which sets forth strength, elongation, webbing width, durability, and other requirements for seat belt assemblies. The fourth relevant safety standard is Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, which establishes strength and location requirements for seat belt anchorages. The final relevant safety standard is Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials. This standard specifies burn resistance requirements for materials used in the oc cupant compartment of motor vehicles.

Because federal law operates differently depending on when the installation of the prisoner transport seat occurs, I will separately discuss three possible scenarios.

Installation as Original Equipment

Standards No. 207, No. 208, No. 210, and No. 302 apply, with certain exceptions that are not relevant to your product, to vehicles and not directly to items of equipment. Thus, the vehicle manufacturer, and not the equipment manufacturer, would be respo nsible for certifying that the vehicle complies with these standards with the prisoner transport seat installed in the vehicle.

Unlike the other four standards, Standard No. 209 applies to seat belt assemblies as separate items of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements. The manufactu rer of the seat belt system provided with the prisoner transport seat is responsible for certifying that the seat belt complies with Standard No. 209.

Your letter specifically asks whether the safety belt system installed with the prisoner transport seat complies with all applicable requirements. Currently, Standard No. 208 requires an integral Type 2 (lap and shoulder) seat belt assembly at all forwa rd-facing rear outboard seating positions, and either a Type 1 (lap) or Type 2 seat belt assembly at all other rear seating positions. Standard No. 208 also requires the lap belt portion of the Type 2 seat belt assembly installed at any forward-facing re ar outboard seating position to have an emergency locking retractor. Thus, because the seat belt assembly for the prisoner transport seat has a manual retractor, the seat cannot be installed at a forward-facing rear outboard seating position.

We note that Standard No. 208 requires emergency locking retractors to ensure improved comfort and convenience for safety belts. The purpose is to make it more likely that the typical vehicle occupant will use his or her safety belts, and also to reduce the likelihood of excessive slack in safety belts during use. You wish to use manual retractors because of special circumstances that arise when the rear seats of police vehicles are used to transport prisoners, i.e., a desire to keep the prisoners soli dly restrained in the seats. However, Standard No. 208 specifies the same occupant crash protection requirements for police vehicles as other vehicles, and does not include an exception in this area.

A possible solution to your problem may be to install your belt system (with manual retractors) in addition to the safety belts required by Standard No. 208. Provided that the installation did not interfere with the required safety belts, such installati on would not affect the compliance of the vehicle with Standard No. 208, since the standard's requirements would be fully met by the original belts. Your belt system would, or course, still have to meet the requirements of Standard No. 209, since it wou ld be considered a "seat belt assembly."

Installation Prior to First Sale

If a prisoner transport seat were added to a new vehicle prior to its first sale, e.g., by the dealer, the person who modified the vehicle would be an alterer of a previously certified motor vehicle and would be required to certify that, as altered, the vehicle continues to comply with all of the safety standards affected by the alteration.

Installation After First Sale

After the first purchase of a vehicle for purposes other than resale, the only provision in Federal law that affects the vehicle's continuing compliance with an applicable safety standard is set forth in 49 U.S.C. @ 30122. That section provides that: A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable motor veh icle safety standard.

This provision would prohibit any of the named commercial entities from installing a prisoner transport seat if such installation rendered inoperative the compliance of the vehicle with any applicable safety standard. For example, if the material used i n the seat did not meet the burn resistance requirements of Standard No. 302, installation of the system would make inoperative compliance with that standard. Any violation of this prohibition is subject to a potential civil penalty of up to $ 1,000 for each violation.

Please note that this provision does not prohibit owners from modifying their vehicles, even if such modification adversely affects the compliance of the vehicle with safety standards. Thus, if a police department were to modify its own vehicles to inst all a prisoner transport seat, it would not be a violation of this provision, even if the original belts were replaced by belts with manual retractors.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-4.28

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 15, 1994

FROM: Mary M. Mann -- Director, Federal Government Relations, National Marine Manufacturers Association; Medford Smith -- NMMA, Director of Technical Services; Gerald Wierstema -- President, Trailer Manufacturers Association

TO: Mr. Patrick Boyd -- NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to 1/11/95 letter from Philip R. Recht to Mary M. Mann (A43; Std. 108)

TEXT: Dear Mr. Boyd:

I want to thank you and Mr. Vincent for visiting with me and the other representatives of the National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA) regarding the NHTSA "Conspicuity Systems" requirements (49 C.F.R. @ 571.108 - S5.7) as they apply to certain large boat trailers, i.e., trailers over 80 inches in width and 10,000 pounds GVWR. I also want to ask for your written confirmation of the understandings we received during that meeting and to ask for your specific guidance on other issues of concern. The paragraph references below are to the numbered paragraphs in 49 C.F.R. @ 571.108 ("DOT 108").

As we explained during our meeting, boat trailers are of a unique design. They are built with a frame that V's forward to the center of the tongue. It is not unusual for this angled frame section to be nine to ten feet long on a trailer of 10,000 GVW R. In addition, such a trailer would have an axle and fender assembly (made up of a tandem or sometimes even a triple axle unit) that is moveable along the frame to compensate for the center of gravity of the boat being carried. The fender, which obscu res the frame behind it from view, is usually six to nine feet long. The rear of the trailer has a v-shaped cross member with little or no horizontal surface and is very low to the ground.

Side Treatment

1. Paragraph S5.7.1.4 prohibits white retroreflective sheeting material from being closer than 75mm to the edge of any lamp "that is required by these standards" [DOT 108] and further prohibits red retroreflective sheeting material from being closer than 75mm to the edge of any like required amber lamp. The clearance lamp required by paragraph S5.1.1.9 to be located "near or at the midpoint on each side [of the boat trailer] to indicate its extreme width" is usually located on the front corner of e ach fender to comply with the "midpoint" and "extreme width" requirements. As a result, when viewed from the side, the amber portion of that clearance light would appear next to a retroreflective sheeting material applied to the frame. We wish to confi rm that the 75mm spacing can be achieved by the width of the fender. In other words, if the side clearance amber light is located 75mm or more out from the frame on the fender, even though it would appear next to the sheeting when viewed from the horizo ntal, it would still be in compliance with paragraph S5.7.1.4.

2. Paragraph S5.7.1.4.2(a) requires that the sheeting cover at least half the length of the trailer and that it be distributed as evenly as practicable. We wish to confirm that the following applications would be acceptable for purposes of determinin g that one half of the trailer side is covered with sheeting under this requirement:

(a) The sheeting can be on the angled portion of the trailer that makes up the tongue regardless of its effect on the reflectivity of the tape when viewed from a right angle to the trailer's centerline.

(b) The sheeting need not all be on the same horizontal plane, e.g., it can be on the outside of the fenders or on the tongue even though the sheeting applied there would be at a different height from each other and from the sheeting applied to the fr ame.

Rear Treatment

1. Paragraph S5.7.1.4.1 (as amended) requires that "reflexive sheeting shall be applied to the rear of each trailer as follows, except that Element 2 is not required for container chassis or for platform trailers without bulkheads, and Element 3 is n ot required for trailers without underride protection devices". Please confirm that boat trailers that do not have bulkheads would be treated the same as similarly rigged platform trailers and hence would only have to comply with Element 1 under this par agraph.

2. Paragraph S5.7.1.4.1, Element 1 (as amended) requires a strip of sheeting as horizontal as practicable "across the full width of the trailer". Because there are mounting brackets attached to the cross member at the rear of the trailer, portions o f the frame that will have sheeting would be obscured from view. Please confirm that such mounting brackets will be treated as "items of equipment" or the like under Paragraph S5.7.1.4(a) and that sheeting across the full width of the cross member, even though partially obscured by the mounting brackets, would comply with Paragraph S5.7.1.4.1.

3. Referring further to Paragraph S5.7.1.4.1, Element 1, and the requirement that the strip of sheeting run across the full width of the trailer, please confirm that it would not be necessary to place a horizontal strip of sheeting on the rear of eac h fender assembly even though when viewed from the rear, the "full width of the trailer" would include the frame plus the two fenders. We understand that only the rear most portion of the frame need be considered for purposes of this requirement.

4. Paragraph S.5.7.1.4(b) and (c) govern the location of sheeting in relation to the trailer lamps. Please confirm that the edge of the red portion of the sheeting may abut a rear identification lamp but that the white portion of the sheeting must b e at lease 3mm from those lamps.

Please further confirm our understanding that it is not acceptable for trailer manufacturers to give rolls of reflexive sheeting tape and instructions to dealers regarding its application. Rather, the sheeting must be installed at the factory.

Thank you again for meeting with us. We appreciate your attitude that manufacturers should put the tape in the best location they have for it to be seen and that you are not trying to force a re-design of the boat trailers.

ID: nht94-4.29

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 16, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Harleigh Ewell, Esq. -- Regulatory Affairs Division, Office of the General Counsel, Consumer Product Safety Commission

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 01/27/94 FROM H. EWELL TO DAVID ELIAS (OCC 9615)

TEXT: This letter responds to your inquiry whether gasoline pump nozzle/hose assemblies (referred to collectively in this letter as "gas nozzles") are an item of motor vehicle equipment. The answer is no. To answer your question, we conducted a detailed exam ination of our past interpretations of what constitutes "motor vehicle equipment" under our statute.

As you are aware, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA's authority was recently recodified in titl e 49 of the U.S. Code. Section 30102(a) (7) (formerly section 102 (4) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966) defines the term "motor vehicle equipment" as:

(A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured; (B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as any accessory or addition to a motor vehicle ; or (C) any device or an article . . . that is not a system, part, or component of a motor vehicle and is manufactured, sold, delivered, offered, or intended to be used only to safeguard motor vehicles and highway users against risk of accident, injury, or death. (Emphasis added.)

The only portion of this definition that gas nozzles could even conceivably fall within is the term "accessories." Proceeding by the process of elimination, a gas nozzle is neither a "system, part, or component" of a motor vehicle as originally manufactu red nor as a replacement or improvement for or to a system, part or component because a gas nozzle never becomes part of the vehicle and cannot realistically be considered part of the vehicle's fuel system. For the same reason, it is not an "addition" t o a motor vehicle. A gas nozzle is not a "device, article, or apparel" because it is not exclusively used as a safeguard from risk of accident, injury, or death. The sole remaining possibility is that gas nozzles may be an "accessory." This question is addressed below.

The agency has typically used two criteria in determining whether a device is an "accessory." These criteria were discussed extensively in a May 25, 1990 letter to Susan Birenbaum, at the time the Acting General Counsel of your commission. The first crit erion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine a product's expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that r etails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is intended to be used principally by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If a product satisfied both criteria, then the product has been considered to be an "accessory."

An allied concept that has been implicit in NHTSA's interpretations is that the item be purchased or owned by the consumer. This concept reinforces the "ordinary user" concept in the second criterion of the test by generally restricting accessories to c onsumer items that we believe Congress intended us to regulate. Examples of items that, without the purchase concept, might be accessories include self-serve car wash equipment, and air pumps and even gas pumps themselves. In making this concept explic it, NHTSA will be stating the criteria for determining whether an item is an accessory as follows:

(1) A substantial portion of its expected uses are related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles; and

(2) it is purchased or otherwise acquired, and principally used, by ordinary users of motor vehicles.

Applying these criteria to gas nozzle/hose assemblies, we conclude that they are not accessories. While gas nozzles have a principal use that is arguably related to the operation and maintenance of motor vehicles, gas nozzles fail the second criterion o f the test. While they are used by ordinary users of motor vehicles, they are not purchased or acquired by those users. It is therefore our opinion that gas nozzles are not motor vehicle equipment.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-4.3

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: August 18, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Keith E. Smith -- Piper & Marbury

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attachment dated 5/27/94: Letter from Keith E. Smith to John G. Womack (OCC-10104)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) considers automotive and motorcycle braking systems to be "safety devices." As explained below, the agency considers such systems to be items of motor vehicle equipment.

Please note that neither the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (formerly at 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. and recently codified in Title 49 of the U.S. Code) nor the agency's regulations in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations use the phrase "safety device." Rather, the statute refers to "motor vehicles" and "motor vehicle equipment." Specifically, motor vehicle equipment is defined, in relevant part, as

any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured or any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of such system, part, or component or as any accessory, or addition to the motor vehicle . . .

Under this definition, NHTSA would consider an automotive or motorcycle braking system to be an item of motor vehicle equipment.

Please note that the Federal motor vehicle safety standards are issued to meet the need for safety. For example, the purpose of Standard No. 105, which regulates hydraulic brake systems of passenger cars and other specified vehicles, is "to insure safe braking performance under normal and emergency conditions." See S2 of Standard No. 105. Similarly, the purpose of Standard No. 122, which regulates motorcycle brake systems, is "to insure safe motorcycle braking performance under normal and emergency co nditions." See S2 of Standard No. 122.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht94-4.30

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 16, 1994

FROM: Ricardo Martinez, M.D. -- Administrator, NHTSA; Signature by Christopher A. Hart

TO: Doug Bereuter -- U.S. House of Representatives

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 06/16/94 from Doug Bereuter to Christopher Hart (OCC 10107)

TEXT: Thank you for your letters concerning the status of our rulemaking on compressed natural gas fuel containers. I am pleased to enclosed a copy of the final rule that has been issued on this topic. I want to ensure you that one of my principal goals as t he National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's new Administrator is to make the agency's rulemeking process more efficient.

ID: nht94-4.31

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: September 16, 1994

FROM: John Womack -- Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Gerald J. Gannon -- General Motors Corporation, Legal Staff

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-22-94 from Gerald Gannon to John Womack

TEXT: This responds to your letter asking whether NHTSA intended, in a recent final rule, "to require that vehicles with an automatic transmission with a 'park' provision must prevent steering after removal of the key in order to have an ignition key-operated transmission shift override device?" You stated that the final rule might be interpreted to produce that result, but argued, based on the preamble, that a more limited result was intended. You suggested that a clarifying amendment would be appropriate. We apologize for the delay in our response.

After reviewing your letter, we have concluded that the issue you raise should be addressed in rulemaking. We anticipate that a notice addressing this issue will be issued shortly.