NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
| Interpretations | Date |
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ID: aiam4671OpenMr. Dennis T. Johnston Senior Executive Engineer Product Engineering and Regulatory Affairs Sterling Motor Cars 8953 N.W. 23rd Street Miami, Florida 33172; Mr. Dennis T. Johnston Senior Executive Engineer Product Engineering and Regulatory Affairs Sterling Motor Cars 8953 N.W. 23rd Street Miami Florida 33172; "Dear Mr. Johnston: This responds to your letter reporting a change i the locking system to be installed on the MY 1991 British Sterling car line. Although your letter does not explicitly request the agency determine that the change is of a de minimis nature and that therefore the Sterling vehicles containing the change would be fully covered by the previously granted exemption for Sterling vehicles, we are treating the letter as making such a request. The alternative to making such a request is to submit a modification petition under 49 CFR 543.9(b) and (c)(2). As you are aware, the Sterling car line was granted an exemption, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 543, from antitheft marking because Austin Rover showed that the antitheft device to be used in lieu of marking on the car line was likely to be as effective as parts marking. This exemption was issued on July 16, 1986, and appeared in the Federal Register on July 22, 1986 (51 FR 26332). In your letter, you stated that beginning with the start of MY 1991, Sterling Motor Cars (Sterling) plans an improvement in the antitheft device that is standard equipment on the Sterling vehicle. The change involves the consequence of opening of the trunk when the system is armed. Currently, the system, once armed, activates when the trunk is opened, even if it is opened with the key. In order to avoid this, the antitheft device must first be disarmed before the trunk is opened. It is our understanding that Sterling plans to change the system by allowing the system to be disarmed by opening the trunk with a key and rearmed by closing the trunk lid. However, if the trunk were to be forced open without a key, the alarm would still be activated. After reviewing the planned change to the antitheft device on which the exemption was based, the agency concludes that the change is de minimis. While the change means that opening the trunk with a key will no longer activate the alarm, the agency does not believe that activating the alarm under those circumstances contributes to theft prevention. The agency concludes that the antitheft device, as modified, will continue to provide the same aspects of performance provided by the original device and relies on essentially the same componentry to provide that performance. Therefore, it is not necessary for Sterling to submit a petition to modify the exemption pursuant to 543.9(b) and (c)(2). If Sterling does not implement the new antitheft device as described in your letter, or delays implementation until after MY 1991, we request that Sterling notify the agency of such decisions. Sincerely, Barry Felrice Associate Administrator for Rulemaking"; |
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ID: aiam1189OpenMr. Ken J. Brown, Director of Engineering, Wayne Corporation, Wayne Transportation Division, P.O. Box 908, Industries Road, Richmond, IN 47374; Mr. Ken J. Brown Director of Engineering Wayne Corporation Wayne Transportation Division P.O. Box 908 Industries Road Richmond IN 47374; Dear Mr. Brown: This is in reply to your letter of June 21, 1973, requestin clarification of provisions of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217 dealing with the identification of emergency exits (S5.1.1). You ask whether this paragraph requires in the case of a 66-passenger school bus having a rear emergency exit which is not located in an occupant space, 66 separate labels, assumedly one for each designated seating position. You ask clarification as well for the identification requirements for emergency exits in a 44-passenger bus with one emergency exit in the rear, three push-out windows on one side of the bus, and two on the other, and with each of the five windows contained wholly in one occupant space. You appear to construe S5.5.1 to require a label for the occupant space of each designated seating position in the bus where a release mechanism is not present.; Your interpretation of the standard is not correct, and th requirements do not call for the extensive labeling you suggest. Paragraph S5.5.1 (second sentence) calls only for the placement of a label in occupant space of an *adjacent seat*, when that occupant space does not contain a release mechanism. Adjacent seats are defined in paragraph S4. of the standard as only those designated seating positions within a specified distance from an emergency exit. Thus, a label is required only when the occupant space of a passenger seat does not contain an emergency exit release mechanism and that seat is an adjacent seat as defined in the standard.; In the case of the school bus you describe, there do not appear to b any adjacent seats, and accordingly no emergency exit identification labeling is required in any occupant space. The only labeling required by S5.5.1 would be that required to appear at the exit itself. The same result would appear to be true with respect to the side push-out windows of the 44-passenger bus you describe if the release mechanism for each push-out window is within the occupant space of the adjacent seat. As you did not indicate the configuration of the seating positions at the rear of this bus we cannot provide you an opinion on the identification requirements at that location.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam1473OpenMr. Ralph N. Lewis, Perkasie Vulkanising Co., Inc., 1419 Route 309, Sellersville, Pennsylvania 18960; Mr. Ralph N. Lewis Perkasie Vulkanising Co. Inc. 1419 Route 309 Sellersville Pennsylvania 18960; Dear Mr. Lewis: This is in reply to your letter of March 25, 1974, asking whether consistently with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 117, maximum permissible load may be labeled in two lines, viz.: MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE LOAD XXXXXXXX LBS.; You ask further whether there is a maximum height requirement for th lettering used in the label.; Standard No. 117 does not specify labeling format, and the two-lin format you submit conforms to the standard. Paragraphs S6.3.1 and S6.3.2 of Standard No. 117 require all safety labeling, both permanent and affixed, to be at least 0.078 inches in height. No other requirements regarding labeling size are specified.; Sincerely, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam4221OpenHerbert Epstein, Esquire, Senior Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Ford Motor Company, The American Road, Dearborn, MI 48121; Herbert Epstein Esquire Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Ford Motor Company The American Road Dearborn MI 48121; Dear Mr. Epstein: This responds to your request for an interpretation of a portion of th National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) response to the petitions for reconsideration of the final rule establishing the Federal motor vehicle theft prevention standard (51 FR 8831, at 8835, March 14, 1986).; Specifically, you were concerned about the following language: >>>A manufacturer is free under this standard and the Theft Act to us a transparent paint mask and to specify in its contracts with its dealers that the dealer must remove the mask before selling vehicles or parts. However, if the dealer does not remove the mask, both the manufacturer and the dealer could be liable for violating section 607(a) of the Cost Saving (sic) Act. The manufacturer and dealer might both be liable for selling a vehicle not in compliance with the theft prevention standard (prohibited by section 607(a)(1)) and the manufacturer might be liable for falsely certifying that the vehicle complies with the theft prevention standard (prohibited by section 607(a)(4)(B)). The manufacturer must assume its portion of this risk if it wishes to use a transparent integral paint mask that must be removed by its dealers.<<<; You stated in your letter that this discussion could be read a imposing vicarious liability on the manufacturers for a dealer's failure to remove a paint mask after the dealer had painted over the mask. You then asked whether NHTSA's opinion would be affected if the manufacturer provided the dealer in writing, either by letter or service bulletin, instructions on how to protect the labels during dealer preparation and advice that Federal law required dealers to remove the paint mask after performing the dealer preparation operations. Such a step would affect the agency's opinion as to the manufacturer's liability for the non-removal of a paint mask as explained below.; The language you quoted from the preamble was intended to alert vehicl and parts manufacturers to their statutory obligations under section 607(a) of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 2027(a)). When dealers must take further actions to bring a vehicle into compliance with the theft prevention standard, sections 607 of the Cost Savings Act requires the vehicle manufacturer to exercise *due care* to ensure that the dealers will, in fact, perform such further actions. See sections 607(a)(4)(B) and 607(b) of the Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 2027(a)(4)(B) and 2027(b)). The language quoted above from the agency response to the petitions for reconsideration implicitly acknowledged this due care defense by stating that manufacturers 'could' and 'might' be liable for violations of section 607(a) if paint masks were not removed by dealers.; It is not possible for us to give a hard and fast rule of wha constitutes due care in all circumstances. For example, a manufacturer that learns that its dealers generally are not removing the paint masks must do more to establish that it exercised due care than it did before it learned of such failures by its dealers. As a general proposition, however, NHTSA believes that a manufacturer using transparent paint masks to protect its labels has exercised due care, and therefore is not liable for violations of section 607(a), when it takes the following steps:; >>>1. The manufacturer includes a provision in its contracts with eac of its dealers obligating the dealer to remove the transparent paint masks,; 2. The manufacturer issues a service bulletin to all of its dealer providing instructions on how to protect the label during painting, rustproofing, etc., and on how and when to remove the transparent paint masks, and; 3. The manufacturer reminds the dealers, either in the service bulleti or in a separate letter, of their contractual and statutory obligations to remove transparent paint masks after performing dealer preparation operations, if the label is then obscured by the paint mask.; << |
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ID: aiam1023OpenMr. A. J. Kuzel, General Manager, Jim Whalen Ford, Ind., 1045 East Chicago Street, Elgin, IL 60120; Mr. A. J. Kuzel General Manager Jim Whalen Ford Ind. 1045 East Chicago Street Elgin IL 60120; Dear Mr. Kuzel: This is in response to your letter of February 20, 1973, concerning th use of the dealer plate number on the form required by the Federal Odometer Disclosure Requirements.; Under the Illinois procedure you describe, where the seller retains hi tags and the dealer attaches dealer tags, the number of the dealer tag may be used in the space marked as 'Last Plate Number.'; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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ID: aiam5060OpenMs. Mindy Lang Division Manager Huntleigh Transportation Services Inc. #12 Millpark Court Maryland Heights, MO 63043; Ms. Mindy Lang Division Manager Huntleigh Transportation Services Inc. #12 Millpark Court Maryland Heights MO 63043; "Dear Ms. Lang: This responds to your letter of September 12, 1992 requesting information on regulations concerning bus conversions. Your company converts the interior of buses by installing such materials as carpets, wall coverings, and blinds. In particular you asked for information on regulations concerning the attachment of seats to vehicles and the material used for the construction of seats. I am pleased to have this opportunity to explain our law and regulations to you. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) authorizes this agency to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. Section 108(a)(1)(A) of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(a)(1)(A)) prohibits any person from manufacturing, introducing into commerce, selling, or importing any new motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment unless the vehicle or equipment item is in conformity with all applicable safety standards. NHTSA, however, does not approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment, nor do we endorse any commercial products. Instead, the Safety Act establishes a 'self-certification' process under which each manufacturer is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. NHTSA has exercised its authority to establish one safety standard relevant to seating, Standard No. 207, Seating Systems, which establishes strength and other performance requirements for vehicle seats. However, this standard excludes passenger seats on buses from these performance requirements. There is one other safety standard that could be affected by the work your company performs. Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials, specifies burn resistance requirements for materials used in motor vehicles, including buses. If your company converts previously certified buses, it could be considered an alterer under our regulations. Under 49 CFR Part 567, Certification, an alterer is defined as: A person who alters a vehicle that has been previously certified ... other than by the addition, substitution, or removal of readily attachable components such as mirrors or tire and rim assemblies, or minor finishing operations such as painting, ... before the first purchase of the vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale .... If considered an alterer, your company would be subject to the certification requirements of 49 CFR 567.7. These requirements include provisions that the alterer supplement the original manufacturer's certification label, which must remain on the vehicle, by affixing an additional label. The label must state that the vehicle as altered conforms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards, including Standard No. 302. The label must also state the name of the alterer and the month and the year in which the alterations were completed. Your company would not be subject to the certification requirements of 49 CFR 567.7 if the modifications involve only readily attachable components. However, the modifications would still be affected by section 108(a)(2)(A) of the Safety Act. That section provides that: No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or in part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle . . . in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Any violation of this 'render inoperative' prohibition would subject the violator to a potential civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation. I hope you find this information helpful. I have enclosed an information sheet for new manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment that briefly explains the responsibilities imposed on manufacturers, and tells how to get copies of the relevant laws and regulations. If you have any other questions, please contact Mary Versailles of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Paul Jackson Rice Chief Counsel Enclosure"; |
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ID: aiam0798OpenMr. Thomas L. Schroeder, Thoroughbred Homes, Inc., P.O. Box 1728, Valdoeta, GA 31601; Mr. Thomas L. Schroeder Thoroughbred Homes Inc. P.O. Box 1728 Valdoeta GA 31601; Dear Mr. Schroeder: This is in response to your inquiry of July 26, 1972, concerning th application of defect reporting requirements to mobile home manufacturers.; Although mobile homes are not specifically mentioned in the Nationa Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, they are considered to be motor vehicles subject to the Act. Because of their unique characteristics, mobile homes have been categorized as a separate vehicle type, 'mobile structure trailer,' under the motor vehicle safety standards 49 CFR Part 581. 'Mobile structure trailer' is defined in section 571.3 of that part.; The Defect Reports regulations (49 CFR Part 573) apply to manufacturer of all types of motor vehicles, including mobile structure trailers. They require manufacturers to report the number of vehicles manufactured during each calendar quarter. The description of the regulation's requirements in the article you enclosed is somewhat incomplete and accordingly we have enclosed a copy of the regulation for your guidance.; There are no specific forms which we require to be used in th submission of the specified information. Copies of acceptable formats you may wish to use, however, are also enclosed.; Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson |
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ID: aiam0262OpenMr. Gerald Sagerman, U.S. Agent, TVR Engineering, Ltd., 572 Merrick Road, Lynbrook, NY 11563; Mr. Gerald Sagerman U.S. Agent TVR Engineering Ltd. 572 Merrick Road Lynbrook NY 11563; Dear Mr. Sagerman: This is in response to your letter of October 14, 1970, to the Directo of the National Highway Safety Bureau forwarding information sheets on the TVR Vixen. I am enclosing copies of the Bureau's Consumer Information Regulations (49 CFR Part 575). The substantive provisions, S 575.101 on vehicle stopping distance, S 575.102 on tire reserve load, and S 575.106 on acceleration and passing ability, require the furnishing of specific information in a format which is in the form set out in the regulations. The information sheets which you have provided fall short of these requirements in both form and substance. For example, S 575.101 requires furnishing information on the minimum stopping distance, expressed in feet, for the particular vehicle, from a particular speed, at specified loads, with the braking system in a specified condition. The information provided by you in this regard is incomplete, and is not in the form specified. In addition, the regulations require the information to describe and be valid for each of the vehicles with which it is provided.; Please study the enclosed regulations carefully and forward to u complying consumer information within the near future. Let us know if you need further assistance.; Sincerely, Rodolfo A. Diaz, Acting Associate Director, Motor Vehicl Programs; |
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ID: aiam5430OpenMr. Richard J. Quigley 5886-b Fernflat Road Aptos, CA 95003; Mr. Richard J. Quigley 5886-b Fernflat Road Aptos CA 95003; Dear Mr. Quigley: This responds to your request for reconsideration o our July 15, 1994 interpretation letter on Standard No. 218, Motorcycle helmets. In that letter, we stated that a drawing you provided would not meet the requirement in S5.6.1(e) of the standard that motorcycle helmets be labeled with the symbol DOT. You enclosed a new drawing and ask whether it meets S5.6.1(e). The answer is no. The new version of the drawing consists of three figures that you believe constitute the symbol 'DOT.' Your new drawing continues to incorporate a corporate logo in lieu of the letter 'O.' As explained in our July 15, 1994 letter, because the symbol DOT constitutes the manufacturer's certification that the helmet conforms to Standard No. 218, there must be no ambiguity in the symbol. Using the corporate logo in lieu of the letter 'O' introduces ambiguity as to whether the manufacturer has certified the helmet. Thus, the new version of the drawing you provided does not meet S5.6.1(e) of Standard No. 218. I hope this answers your question. Sincerely, John Womack Acting Chief Counsel; |
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ID: aiam1920OpenMr. Andrew H. Swartz, Johnson, Hogan & Ometer, Post Office Drawer 668, Moneterey, CA 93940; Mr. Andrew H. Swartz Johnson Hogan & Ometer Post Office Drawer 668 Moneterey CA 93940; Dear Mr. Swartz: This is in response to your letter of April 11, 1975, requesting a interpretation of the meaning of 'gross vehicle weight rating.'; The gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of a trailer consists of th weight of the empty trailer plus its rated cargo load. The weight of the tractor is not included. The tractor and the trailer are considered as two separate vehicles, each with its own individual GVWR.; The Distributors Association interpretation you cited is correct, bu you appear to have misinterpreted it. In the case of a semi-trailer, a significant portion of the loaded trailer's GVWR may be supported by the tractor's rear axle. Therefore, the trailer's GVWR may be significantly higher than its gross axle weight rating, which is the weight an entire axle system, including tires, wheels, axle, and suspension systems, is capable of supporting.; Please let me know if you need further assistance. Yours truly, Richard B. Dyson, Assistant Chief Counsel |
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Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.