NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam1037OpenMr. W. A. Scott, Manger (sic), Tech. Service, Chrysler Leasing Corporation, P.O. Box 1057, Detroit, MI 48231; Mr. W. A. Scott Manger (sic) Tech. Service Chrysler Leasing Corporation P.O. Box 1057 Detroit MI 48231; Dear Mr. Scott: This will serve to confirm the advice given you by telephone on Marc 12, 1973, concerning the obligations of a leasing company under the Federal Odometer Requirements, 49 CFR Part 580.; The situation that concerns you is the transfer from the lessor to th lessee of a vehicle that has been wrecked or stolen while in the lessee's possession. In transfers of this type, the lessee often fails to tell the lessor the mileage on the vehicle, so that the mileage cannot be indicated on the disclosure form. It is our opinion that the lessor in this situation should leave the mileage blank and indicate that the true mileage is unknown.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4235OpenMr. Edwin C. Silverstein, 108 Mayfair Lane, Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054; Mr. Edwin C. Silverstein 108 Mayfair Lane Mt. Laurel NJ 08054; Dear Mr. Silverstein: Thank you for your letter of August 16, 1986, concerning how ou standards apply to a product you have invented. According to the literature you provided us, your product, 'Limo Leash' is a harness system used to secure an animal in a vehicle. The system consists of a piece of webbing which can be attached at either end to the 'clothes hooks' installed in a vehicle. A snap hook, which can be attached to the animal's collar, slides along the webbing to allow the animal to move back and forth.; There are no Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to harness system used for animals. However, since your product is sold as an accessory for use in a motor vehicle, we would consider it an item of motor vehicle equipment. Thus, the manufacturer of your product would be covered by the agency's regulations on safety-related defects that would pose a hazard to other vehicle occupants. I have enclosed an information sheet which describes those regulations.; Since there may be state regulations governing the manufacture or us of your product, I suggest you check with state transportation officials in the jurisdictions in which you intend to market your product.; If you have any further questions, please let me know. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1467OpenMr. James L. Greighton, Maxi-Cab Enterprises, 115G Harvey West Blvd., Santa Cruz, CA 95060; Mr. James L. Greighton Maxi-Cab Enterprises 115G Harvey West Blvd. Santa Cruz CA 95060; Dear Mr. Greighton: This is in reply to your letter of March 18, 1974, asking which Federa requirements apply to the Maxi- Cab, pictures of which you enclose. You describe the Maxi-Cab as a fiberglass shell that fits in the back of compact pickups, and indicate that it has been designed to be used to transport children.; Based on the pictures you have furnished, we have concluded that th Maxi-Cab is a 'pickup cover', which is defined in S4 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, 'Glazing Materials' (49 CFR 571.205), as 'a camper having a roof and sides but without a floor, designed to be mounted on and removable from the cargo area of a truck by the user.'; Since you describe the Maxi-Cab as designed to transport persons, th glazing material used in its construction must conform to Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205. No other Federal requirements administered by this agency apply to it.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4665OpenMr. Philip A. Hutchinson, Jr. Vice President, Public Affairs, General Counsel and Secretary Volkswagen of America, Inc. P.O. Box 3951 Troy, MI 48007-3951; Mr. Philip A. Hutchinson Jr. Vice President Public Affairs General Counsel and Secretary Volkswagen of America Inc. P.O. Box 3951 Troy MI 48007-3951; "Dear Mr. Hutchinson: Thank you for your letter to Administrator Curr inquiring about the status of Volkswagen's exemption from certain provisions relating to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program. The Administrator has asked me to respond. Your letter requested NHTSA's position on the status of Volkswagen's exemption from the provisions of section 503(b)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C 1901 et seq.), and indicated that Volkswagen considers the exemption moot and terminated. As explained below, NHTSA considers the exemption terminated as of the beginning of model year (MY) 1989. In 1981 (46 FR 54453, November 2, 1981), NHTSA granted Volkswagen's petition seeking an exemption from the general statutory provision that a manufacturer's domestically manufactured passenger automobiles and non-domestically manufactured passenger automobiles be placed in separate fleets for purposes of determining compliance with CAFE standards. Such an exemption is authorized under section 503(b)(3)(A) of the statute. The statute prohibits a manufacturer so exempted from earning CAFE credits during the period of the exemption. At Volkswagen's request, NHTSA granted the exemption for the indefinite future, reserving the agency's right to reconsider its action if it appeared that the exemption was no longer consistent with the purposes of the Act. Your letter indicates that Volkswagen terminated the production of 'domestically manufactured' vehicles (i.e., vehicles whose domestic content exceeds 75 percent) on June 30, 1987, and that Volkswagen's U.S. production was terminated entirely effective July 14, 1988. You believe the exemption (including its prohibition on the accumulation of CAFE credits) should have ended on June 30, 1987, but in no event later than July 14, 1988. The primary legal issue raised by your letter is how exemptions can be terminated. Although the agency expects that exemptions will normally terminate only after affirmative agency action, automatic terminations are not precluded. However, we do not believe that an exemption terminates 'automatically' merely because a manufacturer terminates its production of vehicles with more than 75 percent domestic content or halts all U.S. production. To conclude otherwise could create confusion and result in exemptions being terminated in instances in which the exempted manufacturer wanted its exemption to continue. The possibility of such problems may be seen in a number of circumstances, e.g., if a manufacturer temporarily halts U.S. production and then resumes it, or if it permits domestic content to fall below 75 percent temporarily and then raises it. We note that, in situations in which a manufacturer allows the percent domestic content to fall below 75 percent and continues to produce vehicles in the U.S. with that level of domestic content, it is likely to be relatively easy for the manufacturer to raise the level back above 75 percent. There are circumstances in Volkswagen's case, however, that lead us to conclude its exemption terminated at the time Volkswagen's U.S. production terminated in its entirety (July 14, 1988). We believe it was evident at that time that Volkswagen was not merely halting U.S. production, but doing so with an intention to permanently abandon such production. We note, for example, that Volkswagen actively sought purchasers for its U.S. production facility in advance of its termination of U.S. production. While a manufacturer could change its mind after permanently abandoning U.S. production, resumption of U.S. production would be relatively difficult. Further, subsequent events, up to and including Volkswagen's February 1990 letter, have confirmed the appearances in 1988 of permanent termination of production. While it would have been preferable for those appearances to have been confirmed essentially contemporaneously, we conclude that Volkswagen terminated U.S. production with an intention to permanently abandon it, and that its exemption became moot at that time. Since Volkswagen could receive no benefit from the exemption, and clearly had no intention of resuming U.S. production, I conclude that the exemption should be considered terminated effective with the beginning of the first model year following the company's cessation of U.S. production, i.e., MY 1989. This decision is consistent with section 503(b)(3)(F) which provides that in any model year in which an exemption is effective, no credits may be earned. We interpret that section as requiring the bar to continue to the end of the model year in which the exemption terminated. Hence, the prohibition against earned credits is deemed to have ended with the beginning of the 1989 model year. I note that during MY 1989, Volkswagen accrued a CAFE credit excess of $28,798,575 for its passenger cars, and $56,310 for its light trucks. I hope you have found this information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam3909OpenMr. Fred W. Bowditch, Vice President, Technical Affairs Division, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, 300 New Center Building, Detroit, MI 48202; Mr. Fred W. Bowditch Vice President Technical Affairs Division Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 300 New Center Building Detroit MI 48202; Dear Mr. Bowditch: On October 29, 1984, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association file a petition for rulemaking to amend Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, *Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment*. The petition requested 'removal from section 4.1.1.36(a)(2) of the limitation requiring the three aiming pads to be located on the exterior face of the headlamp lens.' You have suggested the mounting flange at the lens-reflector joint as an acceptable alternative location for the aiming pads. The language suggested in the petition for amendment of S4.1.1.36(a)(2) would also allow all three legs to be adjustable on the headlamp aimers.; The agency has proposed amendments to Standard No. 108 (49 FR 47880) t delete the final sentence of paragraph S4.1.1.36(a)(2) with reference to aiming locating plates, and to delete Figures 9-1 and 9-2. Thus, this aspect of your petition has already been granted. We have filed your petition as a comment in the docket to be considered in future rulemaking action on this subject. Further, we interpret the words 'The exterior face of each...lens' in paragraph S4.1.1.36(a)(2) to mean all portions of the lens face including the mounting flange which is a molded and indivisible part of the lens. Thus, no rulemaking is considered necessary to implement this item of your petition. Your request also included a suggestion that the minimum height of the lettering for the adjustment of the legs on the aimer adapter should be reduced from 0.25 inch to 4 mm. This is being addressed in pending rulemaking. Therefore, no further action is necessary at this time.; Sincerely, Barry Felrice, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking |
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ID: aiam1934OpenMr. Beller, Alfred Teves GMBH, 6 Frankfurt/Main 2, Postfach 119155, Germany; Mr. Beller Alfred Teves GMBH 6 Frankfurt/Main 2 Postfach 119155 Germany; Dear Mr. Beller: This responds to your April 29, 1975, question whether S5.4.3 o Standard No. 105-75, *Hydraulic brake systems*, permits a brake fluid warning statement on a filler cap to be partially obscured by two 'contact blades' on the cap which apparently are inserted into a receptacle attached to the vehicle. The description you enclose is similar to one submitted with an earlier request which we evaluated in a March 3, 1975, letter to your representative, Mr. Paul Utans.; Sections S5.4.3(b) requires that the statement be 'located so as to b visible by direct view.' As we noted in our March 3 letter, this requirement prohibits an arrangement which would obscure any parts of the statement. We also noted that S5.4.3(b) permits a location within 4 inches of the brake fluid reservoir filler plug or cap to accommodate arrangements which do not permit use of the filler cap as a location.; From the drawing you enclose, we conclude that the contact blade obscure part of the warning and it therefore would not comply with the requirement of S5.4.3(b). As an enforcement matter, we would find it impossible to allow a 'minor noncompliance' and still be able to enforce a standard objectively. We do not consider the ability to turn the cap to expose the warning to constitute 'visible by direct view.'; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0626OpenMr. Leo P. Ziegler, Jr., Staff Engineer, Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 18121 East Eight Mile Road, East Detroit, MI 48021; Mr. Leo P. Ziegler Jr. Staff Engineer Society of Automotive Engineers Inc. 18121 East Eight Mile Road East Detroit MI 48021; Dear Mr. Ziegler: This is in reply to your letter of February 7, 1972, to th Administrator, in which you requested 'clarification' of two requirements of Standard 207 that impose forces on rearward facing seats.; We do not believe that the requirements are unclear. S4.2(b) requires rearward facing seat to withstand a force of 20 times its weight applied in a rearward direction, while S4.3.2.2 requires the restraining device not to release or fail under an acceleration of 20 g's in the direction opposite to that in which the seat folds.; You suggest that these forces and accelerations are equivalent to thos in a 30 mph barrier impact, and point out that none of the existing standards provides for a 30 mph rear impact. The intent of the cited sections is to require rear facing seats to withstand the force of rear end collisions, which occur frequently and are often of considerable severity. We have some doubt that the 20 g acceleration is equivalent to a 30 mph rear barrier impact, frontal 30 mph impacts typically produce accelerations of 30 to 40 g's. Whether it is or not is irrelevant, however, to the validity of the standard. The standard is clear in its own terms, and in our judgment its requirements are appropriate and feasible.; Sincerely, Robert L. Carter, Acting Associate Administrator, Moto Vehicle Programs; |
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ID: aiam5424OpenMs. Denise Davis 3177 Lotheridge Rd. Gainesville, GA 30501; Ms. Denise Davis 3177 Lotheridge Rd. Gainesville GA 30501; Dear Ms. Davis: This responds to your letter asking for help in matter involving window tinting on your car. I apologize for the delay in responding. You explain in your letter that you asked a window tinting store for a sticker showing that the tint on your windows met Georgia law. The store informed you that it cannot issue you a sticker because your windows only allow 20 percent sunlight through, and the new law requires 35 percent. To get a sticker, you would have to remove the tint, which you explain will be costly. You also state that your windows were tinted seven years ago when you purchased your car, and at the time you had your windows tinted, you were 'not breaking any law.' I regret that we cannot help you pay to have the tint removed. The primary purpose of this agency is to regulate the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment. We have no authority to provide funds to citizens to help them correct problems with their vehicles or equipment. Please bear in mind that the '35 percent' law was adopted by Georgia to regulate the operation of vehicles. Thus, we suggest that you contact the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicles for information about this matter. We appreciate your efforts to reduce the tint on your vehicle and are sorry that we are unable to assist you. If you have any other questions, please contact Mr. Marvin Shaw of my staff at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam0276OpenMr. Howard M. Rensin, Lesser & Leaser, Executive Building, 1030 - 15th Street, N. W., Washington, DC 20005; Mr. Howard M. Rensin Lesser & Leaser Executive Building 1030 - 15th Street N. W. Washington DC 20005; Dear Mr. Rensin: This is in reply to your letter of March 26, 1971, concernin regulations pertaining to automobile windshields.; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, *Glazing Materials Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Motorcycles, Trucks and Buses*, a copy of which is enclosed, specifies the requirements of automotive glazing materials manufactured on or after January 1, 1968. ANSI Standard Z26.1- 1966, incorporated by reference, can be obtained from the American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, New York 10018, at a cost of $4.00.; The marking of the windshield that you depict in your letter of Marc 26 is not sufficient to identify its manufacturer. However, based on the '63' in the marking and the fact that the windshield shape fit the 1969 Plymouth, it can be hypothesized that the material in question is a laminated windshield of the improved design that has been used in 1966 and later models of U.S. automobiles.; There is not a requirement that windshields of this type completel shatter leaving no jagged fragments upon collision.; Sincerely, Clue D. Ferguson, Director, Office of Crashworthiness, Moto Vehicle Programs; |
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ID: aiam5074OpenWilbur D. Owens, III, Esquire Bouhan, Williams & Levy Attorneys and Counselors at Law The Armstrong House Bull & Gaston Streets Post Office Box 2139 Savannah, GA 31498-1001; Wilbur D. Owens III Esquire Bouhan Williams & Levy Attorneys and Counselors at Law The Armstrong House Bull & Gaston Streets Post Office Box 2139 Savannah GA 31498-1001; "Dear Mr. Owens: This responds to your letter dated September 15, 1992 to the Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), regarding Phelps v. General Motors, et al. Reference is also made to your telephone conversation with Mr. Walter Myers of my staff on October 15, 1992. You stated in your letter that your firm represents defendant Grumman Olson in the Phelps lawsuit which arose out of injuries suffered by the plaintiff while operating a 14-foot Grumman Kurbmaster manufactured in 1977. After explaining the theory of the plaintiff's cause of action, you stated that you have looked at current regulations, your main areas of interest being 49 CFR 571.201 through 571.220, and requested our assistance in obtaining those regulations from 1977. You pointed out that in those regulations there are a number of exceptions for walk-in vans, and you asked whether the 14-foot Kurbmaster would be considered a truck or a walk-in van, or both. Please find enclosed, as requested, copies of 49 CFR 571.201 through 220 that were in effect as of October 1, 1977, duly certified as official Federal government documents to make them admissible in Federal court. As Mr. Myers explained to you by telephone, the cost for these copies, as certified, is $30.72. Pursuant to the provisions of 49 CFR Part 7, this charge represents one hour of search time at a cost of $22.22 per hour, plus copying fee of ten cents per page x 85 pages. Please remit a check in that amount, payable to Treasurer of the United States, to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Financial Management, Room 6134, 400 Seventh Street S.W., Washington, D. C. 20590. To ensure that your account will be properly credited, please annotate your check with 'NCC-20.' Before responding to your question about the classification of the 14-foot Kurbmaster, a bit of background information is in order. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. 1381, et seq. (Safety Act), authorizes the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. All motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment manufactured or imported for sale in the United States must comply with all applicable safety standards. In accordance with 49 CFR Part 567, Certification, manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment must certify that their products comply with all such standards. Motor vehicles are, and were as of 1977, classified according to six basic types: passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, buses, trailers, and motorcycles. Each type is defined in 49 CFR 571.3. Each safety standard applies to specified types of motor vehicles and/or motor vehicle equipment. Thus, manufacturers must first classify their vehicles in order to ascertain which safety standards apply and then certify that those vehicles meet all applicable standards. For that reason, NHTSA neither classifies vehicles nor does it approve or endorse any vehicle classification before the manufacturer has done so. NHTSA may, however, reexamine the manufacturer's classification during the course of enforcement proceedings. I note that, in the case of the 1977 14-foot Kurbmaster, there have been no enforcement proceedings. The classification given the 1977 14-foot Kurbmaster by the manufacturer will be found on the certification label required by 49 CFR 567.4(a), and NHTSA has not reviewed or taken issue with that classification. Assuming it was classified as a truck, a truck was in 1977, and still is, defined in 49 CFR 571.3 as 'a motor vehicle with motive power, except a trailer, designed primarily for the transportation of property or special purpose equipment.' As you noted in your letter, certain of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards exclude 'walk-in vans' from their coverage. See, e.g., paragraph S2, Standard 203, Impact Protection for the Driver from the Steering Control System (49 CFR 571.203). The term 'walk-in van' is commonly used and understood within the motor vehicle industry, and for many years the Federal motor vehicle safety standards did not include any definition of the term. I note, however, that in a recent rulemaking which extended Standard No. 214, Side Impact Protection, to light trucks, buses and multipurpose passenger vehicles, the agency added a definition of 'walk-in van' to that standard. Effective September 1, 1993, Standard No. 214 defines 'walk-in van' as 'a van in which a person can enter the occupant compartment in an upright position.' See S2.1. I hope this information will be helpful to you. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Mr. Myers at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.