NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
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ID: aiam3432OpenMr. C. L. Biddle, Supervisor of Claims, General Transportation Department, Firestone Tire Company, 1200 Firestone Parkway, Akron, OH 44317; Mr. C. L. Biddle Supervisor of Claims General Transportation Department Firestone Tire Company 1200 Firestone Parkway Akron OH 44317; Dear Mr. Biddle: This responds to your recent letter to Mr. Kratzke of my staff describing a situation in which a railroad car full of new tires caught on fire. As a result of the damage caused to the tires by the fire, Firestone's quality control staff determined that the tires could no longer be certified as safe for highway use. The railroad company has refused to pay your claim for damage to the tires unless Firestone releases the damaged tires to the railroad company. You stated that the railroad company will either sell the tires through its salvage outlets or use the tires on company vehicles. You ask whether you can rightfully withhold these tires from the railroad company.; If Firestone releases the tires and the railroad company sells th tires or uses them on the public roads, both Firestone and the railroad company would violate an express provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1381 *et seq*.) ('the Safety Act'). Therefore, you can rightfully withhold the tires from the railroad company.; Your letter did not indicate whether the damaged tires were tires fo passenger cars or tires for motor vehicles other than passenger cars. In either case, the tire manufacturer is required to certify that each tire fully complies with certain marking requirements and with specified performance requirements (resistance to bead unseating, strength, endurance, and high speed performance) of Safety Standard No. 109 in the case of passenger car tires (49 CFR S571.109) or of Safety Standard No. 119 for tires other than passenger car tires (49 CFR S571.119). This certification is made by the manufacturer by molding the letters 'DOT' into the sidewall of the tire.; As a result of the damage to this particular shipment of tires, you company has determined that his certification is no longer valid. This determination obligates Firestone to remove the 'DOT' symbol from the sidewall of the tires.; Without the 'DOT' symbol, these tires would clearly not comply with th requirements of either Standard No. 109 or Standard No. 119. Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) provides:; >>>No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, or offer for sale, o introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any ... item of motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard ....<<<; Firestone would violate this prohibition if it were to deliver tires t the railroad company which were not certified as complying with the appropriate safety standard. The railroad company would violate this prohibition if it sold or offered to sell uncertified tires, or if uncertified tires were used by the company on the public roads (introduction in interstate commerce). Section 109 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1398) specifies penalties of up to $1000 for each violation of section 108, and each tire delivered by Firestone or sold or used by the railroad company would constitute a separate violation of section 108. Section 109 specifies that the maximum civil penalty which can be imposed for a series of related violations, which this would be, is $800,000 for each violator.; You indicated that Firestone would not release the damaged tires fo use in any case, because of the potential safety hazard. I hope that this response reinforces that position. Should you need any further information on this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. Please show this letter to the interested railroad company so that it will realize the serious nature of its contemplated actions.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3062OpenMs. Maureen Lindsey, Director of Legal Research, The Institute For Safety Analysis, 6400 Goldsboro Road, Bethesda, Maryland 20034; Ms. Maureen Lindsey Director of Legal Research The Institute For Safety Analysis 6400 Goldsboro Road Bethesda Maryland 20034; Dear Ms. Lindsey: This responds to your letter of July 9, 1979, concerning Federal Moto Vehicle SAfety Standard No. 201, *Occupant Protection in Interior Impacts*.; Your research concerning the history of the standard is correct. Th first notice of proposed rule making on Standard No. 201 (31 F.R. 15212, December 3, 1966) proposed a definition and requirements for the 'unrestrained child impact area.' When the standard was originally issue in final form (32 FR 2408, February 3, 1967), the unrestrained child impact area definition and requirements were deleted. In the same issue of the *Federal Register*, the agency issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking stating that it intended to develop requirements to reduce impact hazards for unrestrained children (32 FR 2417). Although the agency did not subsequently publish any additional notices on Standard No. 201 specifically developed for the unrestrained child, the agency continued work on Standard No. 208, *Occupant Crash Protection*, and developed Standard No. 213, *Child Seating Systems*, both of which provide improved protection for children riding in motor vehicles.; The agency is currently studying the potential benefits of built-i interior padding, child restraint devices and other means of making the vehicle rear seat a safe environment for child transportation. This work may provide the basis for future rulemaking.; You are also correct that there were administrative law hearings hel on Standard No. 201. The record of those hearings, which were held May 22 and 23, 1967, in Detroit, Michigan, and may 24 and 25, 1967, in Washington, D.C., can be found in Docket 1, microfilm roll number 2. Please contact Ms. Hardee (426-2768) of the agency's docket section to make arrangements to view this material.; I hope this information will be of assistance. If you have an additional questions, please let me know.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3598OpenMr. Fukuo Takata, Manager, Certifications Regulations Section, Ichikon Industries, Ltd, 80 Itado, Isehara City, Kanagawa 259-11, JAPAN; Mr. Fukuo Takata Manager Certifications Regulations Section Ichikon Industries Ltd 80 Itado Isehara City Kanagawa 259-11 JAPAN; Dear Mr. Takata: This is in reference to your letter of June 30, 1982, to Mr. Elliott o this agency concerning the effective luminous lens area of a front turn signal lamp under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 108 with respect to three proposed designs.; We assume that you wish to know what is the effective projecte luminous lens area for a front turn signal on vehicles less than 80 inches in overall width. The SAE Standard No. J588e, 'Turn Signal Lamps,' which you quote, imposes no additional requirements for a two compartment front turn signal lamp. Thus, it appears that so long as you meet the minimum of 3.5 square inches for a single compartment lamp, your proposed designs (Case 1 and 2) meet the necessary requirements of FMVSS No. 108. Case 3 would not conform as neither of the two section compartments meets the 3.5 square inch minimum.; Sincerely, Courtney M. Price, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking |
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ID: aiam4748OpenMr. J. A. Schurger Vehicle Improvement Products, Inc. l5l S. Ram Road Antioch, IL 60002-l937; Mr. J. A. Schurger Vehicle Improvement Products Inc. l5l S. Ram Road Antioch IL 60002-l937; "Dear Mr. Schurger: This responds to your request for an interpretatio of Standard No. l0l, Controls and Displays. We apologize for the delay in responding to your letter. You described a proposed design for heavy trucks in which a 'switch package' would be located in the center of the steering wheel, along the center spokes. The switch package would include controls for the horn, turn signals, cruise control, headlights (master lighting switch), marker lamps, hazard warning signal and high beam. You noted that Standard No. l0l requires the identification of certain controls to be 'perceptually upright,' and asked whether identifying symbols which rotate along with the steering wheel would be considered to meet this requirement. As discussed below, it is our opinion that such identification would not be considered to be perceptually upright to the driver. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that its motor vehicles or equipment comply with applicable safety standards. The following represents our opinion based on the facts provided in your letter. Section S5.2.l of Standard No. l0l requires certain vehicle controls to be identified by specified symbols or words and for the identification to be placed on or adjacent to the control. That section also requires that '(t)he identification shall, under the conditions of S6, be visible to the driver and, except as provided in S5.2.l.l and S5.2.l.2, appear to the driver perceptually upright.' The identification of several of the controls that you propose to locate on the steering would be subject to the 'perceptually upright' requirement. Under your proposed design, the identification of controls would rotate along with the steering wheel. The identification would not be perceptually upright to the driver except when the steering wheel is in a centered position. Since rotation of the steering wheel is a necessary and routine part of driving, the identification would often not be perceptually upright to the driver. It is therefore our opinion that identification of controls that rotate with the steering wheel would not be considered perceptually upright to the driver. We note that there is no provision in Standard No. l0l that limits the 'perceptually upright' requirement to conditions where the steering wheel is centered. This interpretation is consistent with past agency practice. In a July l984 notice establishing a requirement to identify the horn control with a specified symbol, NHTSA addressed commenter concerns about how Standard No. l0l's requirement that identification be perceptually upright might apply to horn controls located on the steering wheel. 49 FR 30l9l, 30l94, July 27, l984. The commenters noted that it is impossible for such horn symbols to be perceptually upright at all times. In response to the comments, the agency included a provision that the horn symbol need be perceptually upright only when the vehicle, aligned to the manufacturer's specification, has its wheels positioned for the vehicle to travel straight forward, i.e., when the steering wheel is centered. It would not have been necessary for the agency to establish this special provision for horn symbols if identification of controls located on the steering wheel was considered to be perceptually upright in the absence of such provision. (We note that NHTSA later decided to drop the perceptually upright requirement for the horn symbol. However, that decision does not affect the above analysis.) Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel"; |
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ID: aiam3577OpenMr. Arthur L. Smith, 2401 W. Southern Avenue, B-294, Tempe, AZ 85282; Mr. Arthur L. Smith 2401 W. Southern Avenue B-294 Tempe AZ 85282; Dear Mr. Smith: This is in response to your letter of March 12, 1982. We are sorry fo the delay in our response. In your letter you raised the question of whether devices which tow vehicles without the odometer registering the towed mileage violate the Federal odometer laws.; An odometer is an instrument which measures and records the actua distance a motor vehicle travels while in operation. The odometer is operated from a gear on the vehicle's transmission. Apparently the odometer does not register mileage when a vehicle is being towed with one of the devices described in your letter because these devices disconnect the transmission.; Congress determined that purchasers of motor vehicles rely heavily o the odometer reading as an index of the condition and value of the vehicle and therefore established certain safeguards to ensure that the odometer reading is an accurate reflection of the mileage traveled by the vehicle. Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act ('Act') (15 U.S.C. 1981 *et seq*.), Odometer Disclosure Requirements (49 CFR Part 580). Specifically, the Act prohibits the disconnection, resetting or alteration of a vehicle odometer with the intent to change the number of miles registered on the odometer. 15 U.S.C. 1984. The Act also prohibits the advertisement, sale, use or installation of any device which causes an odometer to register any mileage other than the true mileage driven. 15 U.S.C. 1983.; While the Act does not define 'mileage traveled by a vehicle,' nothin in the Act or the legislative history suggests that Congress intended these words to have a meaning other than their common sense meaning. The common sense usage of 'mileage traveled by a vehicle' in our opinion includes both the mileage traveled when the vehicle is operated by its own power and, (sic) when it is towed. Towing a vehicle exerts wear and tear on critical components other than the vehicle's engine. Indeed, towing so affects the condition of the vehicle, it would have been illogical for Congress to exclude this mileage from the Federal odometer requirements. Therefore for purposes of the Federal odometer laws a vehicle is traveling when it is towed and devices which cause the odometer not to register such mileage are prohibited by the Act.; Because we do not have sufficient information concerning the device which you described in your letter, and the advertisements do not supply all necessary details, we are unable to conclude at this time whether any violation of law has occurred with respect to these particular devices.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4318OpenChing-Hsien Huang, Branch Chief, Structural Analysis Department, Yue Loong Motor Engineering Center, P. O. Box 510, Taoyuan, Taiwan 33099, Republic of China; Ching-Hsien Huang Branch Chief Structural Analysis Department Yue Loong Motor Engineering Center P. O. Box 510 Taoyuan Taiwan 33099 Republic of China; Dear Mr. Huang: Thank you for your letter of May 4, 1987, asking several question about Standard No. 216, *Roof Crush Resistance, and Standard No. 208, *Occupant Crash Protection*. You asked whether Standard No. 216 is still in effect. The answer is yes.; You also asked whether Standard No. 216 can be substituted for th rollover test contained in the 'first, second, or third option of Standard No. 208.' The answer is that compliance with the roof crush resistance requirements of Standard No. 216 cannot be substituted for compliance with the rollover test of Standard No. 208.; I would like to clarify the applicability of the rollover tes requirement of Standard No. 208 for you. The only rollover test contained in Standard No. 208 is found in S4.1.2.1 of the standard. A vehicle is subject to the test only if the vehicle's manufacturer chooses to meet it instead of an alternative requirement. S4.1.2.1(a) provides that a manufacturer has to meet the dynamic occupant protection requirements by automatic means in a frontal/angular crash test. In addition, a manufacturer must meet S4.1.2.1(c). S4.1.2.1(c) provides a manufacturer with two options. A manufacturer can either meet the requirements of S4.1.2.1(c)(1) and provide occupant crash protection by automatic means in a lateral crash test and a rollover crash test or a manufacturer can meet the requirements of S4.1.2.1(c)(2) and provide a manual lap or a manual/shoulder belt at each front designated seating position. If a manufacturer chooses to meet S4.1.2.1(c)(2), the vehicle must comply with S4.1.2.1(a) and provide occupant crash protection by automatic means in frontal/angular test with the manual safety belt *unfastened*. In addition, the vehicle must provide occupant crash protection by automatic means in a frontal/angular test with the manual safety belt *fastened*.; I hope this answers your questions, if you need further informatio please let me know.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam3127OpenMr. G. Frinken, Manager, Automotive Engineering Europe, Uniroyal GmbH, Postfach 410, 5100 Aachen 1, West Germany; Mr. G. Frinken Manager Automotive Engineering Europe Uniroyal GmbH Postfach 410 5100 Aachen 1 West Germany; Dear Mr. Frinken: This is in response to your letter of October 12, 1979, asking whethe the character height of 5/32nds of an inch, stated in the Uniform Tire Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards (49 CFR 575.104, Figure 1), is considered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to specify the only acceptable height for UTQG sidewall molding, or whether the agency interprets this measurement as a minimum value.; The specification of 5/32nds of an inch tire sidewall characters wa intended by NHTSA to establish a minimum requirement to assure readability of the UTQG information presented. The agency has no objection to the use of characters of a height greater than 5/32nds of an inch, so long as all characters used to convey UTQG information are of the same height.; Sincerely, Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5159OpenMr. Jeffery A. Kester Product Development Green Wheels Electric Car Company 181 Elliott St., Unit 605 Beverly, MA 01915; Mr. Jeffery A. Kester Product Development Green Wheels Electric Car Company 181 Elliott St. Unit 605 Beverly MA 01915; Dear Mr. Kester: We have received your letter of March 18, 1993, wit respect to electric vehicle conversions and the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). As we understand it, Green Wheels intends to convert 1975-84 Volkswagen Rabbits to electric power. Because the FMVSS directly apply only to the manufacture of new vehicles you understand that you are 'not bound to comply with the FMVSS and have no reason to petition from exemption from any standards in the FMVSS.' You have concluded that section 108(a)(2)(A) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (l5 U.S.C. 1397(a)(2)(A)) applies in this instance, but are worried by the fact that the conversion operations will render inoperative ''devices or elements of design' on a permanent basis,' as ' t he vehicle will obviously be used during the time such devices or elements of design no longer exist.' You believe that any devices or elements of design rendered inoperative by conversion operations should be disregarded if it will not compromise safety when the vehicle is in operation. For example, because a flammable fuel system no longer exists after conversion to electric power, you should not be regarded as having rendered the system inoperable. On this basis, you have asked for a confirmation of the 'viability' of your interpretation, which you may provide to prospective customers. You have also asked for recommendations for any further action with reference to compliance with section 108(a)(2)(A), information on petitioning for exemption under section 108(a)(2)(B), and information concerning the establishment of standards for used motor vehicles under section 108(b)(1). We are pleased to provide you with our views on this matter. We do not interpret section 108(a)(2)(A) as prohibiting the removal of fuel system components installed in accordance with Standard No. 301 during the conversion to electric propulsion, as long as the converter ensures that its modifications do not 'knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design' required for compliance with any other Federal motor vehicle safety standard. By way of background, it is important to understand the scheme established by the Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) with respect to new and used vehicles. With respect to the issues you have raised, certain statutory provisions are relevant. These are discussed below and quoted in pertinent part: Section 108(a)(1)(A) (l5 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)): 'No person shall manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle . . . on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect . . . unless it is in conformity with such standard and is covered by a certification . . . .' Section 108(b)(1): 'Paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (a) shall not apply to the sale, offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle . . . after the first purchase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale.' Under section 108(b)(1), a 'new' vehicle becomes a 'used' one after its first purchase for purposes other than resale, and certain actions may occur without violation of the Vehicle Safety Act. Please compare section 108(b)(1) with section 108(a)(1)(A). When a vehicle is used, Section 108(b)(1) clearly allows, without penalty, its sale, offer for sale, introduction and delivery for introduction into interstate commerce even if it does not conform to the FMVSS. However, section 108(b)(1) does not include 'manufacture for sale' and 'import' in its used vehicle exclusions. With respect to the latter, the agency does require used imported vehicles to be brought into conformance with the FMVSS. We assume that Congress deemed it impossible to 'manufacture for sale' a vehicle 'after its first purchase for purposes other than resale', and that is the reason why 'manufacture for sale' is not included in the used vehicle exclusions of section 108(b)(1). Section 108(b)(1) (con'd): 'It is the policy of Congress to encourage and strengthen the enforcement of State inspection of used motor vehicles. Therefore to that end the Secretary shall conduct a thorough study and investigation to determine the adequacy of motor vehicle safety standards and motor vehicle inspection requirements and procedures applicable to used motor vehicles . . . . * * * . . . the Secretary . . . shall establish uniform Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to used motor vehicles.' You have asked whether the Secretary has exercised his authority to establish standards for used motor vehicles. The answer is yes, but the standards do not apply to the remanufacture, repair, or conversion of used vehicles, they only establish criteria to be followed by States in their motor vehicle inspection programs. See 49 CFR Part 570 Vehicle in Use Inspection Standards. No standards have been established governing repair or conversion of used vehicles, or 'vehicles in use', the term the agency prefers. Although Congress has not granted the agency authority to establish manufacturing standards for a motor vehicle after its first purchase for purposes other than resale, it did take a limited step intended to ensure that a vehicle remained in compliance with its original FMVSS throughout its life. This step is reflected in section 108(a)(2)(A): Section 108(a)(2)(A): 'No manufacturer, distributor, dealer or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard, unless such manufacturer . . . or motor vehicle repair business reasonably believes that such vehicle . . . will not be used (other than for testing or similar purposes in the course of maintenance or repair) during the time such device or element of design is rendered inoperative.' The principal purpose of this prohibition is to inhibit the removal of safety equipment such as seat belts and head rests that might be initially unpopular with vehicle operators. However, this agency has interpreted the prohibition to apply to any modification of a used motor vehicle that is performed by manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and motor vehicle repair businesses that has the possible effect of creating a noncompliance. However, we have not interpreted Section 108(a)(2)(A) as forbidding modifications that result in the inapplicability of one or more of the FMVSS with which a vehicle originally complied. For instance, under section 108(a)(2)(A) we have allowed the conversions of closed sedans to convertibles, as long as FMVSS requirements applicable to convertibles are met at the end of the conversion process. Similarly, to use your hypothetical, we would not interpret section 108(a)(2)(A) as prohibiting the removal of fuel system equipment installed in accordance with Standard No. 301 in the process of conversion to electric propulsion because this standard would not apply to the propulsion source of a new electric vehicle. However, the converter does remain under the obligation to ensure that its modifications do not create a noncompliance. For example, the additional weight of batteries could render inoperative the ability of the converted vehicle to meet the standards with crash test demonstration procedures. Section 108(a)(2)(B): 'The Secretary may by regulation exempt any person from this paragraph if he determines that such exemption is consistent with motor vehicle safety and the purposes of this Act. The Secretary may prescribe regulations defining the term 'render inoperative.'' Although under section 108(a)(2)(B) the agency may 'by regulation' provide exemptions from section 108(a)(2)(A), we have never developed a procedure by which exemptions may be granted, nor have we adopted a regulation defining 'render inoperative.' No such regulations are under consideration. I hope that this letter is responsive to your request. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam2366OpenMr. W.M. Page, Senior Engineer, Clayton Dewandre Company Limited, P.O. Box 9, Titanic Works, Lincoln LN5 7JL, England; Mr. W.M. Page Senior Engineer Clayton Dewandre Company Limited P.O. Box 9 Titanic Works Lincoln LN5 7JL England; Dear Mr. Page: This responds to Clayton Dewandre Company's May 20, 1976, request fo confirmation that its 'Dual Brake Booster' system is designed to conform to the definition of 'split service brake system' and the requirements of S5.1.2 and S5.1.3 specified in Standard N0. 105-75, *Hydraulic Brake Systems*. in unimpaired braking circuits, the primary circuit which is initially powered by the driver's application of pedal force and subsequently supplemented by pressurized fluid from the pump accumulator system, and the secondary circuit which is powered by pressurized fluid from the pump accumulator system. In the event of a primary circuit failure, a mechanical connection unimpaired by a loss of reservoir fluid continues to modulate the secondary circuit. In event of a secondary circuit failure, the driver's pedal application continues to actuate the primary circuit by muscular effort alone. A single master cylinder reservoir is provided to supply the primary circuit. A single pump reservoir supplies the pump, accumulator, and secondary circuit.; As you are no doubt aware, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicl Safety Act does not authorize a 'type approval' of vehicle design as the basis for certification (15 U.S.C. S 1397(a) (1) (A)). Our comments on the description of your system do not relive the vehicle manufacturer of its responsibility to design a system for each of its products that actually complies with the standard's requirements.; From your description of the system, it would appear to qualify as 'split service brake system' as that term is defined in S4 of the standard. You state that, in the event either of indefinite operation. This conforms to the NHTSA's September 14, 1973, letter to Citroen on the meaning of 'unimpaired operation' of a subsystem.; With regard to partial failure performance, your state that the vehicl can meet the requirements of S5.11.2 (inadvertently designated as S5.1.1 in your letter) using either of two subsystems.; With regard to the requirements of S5.1.3 (for inoperative brake powe assist unit or brake power unit), you indicate that the vehicle is capable of stopping within the specified distances of column IV of Table II 'purely by muscular effort of the driver'. By this we assume you mean that the vehicle conforms to the condition required for testing under S5.1.3.1, *i.e.*, with one power unit inoperative and deleted of all reserve capability. Please note that the NHTSA regards the 'pump and accumulator' energy source to constitute a 'brake power unit' and not a 'brake power assist unit', because the described unit 'provides the energy required to actuate the brakes, either directly or indirectly through the auxiliary device, with the operator action consisting only of modulating the energy applica- tion level.' (S4 definition of 'brake power').; We are assuming that Clayton Dewandre does not object to making publi the designs described in your May 20 letter.The NHTSA will place the materials in the public docket three weeks after the date of this letter unless we hear otherwise from you.; Yours truly, Frank Berndt, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5509OpenEdward Gower, Esq. Chief Counsel Illinois Department of Transportation DOT Administration Building, Room 300 Springfield, IL 62764; Edward Gower Esq. Chief Counsel Illinois Department of Transportation DOT Administration Building Room 300 Springfield IL 62764; Dear Mr. Gower: In response to a request by Larry Wort, Chief of th Bureau of Safety Programs, I have reviewed the provisions of Senate Bill No. 52, now awaiting action in the Illinois General Assembly, to determine whether the provisions relating to school buses would conflict with applicable Federal law. My review leads me to conclude that there is a conflict that could result in Federal preemption in some circumstances. I am specifically concerned about the bill's redefinition of 'school bus.' By way of background information, Chapter 301 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code (Safety Act) authorizes the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and equipment prior to sale to the first retail purchaser. Following the first retail purchase, the use of vehicles becomes a matter of state concern. The Safety Act further provides that a Federal standard preempts any state or local standard applicable to the same aspect of performance that is not identical to the Federal standard. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b) NHTSA defines a 'bus' as a passenger motor vehicle designed to carry more than 10 persons, and further defines a 'school bus' as a bus that is sold for purposes that include carrying students to and from school or related events, except a bus sold for operation as a common carrier in urban transportation. 49 CFR 571.3. Senate Bill No. 52 proposes to amend the definition of 'school bus' in section 1-182 of 625 ILCS by excluding 3. A motor vehicle designed for the transportation of not less than 7 nor more than 16 persons that is operated by or for a public or private primary or secondary school, including any primary or secondary school operated by a religious institution, for the purpose of transporting not more than 15 students to and from interscholastic athletic or other interscholastic or school sponsored activities. There is thus an inconsistency between the definition in 49 CFR 571.3 and the definition in Senate Bill No. 52, since a vehicle with a capacity of 11-16 persons that is sold for school transportation would be a school bus for Federal purposes but not for State purposes. This inconsistency matters at the point of sale of a school bus. The Federal safety standards impose a number of requirements on school buses that do not apply to other buses. See, e.g., 49 CFR 571.222, School bus passenger seating and crash protection. If a dealer were to sell a 11-16 person bus to a school for use in transporting students, the Federal school bus requirements would apply, notwithstanding the State law's exclusion of such a bus from the school bus definition. I want to stress that the Federal law applies to dealers as well as to manufacturers. The obligations of a dealer are set forth at 49 U.S.C.30112(a), which provides that no one may manufacture or sell a new motor vehicle to which a vehicle safety standard applies unless the vehicle complies with the standard. A dealer who sells a bus for school use that does not meet the school bus standards would thus violate the law. The amendment in Senate Bill No. 52 which would add 105 ILCS 5/29-6.3 is not inconsistent with the Safety Act. It has been our position that vehicles that do not comply with applicable Federal school bus safety standards may be borrowed or rented on a one-time or very occasional basis to transport students. Operators should be cautioned, however, that transporting students in other than complying school buses could result in additional liability in the event of an accident. I hope the above information is helpful to you. If you have any further questions or need additional information, you may contact Walter Myers of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel Enclosure cc: Larry Wort Donald J. McNamara; |
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.