ID: nht92-7.49

DATE: April 6, 1992

FROM: John J. Jacoby -- President, Cleartec

TO: Samuel K. Skinner -- Secretary, Dept. of Transportation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 5/29/92 from Paul J. Rice to John J. Jacoby (A39; Std. 104; Std. 205)

TEXT:

Safety people everywhere are positively excited about previews of a new vehicle accident avoidance safety feature soon to enter the marketplace.

To improve visibility for safety and comfort, Cleartec presents windshield wiper cleaning systems to work with all wipers on all windshields.

Manufactured into new windshields or applied onto existing windshields by application of easy-to-apply Clean Sweep Strips, self-cleaning, maintenance-free wiper clearing fields are created in the path of the wipers to work whenever the wipers are turned on.

Although inexpensive, Clean Sweep Strips transfer durable and attractive, transparent wiper clearing fields which are intrinsic and complimentary to any windshield, while yet remaining removable.

A brochure is enclosed. If you would like more information, or would like to receive a cost-free,pre-marketing package of Clean Sweep Strips as it will soon become available worldwide, simply write or return an annotated copy of this letter and/or enclose a letterhead with correct address information for return mail.

We believe we have considered and provided for universal use of this product as presented; however, please let us know if your jurisdiction has any other special requirements for allowance of which we are unaware.

Thanking you for your attention and interest, I am very truly yours.

Attachment One page from Clean Sweep brochure. (Text and graphics omitted.)

ID: nht92-7.5

DATE: May 14, 1992 EST

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: John Faist -- DAS Fleet Services Division, City of Seattle

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2/4/92 from Chris Kuczynski to Manager, NHTSA (OCC 6983)

TEXT:

This responds to the letter to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) from Chris Kuczynski of your Division, asking how the provisions of 49 CFR Parts 554-557, 565-568, 571, 573, 576, 577, and 579 pertain to "a municipal government agency that transfers, modifies and/or fabricates custom vehicle bodies for use by its own departments." In a telephone conversation with Walter Myers of this office, you stated that the operations referred to in the letter involve only trucks, both light and heavy; that you combine both new and used bodies with both new and used chassis, endeavoring to retain the old engines, power axles, and transmissions to the extent possible; that such operations include mounting equipment on truck chassis to create such specific-purpose vehicles as dump trucks, cranes, and the like; and that some of the operations are done in your own shops while others are contracted out to local body shops. The issues raised in your letter are addressed below.

By way of background information, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et sec.; Safety Act) authorizes this agency to establish Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Under the Safety Act, manufacturers are required to certify that their products meet all applicable safety standards.

NHTSA's safety standards are set forth at 49 CFR Part 571. The agency has also established a number of other regulations in carrying out its responsibilities under the Safety Act, including ones related to certification. All of the regulations cited in your letter apply to manufacturers of motor vehicles and/or motor vehicle equipment.

The Safety Act also prohibits commercial establishments such as repair businesses from "rendering inoperative" any device or element of design installed in or on a vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard. This provision does not apply to the situation of vehicle owners modifying their own used vehicles.

The issue of whether NHTSA's safety standards and other regulations would apply to your agency with respect to the operations it performs on a particular vehicle is dependent on the answers to two questions: (1) whether the vehicle in question is considered a "motor vehicle" under the Safety Act, and (2) whether the operations are of such a nature that your agency is considered a "manufacturer" of the vehicle under the Safety Act.

With respect to the first of these questions, NHTSA has jurisdiction over "motor vehicles" as that term is defined by the Safety Act. I note that some vehicles which may be operated by a municipal agency are not considered motor

vehicles. These include airport runway vehicles and certain, but not all, construction and maintenance equipment. NHTSA's safety standards and related regulations do not have any applicability with respect to vehicles that are not considered motor vehicles. I have enclosed copies of two previous letters which should enable you to determine which of the vehicles you perform operations on are considered motor vehicles under the Safety Act (August 8, 1988 letter to Caterpillar Tractor Co. and February 25, 1986 letter to Richard F. Hahn, Esq.).

While NHTSA's safety standards and other regulations do not generally apply to modifications made by vehicle owners to their used vehicles, it is possible for such modifications to be so substantial that the resulting vehicle is considered a new vehicle instead of just a modified used vehicle. In this case, the new vehicle is required to meet all applicable safety standards in effect on its date of manufacture, just like every other new vehicle. This date would be the date such substantial modifications are completed.

In order to enable vehicle modifiers to determine when the modifications are so substantial that the vehicle is considered a new vehicle, NHTSA established specific criteria at 49 CFR Part 571.7(e), Combining new and used components. That section reads as follows:

When a new cab is used in the assembly of a truck, the truck will be considered newly manufactured . . . unless the engine, transmission, and drive axle(s) (as a minimum) of the assembled vehicle are not new, and at least two of these components were taken from the same vehicle.

NHTSA has consistently interpreted that provision to mean that, by its terms, it applies only to new bodies and not to old ones, and that placing a new body on an old chassis does not produce a new vehicle so long as the engine, transmission, and drive axles, as a minimum, are not new AND at least two of these three listed components were taken from the same vehicle. Conversely, a new vehicle would result by placing a new body on an old chassis utilizing new, a combination of new and used, or used engine, transmission, and drive axles no two of which were taken from the same vehicle.

A new vehicle would also result by placing a body, new or used, on a new chassis. In that case the new chassis is an incomplete vehicle which is defined at 49 CFR Part 568.3 as:

(A)n assemblage consisting, as a minimum, of frame and chassis structure, powertrain, steering system, suspension system, and braking system, to the extent that those systems are to be part of the completed vehicle, that requires further manufacturing operations, other than the addition of readily attachable components, such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or minor finishing operations such as painting, to become a completed vehicle.

By adding a body to the new chassis, your agency would become a final-stage manufacturer, defined in Part 568.3 as "a person who performs such manufacturing operations on an incomplete vehicle that it becomes a completed vehicle." Final-stage manufacturers are required to certify that the completed vehicle conforms with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect on the date of manufacture of the incomplete vehicle, the date of final

completion, or a date between those two dates.

I hope this information is helpful. For your additional information, I am enclosing a NHTSA fact sheet entitled "INFORMATION FOR NEW MANUFACTURERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT." If you have any further questions with regard to this matter, please feel free to contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-7.50

DATE: April 3, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Frederick Harris -- Frederick Harris Associates

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2/5/92 from Frederick Harris to National Highway Traffic Safety Institute (OCC 6971)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking about Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to your product, which you described as a cloth device containing plastic items useful to a baby, for use in motor vehicles. You explained that your product would be placed in a motor vehicle adjacent to, but not touching, a child in a nearby child safety seat. In particular, you were concerned about flammability resistance standards applicable to your product. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our requirements to you. I am also enclosing a copy of a fact sheet entitled "Information for New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment."

By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 102(4) of the Safety Act defines, in relevant part, the term "motor vehicle equipment" as:

any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured or any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of such system, part, or component or as any accessory, or addition to the motor vehicle ...

In determining whether an item of equipment is considered an accessory, NHTSA applies two criteria. The first criterion is whether a substantial portion of the expected use of the item is related to the operation or maintenance of motor vehicles. We determine the expected use by considering product advertising, product labeling, and the type of store that retails the product, as well as available information about the actual use of the product. The second criterion is whether the product is intended to be used principally by ordinary users of motor vehicles. If the product satisfies both criteria, then the product is considered to be an "accessory" and thus is subject to the provisions of the Safety Act.

Applying these criteria to the cloth device containing baby items, it appears that your product would be an accessory and thus an item of motor vehicle equipment under the Safety Act. Based on our understanding of your device, it appears that a substantial portion of its expected use will be during the operation of a motor vehicle. In a telephone conversation with Ms. Dee Fujita of my staff, you explained that your device is intended to be sold for use in motor vehicles. In addition, it appears that your product would typically be used by ordinary users of motor vehicles.

While it appears that your device would be considered an item of motor vehicle equipment, this agency has not issued any standards setting forth performance requirements for such a device. Obviously, your device could not be

determined to be in noncompliance with a safety standard if there is no applicable safety standard.

As for your concern about flammability resistance requirements, please be advised that our safety standard about this issue, Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, (49 CFR S571.302, copy enclosed), would not apply to your device. That standard sets forth such requirements applicable to new motor vehicles and not to motor vehicle equipment.

You should be aware that, as a manufacturer of an aftermarket item of motor vehicle equipment, you are subject to the requirements in sections 151-159 of the Safety Act concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects related to motor vehicle safety. In the event that you or NHTSA determines that your product contains a safety related defect, you would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and for remedying the problem free of charge.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions about NHTSA's safety standards, please feel free to contact Marvin Shaw of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

Attachments

Two NHTSA information sheets dated September, 1985, entitled Information For New Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment and Where to Obtain Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and Regulations. (Text of attachments omitted.)

ID: nht92-7.6

DATE: May 14, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Michael F. Hecker -- Micho Industries

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/10/89 from Erika Z. Jones to Joseph Mikoll (Std. 222); Also attached to letter dated 1/8/90 from Jerry Ralph Curry (signed by Jeffrey R. Miller) to Robert J. Lagomarsino (Std. 222); Also attached to letter dated 1/31/91 from Paul J. Rice to Scott K. Hiler (Std. 222); Also attached to letter dated 11/3/88 from Erika Z. Jones (signed by Stephen P. Wood) to Joseph Mikoll (Std. 222); Also attached to letter dated 4/2/92 from Michael F. Hecker to Paul J. Rice (OCC 7174)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of April 2, 1992 concerning possible interpretations of section S5.1.4(c) of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 222, School bus passenger seating and crash protection, as it applies to the R-BAR Passenger Restraint System (R-BAR). (While your letter refers to section S5.1.2(c), you clarified in a telephone conversation with Mary Versailles of my staff that your concerns relate to section S5.1.4(c).) The R-BAR is a padded restraining device, and the ends of the device attach to the rear of a school bus seatback. The device folds down for the purpose of restraining the passengers seated in the next rearward seat. Your letter states that Micho Industries believes that:

A. The standard is not applicable to the R-BAR passenger restraint.

B. The R-BAR complies with the intent of Standard No. 222.

To support these statements you offer the following reasons:

1. The R-BAR is not a fixed position device, nor is it a rigid component of the seat structure.

2. In the event of a rear impact, the R-BAR incorporates a design that allows it to move upward, and away, from the adjoining seat which would thus allow the minimum clearance as intended.

3. The standard in question (571.222, section S5.1.4(c)) was written without the authors having the benefit of knowledge of this type of device and thus allowances were not included for its possible use.

The issue of whether Standard No. 222 is applicable to a device such as the R-BAR has been addressed previously by this agency. Enclosed are copies of four letters concerning similar devices (Mr. Joseph F. Mikoll, November 3, 1988, and March 10, 1989; The Honorable Robert J. Lagomarsino, January 8, 1990; and Mr. Scott K. Hiler, January 31, 1991). Those letters make it clear that if a device such as the R-BAR is installed in any new school bus, the school bus manufacturer must certify that the vehicle meets all applicable safety standards with the device installed. The letters also make it clear that such devices may not legally be installed in used school buses by commercial establishments such as repair businesses if the effect of such installation is

to take the vehicle out of compliance with any safety standard.

With respect to your assertion that the R-BAR complies with the intent of Standard No. 222, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires NHTSA to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that prescribe objective requirements. Under the Act, manufacturers must certify that their products comply with the requirements of all applicable standards and not merely with some alleged "intent" of a standard. Further, manufacturers may not certify products based on speculation that the agency would have established different requirements had it known of a particular design.

With regard to your specific concerns about S5.1.4(c), that section states that when a seat back is subjected to a specified force, "(t)he seat shall not deflect by an amount such that any part of the seat moves to within 4 inches of any part of another passenger seat in its originally installed position." In the enclosed letter to Mr. Hiler, the agency stated that "once the restraining bar is attached to the seatback, it is part of the seatback." Therefore, the R-BAR would be considered a part of the seat subject to the requirements of S5.1.4.(c)

Section S5.1.4(c)'s requirements are not limited to rigid components of a seat, and therefore the fact that the R-BAR is not a fixed position device is not relevant to the applicability of those requirements. With respect to your argument that the device will move upward and away in the event of a rear impact, Standard No. 222 sets forth a specific test procedure for the requirement specified in S5.1.4(c). Manufacturers are required to certify that a vehicle complies with the requirements of the standard when tested in accordance with that test procedure.

I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-7.7

DATE: May 12, 1992

FROM: Michael Gronowicz -- Keiper Recaro Seating, Inc.

TO: Paul J. Rice -- NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 6/22/92 from Paul J. Rice to Michael Gronowicz (A39; VSA 108(a)(2)(A))

TEXT:

At first, please let me take this time to introduce myself. My name is Michael Gronowicz, I have been with Keiper Recaro a little over a year as Julie Gonzalezs' successor. Along with this letter, you will find the inquiry to you dated Sept. 21, 1990, as well as your reply dated Nov. 20, 1990. In your reply, you refer to the "render inoperative" provisions. I have been studying this letter, and I find this subject difficult to comprehend. Can this be re-worded in "laymans" terms to clear up the confusion on my part? If you could, please respond by fax at 1-313-288-0811. If you have any questions, feel free to call me at 1-800-873-2276. Thank you very much for your reply.

ID: nht92-7.8

DATE: May 11, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Eileen Mathews -- Industry Manager, Hose and Tubing, General Electric Company

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11/18/91 from Eileen Mathews to James Scapellato (OCC 7034)

TEXT:

This concerns your letter to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) asking about FHWA's regulation 393.45 (49 CFR S393.45) and NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 106, Brake Hoses. FHWA provided us a copy of its March 6, 1992 response on regulation 393.45. This letter answers your question about Standard 106.

You ask about S7.3.6, 7.3.10 and 7.3.11 of the standard. Those sections set forth performance requirements for limiting the amount a hose may change in length under specified conditions (S7.3.6), for the tensile strength of a hose assembly (S7.3.10), and for the tensile strength of an assembly after immersion in water (S7.3.11). Each of these sections excludes certain items from the requirement.

Your question relates to those exclusions. S7.3.6 excludes coiled nylon tubes for use in assemblies that meet the FHWA requirements of S393.45. S7.3.10 excludes coiled nylon tube assemblies that meet S393.45. S7.3.11 excludes coiled tube assemblies that meet S393.45.

You ask whether those exclusions in S7.3.6, 7.3.10 and 7.3.11 "require compliance with 393.45." The answer is no. Standard 106 does not require tubing to meet 393.45. Instead, compliance with 393.45 is a condition for excluding the item from S7.3.6, 7.3.10 or 7.3.11.

The other condition, relevant for S7.3.6 and 7.3.10, is that the brake hose be coiled NYLON tubing. According to your letter, the brake hose (tubing) of your concern would be made from a material other than nylon. Since the second condition would not be satisfied, such hose would not qualify for the S7.3.6 exception, and an assembly made from such hose would not qualify for the 7.3.10 exception, regardless of whether the hose meets regulation 393.45. Thus, S7.3.6 and 7.3.10 would apply to hose and assemblies made from your product, without exception.

S7.3.11 does not specify that the coiled tubing must be nylon to qualify for the exception. While NHTSA intended to specify nylon (see, preamble to rule adopting the exclusion, 39 FR 28436; August 7, 1974) as adopted, S7.3.11 excludes a "coiled tube assembly" that meets regulation 393.45 from its requirements.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please contact Deirdre Fujita of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-7.9

DATE: May 8, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Gonshiro Miyoshi -- Manager, Design Administration Dept., Technical Division Ichikoh Industries, Inc.

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 4/6/92 from Gonshiro Miyoshi to Paul J. Rice (OCC 7196)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter of April 6, 1992, asking for an interpretation of Standard No. 108. With respect to headlamp system consisting of two lamps, each containing two light sources, you have asked "Is it permissible to have the bulb center of the lower beam lower than that of the upper beam (maximum height difference is 10mm) if they are arranged horizontally?"

Paragraph S7.5(d)(2) specifies the manner in which "the lower and upper beams of a headlamp system consisting of two lamps, each containing either one or two light sources, shall be provided . . ." In such headlamps where each light source provides a beam, the lower beam is provided "by the outboard light source (or upper one if arranged vertically)," and the upper beam is provided "by the inboard light source (or the lower one if arranged vertically)."

Although the standard could be presumed to contemplate that two light sources within a headlamp would be located on the same horizontal or vertical plane, there is no specific requirement for light source placement. Because the difference in the horizontal mounting planes for bulb centers in your design is only 10mm, this difference is not sufficient to conclude that the light sources are vertically arranged, thus requiring that the lower beam bulb center be the "upper" one, or on a plane that is higher. However, for your design to be permissible, the lower beam in this essentially horizontal array must be provided by the outboard light source in the headlamps as specified in S7.5(d)(2).

ID: nht92-8.1

DATE: April 3, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Charles W. O'Conner, Esq. -- Assistant Secretary, Echlin Inc.

COPYEE: Larry Henneberger; Bill Lewandoski; California Highway Patrol

TITLE: None

TEXT:

This responds to your letters of December 26, 1991, and February 25, 1992, with respect to various interpretive letters of this Office on the Commander and Voyager Electronic Brake Control ("Control"). The Control is manufactured by your subsidiary, Tekonsha Engineering Company. For the reasons enunciated in your December letter, you have asked us to "rule that all three of your letters i.e., the November 22 and May 23, 1991, letters to Mr. Lewandoski and your letter of September 10, 1990, to Mr. Henneberger are all void from the beginning."

We are replying on the basis of information presented by representatives of Tekonsha, Mr. Henneberger, and yourself in a meeting with representatives of NHTSA on March 18, 1992, rather than on the basis of your December letter. This meeting brought forth facts, previously unknown to us, and which did not, therefore, form a basis for the three previous letters on this subject mentioned above.

We now understand that the Control is motor vehicle equipment which is added to the towing vehicle by the seller of the towed vehicle, at a time subsequent to the first purchase of the towed vehicle for purposes other than resale. The Control has no effect upon the stop lamp system of the towing vehicle. The Control in ordinary operation has no effect upon the stop lamp system of the towed vehicle. When hand-activated in an emergency mode, the Control applies a modulated pressure to the service brakes of the towed vehicle, without activating the stop lamps on the towed vehicle. It is theoretically possible that the Control will never be operated during the life of the towing vehicle.

It is our opinion that the applicable Federal law in this situation is that which pertains to the operation of vehicles in use, rather than the Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to motor vehicles before their first purchase for purposes other than resale. This means that we do not view this as a question of compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 or a matter concerning the preemption of State statutes by Standard No. 108.

Under the statutes and regulations we administer, the applicable law is 15 U.S.C. Section 1397 (a)(2)(A) . This Section states in pertinent part:

"No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . . ." The question therefore is whether the installation of the Control on the towing vehicle by the dealer of the towed vehicle renders the stop lamps (installed on the towed vehicle in compliance with Standard No. 108) inoperative in whole or in part within the meaning of Section 1397 (a)(2)(A).

We note that the installation PER SE of the Control has no effect of any sort on the stop lamps of the vehicle on which it is installed, or on the vehicle that is towed. Therefore, the dealer has not rendered any stop lamps inoperative by the act of installing the Control. It is the use of the Control that may have an effect upon the stop lamps. In ordinary use, the Control has no effect upon the stop lamps of either the towing or towed vehicle. However, when the hand control of the device is activated in the emergency mode on the towing vehicle, to slow the swaying of the towed vehicle through application of the only set of brakes on the towed vehicle (its service brakes), the stop lamps will not be activated. In the conscious act of activating the emergency feature, the operator has knowingly rendered the stop lamps on the towed vehicle inoperative for the duration of such activation (unless or until the operator applies the service brake of the towing vehicle). However, Section 13 97 (a)(2)(A) does not apply to operators, thus the activation and use of the Control is not prohibited under our Statutes and regulations.

On the basis of the facts presented in the meeting on March 18, it now appears that the sale of the Control is not in violation of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

ID: nht92-8.10

DATE: March 30, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Robert S. McLean, Esq. -- King & Spalding

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3/9/92 Robert S. McLean to Paul J. Rice (OCC 7058)

TEXT:

This responds to your March 9, 1992 letter, seeking an interpretation of Standards No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection and No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies (49 CFR S571.208 and S571.209, respectively). More specifically, you were interested in how certain provisions of these standards apply to a seating position equipped with an automatic shoulder belt certified as complying with the occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 208 and a separate manual lap belt. Your letter indicated you were particularly interested in whether the automatic belt is considered a Type 2a shoulder belt, as that term is defined in S3 of Standard No. 209, and whether the automatic belt must provide the warning instructions required for Type 2a shoulder belts by S4.1(1) of Standard No. 209. The answer to both these questions is no.

NHTSA has consistently recognized a distinction between automatic safety belts and the manual safety belts defined in S3 of Standard No. 209 (Type 1, Type 2, and Type 2a belts). The origins and application of this distinction is explained at length in this agency's April 14, 1986 interpretation letter to Mr. David Martin, a copy of which was enclosed in your letter to me. Thus, automatic belts are not treated as Type 1, Type 2, or Type 2a belts for the purposes of Standard No. 209, and are not generally subject to the provisions of Standard No. 209 that apply to each of those types of belts. Since automatic belts are not Type 2a belts, automatic belts are not required to include any warnings required for Type 2a belts.

Instead, S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 defines the term "automatic belt" and sets forth special provisions for such safety belts. S4.5.3.3 specifies that an automatic belt shall conform to S7.1 of Standard No. 208 (the belt adjustment requirements) and have a single emergency release mechanism, and be equipped with a special warning system in place of the warning system required for manual belts. In addition, S4.5.3.4 specifies that any automatic belts that are not subject to the crash testing requirements for occupant protection under Standard No. 208 must comply with the requirements of S4.2, S4.3, and S4.4 of Standard No. 209 (webbing, attachment hardware, and belt assembly performance requirements, respectively).

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions or need some additional information on the requirements applicable to automatic belts, feel free to contact Steve Kratzke of my staff at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992.

ID: nht92-8.11

DATE: March 30, 1992

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: D.E. Dawkins -- Acting Director, Automotive Safety Planning and Compliance, Product Strategy and Regulatory Affairs Office, Chrysler Corporation

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9/30/91 from W.R. Kittle to Jerry R. Curry

TEXT:

This responds to the petition dated September 30, 1991, that Mr. Kittle submitted on behalf of Chrysler corporation seeking temporary exemption for the TEVan from several Federal motor vehicle safety standards on the basis that the exemption would facilitate the development and field evaluation of low e mission motor vehicles.

The petition indicates (page 4) that exemption is sought for four 1989 Dodge Caravans, converted to electric power, that "were manufactured for test and evaluation". We understand that this conversion occurred after completion of the manufacture of the vans, and that the conversion was performed by a subsidiary of Chrysler. If an exemption is granted, the petition states that "one or more of the vehicles will be titled and sold for ongoing endurance evaluation." Finally, we understand that the TEvans are currently in the possession of the Electric Power Research Institute in California for evaluation, and that presumably they are being driven on the public roads.

We regret the delay in responding to Mr. Kittle's letter. The petition represents a rare instance in which a manufacturer has petitioned for an exemption for a vehicle whose manufacture has been completed, and which has been in use. The purpose of an exemption is to allow a manufacturer to engage in conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, specifically, the manufacture for sale, sale, offer for sale, or introduction or delivery for introduction, or importation into the United States of a motor vehicle that does not conform to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and which does not bear a certification of compliance with those standards.

With respect to the four TEVans for which petition has been made, it appears that they have already been introduced into interstate commerce without a certification of compliance (or, if bearing the certification of the original vehicle, a certification that is false and misleading in a material respect, a further violation of the Act). Any exemption by the Administrator could not cover conduct violative of the Act that has already occurred. However, we have concluded that the Administrator may grant an exemption to vehicles, which would apply to conduct that would violate the Act, but which has not occurred. As Chrysler seeks an exemption in order to sell the TEVans, or to offer them for sale, the Administrator's exemption authority may be exercised to permit Chrysler to do so, after the procedural requirements have been followed.

The petition meets our requirements for form and content, and a notice requesting public comment is being prepared for publication in the Federal

Register. We shall notify you when the Administrator has reached a decision.

If you have any questions, you may discuss them with Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263).