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NHTSA Interpretation File Search

Overview

NHTSA's Chief Counsel interprets the statutes that the agency administers and the standards and regulations that it issues. Members of the public may submit requests for interpretation, and the Chief Counsel will respond with a letter of interpretation. These interpretation letters look at the particular facts presented in the question and explain the agency’s opinion on how the law applies given those facts. These letters of interpretation are guidance documents. They do not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. They are intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or agency policies. 

Understanding NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

NHTSA makes its letters of interpretation available to the public on this webpage. 

An interpretation letter represents the opinion of the Chief Counsel based on the facts of individual cases at the time the letter was written. While these letters may be helpful in determining how the agency might answer a question that another person has if that question is similar to a previously considered question, do not assume that a prior interpretation will necessarily apply to your situation.

  • Your facts may be sufficiently different from those presented in prior interpretations, such that the agency's answer to you might be different from the answer in the prior interpretation letter;
  • Your situation may be completely new to the agency and not addressed in an existing interpretation letter;
  • The agency's safety standards or regulations may have changed since the prior interpretation letter was written so that the agency's prior interpretation no longer applies; or
  • Some combination of the above, or other, factors.

Searching NHTSA’s Online Interpretation Files

Before beginning a search, it’s important to understand how this online search works. Below we provide some examples of searches you can run. In some cases, the search results may include words similar to what you searched because it utilizes a fuzzy search algorithm.

Single word search

 Example: car
 Result: Any document containing that word.

Multiple word search

 Example: car seat requirements
 Result: Any document containing any of these words.

Connector word search

 Example: car AND seat AND requirements
 Result: Any document containing all of these words.

 Note: Search operators such as AND or OR must be in all capital letters.

Phrase in double quotes

 Example: "headlamp function"
 Result: Any document with that phrase.

Conjunctive search

Example: functionally AND minima
Result: Any document with both of those words.

Wildcard

Example: headl*
Result: Any document with a word beginning with those letters (e.g., headlamp, headlight, headlamps).

Example: no*compl*
Result: Any document beginning with the letters “no” followed by the letters “compl” (e.g., noncompliance, non-complying).

Not

Example: headlamp NOT crash
Result: Any document containing the word “headlamp” and not the word “crash.”

Complex searches

You can combine search operators to write more targeted searches.

Note: The database does not currently support phrase searches with wildcards (e.g., “make* inoperative”). 

Example: Headl* AND (supplement* OR auxiliary OR impair*)
Result: Any document containing words that are variants of “headlamp” (headlamp, headlights, etc.) and also containing a variant of “supplement” (supplement, supplemental, etc.) or “impair” (impair, impairment, etc.) or the word “auxiliary.”

Search Tool

NHTSA's Interpretation Files Search



Displaying 941 - 950 of 16517
Interpretations Date

ID: 06-007782jeg

Open

Mr. Lance Tunick

Vehicle Services Consulting, Inc.

P.O. Box 23078

Santa Fe, NM 87502-3078

Dear Mr. Tunick:

This responds to your letter asking several questions about Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) No. 207, Seating Systems, No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages. Your questions are addressed below.

Issues Related to FMVSS No. 210 and FMVSS No. 207

 

Background

 

Your first questions relate to S4.2.2 of FMVSS No. 210. That paragraph reads as follows:

S4.2.2  Except as provided in S4.2.5, and except for side facing seats, the anchorages, attachment hardware, and attachment bolts for any of the following seat belt assemblies shall withstand a 3,000 pound force applied to the lap belt portion of the seat belt assembly simultaneously with a 3,000 pound force applied to the shoulder belt portion of the seat belt assembly, when tested in accordance with S5.2 of this standard:

(a) Type 2 and automatic seat belt assemblies that are installed to comply with Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208); and

(b) Type 2 and automatic seat belt assemblies that are installed at a seating position required to have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly by Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208).

S4.2.5, referenced at the beginning of S4.2.2, provides:

S4.2.5 The attachment hardware of a seat belt assembly, which is subject to the requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) by virtue of any provision of Standard No. 208 other than S4.1.2.1(c)(2) of that standard, does not have to meet the requirements of S4.2.1 and S4.2.2 of this standard.



Your Question 1

 

Your first question asks: When is S4.2.2 of FMVSS No. 210 not applicable by virtue of S4.2.5? You stated that a passenger car manufactured after September 1, 2006 must have a Type 2 seat belt assembly at each front outboard designated seating position by virtue of S4.1.5 of 49 CFR 571.208 and not by virtue of S4.1.2.1(c)(2). You asked whether it is correct that passenger cars manufactured after September 1, 2006 do not have to meet the strength requirements of S4.2.1 and S4.2.2 of FMVSS No. 210.

In considering your question, we have reviewed the history of the provision at issue. On December 5, 1991, in a final rule relating to responses to petitions for reconsideration published in the Federal Register (56 FR 63676, 63677),[1] NHTSA decided to exclude from FMVSS No. 210 the attachment hardware of dynamically tested manual safety belt systems which are the only occupant restraint at a seating position. The agency believed that the FMVSS No. 210 tests were unnecessarily redundant for these dynamically tested systems.

However, NHTSA also explained that it does not consider a manual belt installed at a seating position that is also equipped with an air bag to be dynamically tested, and therefore, the attachment hardware of these belts was subjected to the FMVSS No. 210 strength tests. To accomplish this, the agency included the provision in FMVSS No. 210 citing S4.1.2.1(c)(2) of FMVSS No. 208.

Subsequent to this, the agency has not amended or proposed to amend this requirement of FMVSS No. 210. However, the agency did amend FMVSS No. 208 in a way that made the cross-reference in FMVSS No. 210 outdated, while not making conforming changes to FMVSS No. 210.

Your Question 2

Your second question asks: In a case where S4.2.2 of FMVSS No. 210 is applicable, what is the force imposed on the seat under S4.2(c) of FMVSS No. 207?

S4.2 of FMVSS No. 207 reads in relevant part as follows:

S4.2   General performance requirements. When tested in accordance with S5., each occupant seat, other than a side-facing seat or a passenger seat on a bus, shall withstand the following forces, in newtons. . . .

(c) For a seat belt assembly attached to the seatthe force specified in paragraph (a), if it is a forward facing seat, or paragraph (b), if it is a rearward facing seat, in each case applied simultaneously with the forces imposed on the seat by the seat belt assembly when it is loaded in accordance with S4.2 of 571.210 . . .

In your letter, you state your belief that it is necessary to identify the force imposed on the seat by the seat belt to conduct testing under S4.2(c), and suggest ways of doing so. However, we disagree that it is necessary to identify or calculate these forces. Instead, the seat is loaded as specified in FMVSS No. 210 and the forces specified by FMVSS No. 207 applied simultaneously. Therefore, we do not agree with your suggested interpretation.

You also asked about a reference in Laboratory Test Procedure TP-207-9 which states that the force imposed on the seat frame is 4,950 pounds independent of the seat configuration. This Laboratory Test Procedure refers to the 4,950 pound (force) load when testing a lap belt with the seat system (20 times the weight of the seat).  We note that one of the loading conditions specified in FMVSS No. 210, which applies to lap belts, is a 5,000 pound force. See S4.2.1. The reference you ask about relates to that FMVSS No. 210 loading condition. For this particular compliance testing, we apply a load that is less severe than the 5,000 pounds specified in the standard.

 

We note, however, that manufacturers are required to certify their vehicles to the FMVSSs and not to the laboratory test procedures. TP-207-9 includes the following note on page 1:

The OVSC Laboratory Test Procedures, prepared for use by independent laboratories under contract to conduct compliance tests for the OVSC, are not intended to limit the requirements of the applicable FMVSS(s). In some cases, the OVSC Laboratory Test Procedures do not include all of the various FMVSS minimum performance requirements. Sometimes, recognizing applicable test tolerances, the Test Procedures specify test conditions which are less severe than the minimum requirements of the standards themselves. Therefore, compliance of a vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment is not necessarily guaranteed if the manufacturer limits certification tests to those described in the OVSC Laboratory Test Procedures.

Issues related to S4.1.5 and S7.1.1 of FMVSS No. 208

 

Background

You asked several questions related to S4.1.5 and S7.1 of FMVSS No. 208. These paragraphs read as follows:

S4.1.5   Passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1996.

S4.1.5.1   Frontal/angular automatic protection system. (a) Each passenger car manufactured on or after September 1, 1996 shall:

. . .

(3) At each front designated seating position that is an outboard designated seating position, as that term is defined at 49 CFR 571.3, and at each forward-facing rear designated seating position that is a rear outboard designated seating positions, as that term is defined at S4.1.4.2(c) of this standard, have a Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and S7.1 through S7.3 of this standard, and, in the case of the Type 2 seat belt assemblies installed at the front outboard designated seating positions, meet the frontal crash protection requirements with the appropriate anthropomorphic test dummy restrained by the Type 2 seat belt assembly in addition to the means that requires no action by the vehicle occupant. . . .

S7.1   Adjustment.

S7.1.1  Except as specified in S7.1.1.1 and S7.1.1.2, the lap belt of any seat belt assembly furnished in accordance with S4.1.2 shall adjust by means of any emergency-locking or automatic-locking retractor that conforms to 571.209 to fit persons whose dimensions range from those of a 50th percentile 6-year-old child to those of a 95th percentile adult male

. . .

Your Questions

 

You note in your letter that S7.1.1 specifies certain requirements for seat belt assemblies furnished in accordance with S4.1.2. You ask whether S7.1.1 applies to vehicles manufactured after September 1, 2006, in which the seat belt assemblies are furnished in accordance with S4.1.5.

The answer is yes. The reason for this is that S4.1.5 itself specifies that these vehicles must have seat belt assemblies that conform to S7.1. See S4.1.5.1(2) and (3). We note that the version of S4.1.5 establishing requirements for vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1996 was established by NHTSA in the September 1993 final rule implementing the Congressional requirement for light vehicles to be equipped with an air bag and a manual lap/shoulder belt at both the drivers and right front passengers seating position. In the regulatory text specifying requirements for these vehicles, the agency included the adjustment requirements of S7.1.

You also ask whether parts of S7.1 are outdated. The discussion provided above may provide the information you desire in this area. If not, we would need a more specific question from you.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have further questions, please contact Edward Glancy of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

ref: 207#208#210#101#VSA102(4)

d.6/22/07




[1] See also Final rule; delay of effective date and response to petitions for reconsideration; 57 FR 32902; July 24, 1992.

2007

ID: 06-007783rls

Open

Jesse Houle, P.E.

Westport Power Inc.

1691 West 75th Avenue

Vancouver, B.C.

V6P 6P2

Dear Mr. Houle:

This responds to your email requesting our interpretation of whether an accumulator vessel is regulated under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 304, Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container Integrity (FMVSS No. 304). Specifically, you ask if S3 (Application) of Standard No. 304 covered your implementation of [a] small accumulator vessel as a pressure damping device and not a storage device. Based on the information you have provided, we conclude that this tank is subject to FMVSS No. 304.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment (see 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301). NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. Instead, manufacturers are required to self-certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards that are in effect on the date of manufacture. NHTSA selects a sampling of new vehicles and equipment each year to determine their compliance with applicable FMVSSs. If our testing or examination reveals an apparent noncompliance, we may require the manufacturer to remedy the noncompliance, and may initiate an enforcement proceeding if necessary to ensure that the manufacturer takes appropriate action.

In your email, you described a fuel system consisting of one or more liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage vessels with internally mounted pumps and vaporizers. You said that the LNG system compresses and vaporizes the LNG and delivers compressed natural gas (CNG) to another system that delivers CNG to the engine-mounted fuel system. Your question was whether a 9-liter Type 3 vessel would be subject to the requirements of Standard No. 304 if its purpose was as an accumulator to provide additional system volume to compensate for pump pressure fluctuations.

Standard No. 304 specifies requirements for the integrity of CNG motor vehicle fuel containers. As defined in S4 of Standard No. 304, CNG fuel container means a container designed to store CNG as motor fuel on-board a motor vehicle. You state that The



accumulator is not intended to provide storage capacity but is purely there to dampen pressure pulsations. Despite your assertion, it appears from your description and schematics of the accumulator vessel that the container in question could and most likely does store CNG.

Based on your schematics, NHTSA believes that the tank falls within the category of vessels that FMVSS No. 304 is meant to regulate. Your email explained that the accumulator tank maintains pressure to the engine for combustion: that suggests to NHTSA that the tank is never empty of CNG, and may contain a considerable amount of CNG at any given time depending on how the fuel system is running. Simply because you assert that the additional system volume provided by the tank is only for dampening pressure fluctuations does not remove the tank from being subject to FMVSS No. 304s requirements. The tank still would contain CNG as motor fuel, and the test requirements of FMVSS No. 304 are designed to ensure a basic level of safety for such tanks.

For your additional information, we also note that the vehicle in which your vessel is installed could be subject to Standard No. 303, Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles, if it is a school bus or has a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less. FMVSS No. 303 applies to new passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less and to all school buses that use CNG as a motor fuel.

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact Rebecca Schade of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely yours,

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

ref:304

d.4/25/07

2007

ID: 06-007784as

Open

Mr. Brian J. Conaway

1771 Locust Street,

Denver, CO 80220

Dear Mr. Conaway:

This responds to your letter asking us to reconsider our determination that the Hip Hugger is not a child restraint system (CRS) under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, Child Restraint Systems.[1] The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) previously wrote to you about the Hip Hugger on June 1, 2001, and October 26, 2006. In todays letter, we answer your five questions and confirm our previous opinions that the Hip Hugger is not a CRS.

1. Your first question asks how exactly does a Harness itself 1) restrain, 2) seat, or 3) position a child who weighs 30 kg or less? You state that a harness alone cannot place or arrange the location of the child on the vehicle seat. Unlike the Hip Hugger, a harness restrains a child when used as directed, whereas the Hip Hugger merely positions the seat belt on the child. The difference is that a harness itself is the physical item that restrains the child in the event of a crash, whereas the Hip Hugger is not. The Hip Hugger appears to be a belt-positioning device.

2. Your second question asks since a Belt Positioning System [sic] (BPS) does not position a child on the vehicle seat, how can it be classified as a BPS? A belt-positioning seat is defined in FMVSS No. 213 (S4) as follows:

Belt-positioning seat means a child restraint system that positions a child on a vehicle seat to improve the fit of a vehicle Type II belt system on the child and lacks any component, such as a belt system or structural element, designed to restrain forward movement of the childs torso in a forward impact.

You seem to believe that, to meet the definition of a belt-positioning seat, the device must position a child to sit directly on the vehicle seat. This is not correct. Belt-positioning seats typically provide a seating platform that raises the child to fit the vehicles belt system, and that enables the child to bend his or her knees in a comfortable seating position.

3. Your third question asks, since the Hip Hugger does position a child on a vehicle seat to improve the fit of the Type II belt system on the child and lacks any component, such as a belt system or structural element designed to restrain forward movement of the childs torso on a standard impact, why exactly is it not a BPS? The answer is that a belt-positioning seat positions the child such as by raising him or her to better position the seat belts on the childs torso. The Hip Hugger positions the seat belt by locking it in place at the childs hip, rather than positioning the child relative to the restraint system. The Hip Hugger does not restrain, seat, or position children and thus is not a child restraint system, and is not a belt-positioning seat. The Hip Hugger is more accurately described as a seat belt positioner.

4. Your fourth question asks how your device differs from the Britax Laptop, which you state does not restrain, seat, or position children who weigh 30 kilograms or less? You ask that we examine a printout of a page from a website[2] describing the Laptop. According to the website, the Britax Laptop comes STRAIGHT up the child's chest and covers the breastbone of the child more snugly. Due to the snug LAPTOP fit on the chest of the child, the laptop will keep the upper body from wrapping forward. The device also has sides which would appear to prevent the child from moving side to side.

The Laptop restrains the child occupant with the structural element in front of the childs chest preventing forward movement. The sides of the Laptop position a child to sit upright within the confines of the device. In contrast, your Hip Hugger only positions the vehicles seat belts to fit the child.

5. Your fifth question asks, how can NHTSA continue to not recognize the superior crash test performance of the Hip Hugger when compared to other recognized CRSs and not be in conflict with the stated purpose of FMVSS No. 213?

The Hip Hugger does not meet the definition of a child restraint system, so it is not regulated by FMVSS No. 213. You are not prohibited by FMVSS No. 213 from selling the device. You only must not certify it as a child restraint system complying with FMVSS No. 213.[3]

Please note that the agency is not persuaded that FMVSS No. 213 should be amended to have the Hip Hugger be considered a child restraint system or a belt-positioning seat. The Hip Hugger is a type of device that NHTSA once described as a seat belt positioner in a 1999 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM; 64 FR 44164). In the NPRM, NHTSA considered issuing a consumer information regulation for seat belt positioners, which were proposed to be defined as a device, other than a belt-positioning seat, that is manufactured to alter the positioning of Type I and/or Type II belt systems in motor vehicles. The proposed rulemaking was withdrawn in 2004 (69 FR 13503, 13504). In withdrawing the rulemaking, NHTSA expressed concern that the rulemaking could have resulted in some parents thinking that seat belt positioners and belt-positioning seats were interchangeable as far as occupant protection, which the agency does not believe to be true. NHTSA believed that children who have outgrown their toddler seats are best restrained when in a belt-positioning seat. A copy of the 2004 notice is enclosed.

 

In closing, we trust that our several letters to you about the Hip Hugger have fully addressed your questions. Because we have limited resources and staff, we regret that we will not be able to answer further letters from you on this subject that are redundant with regard to the issues you have previously raised. Thank you for your interest in FMVSS No. 213, and if you need further information you may call Ari Scott of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

 

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

 

Enclosure

d.3/12/07

ref:213

 

 

 




[1] Child restraint system is defined in FMVSS No. 213 (S4) as follows: Child restraint system means any device, except Type I or Type II seat belts, designed for use in a motor vehicle or aircraft to restrain, seat, or position children who weigh 30 kilograms (kg) or less.

[2] http://www.epinions.com/content_71697469060

[3] As noted in previous correspondence, your device is an item of motor vehicle equipment. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment must ensure that their products are free of safety-related defects.

2007

ID: 06-007875--6 May 09 rewrite--rsy

Open

Jeff Ronning, PE

Senior Consultant

Rocky Mountain Institute

1739 Snowmass Creek Road

Snowmass, CO 81654-9199

Dear Mr. Ronning:

This responds to your inquiry to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of November 27, 2006. I apologize for the delay in responding. In your letter, you asked for our interpretation of 49 CFR Part 538 as it would apply to a plug-in electric hybrid design for a postal delivery vehicle. You ask for confirmation that your basic vehicle design will qualify as a dual-fuel vehicle so that the United States Postal Service (USPS) can be assured [you] are on the right course. You explained that if the vehicle is fully charged, it would be able to operate completely on electricity for most carriers where the average carrier route is only 15 miles, and that the gasoline engine would be used only for rare long-range travel and peripherals such as heating and all-wheel drive function. On January 9, 2007, you further asked by email whether a flex-fuel engine (i.e., one able to use either petroleum-based gasoline or ethanol E85 fuel) instead of a plain gas engine for the same hybrid vehicle would qualify as a dual-fuel vehicle under Part 538. Based on the information that you provided, either design would qualify as a dual-fuel vehicle for purposes of the dual-fuel CAFE incentive.

49 CFR Part 538, Manufacturing Incentives for Alternative Fuel Vehicles, is likely not directly relevant to the vehicle you described. Part 538 has three basic purposes. First, it establishes minimum driving range criteria to aid in identifying passenger automobiles that qualify as dual-fueled automobiles. Second, it establishes gallon-equivalent measurements for gaseous fuels other than natural gas. And finally, it extends the dual-fuel incentive program through model year 2008.

The minimum driving range criteria contained in 538.5 and 538.6 apply only to passenger automobiles. In the context of the CAFE program, passenger automobiles are defined as any automobile (other than an automobile capable of off-highway



operation) manufactured primarily for use in the transportation of not more than 10 individuals.[1] Although NHTSA leaves it to automobile manufacturers to classify their vehicles in the first instance for CAFE purposes, we would likely consider a postal delivery vehicle to be a non-passenger automobile (commonly referred to as a light truck), since it is manufactured primarily for carrying cargo, and not for transporting passengers. Thus, the minimum driving range criteria of Part 538 would likely not apply to your vehicle.[2]

The other two aspects of Part 538, gallon-equivalent measurements for gaseous fuels other than natural gas, and the extension of the incentive program through MY 2008, also would not apply to your vehicle. Since you described your vehicle as a plug-in hybrid, gallon-equivalent measurements for gaseous fuels would be irrelevant. Further, Part 538s extension of the incentive program has been superseded by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, which extended the program by statute through model year 2018.[3] Thus, Part 538 would likely not apply to your vehicle.

However, your vehicle may still qualify for the dual-fuel incentive under 49 U.S.C. 32905(b), whether or not 49 CFR Part 538 applies to it. A dual fueled automobile is defined (in relevant part) in 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(8) as an automobile that:

(A)   is capable of operating on alternative fuel and on gasoline or diesel fuel; [and]

(B)   provides equal or superior energy efficiency, as calculated for the applicable model year during fuel economy testing for the United States Government, when operating on alternative fuel as when operating on gasoline or diesel fuel.

Alternative fuel, in turn, is defined at 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(1) as including:

(J) electricity (including electricity from solar energy); and

(K) any other fuel the Secretary of Transportation prescribes by regulation that is not substantially petroleum and that would yield substantial energy security and environmental benefits.

Based on this statutory language, NHTSA interprets electricity as an alternative fuel only if it is not substantially petroleum. The electricity on which the alternative fuel vehicle operates must come from some source other than petroleum-based gasoline pumped into the vehicle; for example, from the grid, as in a plug-in hybrid, or from solar energy as the statute mentions.[4] Thus, we would likely consider a plug-in hybrid like your proposed design, whether it contained a gasoline engine or an engine that could also run on E85, to be a dual fueled automobile under 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(8).

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Rebecca Yoon of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely yours,

Stephen P. Wood

Acting Chief Counsel

ref:538

d.7/24/09




[1] 49 CFR 523.4, see also 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(18).

[2] Nevertheless, we note that it is possible that, in the course of examining your vehicle, NHTSA could conclude that in actuality it would be appropriately classified as a passenger automobile. In that situation, in order to qualify for the dual fuel incentive, your vehicle would be required to conform with Part 538 and 49 U.S.C. 32901(c), which specify that the vehicle must drive a nominal distance of 7.5 miles on its stored capacity of electricity when operated on the EPA urban test cycle and 10.2 miles when operated on the EPA highway test cycle.

[3] Pub. L. 110-140, Sec. 109 (Dec. 19, 2007).

[4] In contrast, in a regular hybrid electric vehicle, any electricity used to run the vehicle comes from stored regenerative braking force, which is derived from the operation of the gasoline engine.

2009

ID: 06-007881as

Open

James C. Morton, Jr., Vice Chairman

Nissan North America, Inc.

Government Affairs Office

196 Van Buren Street, Suite 450

Herndon, VA 20170-5345

Dear Mr. Morton:

This responds to your letter asking for an interpretation of one-piece instrument panels and console assemblies under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 201, Occupant Protection in Interior Impact. Specifically, you asked whether certain indicated seams would determine where the instrument panel ends and the center console begins. Seams do not necessarily denote where the instrument panel begins and the console assembly ends. However, as discussed below, we have interpreted where we believe the rearmost surface of the instrument panel is situated on your vehicle.

Your letter describes a one-piece design, where the instrument panel and the console assembly are attached to the floor and form a one-piece, contiguous, T-shaped design, extending rearward between the driver and passenger seats. In the diagrams included with your letter, you indicated two seams (one in Example A and the other in Example B) which you believe constitute the upper edge of the center console and the lower edge of the dashboard. You state that because S5.1.1(a) of FMVSS No. 201 excludes console assemblies from the head impact protection requirements of the standard, you believe that areas below the seam are not subject to the head impact protection requirements.

In the past, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has declined to pick the dividing line between the instrument panel and the console[1] in one-piece assemblies. In previous interpretations regarding this issue, we have instead used the language from S5.1.1(e) to analyze which portions of a one-piece assembly are subject to the head impact protection requirements of S5.1. We note that it is difficult to determine the dividing line between a dashboard and an adjoining console where there is no intervening gap, and so we continue to believe that using S5.1.1(e) to determine the areas where the head impact protection requirements apply is more appropriate.



S5.1.1(e) exempts areas below any point at which a vertical line is tangent to the rearmost surface of the panel. NHTSA addressed this issue in a 2006 letter to Robert Babcock, in which we stated that for the vehicle in question the rearmost surface of the instrument panelis the rearmost surface of the dashboard at the right front passenger seating position.[2]

Although it is difficult to tell from the oblique diagrams in your letter, a horizontal line drawn at the rearmost surface of the dashboard appears to fall between the seam in example A and the seam in example B. In this instance, a profile view would be helpful for a more precise interpretation. In the absence of an otherwise discernable rearmost surface of the instrument panel, NHTSA would not require areas below the line specified above to meet the head impact protection requirements of S5.1.

If you have any additional questions, please contact Ari Scott of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

NCC-112:AScott:mar:5/29/07:62992:OCC-007881

S:\INTERP\201\06-007881as.doc

Cc: NCC-112:AS:03/19/07:62992

NVS-100, NVS-200, Docket FMVSS 201




[1] September 21, 1988 letter to Mr. Hiroshi Kato.

[2] September 24, 2006 letter to Mr. Robert Babcock.

ID: 06-007883as

Open

Jeff Vey, President

Thoroughbred Motorsports

P.O. Box 369

22611 FM 15

Troup, TX 75789

Dear Mr. Vey:

This responds to your letter in which you seek clarification as to whether your product called the Thoroughbred Stallion, a three-wheeled vehicle designed for on-road use and weighing 1700 lbs, would be classified as a motorcycle for purposes of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs).  Based on the information provided in your letter and the analysis provided below, the Stallion would be considered a motorcycle for purposes of the FMVSSs.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment. A manufacturer must certify compliance of the product with all applicable FMVSSs prior to offering such product for sale.

Pursuant to the definition of "motorcycle" set forth in 49 CFR 571.3, all three-wheeled motor vehicles with motive power and a seat or saddle are classified as motorcycles, regardless of their weight. The pertinent portion of that section reads as follows:

Motorcycle means a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground.

As the Stallion is a three-wheeled motor vehicle with motive power, and has a seat for the rider, it would be considered a motorcycle under the FMVSS.

We note that you asked your question in connection with concerns you have about how your vehicle may be classified under California law, and that you ask for our opinion in order to pursue legislative changes in California.

Although we make no comment on California law, we note that if a State law classifies a vehicle differently than Federal law, preemption is an issue under 49 U.S.C. section 30103(b) if the State classification results in: (1) the vehicle being subject to a State



standard that regulates the same aspect of performance regulated by an FMVSS, and (2) the State standard is not identical to the FMVSS. In such an instance, the State safety standard would be preempted.

We hope this opinion is of assistance to you. If you have any other questions, please contact Ari Scott of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely,

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

d.3/5/07

ref:571

2007

ID: 06-007886rls

Open

Carl E. Peterson, Assistant Director

Public Fire Protection Division

National Fire Protection Association

1 Batterymarch Park

Quincy, MA 02169-7471

Dear Mr. Peterson:

This responds to your inquiry to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerning requirements for fire apparatus emergency warning lights.

You explained that your organization, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), has promulgated a standard for new automotive fire apparatus (NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus). NFPA 1901 includes requirements for emergency warning lights on fire apparatus for use when the apparatus is responding and calling for the right-of-way.

You said that the technical committee responsible for NFPA 1901 had received a request to modify that standard to allow the lower-level flashing warning lights in the rear of the fire apparatus to burn steady when the service brakes are applied while the apparatus is responding and calling for the right-of-way. The proponent of this idea believes that such an arrangement would make it easier for the driver following the fire apparatus to realize the apparatus is slowing or stopping. You described the proposed modification as an option, [that] would not replace or change any federally required stop lights, tail lights, turn signals, or marking lights. It would only be permitted if the warning lights are red and only during braking operations while calling for the right-of-way.

You requested an interpretation from NHTSA as to whether allowing these emergency warning lights to burn steady (not flash) during braking operations would conflict with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards or any other federal regulations for stop lamps on vehicles. We respond to your question below.

By way of background, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to issue FMVSSs that set performance requirements for new motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment (see 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301). NHTSA does not provide approvals of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment.  Instead, manufacturers are required to self-certify that their products conform to all applicable safety standards that are in effect on the date of manufacture. FMVSS No. 108 specifies requirements for original and replacement lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.  NHTSA selects a sampling of new vehicles and equipment each year to determine their compliance with applicable FMVSSs.  If our testing or examination reveals an apparent noncompliance, we may require the manufacturer to remedy the noncompliance, and may initiate an enforcement proceeding if necessary to ensure that the manufacturer takes appropriate action.

Under FMVSS No. 108, certain specified lamps and other lighting equipment for motor vehicles are directly required; additional lamps and lighting equipment may be voluntarily provided but are subject to S5.1.3, which prohibits installation of additional equipment that impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by [the] standard. We also note that S5.5.10(d) of the standard generally requires that all lamps, including auxiliary lighting, must be steady burning, unless otherwise specifically permitted.

In considering how FMVSS No. 108 applies to the lamps at issue, we first examine the current version of the lower-level flashing warning lamps in the rear of the fire apparatus that are activated when the vehicle is responding and calling for the right-of-way. As we understand your letter, these lamps are supplemental lamps provided in addition to the lamps required by FMVSS No. 108. As indicated above, additional lamps are permitted but must not impair the effectiveness of required lighting equipment. We note that FMVSS No. 108 does not specifically list emergency warning lamps for fire and other emergency vehicles as ones that may flash. However, as the agency has explained in previous interpretation letters, we traditionally defer to the judgment of the States as to the installation and use of emergency lighting devices on such state owned or regulated vehicles.

Under the possible revision to NFPA 1901 that you are considering, the lower-level flashing warning lamps in the rear of the fire apparatus could be designed to burn steady when the service brakes are applied while the apparatus is responding and calling for the right-of-way. This would only be permitted if the warning lights are red and only during braking operations while calling for the right-of-way. The effect of this design would be to provide an indication in addition to the required stop lamps that the brakes have been applied.

Recognizing that we traditionally defer to the judgment of the States as to the installation and use of flashing emergency devices on fire apparatus, we have also considered whether the modified design concept you ask about would impair the effectiveness of required lighting equipment. It is our opinion that it would not. In providing this interpretation, we considered the fact that stop lamps are required to be red, and the lamps at issue would also be red. Thus, as a practical matter, the lamps would, in situations where the fire apparatus is responding and calling for the right-of-way, operate as supplemental stop lamps with the same color as the required stop lamps.

We note that, in providing this interpretation, we are not endorsing NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus, or the possible change being evaluated.



If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact Rebecca Schade of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

Sincerely yours,

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

ref:108

d.3/29/07

2007

ID: 06-4519as

Open

Mr. Mark Connors

U.S. Compliance Specialist / Licensed Customs Broker

Buckland Global Trade Services, Inc.

Peace Bridge Plaza, Dock Area

Buffalo, NY 14213

Dear Mr. Connors:

This letter is in response to your request for clarification of 49 CFR 583.6, Procedure for determining U.S./Canadian parts content. This section is used for the determination of the percentage of U.S./Canadian Parts Content for each carline on a model year basis, a determination necessary for automobile parts content labeling. Specifically, you inquired whether the use of value in 49 CFR 583.6(c)(1) and total value of the material in 49 CFR 583.6(c)(4)(ii)(A)(1) for outside suppliers represents the outside suppliers selling prices to the manufacturer (including labor, overhead, and profit), or just the suppliers material costs. As explained below, this office interprets value, as used in these sections, to mean the outside suppliers selling price to the final manufacturer. This would include labor, overhead, and profit. We would use this meaning of value in determining the value added and the total value of the material.

By way of background, Congress enacted the American Automobile Labeling Act, Pub.L. 102-388 (Oct. 6, 1992), in part to regulate the labeling of vehicle components sold in the United States. In implementing this Congressional mandate, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a final rule on September 15, 1995 regulating the labeling of certain motor vehicle parts and requiring manufacturers to specify how much domestic value has been added to motor vehicle components.

One of Congress goals in enacting the American Automobile Labeling Act was for manufacturers to label the country of origin of vehicle engines and transmissions, so that American consumers would know if the major automobile components had been manufactured domestically. In determining the country of origin, if an assemblage was made in multiple countries, Congress stated that the country of origin means the country in which 50 percent or more of the dollar value added of an engine or transmission originated (106 Stat. 1558). The definition of value added is given in 49 U.S.C. 32304(A)(15), which reads:

"value added in the United States and Canada" means a percentage determined by subtracting the total purchase price of foreign content from the total purchase price, and dividing the remainder by the total purchase price, excluding costs incurred or profits made at the final assembly place and beyond (including advertising, assembly, labor, interest payments, and profits)

 

This definition can be broken down into two relevant parts. The first is the total purchase price of foreign content, which is the price that the parts supplier paid for the materials. The second is the total purchase price, which is the actual price paid by the vehicle manufacturer to the parts supplier. By subtracting the total purchase price of foreign content from the total purchase price, what remains is the cost of labor, overhead, profit, and additional material that the outside supplier has provided. This is the value added in the United States or Canada. To convert that into a percentage, take the value added figure and divide it by the total purchase price, then multiply by 100.

The methodology for calculating the value added was further explained in the Federal Register notice issued by NHTSA when it promulgated the final rule. In that notice, NHTSA stated:

The final rule (583.6(c)(4)(ii)) therefore specified that, in determining the value added in the United States or Canada of passenger motor vehicle equipment produced or assembled within the territorial boundaries of the United States or Canada, the cost of all foreign materials is subtracted from the total value (e.g., the price paid at the final assembly plant) of the equipment. The procedures specified that material is considered foreign to whatever extent part or all of the cost of the material is not determined to represent value added in the United States or Canada, traced back to raw materials.[1]

Note that this text explicitly refers to the total value as the price paid at the final assembly plant, which would include labor, overhead, and profits.

 

In summation, here is a short recap of the terms you requested clarification of:

 

Total value of the material, as described in 49 CFR 583.6(c)(4)(ii)(A)(1), is the outside suppliers selling price to the vehicle manufacturer.

 

Value added, as described in 49 CFR 583.6(c)(1), is the total value of the material minus the outside suppliers material costs. To turn that figure into a percentage, divide the value added by the total value of the material, and multiply by 100.

 

If you have any questions, please contact Ari Scott of my staff at (202) 366-2992.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

Anthony M. Cooke

Chief Counsel

 

 

ref:583

d.1/22/07

 

 

 




[1] 60 FR 47883.

2007

ID: 0636

Open

Messrs. Jim Cawse and Fred Diehl
Plastics Technology Division
General Electric Company
One Plastics Ave.
Pittsfield, MA 01201

Gentlemen:

We have received your letter of January 2, 1995, asking for a confirmation of the appropriateness of your proposed test procedures for plastic materials, as you wish to "continue to adhere to the SAE testing protocol as delineated in SAE J576C."

Paragraph S5.1.2 of Standard No. 108 requires, with certain exceptions, that plastic materials used for optical parts such as lenses and reflectors shall conform to SAE J576c. It has been the agency's position over the years that 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 (formerly the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) does not establish a requirement that a manufacturer actually conduct compliance testing, but requires only that a vehicle or equipment item conform to any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard if tested in the manner set forth in the standard. We have advised that a manufacturer may exercise due care in certifying compliance of its product on bases other than the test procedures that are set forth in the Federal motor vehicle safety standards, whether the procedures are incorporated by reference, as with J576c, or directly expressed in the standards themselves, although NHTSA itself will conduct its tests according to the procedures set forth in the standards. For this reason, we have no comment on the merits of your suggested approach.

Because the agency has proposed amending Standard No. 108 to substitute SAE J576 JUL91 for J576c, we are filing your letter in Docket No. 94-37 as a comment to be considered in this rulemaking. Enclosed is a copy of the proposal with which you are probably already familiar. Although the comment period closed on January 3, it is the agency's practice to consider late-filed comments to the extent practicable.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

Enclosure ref:108 d:2/6/95

1995

ID: 0649

Open

Mr. Jeffrey Echt
President, Saline Electronics, Inc.
13379 Michael Road
Highland, IL 62249

Dear Mr. Echt:

This replies to your letter of January 12, 1995, with respect to Federal requirements for stop lamps as they affect a stop lamp system developed by Saline Electronics.

As you describe the system, "during and after episodes of high, braking-induced deceleration, the system flashes the stop lamps it controls on and off." The stop lamps could either be the original equipment lamps, or one or more supplementary ones.

You have asked the following questions, based upon your understanding of the letter sent by this Office to the Virginia Transportation Research Council ("Virginia") on July 30, 1993:

"1. May states specifically permit (by statute or regulation) the use of deceleration warning systems which are neither original equipment nor replacements for original equipment? For example, may states specifically permit the use of an aftermarket deceleration warning system which a) permits all original equipment stop lamps required by FMVSS No. 108 to operate in a normal steady burning mode, and b) flashes one aftermarket center-mounted stop lamp or two side-mounted stop lamps, on vehicles not required to be so equipped?"

A State may enact a statute or regulation that specifically permits the use of deceleration warning systems that are neither original equipment nor replacements for original equipment if these systems are permissible as original equipment under FMVSS No. 108. As we informed Virginia, a deceleration warning system that is not permissible as original equipment under FMVSS No. 108 would also not be permissible as an aftermarket system because its installation by a person other than the vehicle owner would be in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(2) (now recodified as 49 U.S.C.

30122(b)). This section prohibits manufacturers, dealers, distributors and motor vehicle repair businesses from knowingly making inoperative any part of a device installed on a motor vehicle in accordance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard.

After careful review, it is our opinion that the system you describe is indirectly prohibited by two paragraphs of FMVSS No. 108. Because paragraph S5.5.10(d) of FMVSS No. 108 requires original equipment stop lamps to be steady burning in use, the addition of flashing aftermarket stop lamps make the original equipment stop lamps inoperative within the meaning of the prohibition because of the potential of a flashing lamp for detracting from the full effectiveness of the steady burning original equipment stop lamp signal by drawing an observer's attention away from it. A flashing aftermarket stop lamp also has the potential for confusion with the hazard warning system, whether the original equipment system operates through red or amber lamps.

The second paragraph of FMVSS No. 108 that would prohibit installation of your system as original equipment is S5.1.3. This paragraph prohibits the installation of supplementary lighting equipment that impairs the effectiveness of original lighting equipment.

In summary, 49 U.S.C. 30122(b) effectively prohibits a State from enacting a law permitting the use of your system, unless that system is designed to be installed by the vehicle owner. However, a State may permit the use of any aftermarket deceleration warning system that is allowable under FMVSS No. 108.

"2. In the absence of state regulation of flashing deceleration warning systems, is it lawful for individuals, states or municipalities to install such systems on their vehicles, provided they do not alter the steady burning operation of the original equipment stop lamps required by FMVSS No. 108? For example, may mass transit districts operate buses with flashing deceleration warning lamps, if the systems are installed by their own mechanics and the steady burning operation of the original equipment stop lamps is not altered? May individuals install such equipment on their own vehicles?"

"3. May individuals, states or municipalities, who are not manufacturers, distributors or motor vehicle repairs businesses, lawfully install flashing deceleration warning systems which would prevent the original equipment stop lamps from steadily burning during and after episodes of high, braking-induced deceleration? For example, may a mass transit district install a deceleration warning system which would flash some or all of the original equipment stop lamps during and after rapid deceleration due to hard braking, if the system were installed by its own mechanics?"

The answer to all these questions is yes. As noted under Question 1, Sec. 30122(b)(1) does not prohibit vehicle owners or their employees from installing aftermarket equipment such as flashing lamps that may "make inoperative" (in the sense discussed above) equipment that is required by FMVSS No. 108. In Question 2, the inoperability is created by an indirect effect upon the required lighting equipment, while in Question 3, the required equipment itself as well is made to operate in a manner different than prescribed by FMVSS No. 108. But the answer is the same under Sec. 30122(b)(1) in either case.

Sincerely,

Philip R. Recht Chief Counsel

ref:l08 d:3/2/95

1995

Request an Interpretation

You may email your request to Interpretations.NHTSA@dot.gov or send your request in hard copy to:

The Chief Counsel
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, W41-326
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE
Washington, DC 20590

If you want to talk to someone at NHTSA about what a request for interpretation should include, call the Office of the Chief Counsel at 202-366-2992.

Please note that NHTSA’s response will be made available in this online database, and that the incoming interpretation request may also be made publicly available.

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