ID: nht90-4.94

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 24, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Herr T. Spingler

TITLE: None

TEXT:

This is in reply to your FAX of July 19, 1990, to Richard Van Iderstine of this agency asking for confirmation of an oral interpretation provided you by Jere Medlin, Office of Rulemaking, with respect to replaceable bulb headlamps.

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, defines (section S3) a replaceable bulb headlamp as "a headlamp comprising a bonded lens and reflector assembly and one or two standardized replaceable light sour ces." In Europe you fix the lens to the reflector assembly with a rubber seal and clips. For the U.S. market you propose to add "silicone-glue at four places between lens and housing to prevent removal of the lens." Mr. Medlin informed you that this w ould be a "bonded lens and reflector assembly."

The standard does not define "bonded", but the intent of the definition is that, once the lens is joined to the reflector assembly, it shall not be separable. Any method of adhesion that accomplishes this would be a sufficient bond for purposes of the d efinition. If the application of silicone glue at four places between the lens and the reflector assembly is sufficient to prevent manual separation of the lens from the assembly, then it would be a sufficient bond.

I hope that this answers your question.

ID: nht90-4.95

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 24, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Stanley S. Zinner -- Greene & Zinner, P.C.

TITLE: Re FMVSS No. 123

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 12-4-90 to Paul Jackson Rice from Stanley S. Zinner (OCC 5479); Also attached to letter dated 2-16-82 to Brian Gill from Frank Berndt (Std. 123); Also attached to letter dated 10-26-73 to Brian Gill from Richard B. Dyso n

TEXT:

This is in reply to your FAX letter of December 4, 1990, requesting an interpretation of section S5.2.4 of 49 CFR 571.123 Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 123 Motorcycle Controls and Displays. Specifically, you wish an opinion "as to the meaning, purpo se, and intent" of that section.

Section S5.2.4 Stands states that "A stand shall fold rearward and upward if it contacts the ground when the motorcycle is moving forward." As Taylor Vinson of this office explained to you, this requirement was one of the original provisions in Standard No. 123 when it became effective in 1974. However, unlike many other requirements in the standard, it was both proposed and adopted without any discussion of its meaning, purpose, and intent in the preambles to both these rulemaking actions other than the bare remark that the notices contained a requirement for stands. Furthermore, in the 16 years that the requirement has been in effect, the agency does not appear to have issued a single legal opinion relating to section S5.2.4.

However, the agency has issued two interpretations of section S5.2.5 which we believe are relevant to an understanding of S5.2.4. In pertinent part, S5.2.5 Footrests states that "Each footrest for a passenger other than an operator shall fold rearward a nd upward when not in use." In a letter of February 16, 1982, to American Honda Motor Co., Inc., with respect to a proposed footboard design, the then chief counsel commented that "We consider that the purpose of S5.2.5 is to prevent accidents caused by rigid footrests contacting the ground in a banking turn." In a letter of October 26, 1973, also to American Honda, the then Assistant Chief Counsel commented that S5.2.5 did not require automatic folding but only the direction in which the footrests sh all retract "so that if they are inadvertently left down when not in use they will fold rearward and upward should they hit an obstacle while the motorcycle is travelling forward." I enclose a copy of each of these letters for your information.

The meaning of S5.2.4 is, we believe, clear and unambiguous: if a stand is left down, it shall fold rearward and upward if it contacts the ground (which includes the roadway) while the motorcycle is moving forward. Because both sections S5.2.4 and S5.2.5 require motorcycle equipment "to fold rearward and upward", we further believe that the purpose and intent of both sections are the same, and that S5.2.4 could be substituted for S5.2.5 in the sentences of the two letters quoted in the preceding paragra ph.

I hope that this is responsive to your request.

ID: nht90-4.96

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 26, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Captain J.P. Henries -- Safety Officer, Virginia State Police

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 11-6-90 from J.P. Henries to P.J. Rice (OCC 5411)

TEXT:

This responds to your recent letter seeking further information about the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, and the extent to which those standards require safety belts to include a lap belt portion. More specifically, you stated that Virginia's S tate Inspection Program currently requires any 1963 and subsequent model years vehicles designed and licensed primarily for passenger use to be equipped with lap belts or lap/shoulder belts for at least two front seating positions. However, my September 10, 1990 letter to Mr. Rembert Ryals explained that front seating positions equipped with automatic safety belts that are certified as complying with our 30 mph frontal crash protection requirements are not required to include a lap belt either as a par t of the automatic belt system or as a separate manual lap belt. To aid in the efficient administration of Virginia's State Inspection Program, you asked how Virginia safety inspectors could readily identify those vehicles that were not originally requi red to be equipped with lap belts. I am pleased to have this opportunity to provide you with the following information.

Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR S571.208), requires every vehicle other than a bus to have, as original equipment, a safety belt installed at every "designated seating position." Two different types of safety belts have been installe d pursuant to this requirement. The first type of safety belt is generally called a "manual" safety belt. With manual safety belts, the occupant of the seat must take some action to fasten the belt to be protected in a crash. Manual belts are required t o have a lap belt portion, that is, manual safety belts must be either lap-only or lap/shoulder safety belts.

The second and newer type of safety belt is called an "automatic" safety belt. An automatic safety belt positions itself to protect an occupant of the seat without any separate deliberate actions by the occupant. The occupant protection afforded by aut omatic safety belts is evaluated in a 30 mph crash test of the vehicle using test dummies as surrogates for human occupants. Because automatic safety belts must demonstrate their effectiveness in a crash test, they are not subject to all of the requirem ents that apply to manual safety belts. One of the manual belt requirements that does not apply to automatic belts is the requirement that the safety belt include a lap belt portion. Hence, as noted in my letter to Mr. Ryals, automatic belts are not re quired to include a lap belt.

It is easy to distinguish automatic safety belts from manual safety belts, by looking at where the upper end of the shoulder belt is anchored to the vehicle. Manual belts have the upper end of the shoulder belt anchored to the vehicle structure, such as the B-pillars. Again, since most current

safety belts are manual belts, this is the safety belt anchorage location with which you and the members of your department are most familiar. Because automatic belts must position themselves around occupants automatically, they must be anchored in a dif ferent way. Nonmotorized automatic belts are anchored to the door itself, while motorized automatic belts run along a track over the top of the doorframe. These anchorage locations enable either design of the automatic belt to properly position itself around a seat's occupant when the person gets into the vehicle and closes the door, and enable the automatic belt to move out of the way to allow the person to get out of the vehicle when the door is opened.

Although automatic belts are not required to include a lap belt, nearly all manufacturers have voluntarily chosen to provide lap belts for seating positions equipped with automatic belts, either as part of the automatic belt or as a separate manual belt. This is not always the case, however, as Volkswagen, for instance, has not voluntarily chosen to provide a lap belt with some of its automatic belts. Further, since there is no requirement to provide those lap belts, manufacturers may not choose to co ntinue providing lap belts in the future for seating positions equipped with automatic belts.

I hope this information is helpful. Please let me know if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

ID: nht90-4.97

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 26, 1990

FROM: Walter E. Gundaker -- Acting Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Department of Health & Human Services

TO: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2-19-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to Walter E. Gundaker (A37; VSA 102(4); VSA 108(a)(2))

TEXT:

On November 23, 1983 the Food and Drug Administration published in the Federal Register a Final Rule classifying the mechanical automobile hand and foot driving control as a class II medical device. The product is intended to enable persons who have lim ited use of their arms or legs to drive an automobile. The device allows hand operation of the gas, brake, and clutch pedals or foot operation of the steering and gear shift.

Recently we have found that more sophisticated versions of the controls are being developed. These products, which incorporate a joy stick, a microprocessor and servo controls, permit individuals with very limited body control to drive a motor vehicle. Applications to FDA for approval to market these controls have raised questions about vehicle safety which we feel are more appropriately addressed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

In view of the nature of these products, we would like to revoke the classification of the mechanical hand and foot driving control, and not actively regulate the device. Before we do this, however, we need assurances that these driving controls for han dicapped persons do fall in the jurisdiction of NHTSA and that significant complaints of malfunction would be investigated by NHTSA. Could you give us such assurances?

Thank you for your consideration of this subject. If you or your staff need additional background or information, please contact Mr. Leighton Hansel in our Office of Compliance & Surveillance at (301) 427-1144.

ID: nht90-4.98

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 26, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Arthur H. Bryant, Esq. -- Executive Director, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice

TITLE: Neilson v. Porsche, et al., D. Idaho, Civ. No. 87-1121

TEXT:

This is in response to your letter to Kenneth Weinstein, the Assistant Chief Counsel for Litigation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), regarding the above-referenced case, in which the District Court ruled that the plaintiff 's claims are preempted by Federal law. You have requested that the United States file an amicus curiae brief with the Ninth Circuit in support of the plaintiff.

Although this agency strongly disagrees with both the result and the rationale adopted by the District Court, we have decided not to request the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief in this appeal. A discussion of our views on this legal issue and the basis for our decision not to participate is set forth below.

As you are aware, it is the position of the United States, as expressed in amicus briefs filed in Ritt v. General Motors, No. 88-1822 (7th Cir.), and Wood v. General Motors, No. 89-46 (U.S. S.Ct.), that under certain circumstances, claims seeking to hold a motor vehicle liable in tort for its failure to install airbags in a vehicle are preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Act"), 15 U.S.C. S 1381 et seq., and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") No. 208, 49 CFR S 571.208, issued at 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (July 17, 1984). However, in both of those briefs, the United States emphasized that, as a general matter, the fact that a motor vehicle complies with applicable federal safety standards neither preempts state law tort actions nor provides a complete defense to such claims.

Those briefs noted that NHTSA had, for many years, interpreted the Act to allow such claims to proceed, and referred to a January 5, 1981 letter from Frank Berndt, NHTSA's Chief Counsel, to Daniel L. Thistle. As that letter noted:

Section 108(c) (15 U.S.C. 1397(c)) of the Act provides that compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard "does not exempt any person from liability under common law." The House Report (H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess (1966)) on se ction 108(c) states that, "It is intended, and this subsection specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law, particularly those relating to warranty, contract, and tort liability."

This principle has been upheld consistently by the courts, as reflected in the cases cited in the plaintiff's brief in opposition to Porsche's motion for summary judgment in this case. (Of course, NHTSA takes no position on the merits of this case; i.e. , whether Porsche should be held liable for not making the seat backs in the vehicle in question stronger.)

Thus, as noted above, in our view the District Court's opinion misstates the law on this issue. In relying upon cases in which courts have found claims involving airbags to be preempted, the court ignored the vital distiction between claims challenging a manufacturer's failure to install airbags rather than other forms of occupant protection that were specifically authorized by FMVSS No. 208, and claims such as the one at issue here, in which it is alleged that the manufacturer should have provided a h igher level of protection than that required under a NHTSA safety standard. However, to our knowledge, this is the first case in which a court has misapplied the airbag precedents to reverse a consistent body of law that permits claims such as this to p roceed. In keeping with NHTSA's long-standing policy of minimizing its involvement in private tort litigation, we believe that it would not be appropriate to participate formally in this case, particularly since the plaintiff will be able to provide the Ninth Circuit with our views on the issue. In the unlikely event that this erroneous view of the extent of Federal preemption proliferates in the future, the agency may decide to participate in a subsequent case.

ID: nht90-4.99

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: December 27, 1990

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Paul G. Scully -- Vice President, Peterson Manufacturing Company

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8-14-90 to Jackson Rice from Paul G. Scully (OCC 5245)

TEXT:

This is in reply to your letter of August 14, 1990 (postmarked September 19), asking that we notify the police department of Tuscon, Arizona, that reflex reflectors are not required to have SAE markings "in order to be perfectly legal reflectors." You a lso state that another agency of the Department of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carrier Safety, "still retain(s) these marking requirements in their publication" and appeal for "a uniform set of regulations between the two government agencies involved."

Because this matter has not been brought to our attention by the police department of Tuscon, we are responding directly to you so that you may furnish copies to whomever you deem it most advisable.

We confirm your understanding that 49 CFR 571.108, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment, does not require that reflex reflectors bear SAE markings. Although they must meet the requirements of SAE Standard J594f, Reflex Reflectors, January 1977, there is no requirement that they bear SAE markings according to SAE Recommended Practice J759c, Lighting Identification Code, January 1975.

Although the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS) has amended most of its vehicle lighting regulations to conform to Standard No. 108, up until now that agency has required, under 49 CFR 393.26(c), that reflectors bear ( among other markings), the letters "SAE-A". However, OMCS has informed us that it will amend its regulation to conform to Standard No. 108 as early as convenient, and in the meantime will notify its field office that the marking requirement is no longer to be enforced. Therefore, failure to mark reflectors with the letters "SAE-A" may be inconsistent with current OMCS requirements, but it is not a failure to comply with Standard No. 108.

Further, to the extent that Arizona law itself may require marking of reflectors with the letters "SAE-A", that provision is inconsistent with Standard No. 108 and is subject to the preemption provisions of 15 U.S.C. 1392(d). Under the preemption provis ions, no State or political subdivision thereof may enact or continue in effect a standard covering the same aspect of performance as a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, unless it is identical to the Federal standard. Thus, any State or local requi rement for SAE markings on reflex reflectors is one that is not identical to Standard No. 108, and subject to the preemption provisions.

Other than the reference to OMCS regulations, we do not know under what

authority the Tuscon police are acting. Certainly, a local official cannot enforce a Federal standard per se. If Arizona law requires vehicles in interstate commerce to comply with regulations of the OMCS, and the Tuscon police are attempting to enforc e State law, we conclude that the State law is subject to the preemption provisions discussed above, and that such enforcement action has been precluded under Federal law.

I hope that this responds to your concerns.

ID: nht91-1.1

DATE: 01/01/91 EST

FROM: Jessie M. Flautt

TO: Steve Kratzske -- NHTSA Office

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 3-26-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to Jessie M. Flautt (A37; Std. 202; VSA 108(a)(2)(4))

TEXT:

I am writing to your department to obtain authorization to reduce the size of the headrests in a 1991 automobile; These reductions would still meet the federal standards set in 1987. I am not able to drive a 1991 car due to the increased length and width of the headrests in the past few years. The newer cars are designed for an average man with average vision: however, I am under five feet-two and an legally blind in one eye. Therefore, I cannot find a car that does not impede my field of vision. Consequently, my driving safety and that of drivers and passengers in other cars is in jeopardy as I have a limited view of side and rear objects.

I would be the sole driver of the car and would thus not be endangering anyone else by a reduction of the headrests: in fact, I would be greatly improving my own safety as well as that of persons in other vehicles if I were allowed to increase my field of vision by reducing the size of the headrests.

I apppreciate the time and interest you expended in speaking to me on the telephone. It is a wonderful feeling to know that we can indeed reach a helpful person in our huge goverment organization.

(Stetson's Auto Shops, 7414 Ashcroft, Houston, Texas, would be doing this work.)

ID: nht91-1.10

DATE: January 3, 1991

FROM: Gene Schlanger -- President, ROC Capital, Inc.

TO: Taylor Vinson -- Legal Counsel, NHTSA

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 2-26-91 from Paul Jackson Rice to Gene Schlanger (A37; Std. 108)

TEXT:

We have developed a lighted sign (frame size 4 inches high x 23 inches wide) for Automobiles, with letters 2 inches high x 18 inches wide, that are illuminated by LEDs (light emitting diodes). Messages can be customized by the operator via a small, keyboard and stored in the key- board for instant recall by the driver or passenger. The sign can be designed to scroll messages from left to right along the face of the sign or if that is deemed legally inappropriate, the messages can remain stationary on the sign, with the changes in the message that just fade in and fade out. The sign is designed to be mounted inside the car, either on a rear or side window. If that is deemed legally inappropriate the sign can be designed to be placed outside on the roof of the auto, as would commonly seen lighted pizza signs on delivery cars, etc. ie: Domino's. The LEDS donot project beam, as would a headlight or directional light and donot flash, but instead allow the message to be read in day or night by passengers in other cars, or persons on the street, who are either to the rear or side, depending upon where the sign is mounted. We plan to program the sign, so that whenever it is turned on, it will automatically show an initial message saying: DRIVE SAFELY AND PLEASE DONOT TAILGATE. This sign would be sold to the general public.

We would appreciate receiving your opinion, as to whether a sign of this nature is within federal and/or state regulations, which may be applicable.

I look forward to hearing from you and to receiving any other information you feel may be helpful.

ID: nht91-1.11

DATE: January 4, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Edward R. Heussner -- Consultant, Comp U Tence

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 8-16-90 to Paul Jackson Rice from Edward R. Heussner (OCC 5107)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking for this agency's interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion (49 CFR S571.219). You posed two questions; the first asked about the meaning of "penetration" for the area of the windshield below the "protected zone," and the second asked whether engineering judgment in lieu of crash testing, as described in S5 of Standard No. 219 would be "acceptable to the agency." Your questions are responded to below.

In your letter, you noted that section S5 provides that, when a specified crash test is conducted, "no such part of a vehicle (certain parts of the vehicle outside the occupant compartment) shall penetrate the inner surface of that portion of the windshield, within the (Daylight Opening), below the protected zone defined in S6.2. (Emphasis added.) You asked whether, in order for "penetration" to have occurred, does some vehicle component have to go through the windshield or does obscuring of the glass or glass-plastic constitute a penetration.

It is our opinion that, in order for penetration of the inner surface of the windshield to occur, some vehicle component from outside the occupant compartment must break through the windshield. According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (published by Merriam-Webster Inc.), "penetrate" means: to pass into or through, to enter by overcoming resistance: PIERCE, to gain entrance to. Thus, under section S5, when the specified test is conducted, certain vehicle components from outside the occupant compartment must not pass through or pierce the inner surface of the windshield. If the windshield glass or glass-plastic were merely pushed inward by such a vehicle component, without the component breaking through the glass or glass-plastic, the inner surface of the windshield would not have been penetrated.

Regarding your second question asking whether engineering judgment in lieu of crash testing, as described in standard No. 219 would be "acceptable to the agency," please note the following. Each of this agency's safety standards specifies the test conditions and procedures that this agency will use to evaluate the performance of the vehicle or equipment being tested for compliance with the particular safety standard. NHTSA precisely follows each of the specified test procedures and conditions when conducting its compliance testing. However, the Safety Act does not require a manufacturer to test its products only in the manner specified in the relevant safety standard, or even to test the products at all. A manufacturer may choose any means of evaluating its products to determine whether the vehicle or item of equipment complies with the requirements of the safety standards, provided, however, that the manufacturer assures

that the vehicle or equipment will comply with the safety standards when tested by the agency according to the procedures specified in the standard.

If the agency testing shows an apparent noncompliance exists with a vehicle or item of equipment, the manufacturer is asked to show the basis for its certification that the vehicle or equipment complies with the relevant safety standard or standards. If in fact there is a noncompliance, the manufacturer is subject to civil penalties under the Safety Act unless it can establish that it exercised due care, in the design and manufacture of the product and in the checks (through actual testing, computer simulation, engineering analyses, or other means) to ensure compliance, but nevertheless did not have reason to know that the vehicle or item of equipment did not in fact comply with the safety standards.

Please note that this agency has long said that it is unable to judge what efforts would constitute "due care" in advance of the actual circumstances in which a noncompliance occurs. What constitutes "due care" in a particular case depends on all relevant facts, including such things as the limitations of current technology, the availability of test equipment, the size of the manufacturer, and, above all, the diligence exercised by the manufacturer.

You should also note that, while the exercise of "due care" may relieve a manufacturer of liability for civil penalties in connection with the manufacture and sale of noncomplying vehicles or equipment, it does not relieve a manufacturer of the responsibility to notify purchasers of the noncompliance and remedy the noncompliance without charge to the purchasers, if either the manufacturer or this agency determines that vehicles or items of equipment do not comply with all applicable safety standards.

I hope this explanation is helpful. Please contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff (202) 366-2992 if you have any further questions or would like some additional information on this subject.

ID: nht91-1.12

DATE: January 4, 1991

FROM: Paul Jackson Rice -- Chief Counsel, NHTSA

TO: Mark G. Southern

TITLE: None

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 10-2-90 to Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA from Mark G. Southern (OCC 5281)

TEXT:

This responds to your letter asking about the application of Safety Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, to the child harness you wish to produce. You indicated in telephone conversations with Ms. Fujita of my staff that you do not object to our making publicly available the cover letter you sent, and the following description of your device.

The child restraint system you plan to manufacture is a harness that consists of upper torso restraints (belts that would pass over each shoulder of the child), and a lower torso restraint (a frontal shield). The system would be installed in a vehicle by use of a strap that wraps around the vehicle's seat back (attached to the strap are the system's shoulder belts). There is a buckle attached to the system's shield that attaches to the vehicle's seat lap belt. The child restraint system has no crotch belt.

Your first question is whether Standard 213 applies to your product, even if your device "is not the primary restraint." The answer is yes. Standard 213 defines "child restraint system" to mean "any device except Type I or Type II seat belts, designed for use in a motor vehicle or aircraft to restrain, seat, or position children who weigh 50 pounds or less." Your harness meets the standard's definition of a child restraint system and it must therefore meet all applicable requirements of the standard.

You ask specifically about the effect of paragraph S5.3.1 of Standard 213. That paragraph states: "Each add-on child restraint system shall have no means designed for attaching the system to a vehicle seat cushion and vehicle seat back and no component (except belts) that is designed to be inserted between the vehicle seat cushion and vehicle seat back." (Emphasis added.)

(The language emphasized above should read: "seat cushion or vehicle seat back." The word "and" was substituted for "or" through a typographical error that occurred in a January 1988 amendment of Standard 213 (53 FR 1783). The agency's intent was to use the word "or." Your letter has alerted us to the error, and we plan to correct it shortly.)

Since your restraint is designed to attach to a vehicle seat back (by means of the strap which wraps around the vehicle seat back), the restraint would not meet S5.3.1. NHTSA adopted the prohibition against attaching child restraints to vehicle seat backs because the agency was concerned that a vehicle seat back would not be able to withstand the additional load on it from an attached child seat in a crash. It appears

that your harness design would add a load on the vehicle seat back in a crash, and is therefore the type of design that is intended to be prohibited by S5.3.1 of the standard.

We also would like to point out that your design does not appear to comply with paragraph S5.4.3.4(b) of Standard 213. That section provides that each child harness shall "provide lower torso restraint by means of lap and crotch belt." Your restraint does not include a crotch belt to restrain the child's lower torso. You would have to modify the design of the harness to include a crotch belt in order for your harness to comply with S5.4.3.4.

There are a number other requirements in Standard 213 that apply to your harness, including the belts, buckles and webbing requirements (S5.4), the labeling requirements (S5.5 and S5.6), and the flammability resistance requirement (S5.7). In addition to these requirements, you would have to determine that the harness complies with all the performance requirements set forth in S5 of the standard. Once you have made such a determination, you are required to certify that each harness you manufacture satisfies all applicable requirements of Standard 213.

You should also be aware that you will be a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment if you manufacture your harness for sale. As such, you will be subject to the requirements of SS151-159 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (copy enclosed) concerning the recall and remedy of products that either do not comply with an applicable safety standard or have defects related to motor vehicle safety. If it were determined by either you or the agency that your harness did not comply with a requirement of Standard 213 or that it had a defect related to motor vehicle safety, you would have to notify all purchasers of the noncomplying or defective product and remedy the noncompliance or defect free of charge.

If you decide to manufacture the harness for sale, you should also be aware of 49 CFR Part 566, Manufacturer Identification (copy enclosed). This regulation requires a manufacturer of child restraint systems to submit its name, address and a brief description of the child restraints it manufactures to NHTSA within 30 days of the date the restraints are first manufactured.

I hope this information is helpful. Please contact us if you have any further questions. We are returning the sketches you sent to us under separate cover, as you requested.