NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
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ID: aiam4553OpenMr. M. Iwase Technical Administration Dept. Koito Mfg. Co. Ltd. Shizuoka Works 500, Kitawaki Shimuzi--shi, Shizuoka-ken JAPAN; Mr. M. Iwase Technical Administration Dept. Koito Mfg. Co. Ltd. Shizuoka Works 500 Kitawaki Shimuzi--shi Shizuoka-ken JAPAN; Dear Mr. Iwase: This is to provide you with a clarification of m letter to you dated March l6, l988. Your second question was whether the minimum edge to edge separation distance between turn signal lamps and tail/stop lamps is required on a rear lighting array for motorcycles. I responded that 'The answer is yes, and the separation distance you have depicted in your drawings appears to comply with this requirement.' In actuality, the agency has required this separation only where a single motorcycle stoplamp/taillamp is mounted on the vertical centerline, and not when dual lamps are mounted on either side of the vertical centerline, the configuration depicted in your letter of January 25, 1988. Therefore, I am advising you that there is no legal requirement that the 4-inch separation distance be maintained in the configurations you depicted, and that we appreciate your continuing efforts to understand and comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. I enclose a copy of a letter from this Office dated November 2l, l984, which explains our views on motorcycle rear lighting configurations in more detail. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Enclosure; |
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ID: aiam3296OpenMr. Martin D. Davis, Meon, Inc., 221-18 Merrick Boulevard, Springfield Gardens, NY 11413; Mr. Martin D. Davis Meon Inc. 221-18 Merrick Boulevard Springfield Gardens NY 11413; Dear Mr. Davis: This is in response to your letter of May 12, 1980, requestin interpretation of paragraph (c)(2)(iii) of the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (49 CFR S 575.104). That paragraph provides that to qualify as a limited production tire a tire cannot have been listed as a vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire size designation for a new motor vehicle produced in or imported into the United States in quantities greater than 10,000 during the preceding calendar year. You ask whether a tire meets this requirement if its size is recommended for use on several new vehicles, none of which is produced in quantities greater than 10,000 yearly, but which in the aggregate account for annual production in excess of 10,000 vehicles.; Paragraph (c)(2)(iii) refers to '*a* vehicle manufacturer's recommende tire size designation (emphasis added)' and '*a* new motor vehicle (emphasis added)', indicating that the 10,000 vehicle limitation refers to the production or importation of a particular vehicle model, rather than the total of all models for which the tire size is recommended. Thus, if a tire's size is recommended for use on several vehicle models, none of which is produced in or imported into the United States in quantities greater 10,000 during the calendar year preceding the year of the tire's manufacture, the tire would meet the criterion of paragraph (c)(2)(iii).; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1751OpenMr. Robert F. Farrelly, Safety Products, Inc., 2974 Vantage Drive, Memphis, TN 38131; Mr. Robert F. Farrelly Safety Products Inc. 2974 Vantage Drive Memphis TN 38131; Dear Mr. Farrelly: This is in reply to your letter of December 23, 1974, asking whether person who installs a 'Steering Stabilizer' manufactured by Safety Products, Inc., is required to recertify the vehicle in which it is installed. You enclose a copy of a letter from me dated August 24, 1972, in which I stated that we would accept a determination that the installation of a 'Safti-Stabilizer' (the previous name of the Steering Stabilizer) did not constitute remanufacturing, and that a person who installed such a device need not recertify the vehicle on which it is installed.; Since my earlier letter, the NHTSA has issued regulations covering th alteration of completed, certified motor vehicles before their sale to a purchaser for purposes other than resale. These regulations (49 CFR SS 567.7, 568.8, copy enclosed) supersede opinions such as the one we provided you, which was based solely on the more general provisions of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the certification regulations in effect at that time. Under the new regulations, which were effective February 1, 1974, an alteration which either (1) invalidates a vehicle's existing weight ratings or (2) involves installation of other than 'readily attachable' components gives rise to a responsibility for affixing an alterer label, which identifies the alterer and contains some additional information.; From the description of your device, and the enclosed literature, i appears to require no special expertise or tools to install, and is thus probably readily-attachable. It would also seemingly not affect a vehicle's weight ratings. If this assessment is correct, we would accept as reasonable a manufacturer's determination that an alterer label is not required when a 'Steering Stabilizer' is installed on a completed vehicle before its sale for purposes other than resale.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam0843OpenMr. Roy G. Mason, AMCON, 770 Privet Court, Sunnyvale, CA 94086; Mr. Roy G. Mason AMCON 770 Privet Court Sunnyvale CA 94086; Dear Mr. Mason: This is in reply to your letter of August 30, 1972, on the possibl effects of bumper legislation on the type of bicycle and tire carrier manufactured by your company.; The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has adopted Moto Vehicle Safety Standard No. 215 to establish a minimum level for the performance of passenger car bumpers in low speed impacts. The standard applies to new vehicles. It does not apply to equipment that may be placed on or near the bumper after the vehicle has been sold to a customer. If your products are installed after the sale of the vehicle, they are not affected by Standard No. 215.; The State statutes with which we are familiar also apply to ne vehicles and would presumably not affect the installation of your products. However, you might find it advisable to ask the opinion of responsible State officials on this question.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4103OpenMr. S. Elvin-Jensen, Safety Transport Inter (Pty) Ltd., P.O. Box 1513, Dassenberg 7350, SOUTH AFRICA; Mr. S. Elvin-Jensen Safety Transport Inter (Pty) Ltd. P.O. Box 1513 Dassenberg 7350 SOUTH AFRICA; Dear Mr. Elvin-Jensen: This responds to your letter dated August 28, 1985, asking whether child booster seat marketed by your company complies with Standard No. 213, *Child Restraint Systems*. I regret the delay in replying to your letter.; The descriptive materials accompanying your letter indicate that you child seat is secured by a vehicle's belt system, and has no harness of its own. Standard No. 213 applies to all child restraint systems. Those systems are defined in S4 of the standard as including 'any device, except Type I or Type II seat belts, designed for use in motor vehicle (sic) to restrain, seat, or position children who weigh not more than 50 pounds.' The information enclosed with your letter states that the child booster seat is intended to seat children weighing from 15 to 32 kg., which is equivalent to 33 to 70.5 pounds. This weight range includes children who weigh up to 50 pounds. Therefore, Standard No. 213 would apply to your product if it is marketed in this country.; You ask if Standard No. 213 requires child restraint systems to hav their own harness. The answer is no. The specific requirements of the standard on child restraint harness systems only apply if a manufacturer provides belts as a part of the system. Thus, for example, section 5.4.3.3 does not require that each child restraint be equipped with a harness meeting the requirements of that section. Instead, it provides that 'each child restraint system . . .*that has belts designed to restrain the child*' must comply with those requirements. (Emphasis added.); Under S6.1 of the standard, your child booster seat would be teste with a Type I safety belt (i.e., lap belt) attached. Although abdominal loading is not specifically measured in the test, the agency is concerned that when a vehicle lap belt is used with a child restraint system to restrain a child, the belt be positioned so that it does not apply impact loads to the abdomen of the child. The abdomen is, of course, the area of the body most vulnerable to the forces imposed by the belt in a crash. Thus, the agency believes that the lap belt should be held in place by the child restraint so that it passes over the pelvis and thighs of a child, areas of the body best able to withstand the forces imposed by the vehicle belt. Based on the photograph of your child booster seat, we are concerned that the vehicle lap belt may not be properly positioned and securely held by the restraint. Instead, the lap belt may allow submarining and may apply impact loads to the abdomen, unless the seating surface of the restraint is designed to prevent submarining. The agency is also concerned that the lap belt should be properly positioned and securely held so that no substantial inertial loads of the booster seat are applied to the child.; The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Act), a amended, 15 U.S.C. 1391, *et seq*., under which Standard No. 213 was issued, provides for self-certification by manufacturers instead of the type-approval or homologation process used in Europe and elsewhere. Under the Act, manufacturers are responsible for certifying that their items of motor vehicle equipment, such as child seats, comply with the requirements of any applicable safety standard. If you plan to market your child safety seat in this country, you should ensure that your child safety seat complies with all of the applicable requirements of the standard, including the certification requirements of S5.5.; Under the Act and our regulation, manufacturers also have th responsibility to conduct notification and remedy campaigns for safety related defects or noncompliances in their products (sections 151-159). The Act defines a manufacturer as 'any person engaging in the manufacturing or assembling of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, including any person importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale.' In the event that neither the importer nor the assembling manufacturer met an obligation imposed on a 'manufacturer' by the Act or our regulations, the agency would consider taking enforcement action against both parties. Any such obligation, however, could be satisfied by either party.; In addition, there are two other regulations which affec manufacturers. Those regulations require manufacturers to provide the agency with certain identifying information (49 CFR Part 566), and, in the case of foreign manufacturers, to designate an agent for the service of process (49 CFR Part 551).; Copies of Standard No. 213, the Act, Part 566, Part 551, 19 CFR 12.8 and an instruction sheet for new manufacturers are enclosed.; I hope this information is helpful to you. Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1301OpenClyde M. Weaver, Esq., Moore, Weaver, Moore & Bradberry, 13185 Warwick Boulevard, P.O. Box 2228, Newport News, VA 23602; Clyde M. Weaver Esq. Moore Weaver Moore & Bradberry 13185 Warwick Boulevard P.O. Box 2228 Newport News VA 23602; Dear Mr. Weaver: Your letter to Secretary Brinegar of October 8, 1973, has been referre to me for reply.; A copy of Part 580, *Odometer Disclosure Requirements*, is enclosed This disclosure regulation became effective March 1, 1973, and we assume that the August 1972 date in your letter actually refers to an August 1973 sale which would be subject to the regulation.; Title 15 U.S.C. S 1939 provides a remedy for a violation of the Ac made with intent to defraud. A discrepancy between the odometer reading and the disclosure statement could be the result of error, or misunderstanding of the requirement, and by itself, would not establish an intent to defraud.; We are unfamiliar with the facts in the case you mentioned, and th above statement should not be construed as an opinion or evaluation of the merits of that case.; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam2487OpenMr. John F. McCuen, Kelsey-Hayes Company, Romulus, MI 48174; Mr. John F. McCuen Kelsey-Hayes Company Romulus MI 48174; Dear Mr. McCuen: This responds to Kelsey-Hayes Company's November 29, 1976, questio whether an antilock valve (incorporating the function of a relay valve) is subject to the requirement of S5.7.1 of Standard No. 121, *Air Brake Systems*, that a truck or bus be capable of stopping within a specified distance following failure in the service brake system of a part designed to contain compressed air or brake fluid (with the exception of certain parts that are common to both sides of a 'split' service brake system).; From your description, the antilock valve in question, whether or no it incorporates the function of a relay valve, is a part of the service brake system designed to contain compressed air, and would be one of the components whose failure would be subject to the requirement of S5.7.1. I assume that the valve would be in the subsystem to the front axle or to the rear axles of a truck or bus and, as such, would not be a valve that is common to both sides of a 'split' service brake system.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5342OpenJudith Jurin Semo, Esq. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20044-0407; Judith Jurin Semo Esq. Squire Sanders & Dempsey 1201 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington D.C. 20044-0407; "Dear Ms. Semo: This responds to your request for NHTSA's determinatio that certain former East German military trucks, ZIL model 131, are not motor vehicles, and exempt from the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). We are unable to make such a determination. As explained below, a ZIL model 131 truck imported into the United States is considered a 'motor vehicle' for purposes of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act)(15 U.S.C. 1391 et seq.), and is subject to the FMVSS. Your letter explained that a client plans to import over 500 ZIL model 131 trucks into the U.S. Apparently, your client plans to modify the trucks in the U.S. to use for nonmilitary purposes. Your client intends to send most of the modified trucks to buyers in other countries, but plans to sell some of the trucks in the U.S. Your letter states: '... S ome ZIL vehicles may be modified to meet DOT/NHTSA and EPA standards in order to satisfy those buyers who require vehicles conforming to those standards.' Under the Safety Act, any 'motor vehicle,' whether new or used, that is imported into the United States for sale in this country must be brought into conformity with all FMVSS that applied at the time of its manufacture. The question that must be answered is whether the ZIL 131 trucks, at the time of importation, would be considered 'motor vehicles.' 'Motor vehicle' is defined at section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(3)) as: A ny vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails. NHTSA has interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles that are equipped with tracks or are otherwise incapable of highway travel are not motor vehicles. Further, vehicles designed and sold only for off-road use (such as airport runway vehicles and underground mining devices) are not considered motor vehicles, even though they may be operationally capable of highway travel. Vehicles that have an abnormal body configuration that readily distinguishes them from other highway vehicles and a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour (mph) are not considered motor vehicles, because their use of the public roads is intermittent and incidental to their primary intended off-road use. On the other hand, vehicles that use the public highways on a necessary and recurring basis are motor vehicles. For instance, a utility vehicle like the Jeep is plainly a motor vehicle, even though it is equipped with special features to permit off-road operation. If a vehicle's greatest use will be off-road, but it will spend a substantial amount of time on-road, NHTSA has interpreted the vehicle to be a 'motor vehicle.' Further, the agency has determined that a vehicle such as a dune buggy is a motor vehicle if it is readily usable on the public roads and is in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners, regardless of the manufacturer's stated intent regarding the terrain on which the vehicle is to be operated. Applying the above criteria, and based on the information in your letter, the ZIL model 131 trucks are motor vehicles. You state that potential U.S. buyers would require vehicles that meet the FMVSS. This suggests that U.S. vehicle owners intend to use the ZIL model 131 trucks as they would other motor vehicles, on the public roads. Judging from your photographs, the trucks do not have abnormal body configurations that distinguish them from other vehicles on the road. You stated that the trucks have a top speed of almost 50 miles per hour, a speed suitable for public roads. These facts suggest that the ZIL model 131 truck is designed and intended to be routinely used on the public roads, and should be classified as a motor vehicle. Assuming your client is still interested in importing the ZIL 131 trucks for resale in the U.S., the Imported Vehicle Safety Compliance Act requires that the agency determine that the vehicles are capable of conversion to meet the FMVSS, and that the trucks be imported by a 'registered importer.' The agency makes determinations upon the basis of a petition by the manufacturer or registered importer (or upon its own volition). A 'registered importer' is one whom NHTSA has recognized as capable of converting vehicles to meet the FMVSS. If you would like further details on eligibility determinations and import procedures, please let us know and we shall be pleased to provide them. The Safety Act also addresses trucks your client wishes to import into the U.S. for modification for export. Under section 108(b)(3) of the Safety Act, the FMVSSs do not apply to vehicles intended solely for export. Thus, trucks brought into the U.S. for modification for export are not subject to the FMVSSs. Under 49 CFR 591.5, the importer would file a declaration under 591.5(c), that the vehicle does not comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety, bumper, and theft prevention standards, but is intended solely for export. I hope that this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam0140OpenMr. William J. Norton, General Propulsion, 16222 Pacific Coast Highway, Huntington Beach, CA 92647; Mr. William J. Norton General Propulsion 16222 Pacific Coast Highway Huntington Beach CA 92647; Dear Mr. Norton: Thank you for your letters dated January 20 and 28, 1969, in which yo supply Certification information. It is our opinion that the nomenclature, as stated on your certification label for use on the multi-purpose passenger vehicle, does fulfill the requirements of Section 114 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the new Certification requirements effective with vehicles manufactured after August 31, 1969. The same label could be altered for use on the van trucks, see paragraph two of Mr. O'Mahoney's letter to you dated February 5, 1969. A copy is enclosed.; The label you propose to use on the chassis-cab does not fulfill th requirements set forth in 49 C.F.R. S 371.13, formerly 23 C.F.R. S 255.13, which states in part, 'Identifies the Federal motor vehicle safety standards with which its manufacturer states the chassis-cab fully complied for the principal end uses of such vehicle.'; Your statement, 'This cab-chassis conforms with all applicable Federa motor vehicle safety standards in effect on the date of manufacture shown above for the principal end use intended. End use * *.,' or other structure has adequate information with which to meet his statutory responsibilities. A copy of the Federal Register, Volume 33, Number 250 is enclosed. Chapter III, Subchapter A contains all of the pertinent details.; We trust the reply will be of assistance to you in your desire t comply with existing requirements of the National Highway Safety Bureau.; Sincerely, Francis Armstrong, Director, Office of Performance Analysis Motor Vehicle Safety Performance Service; |
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ID: aiam4800OpenWilliam F. Canever, Esq. Staff Attorney Office of General Counsel Ford Motor Company The American Road Dearborn, MI 48l2l; William F. Canever Esq. Staff Attorney Office of General Counsel Ford Motor Company The American Road Dearborn MI 48l2l; "Dear Mr. Canever: This responds to your letter concerning th implications under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy ('CAFE') program of the acquisition by Ford Motor Company ('Ford') of Jaguar plc ('Jaguar'). You stated that you believe all Ford and Jaguar vehicles produced and imported for model year ('MY') 1989 should be placed in Ford's fleet. As discussed below, we have concluded that Ford's acquisition of Jaguar did not take place until MY 1990. Thus, Ford and Jaguar vehicles constituted separate fleets for MY 1989. As a consequence, while the fuel economy credits earned by the combined Ford/Jaguar fleet in MY l990 may be applied to reduce (or eliminate) Jaguar's CAFE shortfall in MY 1987 and later years, the credits earned by Ford in MY 1989 may not be applied to offset any Jaguar shortfall. According to your letter, Ford publicly announced its tender offer for Jaguar shares on November 2, l989. This occurred after Ford had obtained the agreement of the Board of Directors of Jaguar to recommend the offer. The offer document, which constituted the formal legal offer, was mailed on November 8. After over 50 percent of Jaguar stock had been tendered, Ford declared the tender offer 'unconditional' on December l0, l989. You stated that during the period of negotiation, tender offer, and acceptance, and continuing through the end of calender year l989, Ford was 'manufacturing' MY l989 vehicles. Apparently, that statement is based on your statement that a small number of MY l989 Jaguar and Aston Martin vehicles were imported into the United States 'through calendar year end l989.' You argued that because Ford controlled Jaguar and the importer of Jaguar vehicles prior to the time that the last of these MY l989 vehicles were imported, and because fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, all Ford and Jaguar vehicles produced and imported for MY l989 should be placed in Ford's fleet. You contended that this treatment would be consistent with that accorded Chrysler Corporation ('Chrysler') and American Motors Corporation ('AMC') for model year l987. We disagree with your analysis comparing your situation to that of Chrysler/AMC, given significant differences in the timing of the respective acquisitions. In a letter to Chrysler dated April 4, l990, NHTSA stated the following: Another issue raised by Chrysler's memorandum is whether Chrysler and AMC became the same manufacturer for fuel economy purposes for model year l987. According to the memorandum, Chrysler agreed to acquire AMC in the spring of l987, and the transaction closed on August 6, l987. . . . Since Chrysler controlled AMC prior to the end of the l987 model year, and since fuel economy standards apply to particular model years as a whole and not to separate parts of a model year, it is our opinion that all of the vehicles produced by both Chrysler and AMC for model year l987 shall be treated as if manufactured by the same manufacturer, i.e., placed into one fleet. Otherwise, one or both of the manufacturers would have two separate CAFE values, pre-acquisition (or pre-control) and post-acquisition (or post-control), for the same model year. We continue to adhere to our view that where one manufacturer acquires another during a model year, they should be deemed as the same manufacturer, with a single CAFE value, for that model year. However, in the Chrysler/AMC acquisition, all relevant aspects of the transaction took place during the l987 model year. As you know, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act ('Act') establishes time limits within which NHTSA must establish and/or amend fuel economy standards for a given model year that are based upon the beginning of the model year. See sections 502(b) and 502(f)(2) of the Act. In interpreting those provisions, both NHTSA and the courts have concluded that the model year is traditionally thought to start approximately October l. See In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d l346, l349 (D.C. Cir. l986), 49 Fed. Reg. 225l6 (May 30, l984), 49 Fed. Reg. 4l250 (October 22, l984). See also General Motors Corporation v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d l65, l76 (D.C. Cir. l990), Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 7l0 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. l983). In the Chrysler/AMC case, all relevant aspects of the transaction were completed well before the completion of MY 1987, i.e., September 30, l987. Conversely, in the Ford/Jaguar transaction, Ford made its tender offer in early November 1989 and declared the tender offer 'unconditional' on December 10, 1989. These dates and any other possible date for the acquisition are clearly within the l990 model year, which began on approximately October l, l989. We recognize that manufacturers may produce or import vehicles that are designated as belonging to a particular model year after October l of that year. However, for purposes of deciding the model year in which one manufacturer acquires another, we have concluded that the traditional model year is the appropriate frame of reference. This conclusion is supported by the fact that by early November l989, the earliest date referred to in your letter, when Ford made its tender offer, it had been selling its MY l990 models for over a month. The fact that Ford or Jaguar may have produced or imported a small number of MY 1989 cars after the date of the acquisition is not determinative, since it has always been the case that model years can overlap for a given manufacturer, and some prior model year cars may be produced after the commencement of a given model year. Thus, any MY 1989 Jaguar vehicles that were imported during the last three months of 1989 should be included in Jaguar's MY 1989 fleet, as they would have been had the acquisition not occurred. I note that your letter indicated that Ford intended to file its Final l989 Model Year Report under the CAFE program with all MY 1989 Jaguar vehicles included in Ford's fleet. You stated, however, that you would not file that Report until you received this agency's views on the propriety of that action. For the reasons set out above, we believe that Ford and Jaguar had separate, distinct fleets in MY 1989, and that therefore separate information should be filed for that model year. I hope that this letter adequately explains our position on these issues. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel"; |
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.