NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam1576OpenMr. William E. Linch, President, Linch-Jones, Incorporated, 131 Honeysuckle Lane, Smyrna, GA 30080; Mr. William E. Linch President Linch-Jones Incorporated 131 Honeysuckle Lane Smyrna GA 30080; Dear Mr. Linch: This is in response to your August 9, 1974, telephone request for clarification of a transferor's duties under the disclosure requirements of the Federal odometer law.; The odometer requirements of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cos Savings Act specify that the transferor of a vehicle provide written disclosure to the transferee of the mileage registered on the odometer at the time of the transaction. If the transferor *knows* that the odometer reading is incorrect for reasons other than calibration error, a statement to that effect must also be executed at the time ownership of the vehicle is transferred.; In the situation where the accuracy of the odometer is in question, th transferor is required to state that the mileage indicated on the odometer is incorrect in accordance with the form specified in S 580 of 49 CFR Part 580, *Odometer Disclosure Requirements*, if there is credible evidence indicating the inaccuracy. If the transferor has no firm basis for a conclusion that the odometer reading is incorrect but feels that it may be wrong, he does not violate the Act by indicating that the true mileage may differ from that shown. In so doing, he provides more information than required, and is not guilty of any violation.; A statement that the mileage *may* differ from that indicated on th odometer would only be a violation where positive evidence exists suggesting that the odometer reading is incorrect. In such a situation the transferor must inform the buyer of the inaccuracy in the manner prescribed in the odometer disclosure requirements.; If you are in need of any further information, please let us know. Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Acting Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4774OpenMr. Jack Rademacher Chief Engineer Polar Tank Trailer, Inc. 12810 County Road 17 Holdingford, MN 56340; Mr. Jack Rademacher Chief Engineer Polar Tank Trailer Inc. 12810 County Road 17 Holdingford MN 56340; Dear Mr. Rademacher: This is in reply to your letter of May 8, l990, t Stephen P. Wood of this Office, asking for reconsideration of a recent interpretation of Standard No. 108. We assume you mean our letter of January 9, 1990, to Howard Kossover of Oklahoma City. That interpretation stated that if rear lamps on a semi-trailer were mounted 27 inches forward of the rear edge of the vehicle, they were not mounted 'on the rear', the location specified by Standard No. 108. We also observed that compliance with the 45-degree visibility requirements in that location appeared questionable. You say that it has long been the practice of the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA) and its members that 'if the 45 degree visibility requirement of these lights were met 'on the rear' of the trailer both inboard and outboard, the manufacturer met the intent of the standard.' You inform us that the liquid bulk transport industry is especially affected by this interpretation because of reasons of practicality unique to tank transports. On these vehicles, you state that the rear lamps have been 'mounted as far as 36 inches forward from the rear of the bumper', but that, in this location, they 'still maintain the 45 degree visibility requirements.' You therefore ask for reconsideration of the interpretation if the 45 degree visibility requirements are met. The lamps in your letter (and Mr. Kossover's) are stop, turn signal, and taillamps. Only the taillamps are presence lamps. The stop lamps and turn signal lamps operate independently of the headlamps. That is to say, they are intended for use at all times and not just at night or under other conditions of reduced visibility. They indicate actions taken by the vehicle operator to signal his operational intentions to other drivers and pedestrians. Problems with depth perception of following drivers could result if the lamps are not mounted 'on the rear' as the standard requires. We are willing to interpret 'on the rear' as meaning the trailing edge of the rear fender, which may not extend as far rearward as the bulk tank container, provided the visibility requirements are met, but we conclude that a mounting location for stop and turn signal lamps that is 36 inches forward from the rear of the bumper is not 'on the rear' as the standard requires. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam1126OpenMr. Richard T. Ford, Hayden, Smith, Ford & Hays, 1215 Security Bank Building, Fresno, CA 93721; Mr. Richard T. Ford Hayden Smith Ford & Hays 1215 Security Bank Building Fresno CA 93721; Dear Mr. Ford: This is in reply to your letter of April 30, 1973, requesting ou opinion as to the conformity with 49 CFR Part 577, 'Defect Notification', of a defect notification letter to be mailed by your client, V/M Custom Boat Trailers. The notification fails to conform with Part 577 in the following ways:; >>>1. In the second paragraph, the phrase 'trailer vehicle safety' mus be changed to 'motor vehicle safety'. A trailer is a motor vehicle under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.; 2. The letter is silent as to precautions the owner should take t reduce the chance that the malfunction will occur before the vehicle is repaired (S 577.4(c)(4)). One obvious precaution where vehicle lighting is defective is to refrain from night operation.; 3. The letter is silent as to an evaluation of the risk to traffi safety reasonably related to the defect (S 577.4(d)).; 4. We would consider the last paragraph on page 1 of your letter reading, 'The defect on those trailers . . .does not affect the mechanical operation of said trailer except insofar as the lighting is inefficient as installed according to the U.S. Department of Transportation,' to be a disclaimer and prohibited by section 577.6.; 5. The letter does not specify the manufacturer's estimate of the dat by which his dealers or his other service facilities will be supplied with parts and instructions for correcting the defect (S 577.4(e)(1)(ii)).; 6. We consider the last paragraph of your letter, beginning, 'If th owner chooses . . .' to be optional, and therefore permissible, as you have apparently decided to conform to section 577.4(e)(1), under which the manufacturer offers to repair the defect through his dealers or his other service facilities without charge. We wish to point out, for your information, that this paragraph, together with the other information contained in your letter, would not meet the requirements of section 577.4(e)(3) (under which the manufacturer does not bear the cost of repair) were that the applicable provision.<<<; Sincerely, Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4324OpenMr. Andrew G. Baird, II, Executive Director, North Platte Development Corporation, P. O. Box 968, North Platte, NE 69101; Mr. Andrew G. Baird II Executive Director North Platte Development Corporation P. O. Box 968 North Platte NE 69101; Dear Mr. Baird: This responds to your letter concerning a design for a remote automati starting system for motor vehicles. Enclosed is a copy of a September 15, 1986 letter, addressed to C&A Control System, Inc., which discusses the general issues raised by your letter. Also enclosed is a copy of an information sheet which we prepared for manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.; While remote automatic starting systems can be designed so that they d not conflict with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard, you should be aware that this agency strongly advises that cars should never be left unattended with the engine running. Remote automatic starting systems create that vehicle condition. I am enclosing a copy of a recent press release which cautions motorists that allowing a cold engine to idle for an extended period of time could lead to a fire. The agency has previously warned of the danger of inadvertent movement by unattended cars which are left running.; I urge you to consider these and other safety issues as you evaluat the safety of your device.; Sincerely, Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4631OpenMr. Clifford Anglewicz Vice President Marketing Verne Corporation 50405 Patricia Drive Mount Clemens, MI 48045; Mr. Clifford Anglewicz Vice President Marketing Verne Corporation 50405 Patricia Drive Mount Clemens MI 48045; "Dear Mr. Anglewicz: This is in reply to your letter regarding th Dragoon Armored Security Vehicle (ASV), as amplified by a telephone call to you by Mr. Vinson of this Office. The ASV that your company produces is presently used 'by the U.S. Armed Forces'. You are now considering the possibility of selling the ASV 'to police departments, U.S. Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Customs Service to use as a special purpose rescue and utility vehicle', and have asked 'to know the procedure for getting this vehicle classified as a special purpose vehicle.' As Mr. Vinson explained to you, we have no category of 'special purpose vehicle'. If a vehicle is manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, it is a 'motor vehicle' subject to the jurisdiction of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. This means that it must comply with all Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to its type and be certified as conforming to those standards, and that it is subject to remedial action upon the determination that it does not comply with one of those standards or that it contains a safety related defect. If the vehicle is a motor vehicle that has been manufactured for and sold directly to the armed forces in conformity with contractual specifications, it is not required to conform to the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. If a motor vehicle is one that is designed to carry l0 persons or less which is constructed either on a truck chassis, or with special features for occasional off-road operation, it is classified as a 'multipurpose passenger vehicle'. A motor vehicle designed for carrying more than l0 persons is classified as a 'bus'. This means that the ASVs sold to the armed forces have not been required to conform to the Federal standards. As Mr. Vinson further explained to you, we provided the Border Patrol with a letter of interpretation under which we concluded that its mission was so similar to that of the armed forces that it could be considered a component of it, and that the 'Hummer' vehicle it wished to purchase in fulfilment of that mission need not be manufactured to meet Federal safety standards. I enclose a copy of that letter for your information. The ASV appears similar to the Hummer in configuration. Therefore, on the basis of the facts as presented in your letter, ASV's could be sold to the Border Patrol without the necessity of conformance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. On the other hand, we have not been contacted by the Drug Enforcement Administration or the U.S. Customs Service, nor by any police department. In the absence of any interpretation issued in response to these entities, ASVs sold to them must be manufactured to conform with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Technically, the ll and l2 passenger versions of the ASV would be 'buses', but the overall configuration of the ASV, with its high approach and departure angles, its capability of amphibious operation with special equipment, and its suitability for use on rough terrain support its classification as a 'multipurpose passenger vehicle' for all passenger configurations. Obviously, the ASV is not a conventional motor vehicle subject to easy classification or, possibly, conformity with multipurpose passenger vehicle standards (e.g., we understand it uses a military specification brake fluid rather than DOT-3). Because of the facts that your annual production is around 60 units, and that your sales are not to the general public, you might wish to petition for temporary exemption from one or more of the Federal safety standards. If the petition is granted, you would be able to sell the ASV to entities other than the armed forces without conforming it to the Federal standards. Mr. Vinson has provided you with the citations to the Federal standards and to the exemption procedures, and you may consult him if you have any questions with respect to them (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
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ID: aiam1433OpenMessrs. Nebe and Gartner, Continental Gummi-Werke, Aktiengeselischaft, Postfach 169, 3 Hannover, Germany; Messrs. Nebe and Gartner Continental Gummi-Werke Aktiengeselischaft Postfach 169 3 Hannover Germany; Gentlemen: This is in reply to your letter of January 29, 1974, raising certai questions about the effective date (September 1, 1974) of the Uniform Tire Quality Grading regulation. You pose two hypothetical questions, asking whether tires must be quality graded when they are to be placed on vehicles manufactured or imported after September 1, 1974. In the first situation, the tires are manufactured in July 1974, while the vehicle is manufactured in August 1974 and imported in October 1974. In the second, the tires are manufactured in August 1974, the vehicle is manufactured in September 1974 and imported in November 1974.; The Quality Grading regulation applies to tires rather than vehicles Its effective date of September 1, 1974, means that all passenger-car tires manufactured on or after that date must be graded in accordance with the regulation. There is no requirement, however, that vehicle manufacturers must use tires manufactured after that date. In each hypothetical question you present, the tires are manufactured before September 1, 1974, and therefore are not required to be graded. The date of manufacture or importation of the vehicle is immaterial.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4261OpenCharles F. Tupper, Jr., Executive Vice President, NAIDA, 600 E. Colinas Boulevard, Suite 314, Irving, TX 750039 (sic); Charles F. Tupper Jr. Executive Vice President NAIDA 600 E. Colinas Boulevard Suite 314 Irving TX 750039 (sic); Dear Mr. Tupper: It has come to our attention that a recent Alabama Supreme Cour decision has led some dealers to question the appropriate certification to make when issuing an odometer disclosure statement. We have received an inquiry about this decision from the Oregon Independent Auto Dealers Association. Furthermore, I have enclosed a copy of an article which appeared in the November 1986 issue of *The California Dealer* and which was provided to us by the maryland Independent Auto Dealers Association. Based on the Alabama decision, the article instructs dealers who doubt the accuracy of the odometer reading to certify that the odometer reading does not reflect the actual mileage and should not be relied upon. The purpose of this letter is to advise you of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's position concerning the certifications to be made on odometer disclosure statements.; Congress found that purchasers rely on mileage as an indicator of th value and condition of vehicles and enacted Title IV of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. S1981 *et seq*. Section 1988(a) of the Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe rules requiring any transferor to give a written disclosure (1) of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer or (2) that the actual mileage is unknown, if the odometer reading is know to the transferor to be different from the number of miles the vehicle has actually travelled. To carry out this mandate, Federal regulation 49 C.F.R. Part 580 was promulgated. Furthermore, Section 1988(a) states that no transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under the section or give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by such rule.; A Senate report interprets Section 1988 as placing duty on auto dealer to alert purchasers of irregularities in odometers when, in the exercise of reasonable care, they would have reason to know the odometer reading is inaccurate. S. Rep. No. 92-413, (92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.), 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3971-3972. If a purchaser receives an odometer statement in which his transferor certified that the odometer reading does not reflect the actual mileage and should not be relied upon, that purchaser, when selling the vehicle, should certify the same. However, if a purchaser receives an odometer statement in which his transferor certified that to the best of his knowledge the odometer reading reflects the actual mileage the vehicle has been driven, and he has no reasonable suspicion that the reading is inaccurate, when selling the vehicle, he should not certify that the reading is inaccurate. If transferors certify the reading as inaccurate in the latter situation, it is the position of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that they violate the regulations prescribed under Section 1988, 49 C.F.R. S580.4.; The Federal regulations provide for the inclusion of two sets o certifications on odometer disclosure statements. If the dealers truly wish to insulate themselves from liability when they have a reasonable suspicion that the mileage on the odometer has been altered, they *should* certify that the reading is not accurate, and check the third statement in the first set of certifications. However, none of the three statements in the second set covers a situation where a transferor suspects that an odometer reading is inaccurate, but the odometer was not altered, set back or disconnected in his possession. The Agency allows a transferor to check the first statement and cross out the lines which read, 'and I have no knowledge of anyone else doing so' provided that though crossed out it can still be read. Alternatively, we have no objection to a transferor writing and checking a fourth statement which would read:; >>>I hereby certify that the odometer of said vehicle was not altered set back, or disconnected while in my possession.; << |
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ID: aiam1599OpenMr. K. Nakajima, Director/General Manager, Factory Representative Office, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 1099 Wall Street, West, Lyndhurst, NJ 07071; Mr. K. Nakajima Director/General Manager Factory Representative Office Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. 1099 Wall Street West Lyndhurst NJ 07071; Dear Mr. Nakajima: This is in response to your letter of August 12, 1974, inquiring as t whether or not a vehicle with unitized construction, developed as a truck and converted to carry passengers may be classified as a multipurpose passenger vehicle.; Your description of the vehicle in question indicates that it doe qualify as a multipurpose passenger vehicle. The reference to 'truck chassis' in the MPV definition was intended to include vehicles that were designed and developed as trucks but have been produced in a version for carrying passengers. Since the delivery van referenced in your letter was developed as a truck, its modification to enable the carrying of passengers places it in the MPV category.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1063OpenPaul K. Wilson, Staff Engineer, Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, 2430 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20031; Paul K. Wilson Staff Engineer Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association 2430 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. Washington DC 20031; Dear Mr. Wilson: This is in reply to your letter of March 19, 1973, asking whether towbar dolly must be included in determining the overall length of semitrailers for compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108.; The answer is no. Standard No. 108 is a manufacturing standard, an semitrailers are not manufactured with dollies attached. 49 CFR S390.7, to which you refer, is a definition of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety which regulates the operation of certain motor vehicles, and since trailers often use converter dollies, it is understandable that that agency would deem a trailer with a dolly a 'full trailer.'; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5020OpenRobert S. McLean, Esq. King & Spalding 191 Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30303-1763; Robert S. McLean Esq. King & Spalding 191 Peachtree Street Atlanta GA 30303-1763; "Dear Mr. McLean: This responds to your request for additiona information on the requirements applicable to automatic belts. In response to your March 9, 1992 letters, I sent you a March 30, 1992 letter explaining how our requirements apply to automatic belts. Specifically, I explained that an automatic shoulder belt is not a Type 2a belt, as defined in Standard No. 209, and that automatic belts are not required to include any warnings required for Type 2a belts. I noted that all the requirements applicable to automatic belts are set forth in S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208. On May 19, 1992, you sent a FAX to Steve Kratzke of this office asking for a further clarification of the requirements applicable to automatic belts. You followed the FAX up with a telephone call on May 27, 1992, during which you explained that you were seeking an opinion from me with respect to an interpretation that is being asserted in litigation in which you are involved. The issue involves the crash protection requirements in Standard No. 208. S4.1.2 of Standard No. 208 gives vehicle manufacturers a choice of three options for providing occupant crash protection and sets forth specific belt installation requirements for each option. However, S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 contains an important proviso. This section provides that an automatic seat belt assembly may be used to meet the crash protection requirements of any option set forth in S4.1.2 and in place of any seat belt assembly that would otherwise be required by that option. You explained that another party in your litigation is asserting that an automatic belt, which consists solely of a shoulder belt, could not be used pursuant to S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 to meet the crash protection requirements of any option in S4.1.2 of Standard No. 208. This is so because, according to this argument, an automatic belt which consists solely of a shoulder belt is not a 'seat belt assembly.' The reason it is asserted that a shoulder belt alone cannot be a 'seat belt assembly' is that S4.1(b) of Standard No. 209 requires that 'a seat belt assembly shall provide pelvic restraint.' Since an automatic belt that consists solely of a shoulder belt does not provide pelvic restraint, this argument concludes that automatic belts that do not provide pelvic restraint must not be 'seat belt assemblies' within the meaning of Standard No. 209. If these belts are not seat belt assemblies, they are not eligible to be used pursuant to S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 in place of seat belt assemblies otherwise required by Standard No. 208. This argument is without merit. Contrary to the assertion in this argument, automatic belts which consist solely of a shoulder belt are 'seat belt assemblies' within the meaning of S3 of Standard No. 209. That section defines a 'seat belt assembly' as 'any strap, webbing, or similar device designed to secure a person in a motor vehicle in order to mitigate the results of any accident, including all necessary buckles and other fasteners, and all hardware designed for installing such seat belt assembly in a motor vehicle.' An automatic belt consisting solely of a shoulder belt falls squarely within this definition. Thus, an automatic belt consisting solely of a shoulder belt may be used pursuant to S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 to meet the crash protection requirements of the standard and in place of any seat belt assembly that would otherwise be required. It may be that this argument was offered because the person was not aware that automatic belts are not generally subject to the provisions of Standard No. 209 that apply to manual seat belt assemblies, as explained in my March 30, 1992 letter to you. Thus, S4.1(b) of Standard No. 209 does not apply to automatic belts. In place of Standard No. 209's general requirements for manual seat belt assemblies, S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 sets forth special requirements for automatic belts. No provision of S4.5.3 of Standard No. 208 precludes the use of automatic belts that consist solely of a shoulder belt. I hope this information clarifies any lingering questions you may have had. As before, if you need any further information on the requirements applicable to automatic belts, feel free to contact Steve Kratzke at this address or by telephone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel"; |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.