ID: nht88-1.38

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/11/88

FROM: JERRY SMITH -- MINNESOTA BODY AND EQUIPMENT CO

TO: SHARON L. FORD -- HEAD START DIRECTOR SOUTHEAST IOWA ACTION ORGANIZATION, INC.

TITLE: FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF SCHOOL BUS USER'S

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/26/88 TO R.C. ROAST FROM ERIKA Z. JONES, REDBOOK A32, STANDARD 108; LETTER DATED 03/18/88 TO CHIEF COUNCIL -- NHTSA, FROM R C ROST RE REQUEST THAT HEADSTART BUSES NOT BE REQUIRED TO HAVE ROOF WARNING LIGHTS IF A COLO R OTHER THAN SCHOOL BUS YELLOW IS USED, OCC - 1763; LETTER DATED 12/21/77, TO JAMES TYDINGS FROM JOSEPH J LEVIN; LETTER DATED 02/25/88 TO SHARON FORD, FROM JERRY SMITH; UNDATED BROCHURES ON SCHOOLBUS BY WAYNE CORPORATION

TEXT: Dear Sharon:

As per our telephone conversation of February 9, 1988, I am enclosing copies of communications regarding and/or effecting what type of bus that can be sold to, or purchased by the Head Start organization.

Please note that this is not Minnesota Body Company's policy, nor is it our wish to cause you any inconvenience. However, due to the interpretation by the U.S. Department of Transportation, we are bound to provide a vehicle that meets all applicable sch ool bus criteria including warning lights CATCH 22. I further realize that warning lights are not allowed in Iowa for non-school use. Therefore, the warning lights would have to be removed or de-activated before you placed the bus in service.

Please let me know if you have any questions, or if I can be of further service

Sincerely,

Dear Sharon,

I have contacted the following people in an effort to resolve the interpretation of school bus user's etc.

Dwight R. Carlson Assistant Chief Bureau of School Administration and accreditation Grimes State Office Bldg Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0146 (515) 281-5811

J.P. Golinvaux District Representative Iowa Department of Transportation Air and Transit division State Capitol Des Moines, iowa 50319 (515) 281-4265

Jerry Smith

ID: nht88-1.39

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/12/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Allan J. Lameier -- Defense Electronics Supply Center

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 7/1/80 letter from Frank Berndt to E.C. Elliott

TEXT:

Mr. Allan J. Lameier Quality Assurance Specialist, Defense Logistics Agency Defense Contract Administration Services Management Area, Dayton C/O Defense Electronics Supply Center Dayton OH 45444

RE: A. Lameier 513-684-3915

This is in response to your letter requesting clarification concerning the classification of a Davey mobile compressor. You state that the manufacturer of the compressor indicates that the wheeled compressor need not comply with Standard No. 108, Lamps, reflective devices and related equipment, because the compressor is not a trailer. Based on the information provided with your letter, we believe that the compressor is not a motor vehicle and is therefore not subject to the requirements of Standard No. 108 or any other Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

By way of background, our agency is authorized, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act: 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) to issue safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. The Nati onal Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a "self-certification" process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its product s meet all applicable safety standards.

A "trailer" is defined at 49 CFR 5571.3 as "a motor vehicle with or without motive power, designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by another motor vehicle." The mobile compressor shown in the brochure enclosed with your letter appea rs to be designed for carrying property (the compressor) and for being drawn by a motor vehicle. The answer to your question of whether this compressor is a trailer, then depends on whether the compressor is a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Sa fety Act.

Section 102(3) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C 1391(3)) defines a "motor vehicle" as any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

We have interpreted this language as follows. Vehicles such as forklifts and mobile construction equipment which are sold primarily for off-road use, but which incidentally use the public roads to travel from one job site to another, are not considered m otor vehicles. On the other hand, vehicles which regularly use the public roads and stay off-road for only limited periods of time are motor vehicles and are subject to our safety standards.

The agency has previously concluded in a July 1, 1980 letter to Mr. E.C. Elliott (copy enclosed) that his company's portable air compressors were not motor vehicles, based on statements that these devices spend the bulk of their useful lives on construct ion sites and are seldom drawn over public roads by mechanical power. If the Davey portable compressors are used in the same fashion as the compressors discussed in the July 1, 1980 letter, we believe that the Davey compressors were properly classified b y the manufacturer as something other than a "motor vehicle". This means that the Davey compressors are not subject to any of the federal motor vehicle safety standards.

I hope this information has been useful. My apologies for the delay in responding to your letter.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

Enclosure

IN REPLY REFER TO: A. LAMEIER 513-684-3915

SUBJ: APPLICABILITY OF FMVSS #108 TO PORTABLE CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES

1. Enclosed is a photocopy of a brochure showing a compressor being bought on navy contract DLA-700-86-C-8263. This contract requires compliance with " All Applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in effect on the Date of manufacture." 2 . Davey Co. insists STD#108 (Lighting and Reflectors) is not applicable because a wheeled compressor is not a "Trailer."

3. Please send me copies of any rulings or opinions which would clarify this requirement.

Allan J. Lameier Quality Assurance Specialist

Attch 1 Photocopy omitted.

ID: nht88-1.4

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/01/88 EST

FROM: DONALD N. STAHL -- DISTRICT ATTORNEY; JOHN T. FORTH -- CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR, OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY MODESTO CA

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: MCCOY TIRE SERVICE CENTER D.A. NO. CF696

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 12/09/88 FROM ERIKA Z JONES TO DONALD N. STAHL; REDBOOK A33, STANDARD 119; LETTER DATED 03/01/88 FROM DAVE TAYLOR TO JOHN FORTH; LETTER DATED 07/13/87 FROM ERIKA Z JONES TO JACK DENIJS; LETTER DATED 05/19/87 FROM JACK D ENIJS TO CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA; OCC - 500; RE COVERED DOT NUMBERS ON REMANUFACTURED TRUCK CASINGS

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

Our office is currently conducting an investigation pursuant to Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code (unfair business practice).

The case was brought to our office's attention on January 28, 1988, by the California Highway Patrol (CHP). A routine inspection of a local school district's buses disclosed new recapped tires on a bus which had no D.O.T. markings on the tire casing. The CHP learned during the course of their investigation that these tire casings were originally designed for use by a rubber tire train in Japan and were new tires that had been imported for recapping purposes. The CHP investigation disclosed the tir e casings were imported as slicks (no tread design) and the slick was removed. The tires were then recapped using the "bondag" process and resold by the captioned company to the school district.

We contacted Mr. Dave Taylor, Regional Manager/Field Engineer of Bridgestone (USA) Inc., as the tire casings were manufactured by Bridgestone. Attached as Exhibit 1 is his response regarding these tires. His response also indicated the tire was spec ifically designed for rubber tire subway trains in Japan. He also wrote, ". . . is not suitable by any means for highway use", referring to the tires themselves in his letter.

Mr. Taylor also included in his letter a copy of an opinion by your office (date unknown) indicating that tire casings could be imported for recapping use. The letter refers to a June 18, 1981, letter from former Chief Counsel Frank Bundt to Mr. Ray L ittlefield. Attached as Exhibit #2 is a copy of a letter from your office to Mr. Jack DeNijs which refers to these two mentioned opinions.

I have also included as Exhibit #3 a CHP drawing of the tires in question depicting all the markings on the tire casing. Three (3) of these tires are currently being held as evidence by the CHP.

We are requesting an opinion as to the following: 1. Is it permissible to import this type of tire casing?

2. If it is permissible to import this tire casing, does this particular type of tire casing meet Department of Transportation standards?

Your prompt handling of this matter would be greatly appreciated as the above captioned company wants the tires back. If I can be of further assistance, please contact me at telephone number (209) 525-5550.

Enclosures

ID: nht88-1.40

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/12/88

FROM: FRANK H. MILLER -- GERRY BABY PRODUCTS QUALITY ENGINEER

TO: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL NHTSA

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/02/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO FRANK MILLER -- GERRY BABY PRODUCTS; RED BOOK A33; FMVSS 302

TEXT: Dear Ms. Jones:

This is in further reference to my communication to you dated October 19, 1987 and also to your response received December 3, 1987. Both were in reference to paragraph S4.2.1 of Safety Standard No. 302, "Flammability of Interior Materials".

I appreciate your response regarding the testing of threads used in the manufacture of seat cushions and testing them as a part of the component and now would like to know if the binding we use on the edges of the cushion should also be tested as a part of the material. We currently test it as an independent entity but it would ease our testing if it were to be done as a portion of a cushion assembly.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

ID: nht88-1.41

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/16/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mr. Jeffrey W. Sullivan

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. Jeffrey W. Sullivan Rt. 1, Box 3 Jackson, NC 27845

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

This is in reply to your letter of October 27, 1987, to this agency asking for Information on Federal safety and pollution requirements for kit cars.

We are unable to advise you on emission control regulations, and you should address this inquiry to the Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20460.

You have given us, as an example of the type of vehicle you would manufacture for resale, "a '76 year drivetrain on a modified or not original frame/chassis" and asked whether it will have to meet 1976 model or new model standards. You have also asked wh ether you can relocate the engine and transmission, and whether it is would have an effect upon the standards you must meet.

New model Federal motor vehicle safety standards do not apply to vehicles built upon the chassis of a vehicle previously in use. However, under certain circumstances the 1976 safety standards could apply. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safe ty Act a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Thus, if a manufacturer re moves a body from a chassis and installs a new one, he must ensure that the resulting vehicle continues to comply with the Federal safety standards with which the vehicle originally complied. A "Manufacturer" is defined in part as one who manufactures or assembles motor vehicles. This definition would seem to encompass your planned activities. Accordingly, if you removed the 1976 body from its chassis, there is no restriction against your relocation of the engine or transmission, but upon installation o f a new body you are required to ensure that the new vehicle meets 1976 Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

On the other hand, if you purchase the chassis after the body has been removed by another person, there would be no Federal safety standards applicable to it upon installation of the body. However, the vehicle would have to meet State standards necessary for its registration and operation.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

ID: nht88-1.42

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/16/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Mike Kaizaki -- Manager, Truck Tire Engineering, Yokohama Tire Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ATTACHMT: 11/1/88 letter from Erika Z. Jones to Gary M. Ceazan (A32; Std. 109; Std. 119); Undated letter from Erika Z. Jones to E.W. Dahl; 8/18/88 letter from Gary M. Ceazan to U.S. Dot (OCC 1951)

TEXT: Mr. Mike Kaizaki Manager, Truck Tire Engineering Yokohama Tire Corporation Corporate Office 601 S. Acacia Fullerton, CA 92631

Dear Mr. Kaizaki:

This responds to your letter requesting an interpretation of Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger cars. You asked whether it is permissible to place two tire size designations, 385/65R22.5 in larger letters and 15R22.5 in small letters, on the same tire. The answer to your question is no.

By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufac turer to ensure that its vehicles or equipment comply with applicable standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter.

The practice of labeling two tire sizes on one tire, as you requested in your letter, was once a fairly common practice and was referred to as "dual size markings." Dual size markings were a marketing effort by tire manufacturers to try to persuade consu mers to change the size and/or type of tire on their vehicles, by representing that this particular tire size was an appropriate replacement for two different sizes of tires. However, the practice of using dual-size markings confused many consumers about the size of the tire on their vehicle. The only purpose of the Federally required markings on tires is to provide consumers, in a straightforward manner, with technical information necessary for the safe use and operation of the tire. The agency conclud ed that it was inappropriate to permit a marketing technique that was confusing many consumers to defeat the purpose of the required markings on tires. Accordingly, dual-size markings were expressly prohibited for passenger car tires subject to Standard No. 109: 36 PR 1195, January 26, 1971.

The marking requirements for tires subject to Standard No. 119 are set forth in section 56.5 of the standard. Section @6.5(s) requires that each tire be marked on both sidewalls with the tire size designation as listed in the documents and publications d esignated in @5.1. Section @5.1 of Standard No. 119 requires each tire manufacturer to ensure that a listing of the rims that may be used with each tire the manufacturer produces is available to the public. This may be done either by the individual manuf acturer furnishing a document to each of its dealers, to this agency, and to any person upon request, or the manufacturer may rely on the tire and rim matching information published by certain standardization organizations.

While Standard No. 119 does not expressly prohibit dual-size markings, section @6.5(c) uses the singular when it refers to the "tire size designation" to be labeled on the tire. Considering the past history associated with dual-size markings, this agency interprets section @6.5(c) of Standard No. 119 as prohibiting a manufacturer from marking a tire with two different size designations, even if a document or publication designated in @5.1 were to show two different size designations for the same tire si ze. Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

July 17, 1987

Ms Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation N.H.T.S.A. 400 Seventh St., SW Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Ms. Jones:

We at Yokohama Rubber Co., LTD are considering the double tire size designations (equivalent but different) marked on the tire sidewall of the medium truck tire.

We believe that it is in compliance with Standard No. 119. New pneumatic tires for motor vehicles other than passenger cars as far as the tire size designations are equivalent to each other and the tire dimensions, and other markings, meet with the estab lished standard, TRA, ETRTO, and so on.

Accordingly, would you respond to our specific question below regarding this marking:

Yokohama places 2 tire size designations, 385/65R22.5 in larger letters and 15R22.5 in small letters. These sizes are different but equivalent to each other. The max load/inflation pressure marking is one specified by ETRTO for 385/65R22.5 but larger tha n one specified by TRA for 15R 22.5.

Is this compatible with FMVSS 119?

I would appreciate your specific response in writing at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Mike Kaizaki Manager, Truck Tire Engineering

ID: nht88-1.43

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/16/88 EST

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: CHARLOTTE E. O'NEIL

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: MEMO DATED 7-27-87, TO NHTSA FROM CHARLOTTE E. O'NEIL

TEXT: This responds to your letter concerning the location of the clutch, brake and accelerator controls in a school bus that you drive. We apologize for the delay in our response. You stated that the seat of the school bus is about four inches too far to th e right, and that these controls are therefore not in the usual location relative to the seat. You stated: "In order to reach the brake pedal I have to cross my right foot over my left," and expressed concern that a driver might accidentally hit the acc elerator instead of the brake. You asked whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101, Controls and Displays, prohibits placing controls in such difficult to reach locations and, if not, whether there is any way to get the law changed.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issues safety standards covering new motor vehicles and/or new motor vehicle equipment. Since these standards do not apply to used vehicles, the issue of whether the bus you drive was required t o meet Standard No. 101 depends on its date of manufacture.

As you noted in your letter, Section S5.1 of Standard No. 101 requires that certain controls, including the service brake; accelerator; and clutch; be "operable by the driver" when the driver is restrained by the crash protection equipment required by St andard No. 208. You asked whether, with this wording, any control that can be reached at all, even with difficulty, must be considered "operable." One of the stated purposes of Standard No. 101 is "to ensure the accessibility . . . of motor vehicle cont rols . . . in order to reduce the safety hazards caused by the diversion of the driver's attention from the driving task, and by mistakes in selecting controls." Thus, it is the intent of section S5.1 to ensure that drivers are able to operate specified controls as part of the normal driving task. We note, however, that neither Standard No. 101 nor any other standard specifies the precise location of the service brake, accelerator and clutch controls, either relative to each other or to the seat.

In answer to your question concerning how you may be able to get requirements changed "to forbid putting controls in difficult to reach locations," interested persons may petition the agency to commence rulemaking to issue or amend safety standards. I a m enclosing a copy of the agency's regulation which sets forth procedures for submitting petitions for rulemaking.

I am forwarding your letter to NHTSA's Office of Enforcement, which investigates consumer complaints about safety. A copy of this correspondence is being placed in the public docket. ENCLOSURE

ID: nht88-1.44

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/18/88 EST

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- CHIEF COUNSEL, NHTSA

TO: ROBERT J. KAUFMAN -- GINGOLD, KAUFMAN & CHAIKEN

TITLE: GK&C FILE # 1012-271

ATTACHMT: MEMO DATED 1-4-88, FROM ROBERT J. KAUFMAN, TO NHTSA-DOT

TEXT: This responds to your recent letter concerning the advice I gave to a company called Auto Accessories, Inc., with respect to the installation of that company's armrests in Volvo 240 automobiles. More specifically, on behalf of your client, a Volvo deale rship, you seek clarification of that advice and request copies of any information, e.g., tests or studies, regarding the armrests. I appreciate your client's concern for safety. For your information, I have enclosed a copy of my November 18, 1987 lett er to that company, in which the advice was provided. I have also enclosed a copy of the armrest installation instructions that were proposed by Auto Accessories and discussed in my response.

Based on your reading of a letter from Auto Accessories to Volvo dealers (enclosed with your letter), you concluded that the armrest installation procedure "ostensibly was either approved, mandated, or suggested by the Department of Transportation." As y ou will see from my November 1987 letter, the Department did not take any of those actions.

This Department has no authority under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) to approve or endorse any items of motor vehicle equipment or installation procedures therefor. Instead, the Safety Act puts the responsibi lity on manufacturers to certify that their products comply with the applicable requirements (15 U.S.C. 1403), and obliges manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses not to knowingly render inoperative any devices or elemen ts of design in vehicles that were installed in compliance with applicable safety standards (15 U.S.C. 1397(a) (2) (A)).

In keeping with this statutory scheme, this agency did not make a determination in the November 1987 letter or on any other occasion that a dealer following the proposed installation instructions would or would

not render inoperative a vehicle's compliance with the safety standards. The agency makes such determinations only in the context of an enforcement proceeding. Instead, my November 18 letter pointed out the element of design that might be rendered inop erative by installing the armrests, and advised Auto Accessories as the manufacturer to carefully examine its instructions to determine whether or not following them would result in a "render inoperative" violation. It appears from the Auto Accessories letter to dealers that that company believes the installation of its armrest would not result in any violations.

Our advice to dealers is essentially the same as the advice we gave to Auto Accessories. Dealers should examine the instructions to determine whether following them would render inoperative a vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 208 or any other stand ard. You may wish to contact Auto Accessories to learn more about the basis for its apparent belief that the installation of its armrest will not violate any requirements of the Safety Act.

As for the tests and studies you requested, again, because of our statutory scheme, we have not conducted any regarding the armrest or its installation. We would do so only in the context of an enforcement proceeding.

Please let me know if you have any further questions on this subject.

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht88-1.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/18/88

FROM: ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: HOWARD SMOLKIN -- MANAGING DIRECTOR

TITLE: THE MEANING OF PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

TEXT: Attached per your request is a discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the Vehicle Safety Act, for use in connection with the next meeting of the Research Advisory Committee.

Attachment

PRACTICABILITY AND THE VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

This paper provides a general discussion of the meaning of "practicable" under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle Safety Act). The Vehicle Safety Act directs the Secretary of Transportation, or his or her delegate, to issue Feder al motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15 U.S.C. @ 1392(a). (Emphasis added.) See also 15 U.S.C. @ 1391(2). In issuing these standards, the Se cretary is directed to consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescri bed, and the "extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of the Act." 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). (Emphasis added.)

The dictionary defines "practicable" as "capable of being done, effected, or put into practice, with the available means; feasible: a practicable solution." Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabridged edition). Courts construing the term under the Vehicle Safety Act have generally relied on the following statements in the legislative history:

House Report: "In establishing standards the Secretary must conform to the requirement that the standard be practicable. This would require consideration of all relevant factors, including technological ability to achieve the goal of a particular sta ndard as well as consideration of economic factors." H. R. Rep. 1776 at 16.

Senate Report: "The committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill. The committee recognizes . . . that the Secretary will necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate leadtime." S. Rep. 1301, p.6.

The court decisions construing the term "practicable" have established several general principles about its meaning. First, while NHTSA must bear in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Vehicle Safety Act, the agency is to look at costs as well as benefits. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 54-55 (1983), a case reviewing a recission by the agency of the automatic restraint requirements, the Supreme Court concluded that the agency had been correct to look at the costs as well as the benefits of the requirements. NHTSA had determined that the incremental costs of the requirements were no longer reasonable based on its prediction that the safety benefits of the regulation might be minimal. In this instance, the court required a reexamination of the agency's conclusion that the safety benefits might be minimal. The court stated that when the agency examined its findings as to the likely safety benefits, it must also reconsider i ts judgment of the reasonableness of the monetary and other costs associated with the standard, bearing in mind that Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Act.

A second principle is that NHTSA must conduct careful analysis of the economic impacts of safety standards. In H & H Tire Co. v. DOT, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring retreaded tires to meet many of the same per formance requirements as new tires, the court concluded that NHTSA had not adequately investigated the practicability of the standard. The court found that current retread tires could not comply with the requirements and that there was a possibility tha t the industry's best efforts might be insufficient to insure prompt compliance. The court concluded that NHTSA had acted precipitately, adopting a rule which might possibly destroy a well-established industry, without adequate study. The court also in dicated that NHTSA must consider possible economic hardships of both manufacturers and customers. Note: The court agreed with the government that "the fact that a government regulation may cause economic hardship to a party does not make such regulation unreasonable" and stated that the deleterious economic effect on the industry of compliance with the standard at issue might be permissible if retreads unquestionably were major safety hazards and if compliance with the standard clearly enhanced retread s' safety under on-the-road conditions. 471 F.2d at 354.

A third principle is that NHTSA may issue safety standards that are technology-forcing. In Chrysler v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restraints, the court held that NHTSA has authority to issue safety standards which require improvements in existing technology or which require the development of new technology, and is not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already developed.

A fourth principle is that NHTSA must consider the public acceptability of safety standards. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a case reviewing a safety standard requiring vehicles to be equipped with automatic restrain ts, the court held that consideration of public reaction is part of the requirement that standards be practicable. The court stated that "(m)uch as economic analysis must evaluate both supply and demand conditions, motor vehicle safety standards cannot be considered practicable unless we know both that the needed production capability is within reach and that motorists will avail themselves of the safety system." 593 F.2d at 1345.

Finally, the meaning of the term "practicable" appears to differ depending upon whether it is applied to a mandatory or optional provision in a safety standard. In Chrysler v. DOT, 515 F.2d 1053, 1060 (6th Cir. 1975), Chrysler argued that a standard perm itting use of rectangular headlamps, as an alternative to round headlamps, for a specified time period was impracticable because that company could not complete the necessary engineering and retooling in time to produce automobiles equipped with the new headlamps before the option expired. In dicta, the court stated that it had "some doubt that practicability is a significant principle in the context of an optional provision in a safety standard." The court stated that a review of the cases in this are a suggests the practicability requirement was designed primarily to prevent NHTSA from establishing mandatory safety requirements that are economically or technologically infeasible. The court contrasted that situation with the one at bar, in which the use of rectangular headlamps was not required, and Chrysler was not subject to any statutory penalties for failing to comply with this aspect of the standard. The court also stated that even assuming that an optional requirement were required to be prac ticable, it would be difficult to conclude that the rectangular headlamp option was impracticable in any absolute sense, since at least two manufacturers were capable of producing rectangular headlamps.

ID: nht88-1.46

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 02/19/88

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Erika Z. Jones; NHTSA

TO: Stanley Electric Co.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT:

Mr. M. Arisaka Manager, Automotive Lighting Engineering Dept. Stanley Electric Co. Ltd. 2-9-13, Nakameguro, Meguro-ku Tokyo 153 JAPAN

Dear Mr. Arisaka:

This is in reply to your letter of September 23, 1987, with respect to daytime running lamps (DRLs).

With reference to the Canadian proposal on this subject, you have noted that it would allow optically combining the DRL with the parking lamp, using dual intensity bulbs within the same housing and covered by the same lens. (As you may be aware, the Cana dian government recently issued a final rule which adopted the proposal). You have further noted that the maximum candela output of the parking lamp together with the candela of the DRL will be greater than the maximum permitted for the parking lamp. You believe that under this circumstance the parking lamp does not have to conform to the maximum values specified, and have asked for our opinion of this matter.

Under the proposal by the United States, a DRL would have to be a lamp other than a parking lamp (proposed new paragraph S4.6.3(a)), because their brightness is inadequate for use as DRLs. However, the DRL could be incorporated into a multiple function l amp, one of whose functions is to serve as a parking lamp. A lamp with multiple functions must meet all requirements that apply when a specific function is being fulfilled. For example, a lamp that functions both as a parking lamp and a DRL and which is operated in daylight could act as either a DRL or a parking lamp, depending on the intensity of the light emitted, but it would have to meet the photometric requirements for the function being exercised. We cannot really be more specific in answering you r questions, because we are still at the proposal stage of the rulemaking process. The final decision could differ.

Sincerely,

Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel

September 23, 1987

Ms. Erika Z. Jones Chief Counsel Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 900 Seventh Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 U.S.A.

Re. Daytime Running Lamp in the United States

Dear Ms. Jones,

Proposal of Daytime Running Lamp was issued in Canada. In this proposal, Daytime Running Lamp can optically combined with Parking Lamp using same housing and lens with dual intensity bulbs.

We would like to ask you following question on this combined DRL.

-Question-

On this combined DRL with Parking Lamp, DRL and Parking Lamp should be lit simultaneously when switch of Parking Lamp is "ON" position.

In that condition, maximum value of Parking Lamp together with DRL will be greater than the required maximum value of Parking Lamp.

Since, present FMVSS No.108 does not prescribe on DRL, it may be interpreted that the measured maximum value of Parking Lamp can not conform with the required maximum value of FMVSS No.108.

We think that Canadian made passenger car which equips with the combined DRL will go to the United States, in that case the Parking Lamp does not have to conform the required maximum value of FMVSS No.108.

We would like to ask you to give us NHTSA's opinions on this matter.

We appreciate for your quick reply.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley Electric Co., Ltd.

M. Arisaka Manager, Automotive Lighting Engineering Sect.