ID: 77-2.36

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/18/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Video Research Corporation

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This is in response to your letter of March 15, 1977, concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114, Theft Protection, as it relates to a device you wish to market called "Remote Auto-Start."

Standard No. 114, Theft Protection, which applies to passenger cars, requires that when the key is removed, normal activation of the car's engine and either steering or forward self-mobility of the car is prevented (49 CFR 571.114, S4.1(a) and (b)). According to the material which you forwarded, your device results in the following characteristics which differ from what we consider to be normal activation:

1. The engine deactivates when a door is opened.

2. The steering column and gear shift remains locked until the actual key is inserted.

3. The logic circuitry deactivates the engine after 15 minutes.

Consequently, we have determined that your device does not result in a "normal" activation of the car's engine.

Thus, it appears that the characteristics of the "Remote Auto-Start" system are not in conflict with Standard No. 114.

Sincerely,

ATTACH.

VIDEO RESEARCH CORPORATION

March 15, 1977

Frank Berndt -- Acting Chief Counsel, National Highway Safety Administration

Dear Mr. Berndt:

Last week I had the opportunity of talking to Mr. Tilton in regards to interpretating a law which covers various states, as well as federal, concerning cars left unattended with the motors running.

Sometime back, the American Medical Association contacted me in regards to heart patients that have to use a motor vehicle in extremely hot or cold weather. Since it is a stress on the heart when temperatures vary greatly, they felt if possible we could make an item that would heat or cool the vehicle for 15 to 20 minutes before entering same.

We came up with a tentative item called Remote Auto-Start. By reading the enclosed sheets covering this item which was written by our Director of Engineering, you will note that at no time can the vehicle be operated without the ignition key.

We would appreciate it, after you read the enclosed specifications, if you would let us know whether any federal or state laws will affect us.

Looking forward to hearing from you as soon as possible so we can continue with this particular product.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.

Sincerely yours, Martin Fleischman -- Chairman

[Enclosure Omitted]

ID: 77-2.37

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/18/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; Frank A. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Lansdale; Carr & Baum

TITLE: FMVSR INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your March 25, 1977, letter asking whether your proposed tire registration card to be used by your retail tire stores meets the requirements of 49 CFR Part 574, Tire Identification and Recordkeeping.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) does not issue advance approvals of compliance with agency standards or regulations. The agency will, however, give an informal opinion as to whether your registration card appears to satisfy the requirements of the regulation.

The proposed card that you submitted is similar to the example presented in Figure 3 of Part 574. Accordingly, it appears to comply with most of the requirements of that regulation. The actual seller of the tires, however, is not identified on the form. Since Part 574.7 requires that the tire seller be identifiable to the tire manufacturer, the form should disclose that information. Naming only the corporate office is insufficient, since that does not readily identify the store through which the tire was sold. The NHTSA suggests that the actual seller's name and address be provided on the card as shown on Figure 3.

It is our understanding that the tire seller will forward the cards to you who will then forward the information to the manufacturer. This process is acceptable to the NHTSA as long as the information is forwarded to the manufacturer within the time frame specified in Part 574.8.

SINCERELY,

Landsale, Carr & Baum advertising, marketing & management

March 25, 1977

Francis Armstrong, Director Office of Standards Enforcement Motor Vehicle Programs US Department of Transportation National Highway Safety Adminstration

We wish to submit the enclosed design for your approval to be used as a universal DOT identification card throughout our chain of retail tire stores.

This card was designed to conform to the requirements of Section 574.8 of the department's directive on universal formats, dated May 22, 1971.

We would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible so that we can proceed with this project.

Paul Ideker

(Graphics omitted) (Illegible Text)

FIG 3. UNIVERSAL FORMAT

@ 574.8 Information requirements -- tire distributors and dealers.

(a) Each distributor and each dealer selling tires to tire purchasers shall submit the information specified in @ 571.7 (a) to the manufacturer of the tires sold, or to the manufacturer's designee.

(b) Each tire distributor and each dealer selling tires to tire purchasers shall forward the information specified in #571.7(a) to the tire manufacturer, or person maintaining the information, not less often than every 20 days. However, a distributor or dealer who sells less than 10 tires, of all makes, types and sizes during a 30 day period may wait until he sells a total of 10 tires, but in the event longer than 6 months before forwarding the tire information to the respective tire manufactures or their designee.

(c) Each distributor and each dealer selling tires to other tire distributors and dealers shall supply to the tire distributor or dealer to whom he sells tires a (Illegible Words) the information specifical in @ 571.7(a), unless such a means has been provided to that distributor or dealer by (Illegible Word) person or by a manufacturer.

(d) Each distributor and each dealer shall immediately stop selling any group of tires when so directed by a notification issued pursuant to Section 113 of the Act (13 U.S.C. 1102).

@ 574.9 Requirements for motor vehicle dealers.

(a) Each motor vehicle dealer who sells a used motor vehicle for purposes other than resale, or who leases a motor vehicle for more than (Illegible Word) days, that is equipped with new tires or newly retreated tires (Illegible Word) for purposes of this

ID: 77-2.38

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 05/19/77

FROM: AUTHOR UNAVAILABLE; F. Berndt; NHTSA

TO: Mr. John W. Kourik

TITLE: FMVSS INTERPRETATION

TEXT: This responds to your March 24, 1977, letter asking whether Standard No. 107, Reflecting Surfaces, incorporates by reference the SAE Recommended Practice J941 as of November 1965 or as amended through February 1975.

As you note in your letter, Part 571.5 (49 CFR 571.5) of our regulations establishes guidelines for materials incorporated by reference. That section states that materials which are subject to change, such as the SAE Recommended Practice you mention, are incorporated by reference as they are in effect on the date of adoption of the standard unless otherwise specified. Standard No. 107 refers specifically to the 1965 version of the SAE Recommended Practice. Subsequent amendments of that document by the SAE Technical Committee have no effect upon the Federal standard.

Thank you for your offer of assistance in amending Standard No. 107 to reflect more recent changes in the SAE Recommended Practice. We will keep your offer in mind should we determine that a change in the standard is warranted.

SINCERELY,

April 4, 1977

Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Attention: Roper Tilden

We discovered a typographical mistake on the second line of the original March 24, 1977 letter mailed to the Office of the Chief Counsel and would appreciate your substituting this attached copy for the original if it doesn't create any delay in processing the request for interpretation.

John W. Kourik

March 24, 1977

Office of Chief Counsel National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

I would appreciate a statement of interpretation concerning the use of SAE Recommended Practice J941, November 1965 in S571.107 Standard No. 107; Reflecting Surfaces.

Standard No. 107 was promulgated on February 3, 1967 [32 FR 2411] and in accordance with "S571.5 material incorporated by reference" the November 1965 J941 material was designated therin. Since that time the basic SAE 1941 document has been revised as follows: J941a August 1967 J941b February 1969 J941b June 1972 J941d February 1975

In the current Title 49 - Transportation Code of Federal Regulations, Standard No. 107 still identifies the reference as SAE J941, November 1965.

Is it a correct interpretation that the NHTSA is referencing only J941 November 1965 and does not intend J941a or any subsequent revisions to be applicable unless the Standard No. 107 reference is changed by appropriate rulemaking action and final publication of a notice in the Federal Register?

If there is an interest in exploring the rationale for the four (4) revisions to SAE J941, I would be glad to establish a contact with the appropriate SAE Technical Committee.

John W. Kourik

ID: nht89-2.47

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: JULY 27, 1989

FROM: LARRY S. SNOWHITE -- MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO

TO: STEPHEN P. WOOD, ESQ. -- ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED JANUARY 25, 1990 TO LARRY S. SNOWHITE, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY AND POPEO, FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD, NHTSA; REDBOOK A35; VSA 1397 (A)(2)(A); STD. 108

TEXT: On behalf of our clients, ATAT Technology Ltd. ("ATAT") and CTS Corporation, we respectfully request that you determine that the sale into the aftermarket as well as aftermarket installation of the Advanced Brake Light Device ("ABLD") manufactured by ATAT (or of any other device performing as does the ABLD) would not violate the statutes administered by, or regulations of, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Specifically, we are requesting this determination for a device, the ABLD or a similar device demonstrating comparable performance, that consists of a sensor attached to the accelerator pedal that senses the rate at which the foot releases the acceler ator pedal. This signal is transmitted to a processor unit, which determines whether the brake lights should be turned on, and the duration of the illumination until the brake is applied. The ABLD is set so that the brake light will go off unless the b rake is applied within one second of the ABLD's activation, which based on experimentation and observation provides sufficient time for the brake pedal activation of the stop lights while avoiding misleading signals (if NHTSA considers that a different i nterval is consistent with applicable law and regulations, ATAT is prepared to modify the interval to meet an alternative NHTSA performance standard.)

It is our belief that the ABLD, and any similar device, holds out the promise of avoiding significant numbers of rear-end accidents and of reducing the seriousness of rear-end accidents that do occur. As the ABLD does not compromise,

render inoperative, in whole or in part, or impair the effectiveness of the mandated brake light system, we believe that on neither legal nor public policy grounds should NHTSA object to aftermarket sales of the ABLD.

This question was previously considered in a Memorandum dated March 7, 1988 addressed by Erika Jones to the Associate Administrator for Research and Development. In our view, that Memorandum was based on inadequate information concerning the mandated brake and brake light systems, the ABLD's performance and ABLD's potential contribution to safety -- inadequacies for which ATAT was responsible and which it now seeks to correct. In the intervening months, additional studies have been conducted and AT AT has marshaled relevant research materials. This new information is presented in the enclosed submissions.

The March Memorandum expressed concern that installation of the ABLD could create a noncompliance with Standard 108 and thereby presumptively run afoul of the anti-tampering provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1397. In this regard, w e understand that the threshold question is, does the ABLD render inoperative, in whole or in part, a device or element of design installed in compliance with Standard 108. A related determination is whether, under S4.1.3, it "impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required" by Standard 108.

This is a factual determination. And we believe that as a matter of fact the ABLD does not render the brake light system inoperative or impair its effectiveness.

First, the ABLD does not prevent the brake light system (the stoplamp and the CHMSL) from being activated and operating when the brake is applied. The ABLD is consistent with the operation of the brake light system, and arguably enhances it. The ABL D clearly and unambiguously indicates "the intention of the operator of a vehicle to stop or diminish speed by braking." SAE Standard J586d,2.1. Stop Lamps. The brake light is illuminated if the driver releases the accelerator at a rate greater than a predetermined minimum -- a minimum which reflects a very high probability that the release will be followed by an "emergency" brake application. If the brake is applied within one second, the brake light remains illuminated. Certainly this is consisten t with the definition of a Stop Lamp and with the operation of the brake light system.

There will be circumstances in which the brake will not be engaged after the ABLD is activated. In this case, the brake light will remain illuminated only for one second. As the enclosed material documents, this is not a phenomenon unique to, or agg ravated by, the ABLD. Illuminations of the brake lights for one second or less occur frequently during

normal driving without the ABLD. As is described in the enclosed submissions, in everyday driving it is not uncommon for the brake lights to be illuminated briefly even though the service brakes are not activated. The performance of the ABLD adds margi nally to the total number of illuminations of the brake lights for less than one second. Thus, ABLD-caused short-duration illuminations do not convey an intent or signal that is inconsistent or contradictory of the signal sent by the standard brake ligh t system. And they do signal an at least momentary "intention of the operator to stop or diminish speed by braking"

Activation of the ABLD does illuminate the stoplamps by means other than the application of the service brakes. While S4.5.4 prohibits the CHMSL being activated by means other than the application of the service brake, there is no comparable prohibit ion on the stoplamps themselves being activated by means other than the application of the service brakes. The ABLD would activate the stoplamp and CHMSL simultaneously. And it is our understanding that the CHMSL provision is an inadvertent hold-over f rom a rule, S4.5.11(b), that allowed the CHMSL to be activated by the hazard warning system for passenger cars manufactured on or after August 1, 1984 until September 1, 1986. Accordingly, while the installation of the ABLD as OEM technically would be i nconsistent with a literal reading of S4.5.4, this should not be considered an "impairment" such as to bar aftermarket sales and installation of the ABLD.

As previously noted, both the trigger point for the activation of the ABLD and the interval during which the ABLD illuminates the brake lights are subject to adjustment. The trigger and interval chosen reflect ATAT's studied judgment as to what will succeed in order to send a signal in those cases in which a signal is appropriate and minimize the incidence of misleading signals. Part of the basis for this judgment is set out in the attached submissions.

ATAT would appreciate an opportunity to meet with appropriate NHTSA staff in order to discuss this request so as to assure that you are in a position to respond to the request based on the fullest available information. As you will immediately see, t he enclosed submissions are the result of considerable work and ATAT would also welcome the opportunity to respond to questions about them.

As you know, ATAT is an Israeli company. This creates special logistical difficulties in communicating with NHTSA. A representative of ATAT will be in the United States on

August 1-4. We believe that it would be in the mutual interest of ATAT and NHTSA to meet during these dates.

Thank you for your consideration.

Enclosure

ID: nht89-2.48

TYPE: Interpretation-NHTSA

DATE: July 28, 1989

FROM: Anne M. Kennedy -- Customer Relations Representative, Volkswagen United States, Inc.

TO: Emory L. Lariscy -- President, Lariscy Enterprises, Inc.

TITLE: Re #89026684

ATTACHMT: Attached to letter dated 9-4-90 from P.J. Rice to E.J. Lariscy (A36; Std. 108; Std. 124; Std. 301); Also attached to letter dated 8-28-89 from E.L. Lariscy to G. Shifflett (OCC 3910) with Patent Application for Vehicle Safety Light Assembly (gr aphics omitted); Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Mundy to E. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 7-14-89 from J.M. Staples to E.L. Lariscy; Also attached to letter dated 8-8-89 from L. Baer to E.L. Lariscy

TEXT:

Thank you for your recent letter, concerning Vehicle Safety Light Assembly. Please be assured we appreciate the information in your letter, since it is through communications of this nature that changes and/or improvements can be brought about where it appears they are needed most. Your commentary will be called to the attention of all concerned parties.

We have taken the liberty of forwarding the information contained in your letter to our Product Planning Department. You should be hearing directly from them.

Thank you once again for taking the time to write and for giving us the opportunity to review and comment.

ID: nht89-2.49

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: RICHARD J. STROHM

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: LETTER DATED 11/09/87 FROM RICHARD J. STROHM TO EDWARD JETTNER -- NHTSA; FMVSS 207; OCC 1362; LETTER DATED 10/07/87 FROM RICHARD J. STROHM TO CHEVROLET DIVISION; 1987 CHEVROLET CAPRICE, 1G1BL51H0HX163146, 9000 MILES

TEXT: Dear Mr. Strohm:

This responds to your letter, referred to me by Mr. Edward Jettner of this agency, which asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to authorize the adjustment of the front seat in your Chevrolet Caprice by your automobile dealer. I regret the delay in responding.

Your letter and enclosure explained that you would like your dealer to move back the front bench seat in your newly-purchased vehicle to give you more leg room. You stated that the front seat in your new vehicle is mounted closer to the front of the vehi cle than the seat in your former car had been, and that you were more comfortable with the latter seat placement. You said that you contacted a customer service representative and that he told you Chevrolet is prohibited by law from moving the seat. Yo u asked how Chevrolet can obtain authorization to make the desired adjustments. Federal law does not directly prohibit your dealer from adjusting the seat; it does, however, indirectly set limits on the modifications.

By way of background, NHTSA is authorized by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act to issue Federal motor vehicle safety standards that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. Manufacturers m ust certify that their new vehicles and equipment conform to all of our safety standards applying to their product. If a new vehicle is modified before its first sale to a consumer, the person making the modification would have to certify that the vehic le, as altered, continues to comply with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards. Moving back a seat on a new vehicle could affect compliance with Standard No. 207, Seating System, Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. A dealer is not prohibited from making changes in the seat position as long as the modified seat and related safety components continue to perform in the manner required by the applicable standards.

Your situation involves the modification of a vehicle after its first sale to a consumer. While our safety standards apply only to new vehicles, there are some statutory restrictions on modifications of

this type. If a vehicle is modified after its first sale, then @ 108(a)(2)(A) of the Vehicle Safety Act would apply. That section provides, in pertinent part:

No manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business shall knowingly render inoperative, in whole or part, any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an ap plicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard . . .

Your dealer is not prohibited by @ 108(a)(2)(A) from making the seat adjustment if the adjustment can be made without rendering inoperative your vehile's compliance with any applicable Federal safety standard. It may be that the dealer you contacted has determined that it cannot move the seat rearwards without rendering inoperative a component or element of design now in compliance with the Federal safety standards.

The prohibition of @ 108(a)(2)(A) only applies to commercial businesses, not to individuals. Thus, under Federal law, vehicle owners may themselves make any modifications to their vehicles. They must, however, comply with any applicable State laws limi ting modifications.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

ID: nht89-2.5

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 06/16/89

FROM: TAKAYOSHI CHIKADA -- MANAGER OF AUTOMOTIVE LIGHTING ENGINEERING CONTROL DEPT. STANLEY ELECTRIC

TO: RICHARD L. VAN IDERSTINE -- SAFETY STANDARDS ENGINEER

TITLE: REVISION OF FMVSS NO.108 (DOCKET NO.85-15 NOTICE 8)

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER 08/23/89 FROM STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA TO TAKAYOSHI CHIKADA; REDBOOK A34[3]; STANDARD 108

TEXT: Dear Mr. Van Iderstine,

We thank you very much for your kind cooperation during our stay in the U.S. for SAE Lighting Committee Meeting.

We would like have your advice concerning interpretation of new FMVSS No. 108 (Docket No.85-15 Notice 8).

1. The requirement of S7.7.5.1.a) was not applied to replaceable type headlamp by previous FMVSS No.108. Please give us your advice whether this requirement will also be applied to the replaceable bulb type headlamps which are already manufactured accor ding to the previous FMVSS No.108.

2. The requirement of S7.7.5.1.b) need to quote SAE J580 b "Sealed Beam Headlamp Assembly" by previous FMVSS No. 108 and the expression seem to be slightly different from new S7.7.5.1.b). Please advice us whether the requirement of "0.1 in. max." is cond itioned when headlamp is being pushed or after said force is removed.

3. How should we prove the confirmation to the requirement of S7.7.2.2? We think the combinations of Horizontal and Vertical angle within the aim range will be so huge and it is not practicable to test for all combinations.

4. It is acceptable to set up initial "0" point of S7.7.5.2.a).2) not mechanically but photometrically?

Please give us your advice by return facsimile.

We thank you very much in advance.

Yours faithfully,

ID: nht89-2.50

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: STEPHEN P. WOOD -- NHTSA ACTING CHIEF COUNSEL

TO: BUTLER DERRICK -- UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: TEXT OF THE RULING BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING THE STATE'S LAW REQUIRING SEAT BELT USE BY DRIVERS AND FRONT SEAT PASSENGERS IN AUTOMOBILES; DATED 10/01/86; LETTER DATED 07/11/89 FROM BUTLER DERRICK -- CONGRESS TO STEVE WOOD -- NHTSA

TEXT: Dear Mr. Derrick:

Thank you for your July 11, 1989 letter on behalf of one of your constituents in South Carolina, asking whether mandatory safety belt use laws are constitutional. I am pleased to have this chance to provide you with the following information.

Before addressing your specific question, I would like to emphasize that effectively enforced State laws requiring the proper use of safety belts offer our best opportunity to save lives today at virtually no cost to the consumer. We recognize that a saf ety belt use law requires an action that many people do not take voluntarily. However, all traffic laws involve some restraint on individual behavior. Most are accepted without a second thought: we drive on the right side of the road, instead of the le ft, we stop for red lights, and we obey speed limits. In many cases, the failure of motorists to obey these traffic laws will have an impact on motorists besides the violator.

The same is true when motorists fail to wear safety belts. Automobile accidents have many victims -- family, friends, employers, and taxpayers -- all of whom bear some measure of the human and economic cost. During the past decade, 470,000 persons have died on American highways. Each year, an estimated 300,000 are injured seriously enough to require hospital treatment. These traffic injuries and deaths have resulted in an annual cost to society of $ 57 billion, including such costs as workman's comp ensation, welfare payments and lost tax revenues. Because of the substantial societal burden imposed by vehicle-related deaths and injuries, we believe that State legislatures have more than adequate justification to impose the relatively small intrusio n on individual liberties that results from mandatory safety belt use laws.

The constitutionality of State mandatory use laws has been upheld by the courts of three different States, Illinois, Nebraska, and New York. I have enclosed a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion on this issue (Illinois v. Kohrig, decided Octobe r 1, 1986). The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kohrig, on the grounds that it did not present a substantial Federal question. This dismissal suggests that the[Illegible Words]

You also stated that your constituent believes that the Supreme Court has declared laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets to be unconstitutional.

This belief is inaccurate. Page 7 of the enclosed Kohrig decision lists 35 different State and Federal cases that have held that State laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are a valid exercise of a State's powers and not unconstitutional. That list shows that the Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision that the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet use law was a constitutional exercise of a State's power (Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review decisions by State Courts in Lousiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and Wisconsin upholding the constitutionality of State motorcycle helmet use laws. There are no Supreme Court decisions suggesting that State motorcycle helmet use laws are unconstitutional exercises of the State's power.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions or need some additional information on this subject.

Sincerely,

ENCLOSURE

ID: nht89-2.51

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 07/31/89

FROM: W. MARSHALL RICKERT -- MVA

TO: CONSTANCE A. MORELLA -- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 11/29/89 ESTIMATED, FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER -- NHTSA TO JOHN D. DINGELL -- HOUSE; REDBOOK A34; STANDARD 205; LETTER DATED 09/22/89 FROM JOHN D. DINGELL -- HOUSE TO JEFFREY R. MILLER; LETTER DATED 08/25/89 FROM CONSTANCE A. MORELLA -- HOUSE TO NORMAN Y. MINETA -- HOUSE; LETTER DATED 07/08/88 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO NORMAN D. SHUNWAY -- CONGRESS; STANDARD 205; LETTER DATED 11/01/88 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO BEVERLY B. BYRON -- HOUSE; STANDARD 205

TEXT: Dear Congresswoman Morella:

I am writing in response to your letter of July 6, 1989, regarding Katherine M. Dante's letter to you requesting assistance in obtaining a waiver to permit tinted windows on her automobile. You may recall that Mrs. Dante suffers from a skin disease c alled Vitaligo, and has been advised to avoid exposure to the sun's rays.

Unfortunately, the Motor Vehicle Administration has limited authority under present Federal law and regulations to waive standards for window tinting. Title 15, Section 1397(a) of the U.S. Code provides the standards for light transmittance permitted in a new vehicle's window glazing. That Section also makes it a violation of federal law for a car manufacturer, distributer, dealer or repair business to "render inoperative" the glazing installed in the new vehicle. Thus, after the new car is sold, a used car dealer or motor vehicle repair business cannot add tinting to a vehicle which would result in a light transmittance level which did not meet the federal standards for durability and opacity.

Current federal law does not allow for any medical exemptions from this prohibition. Federal law does not, however, prohibit an individual from applying window tinting to his or her own vehicle, even if such application results in a light transmittan ce level which does not conform with the federal standard. Maryland's regulations, however, do prohibit an individual from applying any tinting to a vehicle.

I am informed by my staff and the State Police that there are no window tinting products currently on the market which, when applied, would still meet the federal standard. I am attaching two explanations of this law - one from my counsel and one con tained in a letter from the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to Congresswoman Beverly Byron.

It seems to me there are two things that can be done. On the State level I will explore with the State Police the possibility of amending Maryland's regulation to allow an individual to apply tinting to his or her own vehicle for medical reasons. Ho wever, I believe that federal law should also be amended to allow a motor vehicle repair business to apply tinting which does not conform with federal standards if the tinting is needed for medical reasons. I frankly do not know how difficult it is to a pply tinting, but it seems ludicrous to state that an individual can apply tinting, but that that individual cannot hire someone else to apply it.

I hope my explanation and suggestions are helpful. Mrs. Dante is not alone in her frustration with this law. I intend to do all I can to provide for a medical waiver, but I think it is going to take a joint Federal/State effort to accomplish this g oal. I would be happy to pursue this further with you.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Attachments

The abortion issue is now gone beyond "Right to(Illegible Word) It now threatens our Basic Bill of Rights and the Constitutes who is to say that in the future the table would be turned and mandatory abortions for population control, ie. China would be law. I urge you to side with "Freedom of Choice" and protect our Democracy.

2) Tinted Glass on Motor Vehicles

In the state of Maryland, the law states that only RV, Trucks, Vans, Mini Vans, Limo's are legally allowed to have tinted glass. This I find confusing. The operators of these Vehicles have to visualize traffic conditions the same as the operator of a passenger car. The MVA reason for permitting the tinted glass on the above vehicles, is that they posses a Rear View mirror on the passenger side of the Vehicle. As you are well aware this option is very easily attainable on a passenger car also.

I was informed that the statute stems from a federal law passed in early 1960's, however each state has the ability to ammend this statute. With current advances in technology since 1960's, both in the tinted films, and(Illegible Word) tint manufactu red into the glass, The Visual acuity is unaltered. Tinted glass decreases harmful Ultra Violet Rays, that cause glare for and heat within the automobile. This is especially noticed on those Hot, Humid, Washington D.C. Days, especially for passengers ( Illegible Word) in 3rd seats of STATION wagons. I feel there is no reason why passenger cars should be excluded from possessing tinted glass as long as it meets current industry specifications and the vehicle is properly equiped.

ID: nht89-2.52

TYPE: INTERPRETATION-NHTSA

DATE: 08/01/89

FROM: MICHAEL E. KASTNER -- DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS NTEA WASHINGTON OFFICE

TO: SAMUEL K. SKINNER SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

TITLE: NONE

ATTACHMT: ATTACHED TO LETTER DATED 08/24/89 EST; FROM JEFFREY R. MILLER -- NHTSA TO MICHAEL E. KASTNER -- NATIONAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION; REDBOOK A34; STANDARD 204; LETTER DATED 08/26/87 FROM ERIKA Z. JONES -- NHTSA TO TAK FUJITANI; LETTER DATED 06 /29/89 FROM SAMUEL K. SKINNER -- DOT TO ERNEST F. HOLLINGS -- SENATE

TEXT: Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing on behalf of the National Truck Equipment Association ("NTEA"), which represents over 1,400 companies involved in the manufacture and distribution of commercial and vocational trucks, to express our concern with the Department of Transpor tation's ("DOT" or the "Department") intention to extend regulations that currently apply only to passenger vehicles to the full range of light trucks including those that are not used for family transportation.

Recently you received from Senator Hollings, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, and others on the Committee, a letter requesting that the Department, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA" or the "Agency") in particula r, take steps to apply certain passenger car Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("Safety Standards" or "FMVSS") to light trucks, vans and sport-utility vehicles. In response, you indicated that the Department would make recommendations to the White House concerning such rulemaking initiatives. Senator Hollings' request was based on the fact that such vehicles "are being used primarily for transporting families rather than hauling freight."

In light of two rulemaking proceedings completed by NHTSA within the past 18 months, in which the Agency failed adequately to distinguish between vehicles used for "transporting families" from those used for "hauling freight," the NTEA questions wheth er the Agency has sufficient understanding of the relevant facts and law to pursue such new rulemaking initiatives fairly and objectively. Although the Agency has made an effort to understand the multi-stage manufactured truck industry, we fear that, unt il the Agency fully appreciates the manner in which trucks are produced, it will continue to adopt regulatory requirements that impose impossible burdens on the small- and medium-sized companies in the truck body and equipment industry.

In November 1987, the Agency published two final rules that resulted in the dynamic testing (i.e., crash testing) requirements of FMVSS 204 (steering column rearward displacement) and 208 (occupant crash protection) being applied to a wider array of l ight-truck types and an increased population of multi-stage truck manufacturers. The NTEA submitted a petition for reconsideration of each final rule. NHTSA denied the NTEA's petitions for reconsideration for FMVSS 208 in December 1988 and for FMVSS 20 4 in June 1989.

NTEA argued in its petitions for reconsideration that dynamic testing cannot reasonably and practicably be applied to the small- and medium-sized businesses that produce work-related light trucks manufactured in two or more stages. NHTSA rejected the NTEA's arguments, primarily on the basis that, under the present Safety Standard certification requirements, final-stage manufacturers could effectively avoid certifying to Safety Standards that include dynamic testing requirements. NHTSA expressly ackn owledged that final-stage manufacturers "do not have the engineering or financial resources to conduct dynamic testing."

The alternatives to dynamic testing offered by NHTSA to the truck body and equipment industry demonstrate that the Agency misunderstands its own regulations and the manner in which commercial vehicles are produced in the United States. These misunder standings, which we believe render the Agency's rulemaking arbitrary and capricious, include the following threshold issues:

1. NHTSA has Misinterpreted its Certification Regulations

According to NHTSA, "[t]he final-stage manufacturer need not conduct any crash testing or engineering analyses if it completes its vehicles within the limits specified by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. . . . When the vehicle is completed within the incomplete vehicle manufacturer's specification, the final-stage manufacturer need only so state on its certification label and the responsibility for the vehicle's conformity with the standards rests entirely on the incomplete vehicle manufacturer. " 54 Fed. Reg. 24348 for FMVSS 204 and similarly at 53 Fed. Reg. 50225 for FMVSS 208.

In the denial of NTEA's petition for reconsideration of FMVSS 208, NHTSA states that "[t]hose provisions [the certification regulations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 567 and 568] require the incomplete vehicle manufacturers (companies such as Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) to certify the compliance of their incomplete vehicles, and require the final-stage manufacturers to certify the compliance of the components they mount on the vehicle and the effect of the mounting, and thus obtain effective certificati on of the completed vehicle without imposing unreasonable burdens on either incomplete or final-stage manufacturers." 53 Fed. Reg. 60226. (Emphasis added.)

NHTSA mistakenly concludes that small businesses completing vehicles need not certify to Safety Standards that include dynamic testing requirements. This conclusion is based in part on NHTSA's incorrect belief that the incomplete vehicle manufacturer is required to certify compliance with FMVSS 204 and 208 in all cases, and that the final- stage manufacturer need not certify to these Safety Standards if vehicles are completed within the limits established in the incomplete vehicle document. This co nclusion is contrary to the plain language of NHTSA's own regulations.

The small businesses that complete commercial and vocational vehicles on chassis other than a chassis-cab, (i.e., chassis without an enclosed cab compartment, including cut-aways, chassis cowls and stripped chassis) are required to certify the complia nce of the completed vehicle to all applicable Safety Standards, including those which require dynamic testing. 49 C.F.R. 567; See, also, letter from Erika Jones, NHTSA Chief Counsel, to Tak Fujitani, Project Manager, Inspection Services, Office of Flee t Administration, State of California (Aug. 6, 1987). Accordingly, final-stage manufacturers cannot escape the certification obligation when completing vehicles on these types of chassis. Final-stage manufacturers cannot, as NHTSA suggests, merely "pass through" the incomplete vehicle manufacturer's certification for non-chassis-cab incomplete vehicles because none exists. As the NHTSA Chief Counsel has pointed out, "the [incomplete vehicle] document is not a certification." Id. Incomplete vehicle ma nufacturers need only certify incomplete vehicles that are chassis-cabs (See 49 C.F.R. 567 and 568.), and provide an incomplete vehicle document for all incomplete vehicles, which "document is not a certification."

Thus, NHTSA's suggestion that small businesses involved in the production of trucks can avoid certifying to Safety Standards that include prohibitively costly, crash testing and/or engineering analyses (such as required by FMVSS 204 and 208) by comple ting vehicles within the parameters of the incomplete vehicle document is simply not correct for a substantial population of commercial and work-related vehicles.

2. NHTSA Operates Under a Clear Misunderstanding of the Truck Body and Equipment Industry

In its denials of the NTEA's petitions for reconsideration, NHTSA states: "When a final-stage manufacturer is unable to complete the vehicle within the specifications established by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer, the final-stage manufacturer can build the vehicle on a heavier chassis, and remain within the limits specified for that heavier chassis. Again, the final-stage manufacturer would not have to conduct any dynamic testing or engineering analyses prior to certifying that the vehicle compl ies with the safety standards." (53 Fed. Reg. 50225 and 54 Fed. Reg. 24348). NHTSA further states that "[i]t is also possible that the switch to a higher rated chassis would result in the completed vehicle not being subject to the dynamic testing require ments . . . (54 Fed. Reg. 24346-24347)."

NHTSA's statement that small businesses can avoid certifying to Safety Standards that include dynamic testing requirements by building on a heavier chassis demonstrates that NHTSA does not understand how commercial and vocational vehicles (i.e., all l ight trucks other than unmodified pickups and vans) are produced. In virtually all cases, the customer and the chassis dealer, without input from the final-stage manufacturer, select the chassis to be used for the work-related vehicle and the specificat ions for the completion of the vehicle. With respect to the sale of new commercial and vocational vehicles, the final-stage manufacturer is typically a subcontractor to the dealer. The final-stage manufacturer does not have the option to change the cus tomer's vehicle specifications so as to avoid a certification obligation. NHTSA obviously does not fully appreciate the fact that commercial and vocational vehicles are custom ordered and built to buyer specifications in virtually all cases, and that the small businesses that complete such vehicles act almost exclusively as subcontractors. NHTSA's suggestion that building on a heavier chassis as an alternative to certifying compliance with Safety Standards has absolutely no basis in the reality of the marketplace.

Thus, as the foregoing demonstrates, both of the alternatives NHTSA offers to small businesses to avoid the dynamic testing obligation -- completing vehicles within the incomplete vehicle documentation specifications or building on a heavier chassis - - fail to provide adequate relief to the small businesses that complete commercial and vocational light trucks. In light of NHTSA's acknowledgement that intermediate-and final-stage manufacturers and vehicle alterers cannot, as a group, comply with dyna mic testing requirements, the absence of meaningful alternatives places these businesses in an untenable position. A safety standard that cannot be complied with is neither reasonable nor practicable.

Although this letter has focused only on two inadequacies in the rulemaking record of FMVSS 208 and 204, other significant flaws exist. These include, but are not limited to, NHTSA's failure to conduct any comprehensive study of the multi-stage manuf acturing truck industry and the work-related vehicles produced (other than NHTSA's apparent reliance on limited data submitted nearly a decade ago by a now defunct trade association) in the course of its rulemaking.

We trust that the issues raised in this letter demonstrates the validity of the truck equipment industry's concern over continued rulemaking that would extend passenger-car Safety Standards to all light trucks. We fear that such rulemaking will resul t in Safety Standards that are overly broad and arbitrarily reach commercial/vocational trucks.

The NTEA agrees with Senator Hollings that vehicles designed, marketed, manufactured and used primarily as passenger or family transportation vehicles should be subject to Safety Standards adopted for passenger cars regardless of whether the vehicles are commonly thought of as automobiles, light trucks, vans or sport-utility vehicles. However, vehicles designed, marketed, manufactured and used primarily for commercial, work-related, vocational or emergency purposes, and not for personal transportati on should not be regulated in the same manner as passenger-oriented cars or trucks. While the users of such commercial vehicles should be assured of their safety, in the absence of accident and fatality data suggesting that identical regulation is neces sary and appropriate, the Safety Standards that apply to passenger-oriented vehicles should not be applied arbitrarily to work-related trucks. Moreover, where it is determined that particular Safety Standards should apply to all passenger-oriented vehic les and work-related trucks, the dynamic testing requirements that are imposed and may be appropriate for single-stage, assembly-line produced cars and trucks cannot and should not be imposed on multi-stage produced trucks because of the nature of the mu lti-stage manufacturing truck industry. We believe that this view is consistent with the sentiments of the Senate and is consistent with the spirit of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

We recognize that you must make recommendations to the White House concerning the application of passenger car Safety Standards to light trucks, vans and sport utility vehicles. We urge you, however, to reexamine the previous two rulemaking proceedin gs and conduct a comprehensive study of the unique problems encountered by multi-stage manufacturers in certifying compliance with applicable Safety Standards before undertaking any of these new rulemaking initiatives.

Representatives from the NTEA would be happy to meet with you to provide more detail on the truck body and equipment industry and its concerns. Please feel free to contact me in Washington, D.C. at 628-2010.

Sincerely yours,