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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 12551 - 12560 of 16510
Interpretations Date
 search results table

ID: 9611

Open

Mr. C.N. Littler
Motor Coach Industries
Administrator Regulatory Affairs
1558 Wilson Place
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 0Y4
CANADA

Dear Mr. Littler:

This responds to your letter concerning whether a New York State law addressing the in-use stopping ability of privately owned motor coaches is preempted by Federal law. I apologize for the delay in our response. The New York law states that a vehicle must be capable of stopping "at a rate of deceleration equivalent to a stop within 22.2 feet from a speed of 20 miles per hour." You believe that '103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act") preempts the New York law, since the state law is not identical to Federal motor vehicle safety standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems. Please note that the Safety Act has been codified at 49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq. and that the citation for 103(d) is now 49 U.S.C. '30103.

As explained below, Standard No. 121 currently does not have stopping distance requirements in effect; therefore, the New York law is not currently preempted by a Federal safety standard. Nevertheless, the agency has issued a proposal to reinstate stopping distance requirements in Standard No. 121. (58 FR 11003, February 23, 1993). If the agency issues a final rule to reinstate stopping distances, then any more stringent requirements in the New York law (addressing the same aspects of performance as Standard No. 121) would be preempted.

Title 49 U.S.C. '30103 states:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard ... is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

That provision preempts New York's law if there is a Federal safety standard in effect, the state law covers the same aspect of performance as that Federal standard, and the State law is not identical to the Federal safety standard. While you are correct that Standard No. 121 refers to stopping performance in S5.3.1, you apparently were not aware of a provision in S3 that states

Notwithstanding any language to the contrary, sections S5.3.1, S5.3.1.1, S5.3.2, S5.3.2.1, S5.3.2.2, S5.7.1, S5.7.3(a) and S5.7.3(b) of this standard are not applicable to trucks and trailers, and section S5.3.1 of this standard is not applicable to buses.

The agency amended the standard to include this provision as the result of a ruling in PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978), in which a Federal Court of Appeals invalidated Standard No. 121's stopping distance requirements until the agency obtains "more probative and convincing data evidencing the reliability and safety of vehicles that are equipped with antilock." While the provision did not originally cover buses other than school buses, NHTSA extended the provision to non-school buses in 1987. See 52 FR 20602. Because there are no Federal stopping distance requirements in effect, the New York law is not preempted.

As noted above, NHTSA has issued a notice proposing to reinstate stopping distance requirements for air braked vehicles. The agency is currently reviewing comments to that proposal, and may issue a final rule reinstating stopping distance requirements. If the agency decides to amend Standard No. 121 to include such requirements, then any more stringent requirements in the New York law (addressing the same aspects of performance as Standard No. 121) would be preempted.

I note that the New York law applies to vehicles in use, while Standard No. 121 applies to new vehicles. In general, State laws governing the operation of vehicles are not preempted by inconsistent Federal motor vehicle safety standards unless the State law is more stringent than the Federal standard (with respect to the same aspect of performance). A more stringent law would be preempted, since it would preclude the sale of vehicles that comply with Federal standards.

I also note that the in-use braking performance of many motor coaches is regulated by the Federal Highway Administration. We have referred your letter to that agency's Office of Motor Carrier Standards concerning the issue of whether its regulations preempt the New York law.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. If you wish to contact someone in the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Chief Counsel concerning the motor carrier standards, please call Charles Medalen at (202) 366- 1354.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure

ref:121#103(d) d:9/7/94

1994

ID: 9612

Open

Mr. Eldon J. McLauchlin
President
Valley Automotive Specialties, Inc.
5805 East Sharp, Suite A-2
Spokane, Washington 99212

Dear Mr. McLauchlin:

This responds to your January 25, 1994, letter asking about how this agency's regulations might apply to your product, the Automated Fire Extinguisher System (AFES). You state that your product's purpose is to allow the operators and occupants of a vehicle to exit safely in the event of a fire. Apparently, the AFES sensors will detect smoke and heat and respond by automatically opening some sort of control valve, whereupon a manifold assembly with "strategically placed directional nozzles" will flood the passenger compartment with some sort of fire extinguisher/retardant. You do not state what kind of fire extinguisher/retardant is used. You explain that the automatic nature of this system will provide time to extract even an unconscious or incapacitated operator or occupant.

Apparently, the AFES has wide applicability. You explain that the AFES proto-type can be installed in a car, truck, boat, RV, or bus or other vehicle running on a 12 volt battery. Apparently you will modify the AFES so that it will run off the 110 volt current in homes and commercial buildings.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS's) for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 102(4) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the "Safety Act") defines, in relevant part, the term "motor vehicle equipment" as:

any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured or any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of such system, part, or component or as any accessory, or addition to the motor vehicle ... (emphasis added).

In determining whether an item of equipment is considered an accessory, NHTSA applies two criteria. The first criterion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine a product's expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that retails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is intended to be used principally by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If the product satisfies both criteria, then the product is considered to be an "accessory" and thus is subject to the provisions of the Safety Act.

Applying these criteria to the AFES, it appears that this product would be an accessory and thus an item of motor vehicle equipment under the Safety Act. Based on our understanding of the product, it appears that a substantial portion of the expected use of the AFES system relates to motor vehicle operation. The system is intended to protect anyone occupying a vehicle when a fire occurs. Also, it appears that the product would typically be used by ordinary users of motor vehicles.

While it appears that the AFES system is an item of motor vehicle equipment, NHTSA has not issued any standards for such a device. Nevertheless, there are other Federal laws that indirectly affect the manufacture and sale of your product. You as the product's manufacturer are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. In the event that the manufacturer or NHTSA determines that the product contains a safety related defect, the manufacturer would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge.

We have some concerns about the safety impacts if the AFES were to activate while the vehicle is moving. Is it possible, for example, that a driver smoking in the car on a hot day could accidentally set off the sensors, or that they could malfunction spontaneously? Although we do not know what will be coming through the nozzles (fluid, foam, and inert gases are common fire extinguishing agents), we are concerned that AFES activation could cause the driver to lose control in what is otherwise a controllable situation. We urge you to thoroughly consider these and other factors that could affect the safety of motor vehicle operation.

If the AFES were installed by a vehicle manufacturer as original equipment, the vehicle manufacturer would have to certify that the vehicle with the AFES installed complies with all FMVSS's. Among the FMVSS's that might be affected by certain AFES installations are Standard No. 201, "Occupant Protection in Interior Impact," and Standard No. 208, "Occupant Crash Protection."

A commercial business that installs the AFES system would also be subject to provisions of the Safety Act that affect modifications of new or used vehicles. Section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)) provides that:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle ... in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

This means that a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business must not install your device if the system renders inoperative the vehicle's compliance with the FMVSS's. For instance, compliance with Standard No. 208 might be degraded if it were necessary to mount the AFES manifold or directional nozzles in front of the driver or passenger. Any violation of this "render inoperative" prohibition would subject the violator to a potential civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation.

Please note also that the render inoperative prohibition does not apply to modifications that vehicle owners make to their own vehicles. Thus, Federal law would not apply in situations where individual vehicle owners install the AFES in their own vehicles, even if the installation were to result in the vehicle no longer complying with the safety standards. However, NHTSA encourages vehicle owners not to degrade any safety device or system installed in their vehicles. In addition, individual States have the authority to regulate modifications that individual vehicle owners may make to their vehicles, so you might wish to consult State regulations to see whether your device would be permitted.

I hope this information is helpful. I am also enclosing a copy of a fact sheet titled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment." If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact us at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:VSA d:4/12/94

1994

ID: 9613

Open

Mr. Luis Carricaburu
South Steering Specialists
18310 S. Dixie Hwy
Miami, FL 33157

Dear Mr. Carricaburu:

This responds to your letter asking whether it is legal to buy or sell a salvaged air bag which would be used to repair an automobile with a deployed air bag. Your letter explained that the salvaged air bag would be taken from an automobile sent to a recycling yard with its air bag intact.

I am enclosing two letters that explain legal obligations to replace air bags which have been deployed. The first letter, dated January, 19, 1990, is to Ms. Linda L. Conrad. The second letter, dated March 4, 1993, is to Mr. Robert A. Ernst. As explained in those letters, Federal law does not require replacement of a deployed air bag in a used vehicle. In addition, there is no Federal law that prohibits selling a used vehicle with an air bag that is inoperable because of a previous deployment. However, our agency strongly encourages dealers and repair businesses to replace deployed air bags whenever vehicles are repaired or resold, to ensure that the vehicles will continue to provide maximum crash protection for occupants. Moreover, a dealer or repair business may be required by state law to replace a deployed air bag, or be liable for failure to do so.

Your letter asks the additional question of whether, if a deployed air bag is replaced, Federal law prohibits use of a salvaged air bag as the replacement air bag. The answer to your question is no. As explained in the enclosed letters, the Safety Act does not require a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business to return a vehicle to compliance with a standard if a device or element of design has been "rendered inoperative" by another agent, such as a crash. Thus, Federal law does not regulate the manner in which a deployed air bag is replaced. However, state law may regulate the manner in which a deployed air bag is replaced.

I would like to emphasize that in order for a replacement air bag to provide protection to vehicle occupants, it is essential that the replacement be properly completed. For example, the entire air bag must be replaced, including such things as the crash sensors, the inflation mechanism, and other electronic parts. Moreover, since air bags are designed for specific vehicles, taking into consideration such factors as the seats, steering column crush stroke force resistance, gauge array and location on instrument panel, location and nature of knee bolsters, and compartment acceleration responses in frontal crashes, only air bags which are designed for the vehicle in question should be used. After the air bags are replaced, it is important that the air bag readiness indicator be in good working order to alert the occupants of any future malfunction of the air bag system.

While great care must be taken in any air bag replacement, the use of a salvaged air bag raises additional safety issues. An air bag may have been rendered inoperable, for example, by damage in a low-speed crash, even if it has not been deployed. We would urge you to contact the vehicle or air bag manufacturer to determine whether and how a salvaged air bag could be inspected and/or tested to ensure that it is fully operable.

Finally, you may wish to consult a private attorney concerning the state law implications of using salvaged air bags for repairing automobiles, including possible tort liability.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures

ref:VSA#208 d:5/5/94

1994

ID: 9615a

Open

Harleigh Ewell, Esq.
Regulatory Affairs Division
Office of the General Counsel
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Washington, D.C. 20207

Dear Mr. Ewell:

This letter responds to your inquiry whether gasoline pump nozzle/hose assemblies (referred to collectively in this letter as "gas nozzles") are an item of motor vehicle equipment. The answer is no. To answer your question, we conducted a detailed examination of our past interpretations of what constitutes "motor vehicle equipment" under our statute.

As you are aware, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA's authority was recently recodified in title 49 of the U.S. Code. Section 30102(a)(7) (formerly section 102(4) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966) defines the term "motor vehicle equipment" as:

(A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured; (B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or component, or as any accessory or addition to a motor vehicle; or (C) any device or an article ... that is not a system, part, or component of a motor vehicle and is manufactured, sold, delivered, offered, or intended to be used only to safeguard motor vehicles and highway users against risk of accident, injury, or death. (Emphasis added.)

The only portion of this definition that gas nozzles could even conceivably fall within is the term "accessories." Proceeding by the process of elimination, a gas nozzle is neither a "system, part, or component" of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured nor as a replacement or improvement for or to a system, part or component because a gas nozzle never becomes part of the vehicle and cannot realistically be considered part of the vehicle's fuel system. For the same reason, it is not an "addition" to a motor vehicle. A gas nozzle is not a "device, article, or apparel" because it is not exclusively used as a safeguard from risk of accident, injury, or death. The sole remaining possibility is that gas nozzles may be an "accessory." This question is addressed below.

The agency has typically used two criteria in determining whether a device is an "accessory." These criteria were discussed extensively in a May 25, 1990 letter to Susan Birenbaum, at the time the Acting General Counsel of your commission. The first criterion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine a product's expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that retails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is intended to be used principally by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If a product satisfied both criteria, then the product has been considered to be an "accessory."

An allied concept that has been implicit in NHTSA's interpretations is that the item be purchased or owned by the consumer. This concept reinforces the "ordinary user" concept in the second criterion of the test by generally restricting accessories to consumer items that we believe Congress intended us to regulate. Examples of items that, without the purchase concept, might be accessories include self-serve car wash equipment, and air pumps and even gas pumps themselves. In making this concept explicit, NHTSA will be stating the criteria for determining whether an item is an accessory as follows:

(1) A substantial portion of its expected uses are related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles; and

(2) it is purchased or otherwise acquired, and principally used, by ordinary users of motor vehicles.

Applying these criteria to gas nozzle/hose assemblies, we conclude that they are not accessories. While gas nozzles have a principal use that is arguably related to the operation and maintenance of motor vehicles, gas nozzles fail the second criterion of the test. While they are used by ordinary users of motor vehicles, they are not purchased or acquired by those users. It is therefore our opinion that gas nozzles are not motor vehicle equipment.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:VSA d:9/16/94

1994

ID: 9638

Open

[           ]

Dear [   ]:

This responds to your letter of December 29, 1993, asking for an interpretation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 as it applies to your lighting device. You have requested confidential treatment of the matter but, in a telephone conversation of March 16, 1994, with Taylor Vinson of this office, you agreed to our practice in these matters to delete from the publicly available copy of this letter all information that would identify you, while disclosing the information necessary to render you an opinion.

You plan to create "signs, logos, emblems, accents, etc." which will be constructed of "sheet metal cut-outs of logos/company names," which "would be applied to large trucks and trailers". The color of the LEDs would "correspond to the safety color assigned to the panel of attachment (rear/red, side/amber-yellow)". You note that LEDs provide a low level of illumination, for example, "100 LEDs would produce only 15 candelas of light." You believe the ideal height is 2 feet to 3 feet. You have asked for an interpretation that this would not be prohibited under S5.1.3 of Standard No. 108.

Paragraph S5.1.3 allows the installation on a new motor vehicle (i.e., one that has not been delivered to its first purchaser for purposes other than resale) of motor vehicle equipment provided that it does not impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108. For trailers or trucks whose overall width is 80 inches or more, the required side lighting equipment consists of amber and red side marker lamps; trailers of this width are also required to have conspicuity striping of red/white segments (which is not required for narrower trailers) applied near the lower horizontal edge. We interpret impairment as something that interferes with the function of the required equipment. The function of marker lamps and conspicuity taping is to alert drivers of other vehicles to the presence of a large vehicle in the roadway. We believe your device would not detract from this function since it also serves to call attention to the presence of a large vehicle.

When equipment of this nature is not prohibited under Federal law, its permissibility must be determined under the laws of the States where the vehicle is operated. We are unable to advise you on State laws, and suggest that you consult for an opinion the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 4600 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va. 22203.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:108 d:4/20/94

 

1994

ID: 9640

Open

R. Mark Willingham, Esquire
Thornton, Summers, Biechlin, Dunham & Brown, L.C.
114 Lost Creek Boulevard, Suite 215
Austin, TX 78746

Dear Mr. Willingham:

This responds to your February 1, 1994, letter to me about the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) consumer information regulation for utility vehicles (49 CFR 575.105, Utility Vehicles). The regulation, Part 575.105, requires manufacturers to permanently affix a prescribed sticker in a prominent location of each utility vehicle to alert drivers of the handling differences between utility vehicles and passenger cars.

You asked about the meaning of the word "permanent" as used in Part 575.105. In a May 1984 final rule establishing Part 575.105 (copy enclosed), NHTSA said that the label "should be of a permanent nature" and concurred with a comment on the proposed rule that the label should be permanently affixed so that, among other reasons, subsequent vehicle owners are made aware of the utility vehicle's handling characteristics. NHTSA believed specifying precisely how the label is to be permanently affixed would be design restrictive. However, we stated in the enclosed final rule that stickers such as the placard required by paragraph S4.3, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 110, Tire Selection and Rims, would be considered adequate.

You also asked "to whom is Part 575.105 directed (i.e., manufacturer, distributor, dealership)...[or] a seller of a used vehicle." The regulation applies to the manufacturer and seller of a new vehicle, not to a seller of a used vehicle. The regulation was issued under sections 103, 112 and 119 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. '1381, et seq. (hereinafter Safety Act). Section 103 authorizes NHTSA to issue and amend Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 112(d) (15 U.S.C. '1401(d)) authorizes NHTSA:

"[T]o require the manufacturer (of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment) to give such notification of such performance and technical data as the Secretary determines necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act in the following manner -- (1) to each prospective purchaser of a motor vehicle or item of equipment before its first sale for purposes other than resale . . .; and

(2) to the first person who purchases a motor vehicle or item of equipment for purposes other than resale . . . .

Section 119 confers general rulemaking authority to issue rules to effectuate the express grants of authority and the obligations imposed by the Safety Act.

Sections 103, 112 and 119 of the Safety Act authorize NHTSA to require the consumer information label up to the delivery of the new vehicle to the consumer who first purchases the vehicle "for purposes other than resale". NHTSA cannot require sellers of used vehicles to restore missing labels prior to sale of the used vehicles, or prohibit a vehicle owner from removing or defacing the label.

You also asked for documents regarding the drafting and interpretation of Part 575.105. Please find enclosed copies of the following: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, dated December 30, 1982 (47 FR 58323); final rule, dated May 11, 1984 (49 FR 20016); final rule, response to petitions for reconsideration, dated August 10, 1984 (49 FR 32069); and letter to Lawrence F. Henneberger, Esq., dated August 15, 1984. For future reference, copies of NHTSA's interpretation letters can be obtained from the agency's docket section. The address for the docket is 400 Seventh St., S.W., room 5108, Washington, D.C., 20590, telephone (202) 366-4949.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need any further information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

Enclosures ref:575 d:4/l/94

1970

ID: 9645

Open

Mr. John Moore
Ferrucci Nurseries
Rd 1, Box 299
Piney Hollow Rd.
Newfield, NJ 08344

Dear Mr. Moore:

This responds to your letter of February 4, 1994, requesting verification of a statement made by a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) employee that you are allowed to install passenger seats in a van used for farm transportation if you comply with the safety regulations. In a phone conversation with Mary Versailles of my staff, you explained that you would like to add seats to the rear of a 14 foot cargo van which the nursery owns. You would be performing this work yourself. As explained below, Federal law does not apply to situations where vehicle owners alter their own vehicles.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our laws and regulations to you. NHTSA is authorized under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.; Safety Act) to issue motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) prohibits any person from manufacturing, introducing into commerce, selling, or importing any new motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment unless the vehicle or equipment item is in conformity with all applicable safety standards.

NHTSA has exercised its authority to establish five safety standards which could be relevant to installation of a seat in a used vehicle: Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, and Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials. Standards Nos. 207, 208, 210, and 302 apply, with certain exceptions that are not relevant to your situation, to vehicles and not directly to items of equipment. Standard No. 209, however, applies to seat belt assemblies as separate items of motor vehicle equipment, regardless of whether the belts are installed as original equipment in a motor vehicle or sold as replacements. Thus, if you install new seat belts on the seats, the manufacturer is required to certify that the seat belts comply with Standard No. 209.

If a seat is installed in a used motor vehicle, the seat, as an item of equipment, does not have to comply with any Federal standards. However, 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act provides, in pertinent part:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard. . . .

None of these entities could install seats in your van if it caused the vehicle to no longer comply with any of the safety standards. Please note, however, that the "render inoperative" prohibition does not apply to modifications vehicle owners make to their own vehicles. Thus, Federal law would not apply in a situation where you, as an individual vehicle owner, installed seats in your own vehicles, even if the installation were to result in the vehicle no longer complying with the safety standards. However, you should be aware that individual States have the authority to regulate modifications that individual vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles.

While Federal law would not apply to a modification you make to your own vehicle, I nonetheless urge you to exercise care in installing the seats and to install seat belts on the seats. The seats and seat belts will not provide any protection to occupants if they separate from the vehicle frame in a crash. Also, you may wish to consult a private attorney familiar with the law in the State of New Jersey regarding potential liability in tort for your business in these circumstances.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:207 d:4/14/94

1994

ID: 9646

Open

Martin M. Sackoff, Ph.D.
Executive Director of Laboratories
International Testing Laboratories
578-582 Market Street
Newark, NJ 07015-2913

Dear Dr. Sackoff:

This responds to your letter to this agency with reference to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109, New Pneumatic Tires.

Your specific question addressed S4.2.2.4, Tire strength, which states: "Each tire shall meet the requirements for minimum breaking energy specified in Table I when tested in accordance with S5.3." You asked for an interpretation of the term "breaking," whether it means a blowout of the tire or the breaking of the tire caused by the plunger used in the test specified in the standard.

The breaking energy test is a measure of the resistance of the tire to bruise or damage due to impact of the tire with road hazards. This agency tests such resistance in accordance with the procedures of S5.3, Tire strength, of the standard. In that test, a cylindrical steel plunger is forced perpendicularly into the tire rib at the rate of 2 inches per minute at five test points equally spaced around the circumference of the tire. The inch-pounds of force required to push the plunger into the tire is continuously monitored. As the plunger pushes into the tire, the resistance to the plunger force increases. That resistance requires ever- increasing force applied to the plunger to continue pushing it into the tire. Ultimately, one of two things will happen:

1. The plunger will push all the way to the rim; or

2. The tire cords, plies, innerliner, or other components of the tire will stretch, separate, crack or break so that the resistance pressure of the tire diminishes. The "breaking" of the tire at that point does not require an actual blow-out although, obviously, a blow-out would constitute a "breaking."

The plunger force is measured just prior to contact with the rim as in 1 above or just prior to the force reduction described in 2 above. The measured force is then combined with the penetration of the plunger into the tire as specified in S5.3.2.3 and S5.3.2.4 of the standard. The breaking energy value of the tire is then determined by computing the average of the values obtained at the five test locations on the tire. Table I, Appendix A of the standard specifies the minimum breaking energy of tires based on tire type, size, composition, and inflation pressure.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Should you have any further questions or need any additional information, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:109 d:5/12/94

1994

ID: 9653

Open

Mr. Michinori Hachiya
Director, Technical Affairs
Nissan North America, Inc.
750 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 901
Washington, D.C. 20006-4607

Dear Mr. Hachiya:

This responds to your request for an interpretation of the theft prevention standard (49 CFR part 541) as it would apply to high theft passenger motor vehicles and their replacement parts from model year (MY) 1996 and thereafter. Because the agency has not yet published regulations for MY 1996 high theft lines and thereafter, we are unable to answer your specific questions.

As a result of the "Anti Car Theft Act of 1992" (ACTA), certain changes must be made to the theft prevention standard. In its October 25, 1993 semiannual regulatory agenda, NHTSA listed its proposed rulemakings to implement the ACTA. (See 58 FR 56734 et seq.) In a Federal Register document of January 6, 1994 (59 FR 796), NHTSA stated it intended that the new ACTA-mandated procedures apply to high theft lines beginning in MY 1996.

As indicated in the October 1993 semiannual agenda, NHTSA will shortly issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the theft prevention standard. We believe the NPRM will address the issues you raise. If the NPRM does not address them, you will be able to discuss any questions you may have in your comments on the rulemaking submitted to NHTSA during the public comment period.

If you have any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel ref:541 d:4/l/94

1970

ID: 9654

Open

Mr. Scott Slaughter
Pitts Enterprises, Inc.
5734 Highway 431
P.O. Box 155
Pittsview, AL 36871

Dear Mr. Slaughter:

This responds to your inquiry about whether a logging trailer known as the "knuckle boom loader trailer" that you manufacture is a motor vehicle that would have to comply with the applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. You explained that your trailer stays in the woods the majority of its life and is infrequently transported over public roads between job sites. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our regulations to you.

This agency interprets and enforces the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act" 13 U.S.C. 1392 et seq.) under which the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are promulgated. The Act defines the term "motor vehicle" as follows:

"any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails."

Whether the agency considers your trailer to be a motor vehicle depends on its use. It is the agency's position that this statutory definition does not encompass mobile construction equipment, such as cranes and scrapers, which use the highway only to move between job sites and which typically spend extended periods of time at a single job site. In such cases, the on-highway use of the vehicle is merely incidental and is not the primary purpose for which the vehicle was manufactured. In contrast are instances where vehicles, such as dump trucks, frequently use the highway going to and from job sites, and stay at a job site for only a limited time. Such vehicles are considered motor vehicles for purposes of the Safety Act, since the on-highway use is more than "incidental."

Based on the available information, it appears that your trailer is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Safety Act. This conclusion is based on statements in your letter and brochures that this equipment spends extended periods of time at a single construction site and only uses the public roads infrequently to move between job sites. Thus, the agency would consider the use of your device on the public roads to be incidental and not its primary purpose. Since your trailer is not a motor vehicle, it would not be subject to our Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

If the agency were to receive additional information indicating that your trailer used the roads more than on an incidental basis, then the agency would reassess this interpretation. If the agency were to determine that your trailer is a motor vehicle, then the trailer would have to comply with the applicable Standards, including Standard No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, which addresses conspicuity, Standard No. 115, Vehicle Identification Numbers, Standard No. 120, Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars, and Standard No. 121 Air Brake Systems which requires automatic slack adjusters and brakes to act on all wheels.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

John Womack Acting Chief Counsel

ref:VSA d:4/5/94

1994

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.