ID: 2783y

Mr. Paul G. Scully
Vice President
Peterson Manufacturing Company
4200 East 135th Street
Grandview, MO 64030

Dear Mr. Scully:

This is in reply to your letter of August l4, l990 (postmarked September l9), asking that we notify the police department of Tuscon, Arizona, that reflex reflectors are not required to have SAE markings "in order to be perfectly legal reflectors." You also state that another agency of the Department of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carrier Safety, "still retain(s) these marking requirements in their publication" and appeal for "a uniform set of regulations between the two government agencies involved."

Because this matter has not been brought to our attention by the police department of Tuscon, we are responding directly to you so that you may furnish copies to whomever you deem it most advisable.

We confirm your understanding that 49 CFR 571.108, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l08, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, does not require that reflex reflectors bear SAE markings. Although they must meet the requirements of SAE Standard J594f, Reflex Reflectors, January 1977, there is no requirement that they bear SAE markings according to SAE Recommended Practice J759c, Lighting Identification Code, January l975.

Although the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS) has amended most of its vehicle lighting regulations to conform to Standard No. l08, up until now that agency has required, under 49 CFR 393.26(c), that reflectors bear (among other markings), the letters "SAE-A". However, OMCS has informed us that it will amend its regulation to conform to Standard No. l08 as early as convenient, and in the meantime will notify its field office that the marking requirement is no longer to be enforced. Therefore, failure to mark reflectors with the letters "SAE-A" may be inconsistent with current OMCS requirements, but it is not a failure to comply with Standard No. l08.

Further, to the extent that Arizona law itself may require marking of reflectors with the letters "SAE-A", that provision is inconsistent with Standard No. l08 and is subject to the preemption provisions of l5 U.S.C. 1392(d). Under the preemption provisions, no State or political subdivision thereof may enact or continue in effect a standard covering the same aspect of performance as a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, unless it is identical to the Federal standard. Thus, any State or local requirement for SAE markings on reflex reflectors is one that is not identical to Standard No. 108, and subject to the preemption provisions.

Other than the reference to OMCS regulations, we do not know under what authority the Tuscon police are acting. Certainly, a local official cannot enforce a Federal standard per se. If Arizona law requires vehicles in interstate commerce to comply with regulations of the OMCS, and the Tuscon police are attempting to enforce State law, we conclude that the State law is subject to the preemption provisions discussed above, and that such enforcement action has been precluded under Federal law.

I hope that this responds to your concerns.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:l08 d:12/27/90

ID: 2784y

Mr. Takahiro Maeda
Assistant to the Vice President
Engineering Division
Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.
P.O. Box 6555
Cypress, CA 90630

Dear Mr. Maeda:

This is in reply to your letter of September 28, l990, requesting an interpretation of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. l08.

Table IV of the standard establishes a minimum "edge to edge separation distance" between turn signal lamps and tail or stop lamps installed on motorcycles. You have asked whether the edge in question is the outer edge of the lamp assembly itself, or the edge of the reflector in the lamp.

The minimum edge to edge separation distance is measured from the edge of the illuminated surface of one lamp to another, that is to say, from the edge of the effective projected luminous area of one lens to the edge of the effective projected luminous area of the other. It is unclear from the drawing you enclosed of the "tail/brake lamp" whether the edge of its effective projected luminous area of the lens is at the edge of the reflector, or at the edge of the lamp (as appears to be the case with the "turn signal"). If the former, the distance is measured between the edge of the tail/stop lamp reflector to the edge of the turn signal lamp assembly as you have initially indicated.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel ref:l08 d:l2/7/90

ID: 2785y

Sgt. Cal Karl
Minnesota State Patrol
District 4700-Commercial Vehicle Section
100 Stockyard Rd., Rm. 252
So. St. Paul, MN 55075

Dear Sergeant Karl:

This is in response to your letter to Marvin Shaw of my staff seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release (49 CFR 571.217). Specifically, you asked how S5.2.3.2, which applies to school buses, would affect the installation of certain designs of "vandal locks" on school buses. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain this safety standard for you.

Before I address your specific questions, I would like to provide some background information. Throughout this letter, I will use the term "vandal lock" to describe locking systems installed for the doors and emergency exits of school buses intended to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the school bus through those exits when the bus is unoccupied and unattended. S5.2.3.2, the relevant provision of Standard No. 217, reads as follows:

The engine starting system of a school bus shall not operate if any emergency exit is locked from either inside or outside the bus. For purposes of this requirement, "locked" means that the release mechanism cannot be activated by a person at the door without a special device such as a key or special information such as a combination.

Your first question was whether S5.2.3.2 prohibits the use of a vandal lock system that, although it must be unlocked for the bus to start, can be relocked once the bus is started. The answer is that such locks are not prohibited by Standard No. 217. I have enclosed a copy of a December 7, 1982 letter to Mr. M. B. Mathieson in which NHTSA addressed this issue. As stated in that letter, "Nothing in Standard No. 217 prohibits the installation of locking doors [on a school bus] as long as the vehicle cannot be started with the [emergency] door in the locked position." In other words, the prohibition in S5.2.3.2 focuses exclusively on whether the vehicle can be started when any emergency exit is locked. If the school bus cannot be started when an emergency exit is locked, the bus complies with S5.2.3.2, even if an emergency exit can be locked once the bus is started.

Your second question was whether S5.2.3.2 allows a vandal lock to be relocked after the vehicle is running without the use of a key or special information. The answer to this question is yes. As stated above, the prohibition in S5.2.3.2 focuses exclusively on whether the vehicle can be started when any emergency exit is locked. If the school bus cannot be started when an emergency exit is locked, the bus complies with S5.2.3.2, even if an emergency exit can be locked once the bus is started. Nothing in S5.2.3.2 requires that any locks on emergency exits be relocked only by means of a key or some special information after the vehicle is started.

I appreciate your concern about potential problems that might arise if emergency doors are locked after a school bus is started. Nevertheless, regardless of whether you believe that NHTSA intended to make or should have made some provision to prevent emergency exits on school buses from being relocked once the bus is started, it is not possible to interpret the language of S5.2.3.2 as including such a provision. Since an interpretation cannot add or delete requirements in the language of a safety standard, the only way whereby the standard could include a provision to prevent emergency exits on school buses from being relocked once the bus is started would be for this agency to undertake a rulemaking action to amend the current language of S5.2.3.2.

We are unaware of any safety need to commence such a rulemaking. We do not have any indication that there have been deaths or injuries to school bus occupants as a result of an emergency exit being relocked once the bus was started. Moreover, the potential hazards to school bus occupants absent any Standard No. 217 requirements on this subject seem minimal. School bus doors, including emergency doors, should not be locked when the bus is in operation, and we believe that, in practice, they remain unlocked when the buses are in use. It is also our understanding that the vast majority of school buses with emergency doors that can be locked in this fashion are voluntarily equipped with warning buzzers that alert the driver to the fact that the doors have been relocked.

I hope you find this information helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact David Greenburg of my staff at (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions or would like some additional information.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:2l7 d:ll/27/90

ID: 2786y

Mrs. Erika Z. Jones
Mayer, Brown, & Platt
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1885

Dear Mrs. Jones:

This responds to your letter requesting a confirmation of your telephone conversation with Mr. Stephen Wood of my staff. In that conversation, he informally stated that the attached letter dated January 5, 1990 from Fidelity Tire Manufacturing Company contained the information necessary to comply with the notification requirements in S5.1 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 119 (49 CFR 571.119) for tires and rims not listed in the publication of a specified tire and rim association. This letter confirms that Fidelity's letter would satisfy the requirements of section S5.1.

Section S5.1 requires that a listing of the rims which may be used with each tire produced by a manufacturer be provided to the public. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the tire will be mounted only on appropriate rims and that the tire will be mounted on vehicles where its load-carrying capacity will be adequate. That section gives manufacturers the option of using the data provided for the tire size and corresponding rims published in certain standardization organization yearbooks or listing the appropriate information "in a document furnished to dealers of the manufacturer's tires, to any person upon request, and in duplicate to [NHTSA]." Fidelity's letter which includes the appropriate dimensional and load-carrying data for the tire and rim appears to satisfy this requirement.

I hope this explanation is helpful. Please contact Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel ref:ll9 d:l2/6/90

ID: 2787y

Roger C. Fairchild, Esq.
Shutler and Low
14500 Avion Parkway
Suite 300
Chantilly, VA 22021-1101

Dear Mr. Fairchild:

This responds to your request for my opinion of whether a particular vehicle (the Pinzgauer) would be considered a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. When NHTSA previously considered this question, we stated in a March 25, 1982 letter to Mr. Leonard Fink that the Pinzgauer would be considered to be a motor vehicle, based on the information that was available to the agency at that time. However, that letter also stated that the agency would be willing to reconsider this conclusion if additional information were provided regarding the vehicle's marketing, advertising, and actual use. Your recent letter set forth three additional factors that you suggested might lead the agency to change its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer was a motor vehicle. As explained in detail below, this agency reaffirms the previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use. On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle". Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

Vehicles such as the Pinzgauer are not easily classified under either of these groupings. On the one hand, the Pinzgauer is obviously designed to have substantial off-road capabilities, as evidenced by high ground clearance, deep water fording capabilities, and all-wheel drive. According to its manufacturer, 95 percent of the annual production of Pinzgauers is purchased by armed forces worldwide. These factors suggest that the Pinzgauer should not be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the available information shows the Pinzgauer is suitable for use on-road. The vehicle has a top speed of nearly 70 miles per hour. Page 4 of Enclosure 1 of your letter shows that the Pinzgauer is equipped with turn signals and states that the power steering minimizes steering effort "both in difficult terrain and when parking." Page 4 of Enclosure 3 with your letter describes the serviceability of the Pinzgauer "with ordinary on- and off-road usage." These factors suggest that the vehicle is designed and intended to be routinely used on the public roads, which suggests that it should be classified as a motor vehicle.

In instances where the agency is asked whether something is a motor vehicle, when the vehicle has both on-road and off-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, NHTSA has applied five factors to reach its conclusion. These factors are:

1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use.

3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use.

4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles.

5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads.

When NHTSA previously considered whether the Pinzgauer should be considered a motor vehicle, the available information regarding these factors showed that the manufacturer had equipped the vehicle with side marker lights, the manufacturer expected the vehicle to be used on-road, and that it would be sold by dealers that also sell vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles.

In your letter, you enclosed some additional information and brochures from the manufacturer that show the manufacturer continues to expect Pinzgauers to be used both on- and off-road. Since the manufacturer does not now expect to sponsor the vehicle's sale in the U.S., no information is available on the anticipated dealers. The additional information enclosed with your letter did not specifically address any factors on which no information was previously available to NHTSA. Hence, the agency has no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

You suggested three reasons that might lead the agency to reverse its previous conclusion. First, you suggested that the 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer has a unique body configuration which distinguishes it from typical, on-road vehicles and makes it particularly well suited to off-road use. You correctly noted that the agency's 1982 letter addressed both the 4-wheeled and 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. However, for the purposes of this analysis, there is no attribute of the 6-wheeled version that would lead the agency to conclude that it should be classified differently than the 4-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. Many vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles have 6 wheels. In all other respects, the 4- and 6-wheeled Pinzgauers have similar on-road capabilities, including a top speed of more than 65 miles per hour.

Second, you suggested that NHTSA concluded that the Unimog is not a "motor vehicle" in a February 7, 1984 letter, and that the Unimog and Pinzgauer are comparable vehicles. In the February 7, 1984 letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Faber to which you refer, NHTSA stated that it had no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Unimog was not a "motor vehicle." NHTSA also noted that this conclusion was based upon the assumptions that Unimog vehicles would continue to be marketed through dealers of farm machinery and heavy equipment and that Unimog vehicles would have a label affixed stating that the Unimog is not manufactured for highway use. In other words, the information available for Unimog (especially regarding factors number 4 and 5 above) was sufficient to lead the agency to conclude that it was not a motor vehicle, even though Unimogs are operationally capable of on-road use. By way of contrast, either no information is available for Pinzgauer vehicles regarding the five factors identified above or, if information is available for a factor, it suggests that the Pinzgauer should be treated as a motor vehicle. Since the Pinzgauer is operationally capable of on-road use, and there is no indication that the manufacturer does not intend for it to spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA reaffirms its previous statement that these vehicles appear to be "motor vehicles," within the meaning of the Safety Act.

Third, you suggested that NHTSA's 1982 conclusion did not include a consideration of the primary design intent of the Pinzgauer for military purposes and the high percentage of its total sales to the military. NHTSA's 1982 conclusion and this reconsideration both are addressed only to the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer. The military versions of the Pinzgauer would not be subject to the safety standards if their sales satisfied 49 CFR 571.7(c). In both the 1982 and this examination of whether the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer are motor vehicles, the agency fully considered the substantial off-road capabilities of these vehicles. However, absent indications that the manufacturer does not intend the Pinzgauer to spend substantial periods of time on-road, NHTSA concluded in 1982, and reaffirms at this time, that the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer appear to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this topic, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:VSA#571 d:l2/l4/90

ID: 2788y

Roger C. Fairchild, Esq.
Shutler and Low
14500 Avion Parkway
Suite 300
Chantilly, VA 22021-1101

Dear Mr. Fairchild:

This responds to your request for my opinion of whether a particular vehicle (the Pinzgauer) would be considered a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. When NHTSA previously considered this question, we stated in a March 25, 1982 letter to Mr. Leonard Fink that the Pinzgauer would be considered to be a motor vehicle, based on the information that was available to the agency at that time. However, that letter also stated that the agency would be willing to reconsider this conclusion if additional information were provided regarding the vehicle's marketing, advertising, and actual use. Your recent letter set forth three additional factors that you suggested might lead the agency to change its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer was a motor vehicle. As explained in detail below, this agency reaffirms the previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as

any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are plainly not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold solely for off-road use (e.g., airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use. On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, then NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a "motor vehicle". Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated.

Vehicles such as the Pinzgauer are not easily classified under either of these groupings. On the one hand, the Pinzgauer is obviously designed to have substantial off-road capabilities, as evidenced by high ground clearance, deep water fording capabilities, and all-wheel drive. According to its manufacturer, 95 percent of the annual production of Pinzgauers is purchased by armed forces worldwide. These factors suggest that the Pinzgauer should not be classified as a motor vehicle. On the other hand, the available information shows the Pinzgauer is suitable for use on-road. The vehicle has a top speed of nearly 70 miles per hour. Page 4 of Enclosure 1 of your letter shows that the Pinzgauer is equipped with turn signals and states that the power steering minimizes steering effort "both in difficult terrain and when parking." Page 4 of Enclosure 3 with your letter describes the serviceability of the Pinzgauer "with ordinary on- and off-road usage." These factors suggest that the vehicle is designed and intended to be routinely used on the public roads, which suggests that it should be classified as a motor vehicle.

In instances where the agency is asked whether something is a motor vehicle, when the vehicle has both on-road and off-road operating capabilities, and about which there is little or no evidence about the extent of the vehicle's on-road use, NHTSA has applied five factors to reach its conclusion. These factors are:

1. Whether States or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use.

2. Whether the vehicle is or will be advertised for use on-road as well as off-road, or whether it is or will be advertised exclusively for off-road use.

3. Whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use.

4. Whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles.

5. Whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads.

When NHTSA previously considered whether the Pinzgauer should be considered a motor vehicle, the available information regarding these factors showed that the manufacturer had equipped the vehicle with side marker lights, the manufacturer expected the vehicle to be used on-road, and that it would be sold by dealers that also sell vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles.

In your letter, you enclosed some additional information and brochures from the manufacturer that show the manufacturer continues to expect Pinzgauers to be used both on- and off-road. Since the manufacturer does not now expect to sponsor the vehicle's sale in the U.S., no information is available on the anticipated dealers. The additional information enclosed with your letter did not specifically address any factors on which no information was previously available to NHTSA. Hence, the agency has no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Pinzgauer appears to be a motor vehicle.

You suggested three reasons that might lead the agency to reverse its previous conclusion. First, you suggested that the 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer has a unique body configuration which distinguishes it from typical, on-road vehicles and makes it particularly well suited to off-road use. You correctly noted that the agency's 1982 letter addressed both the 4-wheeled and 6-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. However, for the purposes of this analysis, there is no attribute of the 6-wheeled version that would lead the agency to conclude that it should be classified differently than the 4-wheeled version of the Pinzgauer. Many vehicles that are clearly motor vehicles have 6 wheels. In all other respects, the 4- and 6-wheeled Pinzgauers have similar on-road capabilities, including a top speed of more than 65 miles per hour.

Second, you suggested that NHTSA concluded that the Unimog is not a "motor vehicle" in a February 7, 1984 letter, and that the Unimog and Pinzgauer are comparable vehicles. In the February 7, 1984 letter to Mr. Karl-Heinz Faber to which you refer, NHTSA stated that it had no basis for changing its previous conclusion that the Unimog was not a "motor vehicle." NHTSA also noted that this conclusion was based upon the assumptions that Unimog vehicles would continue to be marketed through dealers of farm machinery and heavy equipment and that Unimog vehicles would have a label affixed stating that the Unimog is not manufactured for highway use. In other words, the information available for Unimog (especially regarding factors number 4 and 5 above) was sufficient to lead the agency to conclude that it was not a motor vehicle, even though Unimogs are operationally capable of on-road use. By way of contrast, either no information is available for Pinzgauer vehicles regarding the five factors identified above or, if information is available for a factor, it suggests that the Pinzgauer should be treated as a motor vehicle. Since the Pinzgauer is operationally capable of on-road use, and there is no indication that the manufacturer does not intend for it to spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA reaffirms its previous statement that these vehicles appear to be "motor vehicles," within the meaning of the Safety Act.

Third, you suggested that NHTSA's 1982 conclusion did not include a consideration of the primary design intent of the Pinzgauer for military purposes and the high percentage of its total sales to the military. NHTSA's 1982 conclusion and this reconsideration both are addressed only to the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer. The military versions of the Pinzgauer would not be subject to the safety standards if their sales satisfied 49 CFR 571.7(c). In both the 1982 and this examination of whether the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer are motor vehicles, the agency fully considered the substantial off-road capabilities of these vehicles. However, absent indications that the manufacturer does not intend the Pinzgauer to spend substantial periods of time on-road, NHTSA concluded in 1982, and reaffirms at this time, that the non-military versions of the Pinzgauer appear to be "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Safety Act.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this topic, please feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:VSA#571 d:l2/l4/90

ID: 2789o

Mr. J. Mike Callahan
Precision Images
P.O. Box 5524
Kent, Washington 9803l

Dear Mr. Callahan:

This is in reply to your letter of April l4, 1987, to Mr. Vinson of this office with respect to your representation of a company "that will be selling plastic name plates which would be installed behind the red lens of the third brake light." You stated that "these are to be sold to new car dealerships. When the driver of the car steps on the brake the dealer's name lights up." You ask for letters regarding the legality of the name plates for 24 States.

We regret the delay in responding to your request. When Mr. Vinson tried to reach you by phone this week he was told that you had already received a letter, and that the answer was negative. Perhaps that letter came from one of the 24 States listed in your letter. We are unable to advise you of the legality under State laws, but I have enclosed representative interpretation letters of this agency on the legality of similar devices under Federal law.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

/ ref:l08 d:8/ll/88

ID: 2789y

Mr. Joe W. Humphrey
10250 Goodman Road, #l0l
Olive Branch, MS 38654

Dear Mr. Humphrey:

This is in reply to your letter of November 9, 1990, with respect to the center high-mounted stop lamp.

You have asked if it is acceptable to add amber turn signal lamps to each side of the center stop lamp. The answer is yes, if the turn signal lamps are separate from the stop lamp. Under the Federal motor vehicle safety standard on lighting, the center stop lamp cannot be combined with any other lamp or reflective device.

I hope that this answers your question.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:l08 d:l2/l3/90

ID: 2790y

Mr. Danny Pugh
Engineering Manager
Utilimaster Corporation
65266 State Rd. 19
P.O. Box 585
Wakarusa, IN 46573

Dear Mr. Pugh:

This responds to your letter seeking an interpretation of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). More specifically, you asked about the requirements for safety belts at the various seating positions in vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating under 10,000 pounds that you called "van conversions."

You first asked whether a "van conversion" would be classified as a passenger car, truck, or multipurpose passenger vehicle. Vehicles commonly called "vans" may be classed in four different vehicle categories (set forth at 49 CFR 571.3) for the purposes of our safety standards, depending on the configuration of the particular "van." Most cargo vans are classified as "trucks" under our safety standards, because those vehicles are "designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment." Most passenger vans are classified as "multipurpose passenger vehicles," because they do not meet the definition of a "truck", but are "constructed on a truck chassis." Those vans that have eleven or more designated seating positions are classified as "buses," because they are "designed for carrying more than 10 persons. Finally, one minivan (the Nissan Axxess) was certified by its manufacturer as a "passenger car," because it was "designed for carrying 10 persons or less."

Additionally, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act places the responsibility for classifying a particular vehicle in the first instance on the vehicle's manufacturer. For this reason, NHTSA does not approve or endorse any vehicle classification before the manufacturer itself has classified a particular vehicle. NHTSA may reexamine the manufacturer's classification in the course of any enforcement actions. If you are interested in the appropriate classification for a particular van conversion, we will offer our tentative opinion if you will provide us with detailed information on the van conversion in which you are interested.

You next asked on what date safety belts were required in "van conversions," what type of safety belts, and at what locations those belts were required. As explained above, we do not class vehicles as "van conversions" for the purposes of our safety standards. If the vans were classed as passenger cars, passenger cars manufactured on or after January 1, 1968 were required to have lap/shoulder safety belts at the front outboard seating positions and either lap/shoulder or lap-only safety belts at every other seating position in the car. Beginning December 11, 1989, passenger cars were required to have lap/shoulder safety belts at both front and rear outboard seating positions, with either lap/shoulder or lap-only safety belts at every other seating position. Since September l, l989, all passenger cars are required to be equipped with automatic crash protection for outboard front-seat occupants.

Multipurpose passenger vehicles and trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less manufactured on or after July 1, 1971 were required to have lap/shoulder safety belts at the front outboard seating positions and either lap/shoulder or lap-only safety belts at every other seating position in the vehicle. Beginning September 1, 1991, vans classified as multipurpose passenger vehicles or trucks (other than motor homes) must have lap/shoulder belts at both front and rear outboard seating positions, with either lap or lap/shoulder belts at all other seating positions. Motor homes manufactured on or after September 1, 1991 will continue to be required to have lap/shoulder belts at front outboard seating positions and either lap/shoulder or lap-only safety belts at every other seating position. In addition, effective September l, l99l vans must meet dynamic crash test injury criteria for the front outboard seating positions.

If the vans were classed as buses, buses manufactured on or after July 1, 1971 were required to be equipped with either a lap/shoulder or a lap-only safety belt at the driver's seating position. Beginning September 1, 1991, buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less (except school buses) must be equipped with lap/shoulder belts at all front and rear outboard seating positions and either lap/shoulder or lap-only safety belts at every other seating position.

Also, the agency has proposed extending the automatic crash protection requirements mentioned above to these other vehicle classifications.

I hope this information is useful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject, please contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel

ref:208#571 d:12/13/90

ID: 2791o

Ms. C. Dianne Black
Engineering Manager
Jaguar Cars, Inc.
600 Willow Tree Road
Leonia, NJ 07605

Dear Ms. Black:

Thank you for your letter of April l4, l988, providing further information about the Jaguar headlamp levelling system discussed in your letters of June and October l987 to which I responded on February 1, 1988.

We support your efforts to call the driver's attention to the fact that the system does not automatically return to the "zero" position from either of the two adjustment positions when those loading conditions no longer exist.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

ref:l08 d:8/l/88