ID: nht74-3.47

DATE: 05/24/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank Berndt; NHTSA

TO: J. Alec Reinhardt

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 17, 1974, asking us to approve language to be substituted for the first two sentences of the second paragraph of White's version of the defect notification letter in campaign #73-0140, as well as substitute language suggested by the Court.

We would consider the language of either submission to conform to 49 CFR Part 577 if the word "may" is stricken. The sentence would then read, "We have found that a defect exists in that. . . ." We have interpreted the regulations to require the finding that the defect exists, not that it may exist. However, the notification letter may indicate that the defect may not be present in every vehicle if that is the case.

ID: nht74-3.48

DATE: 05/31/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Mitsubishi Motors Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your verbal request to Mr. Herlihy of this office for a determination that a 3-point, continuous loop, Type II seat belt assembly would meet the requirements of @ 4.1.2.3.1(a) of Standard No. 208 if its emergency-locking retractor were mounted at the outboard floor anchorage instead of at the roof rail. The belt is routed from the fixed upper torso end, through a slip-fitting latch and pelvic section, to the retractor.

Assuming the belt assembly meets any other adjustment requirement of @ 4.1.2.3.1, it would conform to @7.1 or standard No. 208 and @4.1(g) of Standard No. 209 with the emergency-looking retractor mounted at the outboard floor anchorage. The upper torso restraint would "adjust by means of an emergency-locking retractor" within the meaning of @7.1 as long as the continuous loop permitted slack from the floor-mounted emergencylocking retractor to reach the upper torso portion of the assembly.

ID: nht74-3.49

DATE: 06/06/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Armstrong Rubber Company

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter to Michael Peskoe of NHTSA's Cheif Counsel's Office asking our comments on a sample defect notification letter Sears plans to send to known purchasers of the Armstrong L78-15 Allstate Wideguard Dynaglass tire having the identification number CEV3FP1372.

The sample notification letter you enclose would not conform to 49 CFR Part 577, "Defect Notification" in several respects. To comply with section 577.4(b) we believe your letter should include, in addition to the existing statement, a statement that the tires failed to conform to the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. We have taken the position that defect notification letters resulting from failures of compliance with applicable safety standards should contain that information, as it would be required under section 575.5(b) were the notification sent following an administrative proceeding.

We also believe the letter should include precautions the purchaser can take to reduce the chance that the failure will occur (@ 577.4(c) (4)). Such precautions could be stated as the corollary to the failure mode you describe, i.e., avoid prolonged driving.

The letter further fails to conform to Part 577 in that it does not evaluate the risk to traffic safety in the manner set forth in section 577.4(d). Vehicle crash would seem to be a potential result of tire failure, and the letter should therefore contain language meeting section 577.4(d)(1).

Finally, the letter does not conform to section 577.4(e). It is not clear whether the "replacement free of charge" will include mounting or balancing, both of which might be considered by consumers as part of a free replacement. Consequently, we find that the description required by section 577.4(a)(1) is incomplete. There is further no attempt to meet the requirements of 577.4(e)(2) or (e)(3), requiring a date by which replacement parts (tires) are available (if they are presently available, the letter should so indicate) and how much time will be necessary to perform whatever labor is included in the replacement.

In order for your letter to conform to Part 577, it must be modified in each of the respects described above.

ID: nht74-3.5

DATE: 07/09/74

FROM: P.K. KAMATH -- OSHKOSH TRUCK CORPORATION

TO: RICHARD DYSON -- U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.

TITLE: 49 CFR PART 571, FMVSS 101 - CONTROL LOCATION, IDENTIFICATION AND ILLUMINATION

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 07/30/74 TO P.K. KAMATH FROM RICHARD DYSON -- NHTSA; N40-30 [ZTV]; OPINION FILE REDBOOK (-); STANDARD 101

TEXT: Dear Mr. Dyson:

Oshkosh Truck Corporation, in many vehicles, incorporates two controls to stop the engine. One control designated as engine stop (electrical) is operated in normal use to shut off the engine, the other control designated as the emergency engine stop (mechanical cable) is used only in emergency to shut off the engine, should the normal engine stop fail.

It is our understanding that the standard 101 applies to the control for normal engine stop and not to the emergency engine stop control.

Please confirm our understanding and if you disagree, please clarify how the control is to be identified and illuminated.

Very truly yours,

ID: nht74-3.50

DATE: 06/03/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: American Retreaders' Assoc., Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letters of April 7 and April 8, 1974, regarding Standard No. 117, "Retreaded Pneumatic Tires." Your April 7 letter asks whether Standard No. 117 requires treadwear indicators to be straight across the tread face. Your letter of April 8 encloses two sample rubber labels and asks whether each conforms to the requirements of S6.3 of Standard No. 117.

Paragraph S5.1.1(b) of Standard No. 117 does not specify a configuration for treadwear indicators. Rather, it incorporates by reference the requirements for treadwear indicators of S4.2.1(d) of Standard No. 109, which calls only for a treadwear indicator that provides a "visual indication that the tire has worn to a tread depth of 1/16 inch." We do not construe this language to require a straight-across treadwear indicator and other configurations are therefore permitted.

With respect to the labels you enclose in your letter of April 8, each would conform to all of the requirements of S6.3 (which includes the requirements for both affixed (S6.3.1) and permanent (S6.3.2) labeling) if the tires to which they are affixed are of neither bias-belted or radial construction. If they are of either of these construction types, that information would have to be included either through affixed or permanent labeling, including retention of the original casing labeling.

AMERICAN RETREADERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.

April 7, 1974

Lawrence R. Schneider Chief Counsel Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

In the manufacture of retreaded tires we have a need for clarification as to what constitutes a "tread wear indicator."

We are aware of a specific height requirement of 1/16" but are not clear as to whether it must be straight across the tread face or if some other type of configuration is acceptable.

Thank you for your assistance.

E. J. Wagner

Managing Director

AMERICAN RETREADERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.

April 8, 1974

Lawrence R. Schneider Chief Counsel Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

I have enclosed two sample rubber labels that we have been recommending to retreaders to affix to the sidewall of their product in order to comply with Section S6.3 as it now stands.

There has been some question as to whether this label complies with the requirements of S6.3.

May we have your views on this?

Thank you for your assistance.

E. J. Wagner

Managing Director

ID: nht74-3.6

DATE: 01/15/74

FROM: W.G. MILBY -- BLUE BIRD BODY COMPANY

TO: RICHARD DYSON -- NHTSA ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL

TITLE: FMVSS 108

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 02/19/74 FROM RICHARD DYSON TO W.G. MILBY; N40-30 [ZTV], STANDARD 108; REDBOOK (-)

TEXT: We need a ruling on whether it is legal to use rear stop lights on a bus as follows:

1. When brakes are applied rear stop lights are steady burning under all conditions.

2. Place gearshift in reverse - two backup lights are energized and the two seven inch and two four inch rear stop lights flash at a frequency between 60 and 120 cycles per minute.

The purpose for such a system is to give school pupils and others additional warning in addition to the backup lights when the bus is in reverse gear and would not interfere with the stop light function. Thanks for an early reply.

Yours very truly,

ID: nht74-3.7

DATE: 12/11/74

FROM: GERHARD P. RIECHEL -- ATTORNEY VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA INC

TO: TAYLOR VINSON -- OFFICE OF THE CHEIF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: STANDARD 105 - FAILURE INDICATOR LAMP

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 02/28/75 FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA TO GERHARD P. RIECHEL, RED BOOK (-); STANDARD 105-75

TEXT: Dear Mr. Vinson:

This is in reference to our meeting of Friday, November 22, and previous telephone conversations concerning the permissibility of Volkswagen's brake failure indicator configuration for use in connection with 1976 model vehicles.

We have understood Paragraph S5.3.3 of FMVSS 105-75 read in conjunction with S5.3.1(a)(1) to permit deactivation of the failure indicator lamp whenever the brake system is not under pressure, that is whenever brake activation terminates. Mr. Bloom informed us that this understanding did not accurately reflect the intent of the language of the Standard nor the purpose that its authors sought to achieve.

While we appreciate the difficulty of drafting regulations dealing with complex technical subjects, we believe that the language of the rule should be accorded priority where a contrary intent and purpose are not readily apparent. We have closely examined each notice issued by the NHTSA in the course of the lengthy rulemaking process relating to Standard 105 and find nothing that would have aided us in ascertaining the claimed intent of the rule.

It should also be noted that unlike certification, recall and record keeping regulations promulgated by the NHTSA, its safety standards are addressed to design engineers, who are accustomed to working with measurable and ascertainable values and conditions. A "gross loss of pressure," an engineer would justly maintain, simply cannot exist in the absence of any pressure in the brake system. One could argue that had the rule's authors intended the indicator lamp to remain activated as long as the brake system was so grossly defective that it was incapable of building up pressure, terms similar to "inability to build up pressure" or other such language would have been chosen. There is little doubt that our engineers chose that meaning, which most closley conforms to the letter of the standard, and totally unaware of the subsequently disclosed "intent" of the rule, acted responsibly in designing and developing a brake failure warning and indicator lamp configuration, which now is ready for production and use in connection with 1976 model cars.

Description of the Volkswagen Brake Failure Warning System and its Advantages Over Other Systems

Volkswagen uses a dual chamber master cylinder, which provides operating pressure to both brake circuits. The system is so designed that leaks in one circuit will not affect the performance of the other circuit. An electrical warning system, which is actuated by a pressure switch in each of the two brake circuits, which is located in the master cylinder, causes a red indicator lamp on the instrument panel to light up whenever a gross loss of pressure occurs in one of the two circuits upon application of the brake pedal with a control force of not more than fifty (50) pounds. The two pressure switches perform dual functions. Under normal operating conditions, they operate the tail brake lights. Both pressure switches are actuated simultaneously as the result of pressure built up in each circuit. In the case of a gross loss of pressure in one of the circuits, the pressure switch for the other circuit is actuated and in turn illuminates the tail brake lights and the warning indicator lamp upon application of the brake pedal. When the brake pedal is released, the warning and tail lights are deactuated.

This type of pressure failure warning system has certain advantages and, we believe, is superior to warning systems incorporating latching relay components, which allow the warning lamp to remain activated even if the brake pedal is released. Latching relay components have the disadvantage that they operate only in the event that a failure occurs. Unused, they may become increasingly unreliable as the vehicle ages. There is no way of checking, short of dis-assembly, whether or not they are operative. With the increasing age of the vehicle, possible malfunctions due to corrosion and other causes remain undetected until such time as the actual pressure loss occurs. Volkswagen's warning system offers a means of checking and assuring continuous operation throughout the life of the vehicle.

Additionally, since the Volkswagen pressure switch does not only sense a pressure loss but also any malfunction in the switch itself, which, if it occurs, would activate the indicator lamp, the driver is made aware of any deficiency in his braking system.

The Volkswagen warning system also enables the vehicle operator to distinguish between a pressure failure signaled by the warning light being deactivated upon release of the brake pedal, and a loss of brake fluid. In the latter instance, the warning light will remain activated independent of any brake pedal activation.

Notwithstanding the unpublished intent of the rule, which was unknown to us until recently, we believe there is ample support for our claim that the Volkswagen design falls squarely within the interpretive parameters of the Standard's language. We therefore believe that our design is permissible under the law without further rulemaking.

In the event that the NHTSA should disagree with this view, we respectfully request that the effectiveness date of Paragraph S5.3.3 to the extent that it makes reference to Paragraph S5.3.1(a)(1) be postponed until September 1, 1976.

Volkswagen is currently committed to produce the system described above and in more detail in Attachments 1, 2, and 3.

In order to meet the alleged intent of the rule, it will be necessary to redesign our current warning system in several respects. Attachment 4 shows the circuit diagram of the new system, and Attachment 3, the changes that are necessary in the lamp housing in order to accommodate the additional components. The changes are marked in red pencil.

Enclosed as Attachment 5 is an estimate of the cost that we anticipate in acquiring new tooling and in tool modifications for the purpose of incorporating latching relay components into the warning system of each of the models offered for sale in the United States. Note in particular the high costs that will be incurred for our two new models, the Rabbit and Scirocco. The single largest cost factor in this case involves major changes on the dashboard support structures on these models to receive the larger components of the new lamp assembly. The dashboard changes as well as the modifications of the instrument panel insert are marked in red pencil in the drawing enclosed as Attachment 6. The total cost for new tooling is estimated to be approximately $400,000. The cost to the manufacturer of the additional components that must be installed in 1977 vehicles is approximately $4 per car.

Redesign and preparation for production including development of the additional tooling is estimated to require approximately 20 months.

Your favorable consideration of our request is appreciated.

Sincerely,

ENCS

ID: nht74-3.8

DATE: 07/17/74

FROM: JACK R. GILSTRAP -- SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT

TO: RICHARD B. DYSON, -- ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

COPYEE: CHARLES R. SHARP -- GM

TITLE: FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD 108

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/05/74, FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA TO JACK P. GILSTRAP; N40-30 [ZTV]; STANDARD 108; LETTER DATED 12/26/73 FROM WARREN M. HEATH TO JACK R. GILSTRAP

TEXT: Dear Mr. Dyson:

On April 30, 1974, the Southern California Rapid Transit District entered into a contract with GMC Truck & Coach Division of General Motors Corporation for the furnishing of 200 heavy duty transit buses. This purchase is funded under a Capital Grant from the Urban Mass Transportation Administration of the Department of Transportation.

The specifications for these buses required the provision of spare wires serving the clearance and marker lamps around the roof of the bus, as well as the installation of a silent flasher in the engine compartment. This additional wiring was required in order to enable the District to install dual-filament bulbs in the corner clearance lamps. The 32 candlepower filament of these bulbs would be connected in a manner to be put into operation in a flashing mode as a part of an experiment in improving safety onboard transit buses. In December 1973, the District received a permit from the California Highway Patrol to install flashing lamps in the corner clearance lamps. A copy of this permit is enclosed.

The flashing lamps are controlled by a hidden switch which can be secretly activated by the driver in the event of a hijacking, robbery or other crime in progress on the bus. This same switch activates a radio silent alarm on those buses which are radio equipped. In addition, all District buses have identification numbers painted on the roof. These features, the flashing lamps, the radio silent alarms, and the roof numbers are all part of a program initiated jointly by the District and law enforcement agencies in an attempt to combat the growing incidence of crime onboard public trans buses. The District presently operates more than 1700 buses outfitted with these flashing lamps as approved by the California Highway Patrol. Most of the local law enforcement agencies have expressed to the District the opinion that the flashing lamps are a significant aid in spotting a bus with a crime in progress. No objections or complaints have been received.

2

General Motors, although it did not take exception to the Specifications prior to award of the contract, has now advised us of their refusal to manufacture the buses with the specified additional wiring. The purported grounds for their refusal is that to do so would violate the intent of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108, in particular, Paragraph S 4.6, even though GMC has not been requested to connect any operating lamp or other device to this wiring.

The District's interpretation of Paragraph S 4. 6 is that it applies only to turn signal lamps, hazard warning signal lamps and school bus warning lamps as cited therein. It is not the intent, nor would it be a permitted practice, to activate the flashing crime warning lamps at the same time as, or in conjunction with, any of the lamps cited in Paragraph S 4.6. In any case, it is the District's interpretation of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that the mere provision of wiring would not create or constitute a violation on the part of GMC.

Nevertheless, General Motors has asked that we obtain an opinion from your office that the installation of the additional wiring by GMC would not constitute a violation of FMVSS 108. The District is prepared to take full responsibility for installation of any flashing lamps under the experimental permit issued by the California Highway Patrol in December 1973. Please note that buses of the District do not operate in any service outside the State of California.

Should there be problems of which the District is not aware we request that you consider this letter as a petition for the amendment of FMVSS 108 to allow the installation and use of dual filament flashing bulbs in the corner clearance lamps to signify a crime in progress onboard a transit bus.

Should you have any questions of a legal nature, please contact Miss Suzanne B. Gifford, our Assistant General Counsel. If there are questions on mechanical or technical matters, please contact Mr. Frank Barnes, our Deputy Administrator of Operations.

We would appreciate your consideration of this matter.

Cordially,

ID: nht74-3.9

DATE: 01/01/74 EST

FROM: RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO 01/01/75 (EST) LETTER FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL TO ALLEN B. FREDHOLD OF K-B AXLE COMPANY INC.; N40-30 (TWH) LETTER DATED 4/16/75 FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL TO GEOFFREY R. MYERS OF HALL AND MYERS; UNDATED LETTER FROM RICHARD B. DYSON -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL TO ADDRESSEE UNKNOWN

TEXT: De

This responds to your April 22, 1974, question concerning the certification responsibility of a small manufacturer of trailers that must conform to Standard No. 121, Air brake systems. You ask if road testing of any or all vehicles produced would be necessary to satisfy the requirements.

A manufacturer must "exercise due care" in certifying that the vehicles manufactured by him comply with the applicable standards (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, @ 108(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. @ 1397(b)(2)). What constitutes due care in a particular case depends on all relevant facts, including such things as the time to elapse before a new effective date, the availability of test equipment to small manufacturers, the limitations of current technology, and above all the diligence evidenced by the manufacturer.

A small manufacturer of standard and custom trailers might fulfill his due care responsibility to assure that each of his trailers is capable of meeting the standard in several ways. For example, he could establish categories of models which share a common brake and axle system and certify them all on the basis of tests on the most adverse configuration in the category. Calculations should be written down in such a case to establish that reasonable care was taken in these decisions.

Alternatively, joint testing might be undertaken with a trade association or with a major supplier of brake and axle components. In the case of standard models, you might be able to rely on the supplier's warranty of his products' capacities.

Neither of these methods would require road testing of each vehicle manufactured, nor would every model have to be road tested. A manufacturer must simply satisfy himself that the trailer is capable of meeting the stopping performance requirements if it were tested by the NHTSA.

Yours truly,

ID: nht74-4.1

DATE: 06/07/74

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Richard B. Dyson; NHTSA

TO: Breeze Corporations Inc.

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of May 8, 1974, asking whether persons installing on a new vehicle a device called the Breeze Jacknife Control are required to certify the conformity of the vehicle to applicable motor vehicle safety standards. You indicate such a device would ordinarily be installed after the truck leaves the factory.

Persons who install components on or otherwise modify completed vehicles before their sale to a purchaser for a purpose other than resale may be vehicle alterers under NHTSA Certification regulations (49 CFR Parts 567, 568), and if so are required to certify that the vehicle as altered conforms to applicable standards by attaching to it a label containing specified information. A label must be attached when the alteration either involves components which are not readily attachable or whose installation renders invalid the vehicle's stated weight ratings. Modifications to a completed vehicle after its purchase for purposes other than resale, however, do not give rise to any certification or labeling requirements.

Copies of the Certification regulations and information on obtaining copies of all NHTSA requirements are enclosed.