ID: 77-1.39

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/04/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Trailer Manufacturers Association

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of December 20, 1976 asking for a clarification of the statement in my letter to you dated December 3, 1976, that "the light emitted by one bulb must not be perceived as performing the function of the other in addition to its design function."

It is evident from your letter and others that our previous interpretations of the term "optical combination" have been found to be ambiguous and lacking in the objective criteria that a Federal motor vehicle safety standard must provide. We have reviewed the matter, and now wish to modify our previous interpretation. In our view a lamp is "optically combined" when the same light source (i.e. bulb) and the same lens area fulfill two or more functions (e.g. taillamp and stop lamp, clearance lamp and turn signal lamp). A dual filament bulb would be regarded as the "same light source". In determining conformance, the photometric requirements for clearance and taillamp functions, where two bulbs are located in a single compartment, must be met with only the bulb energized that is designed to perform the specific function. But the 15 candlepower maximum under Standard No. 108, however, would be determined with both the taillamp and clearance lamp bulb energized. Further, the lamp must be located to meet requirements for both clearance and taillamps. Our re-interpretation means that the issue of light spill-over form one area of the lamp to another is irrelevant to conformance.

SINCERELY,

Trailer manufacturers association

December 20, 1976

Mr. Frank A. Berndt U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Further to my letter of October 29th, and yours of December 3, 1976 (N 40 - 30), the 47 Series Tite Lite contains a No. 57 2 CP bulb serving the clearance and sidemarker lamp functions and a No. 1157 3/32cp bulb serving the remaining functions.

Our question concerning this light was limited to whether the clearance lamp function is considered "optically combined."

Your December 3rd letter indicates that "the light emitted by one bulb must not be perceived as performing the function of the other in addition to its design function." We don't understand the meaning of this statement. In the 47 Series Tite-Lite, the No. 57 bulb provides the clearance lamp design function, yet the No. 1157 bulb which is always lit simultaneously certainly augments the light emitted by the clearance lamp, and will light the clearance lamp lens an appreciable amount if the design bulb was burned out. That would seem a safety feature.

An early response will be appreciated.

Director of Engineering

Donald I. Reed

ID: 77-1.4

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 01/18/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Volvo of America Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

ID: 77-1.40

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/04/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Dry Launch

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of December 27, 1976, asking several questions about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. You referenced my letter of October 7, 1976 to Wesbar Corporation, and my views about the prohibition against the optical combination of lamps (S4.4.1).

It is evident from your letter and others that our previous interpretations of the term "optical combination" have been found to be ambiguous and lacking in the objective criteria that a Federal Motor vehicle safety standard must provide. We have reviewed the matter, and now wish to modify our previous interpretation. In our view a lamp is "optically combined" when the same light source (i.e. bulb) and the same lens area fulfill two or more functions (e.g. taillamp and stop lamp, clearance lamp and turn signal lamp). A dual filament bulb would be regarded as the "same light source". In determining conformance, the photometric requirements for clearance and taillamp functions, where two bulbs are located in a single compartment, must be met with only the bulb energized that is designed to perform the specific function. But the 15 candlepower maximum under Standard No. 108, however, would be determined with both the taillamp and clearance lamp bulb energized. Further, the lamp must be located to meet requirements for both clearance and taillamps. Our re-interpretation means that the issue of light spill-over from one area of the lamp to another is irrelevant to conformance.

You have also asked whether the November 1975 amendments (S4.3.1.1.1) "permit clearance lights that are designed for OEM application only be allowed to have lower or no photometrics in this area but still be considered a combination clearance and sidemarker lamp" as the lamp otherwise complies with Standard No. 108.

The amendment in question was intended to cover clearance lamps only. If a lamp is intended as a combination clearance and side marker lamp and does not meet the requirements for a clearance lamp because of the exemption provided by S4.3.1.1.1, it must nevertheless meet the requirements for side marker lamps. If it doesn't, a separate conforming side marker lamp must be provided.

Yours Truly,

DRY LAUNCH

December 27, 1976

Frank A. Berndt Acting Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration In a recent discussion with an Engineer at the California Highway Petrol's Certification Office in Sacramento, we discussed combining of lighting functions. He had a copy of a letter from you to Mr. B. A. Weber of Wesber Corporation dated October 7, 1976. As a result of reading this, the following two questions come to mind - the third question I have been intending to write you about.

1. Question and Answer to No. 2 was the following:

"Can a clearance lamp and tail lamp be combined in a single compartment with no opaque barrier wall existing between the clearance lamp bulb and the tail lamp bulb?

The answer is no because the same luminous area of the lens would be lighted when both lamps are in use, and the lamps would be "combined optically."

I ask if no barrier existed between the two functions and both photometric tests simultaneously, (that is, neither were over maximums or under minimums) and both passed their tests when the other one was extinquished (that is, not over maximums or not under minimums), why must the opaque wall exist at all? In view of public safety, it would appear to enhance it as well as save money and weight by omitting the opaque wall.

2. If an opaque wall must exist between clearance light and tail light, there is bound to be a certain amount of "spill over" of one compartment's light into the next. In this case what limit of "spill over" might exist realistically?

3. Recently, an amendment to Federal 108 allowed the covering of the 45 degrees sector of a clearance light that was inboard (S4.3.1.1.1). Does this permit clearance lights that are designed for OEM application only be allowed to have lower or no photometrics in this area but still be considered a combination clearance and sidemarker lamp as long as all other rules of Federal 108 are met and they are properly mounted?

I would appreciate a prompt reply as your answers affect two decisions for new lights that we are working on.

Dennis G. Moore

ID: 77-1.41

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/04/77

FROM: FRANK A. BERNDT -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: FRANK W. ALLEN -- ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, General Motors Corp.

TITLE: N40-30[TWH]

TEXT: Dear Mr Allen:

General Motors Corporation advised the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in a March 16, 1976, letter that it disagrees with the agency's construction of the phrase "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance" as it is found in @ 102(2) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. @ 1391 (2)). The construction appeared in the preamble to an amendment of Standard No. 105-75, Hydraulic Brake Systems, (41 FR 2392, January 16, 1976) and stated:

"Minimum" performance standards do not equate with "minimal" performance standards, as implied by General Motors and Wagner. The word "minimum" in the statutory definition of motor vehicle safety standards (15 U.S.C. 1391(2)), does not refer to the substantive content of the standards but rather to their legal status -- that the products covered must not fall short of them.

Your letter stated that GM disagrees and believes that the word "minimum" in the definition of "motor vehicle safety standards" refers solely to the substantive content of the safety standards and not to their legal effect.

As the term "minimum" concerns this discussion, it is found in two places in the Act. "Motor vehicle safety standards" are defined in @ 102(2) to mean (in relevant part) "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance." Section 103(i)(1) (A) directs the proposal of school bus standards that "include minimum standards" for enumerated aspects of performance. While the adjective "minimum" has both of the meanings that our constructions would give it, it cannot, in the agency's opinion, be used in the sense of "least possible" or "minimal," given the context of the Act's provisions and their legislative history.

2

Your argument that the "minimum" performance standards contemplated by the Act should be the "least possible" levels of performance that accomplish a stated safety goal is not logically supportable because of the nature of the stated goal. That goal, meeting the need for motor vehicle safety, is not unitary or otherwise bounded in such a way that certain actions (or a level of action) can accomplish the goal. Rather, "meeting the need" is a goal that admits of a virtually infinite number of actions that meet the need in part but don't accomplish the need in its entirety. Thus, in the agency's view, no "minimum" standard is conceptually able to constitute the "least possible" requirement or level of performance that carries out the purposes of the Act.

Beyond this logical difficulty, it is our opinion that various aspects of the Act and its legislative history make clear that "minimum standards" were conceived of as legal thresholds that a manufacturer would be required to meet or exceed. This view also conforms to the general approach to consumer safety regulation utilized in the United States.

The hearings on motor vehicle and tire safety that preceded enactment of the Safety Act demonstrate that witnesses and legislators generally viewed "minimum standards for performance" as thresholds of performance to be met or exceeded by the manufacturers. Senator Nelson and Federal Trade Commission Chaiman Paul Rand Dixon discussed the "proper interpretation of minimum safety" contemplated for tires and appeared to that no absoulute safety level could be required for each safety need but that a threshold should be established, permitting competition in premium tires for greater levels of safety (Hearings on S. 1643 Before the Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Ser. 89-37, at 27, 28 (1965)) (hereinafter referred to as Hearing 1643).

On page 31 of Hearing 1643, the National Bureau of Standards representative discussed "certain minimum specifications which are substantially more stringent than, for example, [industry] specifications for tires." In this context, "minimal" or "least possible" cannot logically be substituted for "minimum" as your construction would require. The General Services Administration (from which many NHTSA initial standards derive) used the term "minimum" in the sense of "least allowable" in describing its requirements for tires with a "minimum tread life" (page 51 of Hearing 1643). These examples are not intended to imply that no other construction can be put on other references to "minimum" in the hearings. The majority of references, however, support the agency's construction.

3

In other hearings, Senator Magnuson discussed two-stage implementation of "interim minimum safety standards" that must be upgraded within two years (Hearings on S. 3005 Before the Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., ser 89-49, at 1, 2. (1965) (hereinafter referred to as Hearing 3005)). It is clear that use of the term "minimum standards" for the second series of requirements contemplated a level of requirement greater than "minimal" or "least possible". Society of Automotive Engineers standards, in contrast, were described by the Department of Commerce as "minimal in nature" (Hearing 3005, at 64).

The Secretary of Commerce, then contemplated as the person who would administer the Act, expressed the view that the vehicle "meets or exceeds the established safety performance standards." (Hearing 3005, at 67). The Secretary, in discussing economic practicability, noted the definition of standards as "minimum standards" and stated "I would think that it would be impracticable for the Secretary to determine upon a minimum standard that would up the price of the total automobile to such an amount that most Americans wouldn't be able to afford to buy it". This consideration of a stringent and expensive "minimum standard" can only mean that more than minimal changes were considered possible.

The Automobile Manufacturers Association (the AMA, and now the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association) accepted the view that improvement in safety performance evolves continually, with the implication that minimal standards were not contemplated. For example, the Chairman of the AMA's safety administrative committee testified: "While the safety standards of American automobiles have improved significantly over the years, the present traffic accident problem requires that the pace of achievement be further accelerated." (Hearing 3005, at 384). This AMA representative noted that "The aim of title I [of the Act] is to get safety performance standards that guarantee an optimum safety in the vehicles . . . ." (Hearing 3005, at 411).

The Senate and House Reports confirm the agency's view that "minimum" standards refer to "least allowable" performance levels. In the Senate Report, the statement is made that, while American cars were among the world's safest and demonstrated marked improvement over earlier models, further improvement would be needed (S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess., at 2-5 (1966). Your construction of the term "minimum standard" as the "least possible" level of safety performance that meets a safety

need is not consistent with the Senate finding. On page 5 of the House Report is a description of the two-stage statutory provision for the imposition of "interim" standards followed by "new and revised" standards as "safety research and development mature." This statement is followed by the building code analogy cited in your letter:

. . . . Such standards will be analogous to a building code which specifies the minimum load-carrying characteristics of the structural members of a building wall, but leaves the building free to choose his own materials and design.

Our conclusion is that the analogy is directed to the concept of minimum standards as a "threshold" specifying a level of performance to be met or exceeded. It is apparent from the quoted material that the minimum "thresholds" of performance were considered as a means to avoid stifling design.

The House report also emphasises the concept of initial standards that would be followed by "new and revised" standards at a later date (H.R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong, 2nd Sess., at 19 (1966)). Finally, of course, @ 103 (h) of the Act mandates issuance of interim standards to be followed by upgraded standards.

It is also meaningful that the criteria for a "minimum standard" set forth in @ 103 (a) do not include the concept of their being the "minimal" or "least possible" level that meets a safety need. Sections 103(d) and 103(f) dealing with Federal preemption of State and other regulations both discuss a "higher standard of performance" that implies the "threshold" or "least possible" meaning for minimum standards. A similar construction can be put on the grounds for statutory exemption in @ 123 of the Act that refer to a higher "overall level of safety performance" as grounds for exemption.

While it is arguable that a "minimal" standard can also convey logically the idea of a "threshold" that can be exceeded, the agency finds it difficult to accept that the word "minimum" was intended by Congress to carry both meanings simultaneously. If it is assumed that "minimum" only carries the concept of "least possible", one would then have to accept that the standards are stated as exact "minimal" values. While this line of reasoning is possible, its logical conclusion is that a vehicles only "complies" in the sense of @ 108(a)(1)(A) if it conform exactly to the performance values stated, and that it

5 neither falls short of nor exceeds them. This construction runs counter to the general statutory opinions and interpretations rendered by the NHTSA and accepted by the manufacturers since the Act went into effect. Moreover, making a certification (as required by @ 114 of the Act) that each vehicle complies exactly with the stated requirements would be a physical impossibility, given material, assembly, test condition, and instrumentation variations.

The NHTSA concludes, therefore, that a reasonable construction of the various provisions of the Act does not support the construction put forward by General Motors in your March 16, 1976, letter.

Sincerely,

ID: 77-1.42

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/08/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank A. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Trean Mfg. Corp.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 4, 1977, question whether Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, applies to materials supplied to the aftermarket for use in vans.

Standard No. 302 does not directly apply to aftermarket materials or components. As a vehicle standard it applies only to those original components or materials of new vehicles specified in paragraph S4.1 of the standard and installed in a vehicle prior to its first sale for purposes other than resale (15 U.S.C. @ 1397(b)(1)). Therefore, materials that you supply to the final vehicle purchaser are not subject to the requirements of the standard.

I would also note that, with regard to the installation of interior materials in motor vehicles after the first sale for purposes other than resale, no manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business may knowingly render inoperative a device or element of design (such as flame retardant materials) installed in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard (15 U.S.C. @ 1397(a) (2) (A)). Therefore, although the materials you produce may not always be required to meet the requirements of the standard when sold in the aftermarket, there may be situations in which the materials could not be legally installed by a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business unless they were in compliance with the standard.

SINCERELY,

Treon Mfg. Corp.

FEBRUARY 4TH, 1977

CHIEF COUNSEL FRANK BERNDT

AS PER MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. BOB WILLIAMS OF NHTSA, I AM WRITING TO YOU FOR LEGAL INTERPRETATION.

MY COMPANY MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIES VAN INTERIOR SOFT PARTS TO THE AFTER MARKET. OUR DISTRIBUTION IS EITHER DIRECT TO CONSUMER OR THROUGH WAREHOUSE DISTRIBUTORS, WHO IN TURN SERVE THE VAN OWNER.

WOULD YOU PLEASE GIVE US THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS GOVERNING THE USE OF FORMULA 302 TREATMENT IN FABRICS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF THESE PRODUCTS.

THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE FOR ANY COURTESIES EXTENDED.

ARTHUR WOLINSKY PRESIDENT

ID: 77-1.43

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/09/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Blue Bird Body Company

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 8, 1977, letter asking whether a New York state requirement mandating the installation of both side emergency doors and rear emergency doors in school buses would mean that both emergency doors would be required to comply with the school bus exit specifications in Standard No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release.

The NHTSA has determined previously that only those exits required by S5.2.3 must meet the requirements specified for school bus emergency exits in Standard No. 217. Paragraph S5.2.3 requires either a rear emergency door or a side emergency door and a rear push out window. The side emergency door to which you refer is installed in addition to a rear emergency door. The presence of the rear emergency door, alone, satisfies the requirements of S5.2.3. Therefore, a side emergency door is not required by the standard and need not meet the specifications for school bus emergency exits. Emergency exits installed in school buses beyond those required in S5.2.3 must comply with regulations applicable to emergency exits in buses other than school buses. These requirements are also detailed in Standard No. 217.

SINCERELY,

BLUE BIRD BODY COMPANY

February 8, 1977

Frank Berndt Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

SUBJECT: FMVSS 217

The latest New York state specifications require emergency doors as follow: Capacity Rear Emerg. LH Emerg. Door RH Emerg. Door Door Rear of Center Rear of Center 17-30 X 31-48 X X 49-66 X X 67 & up X X X

At a recent meeting of the New York State Bus Body Association we understand that it was stated: "The rear emergency door will be described in the future as a primary emergency exit and the side emergency door defined as a secondary exit. The only requirement for the secondary emergency door will be that the ellipsoid defined in Federal Specifications will pass through the side emergency door without obstruction."

Is this statement correct regarding a side emergency door when it is in addition to a rear emergency door (FMVSS 217 - S5.4.2.1(b))? This would allow the seat back in front of the side emergency door to extend into the door opening in this case.

Thanks for your help in this matter.

W. G. Milby Manager, Engineering Services

ID: 77-1.44

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/10/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; E. T. Driver; NHTSA

TO: Stanley Electric Co., Ltd.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in reply to your letter of February 14, 1977, concerning the symbol "DOT" as a certification of compliance to FMVSS No. 108.

The symbol "DOT" is permitted by the Standard to be placed on the item of equipment in lieu of the certification requirements of Section 114 of the "National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966," which states, in part ". . . In the case of an item of motor vehicle equipment such certification may be in the form of a label or tag on such item or on the outside of a container in which such item is delivered . . ."

"DOT" on the individual container does not meet the certification requirements. The label or tag must state that the item "conforms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards."

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

STANLEY ELECTRONIC CO. LTD.

February 14, 1977

E. T. Driver -- Director, Office of Crash Avoidance Motor, Vehicle Programs,

U. S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Driver,

Our lighting equipment to which F.M.V.S.S. 108 is applicable are now being directly labeled with symbol "DOT" as a certification of compliance to that standard.

We are now considering to label this symbol "DOT" on an individual container in which each item of equipment is packaged, instead of labelling it on the item itself.

Please let us have your comment on whether the labelling with symbol "DOT" container is acceptable or not.

Thanking you in advance for your cooperation,

Yours faithfully, H. Miyazawa -- Director, Automotive Lighting, Engineering Dept.

ID: 77-1.45

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/16/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Sheller Globe Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 8, 1977, question whether the use of a front-row two-passenger bench seat with a three-passenger seat back requires a forward restraining barrier for two or three designated seating positions according to the requirements of Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection.

The NHTSA answered this question on February 22, 1977, in response to a request for an interpretation from Blue Bird Body Company. I am enclosing a copy of that interpretation for your information. You will note that Blue Bird accomplished the modification of the front-row seat by the installation of a two-passenger bench seat. As the interpretation indicates, the NHTSA requires a restraining barrier only in front of designated seating positions.

You also ask what procedure is required to obtain approval from the NHTSA for a particular front-row seat design. Although the agency does not give formal "approval" of designs, it is willing to give an opinion as to whether your design appears to satisfy the requirements of the standard. We require that you submit full detail (including pictures if possible) of any proposed design. In particular, we would like to know how you intend to render the excess 13 inches of frame permanently inoperative as a seating position. We would also be interested to know why you cannot install a two-passenger bench seat to obviate the problem of excess seat frame.

SINCERELY,

SHELLER-GLOBE CORPORATION Vehicle Planning and Development Center

February 8, 1977

Frank R. Berndt Office of Chief Counsel NHTSA

REF: FMVSS 222

Sheller-Globe Corporation is requesting an interpretation of S.5.2.2 barrier position and rear surface area of FMVSS 222 - School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection.

Some states have for many years required a 24 inch clearance between the driver's stanchion and stepwell stanchion and are concerned about the 12 inch aisle between the barriers closing this area at the stepwell and entrance door.

Our question relates to the possibility of supplying front right-hand and/or left-hand seat with a 39 inch seat back and using a two passenger or 26 inch wide seat, cushion with a barrier width also of 26 inch width.

The 39 inch seat is used as an example with the understanding the same question also refers to other size seats such as 45, 36, 34, etc.

If this type seat and barrier will comply with your requirement and a method is devised to make the remaining 13 inches of the seat frame as to render it unusable as a seating area, what procedure is required to obtain approval from NHTSA that the particular design is determined to be a none seating position.

Your prompt attention is requested due to April 1, 1977, effective date and many questions from states reviewing their standards.

R. M. Premo - Director Vehicle Safety Activities

ID: 77-1.46

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/17/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Paulson and Humphrey

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 3, 1977, letter asking whether the intersection of a plywood floor panel and the floor channel structure constitutes a "body panel joint" subject to the requirements of Standard No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength.

The terms which establish the applicability of the requirements of the standard to a particular section of a school bus body are defined in S4 of the standard. Read together, they establish the following test. If the edge of a surface component (body panel) that encloses the bus' occupant space comes into contact or close proximity with any other body component, the requirements of S5 apply, unless the area in question is designed for ventilation or another functional purpose or is a door, window, or maintenance access panel. Applying this test to the joint you describe, it appears that the joint must comply with the requirements of the standard, because it is the connection of a body component (floor channel structure) with a body panel that encloses occupant space (plywood floor panel).

In your letter, you argue that the standard is not directed at these types of joints and that in fact the NHTSA stated that not all joints would be regulated by this standard. While it is true that not all joints are regulated by the standard, all joints between the edge of a body panel and a body component are regulated unless expressly excepted from coverage by the language of the standard itself. Since the joint you describe connects a body panel to a body component, it is exactly the type of joint for which coverage was intended.

Finally, you argue that all joints located below the floor are not covered by the standard. This is correct. However, the NHTSA has required floor panels regardless of composition to comply with the requirements of the standard, since these panels form the floor and do not fall below it.

SINCERELY,

PAULSON AND HUMPHREYS

February 3, 1977

Frank Berndt, Esquire Acting Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

This is a request for interpretation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength, submitted on behalf of the Gillig Corporation of Hayward, California.

We have examined the standard, as published January 27, 1976 and the NHTSA interpretive opinions to Blue Bird Body Company of April 14 and April 26, 1976 (N40-30). The conclusions which we express are based substantially on the foregoing. It will be appreciated if you will inform us as rapidly as may be feasible whether you agree with these conclusions or whether another interpretation is appropriate.

Enclosed are diagrams illustrating a possible form of construction of the floor elements of a school bus design (View #1 and View #2). In both diagrams you will note that the floor structure is formed by use of laminated plywood abutting, on either side, a steel channel structure. Over this floor structure is added a rubberized floor covering. In View #1 the mechanism used to attach the plywood to the steel channel structure is exhibited as one of several screws. In View #2, an adhesive is added between the bottom of the particular plywood panel and the abutting flange of the steel channel structure.

Gillig believes that either of the forms of floor structure described will provide adequate structural integrity for foreseeable crash conditions. Gillig wishes, however, to be sure whether the requirements of the standard apply to this structure.

The question which arises is whether, in the form of floor diagrammed, either the edge of the plywood panel abutting the steel channel (shown in the diagrams as "Joint A") or the bottom of the plywood panel as it rests on the flange of the steel channel (shown in the diagrams as "Joint B") constitute "body panel joints" as defined in FMVSS No. 221, paragraph S4. In other words, is the standard applicable to either of such "joints"?

It is our conclusion that neither of the joints described is a "body panel joint" within the purview of FMVSS No. 221. We base this conclusion on several things:

First, the definition of "Body component", in paragraph S4, imports that a component to be a "body component" must be of a "single piece" of either homogenous material or a "single piece" of composite material such as plywood. The form of structure exhibited in the diagrams would not seem to constitute a "body component" and thus would not be subject to joint strength requirements at any point and particularly at "Joint A" or "Joint B".

Second, the forces which might be exerted in a vehicle crash and to which the standard is directed would not seem adversely to affect joints like "A" and "B". Further, attempting to achieve the type of increased joint strength to which the standard is directed, i.e. through the addition of more rivets or other fasteners, would probably be impracticable, if not impossible, in the type of joints illustrated in the diagrams. The standard obviously is directed toward achieving essentially a strengthening of those joints between side panels and between side panels and certain other body components, such as the roof or rear wall. The Preamble to the proposed rule, as published March 13, 1975 (40 FR 50, page 11738), substantiates this conclusion in that it states that regulation of all joints has been tentatively determined to be impractical.

Finally, an interpretation is stated in the third paragraph at page 2 of the letter to Blue Bird of April 26, 1976 that components located entirely below the level of the floor line are not subject to the standard; but that where a portion lies above the floor line that portion is subject to the requirements of the standard.

Your early reply will be appreciated since the standard becomes effective on April 1, 1977.

Edmund C. Burnett

cc: J. M. DABROWSKI -- DIR. OF ENGINEERING; GILLIG

View #1

(Graphics omitted)

View #2

FLOOR COVERING

ADHESIVE

(Graphics omitted)

ID: 77-1.47

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 03/17/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank A. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Lucas Industries North America, Inc.

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your February 4, 1977, question whether Safety Standard No. 116, Motor Vehicle Brake Fluids, permits DOT 3 and DOT 4 brake fluids to be colored "fluorescent yellow."

The answer to your question is yes. Paragraph S5.1.14 of Standard No. 116 specifies that DOT 3 and DOT 4 fluids manufactured on or after September 1, 1978, shall be "colorless to amber." The agency interprets this color range to include any "yellow," whether or not fluorescent. Although not required, we consider fluorescence to be an added safety factor since it would facilitate the detection of leaks in the braking system.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

Office of the Chief Counsel -- National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Dear Sir

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 116 - Brake Fluids

Girling Limited manufactures motor vehicle brakes in the United Kingdom and also markets brake fluid. Girling Limited, like ourselves, is a subsidiary of Lucas Industries Limited of England. Girling products enter this country as original equipment on imported vehicles and, also, we import and market their products.

We wish to know whether "fluorescent yellow" is an acceptable color for DOT 3 and DOT 4 motor vehicle brake fluids. The definition of clear-to-amber does not make this apparent.

Yours truly

LUCAS INDUSTRIES NORTH AMERICA INC;

A J Burgess -- Vice President (Technical)

cc: F Redler, NHTSA