NHTSA Interpretation File Search
Overview
NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies.
Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage.
An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.
- Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
- Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
- The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
- Some combination of the above, or other, factors.
Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files
Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.
Single word search
Example: car
Result: Any document containing that word.
Multiple word search
Example: car seat requirements
Result: Any document containing any of these words.
Connector word search
Example: car AND seat AND requirements
Result: Any document containing all of these words.
Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.
Phrase in double quotes
Example: "headlamp function"
Result: Any document with that phrase.
Conjunctive search
Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.
Wildcard
Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).
Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).
Not
Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”
Complex searches
You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.
Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”).
Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”
Search Tool
NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search
Interpretations | Date |
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ID: 2170yOpen The Honorable Bud Shuster Dear Mr. Shuster: Thank you for your inquiry on behalf of your constituent, Mr. Lester Hoover. Mr. Hoover requested information about laws that cover the branding of tires that are not first quality. In addition, he asked whether there is any way to apply such a law to other consumer goods such as batteries. This inquiry has already been referred to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which sent you a letter dated October 16, 1989 explaining its tire labeling regulations. The FTC's letter also indicated that this agency's tire labeling regulations might be of interest to Mr. Hoover. Let me begin by explaining that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has promulgated regulations related to tires. In particular, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109, New Pneumatic Tires, applies to new tires for use on passenger cars, Standard No. 119, New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars, applies to new tires for use on vehicles other than passenger cars, Standard No. 117, Retreaded Pneumatic Tires, applies to retreaded tires for use on passenger cars, and Part 569, Regrooved Tires, applies to all regrooved tires. Each of these regulations includes some labeling requirements. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires that every manufacturer certify that each of the tires it produces complies with these standards, including the labeling requirements. Thus, even a tire identified as something like "blemished" or "out-of-round" must be certified as complying with all provisions of the applicable safety standard(s). None of the regulations administered by this agency require, or establish any standards for, the identification of tires as something other than "first quality." If some Federal regulation exists that requires the identification of tires as something other than "first quality," it would be promulgated by the FTC under that agency's authority to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices. If the FTC does not have any such regulation, I am not aware of any other Federal agency that would have authority in this area. Similarly, I am not aware of any such labeling regulations that could be applied to consumer goods such as batteries. I hope you find this information helpful. Please let me know if you have any further questions or concerns in this area. Sincerely,
Stephen P. Wood Acting Chief Counsel /ref:109#117#119 d:ll/20/89 |
1970 |
ID: 21713.ztvOpenKeith G. Dameron, Captain Dear Captain Dameron: This responds to your letter dated May 17, 2000, in which you request an interpretation whether Samsung and Daewoo "fixed-load/off-road" trucks are classified as "motor vehicles." This letter confirms that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not consider the trucks you describe, commonly called mobile construction cranes, to be "motor vehicles." As you may be aware, a motor vehicle under our principal vehicle safety statute is defined as a vehicle that has been "manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways." (49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6)). Further, if a vehicle is a "motor vehicle," it must comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards in order to be imported into the United States (49 U.S.C. 30112(a)). The question is whether the Samsung and Daewoo trucks are "motor vehicles." This issue was the subject of Koehring Co. v. Adams, 452 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wisc. 1978). The plaintiffs were seven manufacturers who sought a declaratory judgment that the mobile cranes, mobile excavators, and mobile drill wells which they manufactured were not "motor vehicles" subject to 15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (recodified as 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 in 1994). The manufacturers had admitted that their vehicles used the public roads, and the parties stipulated that the typical item of the construction equipment at issue traveled an estimated average of 2,100 to 2,200 miles per year under its own power on the public roads, and spent a majority of its operation time off the public roads. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and declared "that mobile construction equipment which is designed to perform work on a construction site and which normally uses the public streets, roads or ways only for travel between job sites, is not a vehicle which has been manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads and highways" (op. cit. at 638). Although conceding that the equipment possessed design features required for on-road travel such as rubber tires, the capability of traveling at highway speeds and conforming to government regulations for vehicle width, the court stated that the record before it was clear that operation on the public roads was "decidedly" an incidental activity and that "the greater percentage of these vehicles' operation is on off-highway construction sites rather than on public roads." On a limited interpretation of the term "primarily" in the definition of " motor vehicle," the court held that the mobile cranes, excavators and drill wells at issue were not "motor vehicles." The 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Although we did not agree with the courts, we have not undertaken to reconsider Koehring in our interpretations involving construction equipment. We continue to be concerned with the Koehing decision, particularly because we have received information indicating that mobile construction cranes manufactured by Samsung and others are using the public roads far more frequently than they appear to have done at the time of the Koehring decision. We are not bound by Koehring because it was not based on an analysis consistent with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Committee, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). However, the importers of the Samsung and Daewoo mobile construction cranes may have imported their vehicles pursuant to Koehring's classification of mobile cranes as "mobile construction equipment," in accordance with that court decision. Since our interpretations are in accord with that decision and we have not undertaken to distinguish it, we do not view the importation and use of the Samsung and Daewoo vehicles you describe as a violation of 49 U.S.C. 30112(a). Sincerely, ref:571 |
2001 |
ID: 21718.ztvOpenMichel Luc Bataini, Eng. Jr. FAX 450-622-3017 Dear Mr. Bataini: This is in reply to your fax of May 25, 2000, with questions about S5.4 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. This paragraph specifies that "Two or more lamps, reflective devices, or items of associated equipment may be combined, if the requirements for each lamp, reflective device and item of associated equipment are met . . . ." It is your assumption that "a front side reflector made of 2 different items is legal only if both item individually meet the regulation." You then asked "if two reflective devices (each device do not meet the regulation by itself) molded separately, are assembled on the same housing, then, would that be legal? If not, molding those two items together and then assembling them with the housing would be legal?" S5.4 allows a manufacturer to combine two lamps, reflective devices, or items of motor vehicle lighting equipment provided that each lamp, reflective device, or item of motor vehicle equipment used in the combination complies with the requirements of Standard No. 108 which apply to it. You have informed us that neither of the reflective devices in your design comply with Standard No 108's requirements, presumably those for a front side marker reflector. This means, then, that S5.4 does not apply to your design, and that we must answer your letter without reference to S5.4. The drawing accompanying your letter shows that the reflective devices to which you refer would be incorporated into a headlamp housing and be visible from the side when light is reflected from them. The proper question, then, is whether Standard No. 108 permits a front side marker reflector to consist of two reflective devices molded separately and assembled on the same housing. The answer is yes, provided that when assembled on the housing they meet the requirements of SAE Standard J594f Reflex Reflectors January 1977, principally those relating to photometry. It follows then, that two reflective devices may be molded together and mounted on the same housing if they comply with SAE J594f 's requirements for reflex reflectors as mounted on the housing. You will note that some rear lamp units are designed so that compartments that are lit are separated by multiple red reflex reflective devices, neither of which alone may be sufficient to comply with the rear red reflex reflector requirements of Standard No. 108, but, taken together, meet the standard. In this situation also, the reflex reflectors are not "combined" within the meaning of S5.4. If you have further questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, |
2000 |
ID: 2171yOpen The Honorable John D. Dingell Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of September 22, 1989, forwarding Representative Morella's letter inquiring about the requirements of Federal law and regulations as they apply to the tinting of motor vehicle windows for medical reasons. We recently began a rulemaking proceeding on the issue of tinting, and I welcome this opportunity to discuss the matter. The enclosures to Ms. Morella's letter described a case in which a person suffers from a skin disease called vitiligo and was advised to avoid exposure to the sun's rays. The presumption is that this person needs more protection from the sun than that afforded by vehicle windows that conform to the Federal standard. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205, Glazing Materials, establishes a minimum 70 percent light transmissibility for glazing at levels "requisite for driving visibility," which includes all windows in passenger cars. When a requirement is established in a Federal safety standard, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act prohibits any person from manufacturing, selling, or importing a new vehicle that does not comply with that requirement. The Safety Act does not provide for individual medical exemptions. Similarly, the Safety Act prohibits any manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business from "rendering inoperative" an element of design required by a safety standard, such as minimum light transmissibility. This "render inoperative" prohibition applies to vehicles after sale to purchasers. Neither this "render inoperative" provision nor any other Federal requirement would prohibit an individual vehicle owner from modifying their own vehicles, even if the modifications cause the vehicle to no longer comply with the Federal safety standards. Thus, an individual vehicle owner can make whatever modifications he or she likes, for medical or any other reasons, without violating Federal law. However, the individual States have the authority to regulate modifications that owners may make to their vehicles, and many States have chosen to regulate window tinting. For your reference, I have enclosed copies of our July 8, 1988 letter to Representative Shumway and our November 1, 1988 letter to Representative Byron on this subject. The minimum light transmissibility requirement in Standard No. 205 represents a balancing of legitimate competing interests. On the one hand, safety considerations dictate that drivers must be able to see and analyze the traffic situation in which the vehicle is being operated and react to that situation properly and promptly. To the extent that some of the available light is not transmitted through the vehicle glazing, the driver's ability to react to the traffic situation is potentially delayed. This is especially true under low light conditions, such as occur at night and on very overcast days. On the other hand, there are legitimate reasons for allowing some tinting of vehicle windows. These include avoiding excessive heat for all vehicle occupants, reducing glare for the driver, preserving the vehicle interior, and helping persons with medical conditions that are sensitive to the sun's rays. NHTSA balanced these competing interests by establishing the current 70 percent minimum light transmissibility requirement in Standard No. 205. However, the agency was asked in a petition for rulemaking to reexamine this balance and to permit darker tinting of windows, by lowering the minimum light transmissibility requirement. We decided to reexamine whether the current minimum light transmissibility requirement continues to represent the most appropriate and reasonable balance of the competing interests. Accordingly, on July 20, 1989, this agency published a request for comments on a comprehensive review of the 70 percent light transmissibility requirement for side and rear window glazing in passenger automobiles. One of the issues raised was the light transmissibility standard's effect on those who need more protection from the sun's ultraviolet rays. The comment period for this notice closed on September 18, 1989. The agency received nearly one hundred comments on this issue and is currently reviewing those comments. We will notify you and Ms. Morella when we announce our decision. I have placed a copy of your letter and this response in the public docket for this rulemaking action. I hope this information is helpful. Sincerely,
Jeffrey R. Miller Acting Administrator Enclosures cc: The Honorable Constance A. Morella ref:205 d:ll/20/89 |
1970 |
ID: 21723.ztvOpenRandy Thomas, Vice President, Marketing Dear Mr. Thomas: This is in reply to your letter of May 18, 2000, responding to my letter of March 27, 2000, inviting you to submit further information needed for a decision that the Daewoo Labo that you would like to export to the United States is not a "motor vehicle." You previously described the vehicle as "a small truck from Korea," which you would modify by installing a governor limiting its speed to 40 km/h (25 mph), "as well as installing turf tires and hydraulics for a dump box which we manufacture here." You stated that the truck is similar to the Metro Motors "Microtruck" and Cushman's "White" truck, and would be used "for the same utility purposes." You informed us that the truck "would be sold only for off road applications." We replied that your assurances that the modified Labo would be sold only for off- road applications were not dispositive of this issue. There appeared to be no reasons why a purchaser could not obtain a license for on-road use of the truck. Further, the planned modifications were also insufficient for us to conclude that the Labo was no longer a motor vehicle. In our opinion, neither the modified speed limit nor the addition of turf tires were inconsistent with a conclusion that this vehicle remains a "truck." We also informed you that in cases that are not clear cut, we apply five factors in reaching a determination. I enclosed a copy of our letter of January 25, 1999, to William Sanford of Metro Motors which discussed these factors, and your letter of May 18, 2000, seeks to address them. The first factor is whether the vehicle will be advertised for on-road as well as off-road use, or whether it will be advertised exclusively for off-road use. You have stated that "The Daewoo Labo vehicle will be promoted as an 'off-road only vehicle' and all literature will include the information that these vehicles are for 'off-road use only.'" Your response suggests that, applying this factor, the vehicles should not be considered motor vehicles. The second factor is whether the vehicle's manufacturer or dealers will assist vehicle purchasers in obtaining certificates of origin or title documents to register the vehicle for on-road use. You have stated that you will "supply documentation with the vehicle (Certificate of Origin) which will clearly state that these vehicles are for off-road use only. The wording of this statement will be 'THIS VEHICLE DOES NOT CONFORM TO ALL SAFETY AND EMISSIONS STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO ON-ROAD VEHICLES IN THE UNITED STATES.'" You have also stated that you will direct your dealers to include this statement on any invoice or bill of sale that they produce. Your response would indicate that, applying this factor, the vehicles should not be considered motor vehicles. The third factor is whether the vehicle is or will be sold by dealers also selling vehicles that are classified as motor vehicles. You have replied that your "target market for these vehicles is golf course equipment dealers and industrial dealers such as forklift dealers." The vehicles sold by these dealers are not motor vehicles. Your response suggests that, applying this factor, the vehicles should not be considered motor vehicles. The fourth factor is whether the vehicle has or will have affixed to it a warning label stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads. You have replied that you "will be attaching warning labels inside the vehicle, which state 'THIS VEHICLE IS FOR OFF-ROAD USE ONLY.' The same message will appear on placards on the exterior of the vehicle." Applying this factor would indicate also that the vehicles are not motor vehicles. The fifth and final factor is whether states or foreign countries have permitted or are likely to permit the vehicle to be registered for on-road use. You have replied that it is your "opinion that these vehicles, as modified, would not be considered for 'on-road use' in any country or state." You conclude by expressing your belief that the precautions you have previously discussed "will preclude anyone from registering this vehicle as an on-road vehicle." We assume that the trucks as originally manufactured are permitted on the public roads of Korea, its country of origin. We have no information whether reducing the speed of the truck to 25 mph would render it impermissible to be driven on Korea's roads. We cannot accept your "opinion" as dispositive of the issue. We have insufficient information to apply this factor to your situation. Based on the representations in your letters and considering four of the five factors discussed above, we believe that your vehicles are not "motor vehicles." However, we will reexamine this conclusion if we learn that, for example, the vehicles are in fact used on the public roads by a substantial number of owners. If you have any questions, you may contact Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, |
2000 |
ID: 21736Open Mr. Ronnie H. McDaniel Dear Mr. McDaniel: This responds to your letter asking for information about the application of Federal safety standards to a "sun visor extender." By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. NHTSA is not authorized to certify or approve motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for compliance with our Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Instead, under Chapter 301 of Title 49 of the United States Code, "Motor Vehicle Safety" (copy enclosed), each manufacturer of a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment is responsible for certifying that its products meet all applicable safety standards. There is currently no Federal motor vehicle safety standard that is directly applicable to a sun visor extender sold directly to a consumer. The Federal safety standard that regulates sun visors (Standard No. 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact) applies only to new motor vehicles (i.e., vehicles that have not yet been sold for purposes other than resale) and not to items of aftermarket equipment such as a sun visor extender. However, there are other Federal requirements that indirectly affect the manufacture and sale of your device. Under Chapter 301, your device is considered to be an item of motor vehicle equipment. As a manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment, you are subject to the requirements in sections 30118-30120 of Chapter 301 concerning the recall and remedy of products with defects relating to motor vehicle safety. I have enclosed an information sheet that briefly describes those responsibilities. In the event that you or NHTSA determines that your sun visor extenders contain a safety-related defect, you would be responsible for notifying purchasers of the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge. As stated above, the sun visor in a new vehicle is regulated by Safety Standard No. 201, which requires that the visor be "constructed of or covered with energy-absorbing material" and that the visor's mounting must "present no material edge radius of less than 0.125 inch that is statically contactable by a spherical 6.5-inch diameter head form." The purpose of the standard is to reduce the injuries that occur when occupants strike the visor or its mounting with their heads. If your sun visor extender were installed by the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle, the visor, as modified by that installation, would have to comply with the visor requirements of the standard. I am enclosing a copy of Standard No. 201 for your review. Another Federal standard to which the vehicle manufacturer must certify its vehicle as conforming is Standard No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials (copy enclosed). This standard establishes flammability resistance requirements for certain vehicle components, including sun visors, on new vehicles. If a new vehicle manufacturer installs your product on the new vehicle, that manufacturer would have to certify the vehicle's compliance with Standard No. 302, and thus would be required to ensure that the sun visor conforms to the flammability resistance requirements of the standard and that the extender does not interfere with or prevent that capability to comply. A commercial business that installs the sun visor extender on new or used vehicles would be subject to provisions of the Safety Act that affect whether the business may install your product on a vehicle. Section 30122 of Chapter 301 states: "A manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business may not knowingly make inoperative ... any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard..." This section requires manufacturers, distributors, dealers or motor vehicle repair businesses (i.e., any person holding him or herself out to the public as in the business of repairing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for compensation) installing your sun visor extender on new or used vehicles to ensure that the addition of the device would not negatively affect the compliance of any component or design on a vehicle with applicable Federal safety standards. For example, the commercial entity must ensure that the addition of the device does not reduce the effectiveness of those features and aspects of performance of the sun visor that enabled the vehicle to comply with Standard No. 201 or Standard No. 302. However, the prohibitions found in Section 30122 do not apply to the actions of a vehicle owner in adding to or otherwise modifying his or her vehicle. Thus, a vehicle owner would not violate Chapter 301 by installing the sun visor extender, even if doing so would negatively affect the safety performance of the sun visor. However, we encourage owners not to degrade the safety of their vehicles. Please feel free to contact Otto Matheke of this office at (202) 366-2992 if you have further questions. Sincerely, Frank Seales, Jr. Enclosures |
2000 |
ID: 21770.rbmOpenMs. Melba J. Collins Dear Ms. Collins: This responds to your letter to Rodney Slater, the Secretary of Transportation, asking whether it is legal to install "used" air bags in a vehicle. You wrote that after the air bag in your vehicle deployed, it was replaced with a used air bag. It is not clear from your letter what the condition of the air bag was when it was salvaged from another vehicle. Secretary Slater has asked this office to address your concerns. By way of background information, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized under Title 49, Chapter 301 of the U.S. Code (Motor Vehicle Safety) (Safety Act) to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new items of motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards established by NHTSA, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208), requires air bags be installed in cars and light trucks. Your letter asks whether, when a deployed air bag is replaced, Federal law prohibits the use of a salvaged air bag as the replacement air bag. The answer to your question is no. The Safety Act does not require a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or repair business to return a vehicle to compliance with a standard if a device or element of design has been "rendered inoperative" by another agent, such as a crash. Thus, Federal law does not require that deployed air bags be replaced or regulate the manner in which such air bags are replaced. However, some States may have requirements applicable to such replacements. In order for a replacement air bag to provide protection to vehicle occupants, it is essential that the replacement be properly completed. The repair should be performed according to the procedures specified by the vehicle manufacturer. This may require replacement of system components in addition to the air bag inflator module such as crash sensors, wiring and other electronic components as specified by the manufacturer. As stated above, the repair or replacement of an air bag system is not addressed by federal regulations; however, manufacturers and/or insurance carriers may have policies addressing the use of salvage parts in the repair of crash vehicles. Finally, after the air bags are replaced, it is important that the air bag readiness indicator be in good working order to alert the occupants of any future malfunction of the air bag system. While great care must be taken in any air bag replacement, the use of a salvaged air bag raises additional safety issues. An air bag may be rendered inoperable, for example, by damage in a low-speed crash, even if it has not been deployed. Likewise, even if the vehicle from which the air bag was removed had not been in a crash, the way in which the salvaged air bag was removed from the vehicle could affect how the air bag will perform in a crash. We would urge you to contact the vehicle or air bag manufacturer to determine whether and how a salvaged air bag could be inspected or tested to ensure that it is fully operable. Finally, you may wish to consult a private attorney concerning the state law implications of using salvaged air bags to repair automobiles, including possible tort liability. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Rebecca MacPherson of my staff at this address or by phone at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Frank Seales, Jr. ref:208 |
2001 |
ID: 21771.rbmOpenStephen E. Van Gaasbeck, Esq. Dear Mr. Van Gaasbeck: This responds to your letter asking whether you may replace the air bag in your 1997 vehicle with a depowered 1998 air bag. You specifically wanted to know whether replacing the air bag would violate any standards or regulations issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). As discussed below, there is no legal impediment to modifying older vehicles so that they have the same kinds of redesigned air bags being offered on most new vehicles. However, depending on the vehicle, such modifications may be very complicated and potentially expensive. Additionally, since the replacement air bag is different from the one for the original occupant protection system was designed, such a modification may have a negative effect on the integrity of the entire occupant protection system. You may wish to ask your vehicle manufacturer whether it your vehicle can be modified in this manner without a degradation in overall safety and at what cost. By way of background information, NHTSA is authorized to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that apply to the manufacture and sale of new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment. One of the standards we have issued is Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208). Manufacturers install air bags in passenger cars as part of complying with the occupant protection requirements of Standard No. 208. While the Federal motor vehicle safety standards apply only to new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle equipment, Federal law limits the modifications that can be made by certain businesses to used vehicles. Manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and repair businesses are prohibited from "knowingly making inoperative" any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable safety standard (49 U.S.C. 30122). A manufacturer, dealer or other business which modified the air bags on your 1997 Ford F150 would not violate the "make inoperative" provision if, after the modification, the vehicle continued to meet the relevant requirements in effect either on the date of manufacture or as later amended. In 1997, NHTSA amended Standard No. 208 to make it easier for manufacturers to quickly redesign their air bags, e.g., by reducing the power as compared to previous years. Modifications that assured that the vehicle complied with the amended requirements would thus not violate the "make inoperative" provision, even if the vehicle might no longer comply with the requirements in effect at the time it was built. As noted earlier, however, the modifications that would need to be made to an existing vehicle so that it would have redesigned air bags could be very complicated and potentially expensive. I have enclosed a copy of the NHTSA publication "Air Bags and On-Off Switches, Information for an Informed Decision." While this publication does not address your concerns directly, it does provide useful information on how one can reduce the risk of air bag injury. I hope you find this information helpful. If you have any other questions, please contact Rebecca MacPherson of my staff at this address or by phone at (202)366-2992. Sincerely, John Womack Enclosure |
2001 |
ID: 21809.ztvOpenMr. Charles I. Sassoon Dear Mr. Sassoon: This is in reply to your fax of June 14, 2000, to Michael Cole of our Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. You have had an inquiry from your customer, California Bus Sales, asking whether "they could utilize a LED beehive light classified 'side marker lamp' as a turn signal indicator." You have enclosed certificates from a test laboratory indicating that four different LED side marker lamps comply with both Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108 (FMVSS No. 108) and Canadian Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. We assume that the certificate is intended to cover compliance only with the side marker lamp requirements of each of the two safety standards. The meaning of the word "indicator" is unclear. If you mean to ask whether the side marker lamp may flash when a vehicle's principal turn signal lamp system is operating, our answer is yes. Paragraph S5.5.10(b) of FMVSS No. 108 specifically allows side marker lamps to be wired for signaling purposes. However, it seems unlikely that the LED beehive light could be used as an original equipment turn signal lamp that meets the performance requirements of FMVSS No. 108. For one thing, a turn signal's brightness is approximately 50 times that of a side marker lamp. The certificates that the LED beehive lights meet the requirements for side marker lamps is insufficient to indicate compliance with turn signal lamp requirements. Even if tests should indicate that the LED beehive light meets all the performance requirements that apply to turn signal lamps, the lamp would have to be mounted in accordance with the location and visibility requirements of FMVSS No. 108. If you have any questions, you may call Taylor Vinson of this Office (202-366-5263). Sincerely, Frank Seales, Jr. ref:108 |
2000 |
ID: 21866.drnOpen Monsieur Jean-Yves Le Bouthillier Dear Monsieur Le Bouthillier: This responds to your request for an interpretation of whether the interior emergency exit designation on a school bus exit door may be placed on the top half of the emergency exit door. The answer is yes. With your submission, you provided a photograph (which you call Picture 483) of the rear interior of a Corbeil school bus. In the vehicle's interior, a large piece of equipment (described in your submission as the air conditioning unit) entirely covers the area (in both length and width) above the emergency door, and under the interior roof. On the top half of the emergency exit door, on the glazing, is the designation "Emergency Exit." You write that because of the air conditioning unit's location, the interior emergency exit door designation cannot be placed above the door. You therefore propose the top half of the emergency exit door for the interior "Emergency Exit" designation. Among other requirements, Standard No. 217, Bus emergency exits and window retention and release, specifies at S5.5.3(a) that each school bus emergency exit provided in accordance with S5.2.3.1 shall have the designation "Emergency Door" or "Emergency Exit," and that the designation shall be located at the top of, or directly above, the emergency exit door on both the inside and outside surfaces of the bus. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has addressed your question in a letter of September 28, 1977, to Thomas Built Buses, Inc. (copy provided). In that letter, NHTSA interpreted the emergency exit door designation requirement "to mean that the emergency door label must be located on the top half of the door or directly above the door." Your Picture 483 shows the interior "Emergency Exit" designation to be placed on the door's glazing, on the top half of the door. Since the designation is located on the top half of the door, a school bus with the designation placed in the depicted location would meet S5.5.3(a) of Standard No. 217. I note that S5.5.3(a) specifies that the designation be placed "on both the inside and outside surfaces of the bus." Since your designation is on the emergency exit door's glazing, you may be interested in the enclosed letter of October 2, 1987, to Ward Industries, Inc., in which NHTSA determined that a school bus with an interior label placed on the emergency exit door's glazing that is visible from the outside of the school bus meets exterior and interior placement requirements. The words "Emergency Exit" or "Emergency Door" must be readable (not backwards) when viewed from inside the school bus and from outside of the school bus. I hope this information is helpful. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Dorothy Nakama of my staff at this address or at (202) 366-2992. Sincerely, Frank Seales, Jr. Enclosures |
2000 |
Request an Interpretation
You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:
The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590
If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.
Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.